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ABSTRACT 
The UK judges defer to company directors’ certain type of business decision and 
thereby, insulate them from excessive standard of judicial scrutiny. However, the 
definition of the type of executive discretion that qualifies for company law deference 
has long been uncertain. The UK judges take the view that, as judges, they are 
‘ill-equipped’ (similar to the term – ‘that judges are not business experts’ used by the 
US courts in justifying their common law-derived business judgment rule) to 
second-guess those decisions, without a clear explanation as to the precise meaning of 
the term. The lack of clarity leads to the long-standing misconceptions amongst the 
academics and the practitioners citing the judges’ insufficient business expertise as a 
reason. This thesis sets out to map the relevant law. It offers some meaningful insights 
into how company law deference functions, by reviewing the types of business 
decisions through psychology, and to a lesser extent, economics. Case studies are 
undertaken to give an in-depth illustration, from a psychology perspective, on the 
types of business decisions eligible for company law deference. This thesis gives a 
critical evaluation of the customary view questioning judges’ business expertise as a 
justification for courts’ deference. It submits that, in practice, the judges focus on the 
dichotomy between directors’ business creativity and corporate governance functions. 
Showing contrast between the so-called ‘programmed’ and ‘non-programmed’ 
decisions in the context of courts’ deference to executive discretion. It is this 
taxonomy that is both doctrinally and normatively dispositive to the courts’ approach. 
This thesis also submits that the law plays an important role in yielding appositive 
impact on motivation of company directors’ business creativity. This interdisciplinary 
research involving the relevant law, psychology and economics leads to a useful 
mechanism, capable of identifying or predicting the types of business decisions for 
the application of the courts’ deference.  
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
A company in law is regarded as a separate legal entity from its members.1 This 
means that it entails the attributes of legal personality2 in the sense that like a real 
individual, it has the right to own assets, entering into contracts in its own name or on 
behalf of a third party.3 It also has the right to be a plaintiff, defendant or party in 
legal or insolvency proceedings, for instance, in the case of Salomon v Salomon and 
Co Ltd4 it was held that creditors of an insolvent company could not sue the members 
of the company for the company’s debt. Instead the creditors had to prove the debt in 
the company’s liquidation. A company therefore, is a trading vehicle to ’provide a 
legal form which would enable investors to put their money into a business without 
being responsible for managing it.’5  
However, as an artificial person, a company is physically incapable to perform its acts, 
therefore has to have its affairs or business decisions managed and taken through 
                                                
1	 1862	Companies	Act,	section	18.	5	
2	 ’The	company	is	at	law	a	different	person	altogether	from	the	subscribers	to	the	memorandum;	and,	
though	it	may	be	that	after	incorporation	the	business	is	precisely	the	same	as	it	was	before,	and	the	
same	persons	are	managers,	and	the	same	hands	receive	the	profits,	the	company	is	not	 in	 law	the	
agent	 of	 the	 subscriber	 or	 trustee	 for	 them.’	 as	 per	Mcnaghten	 in	 Salomon	 v	 Salomon	 and	 Co	 Ltd	
[1896]	UKHL1	 (HL);	 see	 also	W.E	 Singleton,	 ‘Entities	 and	 Real	 Artificial	 Persons’	 (1912)	 J	 Soc	 Comp	
Legis	 Vol	 12	 No	 2	 295;	 and	 Ivamy	 E.R.H.	 Dictionary	 of	 Company	 Law	 (Butterworth	 Professional	
Dictionary	Series	1983)	43	 	
3	 Mayson,	French	&	Ryan,	Mayson,	French	&	Ryan	on	Company	Law	(34th	edn,	OUP	2017-2018)	5	 	
4	 [1896]	UKHL	1	(HL)	
5	 Mayson,	French	&	Ryan,	Mayson,	French	&	Ryan	on	Company	Law	(34th	edn,	OUP	2017-2018)	425	 	
 11 
agents known as directors. In Ernest v. Nicholls,6 the judge stated that,’ … for the 
purposes of contract, the company exists only in the directors and officers acting by 
and according to the deed [i.e., the deed of settlement, equivalent to those days to the 
articles of association]7…’ 8  
It is easy to understand that when the director is involved in acts of bad faith 
including gross negligence, conflict of interest and fraud in the process of his business 
decision-making, the law will intervene and punish the guilty as a matter of 
safeguarding the interests of the stakeholders, such as the shareholders and creditors 
of the company. This principle applies even in countries such as America where 
judicial deference is normally given to directors that the’…courts will only pass 
judgment on the wisdom of a board’s decision if a transaction is so disadvantageous 
to the firm that no reasonable person could deem it fair.’9  
A difficulty that arises as to what legal consequences should a director face when the 
company sustains a loss whether financially or not as a result of the director’s 
negligence in his business decision. As business decisions are made on behalf of the 
company by its directors, it is inevitable that directors will make bad business 
decisions from time to time because ’bad luck is inherent in the nature of uncertain 
                                                
6	 [1857]	10	ER	1351	(PC)	
7	 Mayson,	French	&	Ryan,	Mayson,	French	&	Ryan	on	Company	Law	(34th	edn,	OUP	2017-2018)	425	
8	 [1857]	10	ER	1351	(PC)	[423]	
9	 Lynne	 A.	 Stout,	 ‘In	 Praise	 of	 Procedure:	 An	 Economic	 and	 Behavioural	 Defense	 of	 Smith	 v.	 Van	
Gorkam	and	the	Business	Judgment	Rule’	(2002)	96	NW	U	L	Rew	675;	and	see	Grobow	v.	Perot	539	
A.2d	180,	187	[Del.	1988]	for	such	a	guideline	for	the	presumption	of	business	judgment	rule.	 	
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world.’10 And because ’business decision invariably involve risk evaluation and 
assumption.’11 
Currently, both the UK and the US have adopted, to a certain extent, similar legal 
regimes governing the fate of a director in this respect; namely, the legal regimes in 
both of the countries allow the company shareholders to take a derivative claim on 
behalf the company against the director for negligence. Although, both the UK and 
the US judges defer to the business decisions of company directors, the respective 
courts’ deference to directors’ business decisions is procedurally different. In the UK, 
derivative claim against company directors can be taken under section 260(3) of Part 
11 of the Companies Act 2006 (with the courts having the discretion to apply 
legislated deference in favour of the company under sections 263(2)(a) and 263(3)(b) 
of the same Act). Serving as a legal guideline, legislated deference is applied on the 
basis that no hypothetical director acting in the interest of the company (within the 
provisions of section 172 (duty to promote the success of the company) - as a 
benchmark to assess the intention of the shareholder claimant) would continue the 
derivative claim (sections 263(2)(a) & 263(2)(b)). In the US, the court does not apply 
the business judgment rule by looking from the perspective of claimant shareholders’ 
intention, rather, the business judgment rule is a rebuttable presumption with the 
                                                
10	 Kenneth	E.	Scott,	‘Corporation	Law	and	the	American	Law	Institute	Corporate	Governance	Project’	
35	 Stan	 L	 Rev	 927,	 936.	 as	 cited	 by	 Franklin	 A.	 Gevurtz,	 Corporation	 Law	 (2edn,	 West	 Academic	
Publishing	2010)	Chapter	4	 	
11	 Herbert	S.	Wander	and	Alain	G.	LeCoque,	‘Boardroom	Jitters:	Corporate	Control	Transactions	and	
Today’s	Business	Judgment	Rule’	(1986-1987)	42	Bus	Law	29	 	
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burden upon the shareholder claimants to prove ‘directors, in reaching their 
challenged decisions, breach any one of the triads of - good faith, loyalty or due 
care’.12 In other words, the shareholder claimants must successfully demonstrate that 
in making such a business decision, the director has either acted in bad faith (not in 
the best interest of the company); wastefully; on uninformed basis; and/or acting 
self-servingly.13   
On the other end of the spectrum, strict application of derivative lawsuit in the 
absence of the possibility of judicial or legislated deference would serve, from a 
psychology perspective, as a mechanism for ‘punishment’ and might ensure certain 
degree of carefulness on the part of the directors. However, from a psychology 
perspective, the absence of judicial or legislated deference of which the court could 
apply within a set of legal guidelines, will arguably undermine and de-motivate 
company directors from appropriate risk-taking, invariably is an essential element to 
the business creativity that promotes the success of the company.14  
Judicial or legislated deference, on the other hand, allows the directors to take 
business risks without the fear of liability for negligence with the benefit, from the 
psychology perspective, of motivating business creativity.   
                                                
12	 Cede	&	Co	v.	Technicolor,	Inc	[Del.	1993]	634	A.2d	361	 	
13	 Grobow	v.	Perot	539	A.2d	180,	187	[Del.	1988]	
14 	 Taylor	 H.	 Cox	 and	 Stacy	 Blake,	 ‘Managing	 Cultural	 Diversity:	 Implication	 for	 Organisation	
Competitiveness’	 The	 Executive	 (Vol	 5	 No.	 3	 1991)	 50;	 A.	 Toynbee,	 ‘Has	 America	 Neglected	 Her	
Creative	Minority?’	 	 (1962)	 Editorial	 Projects	 in	 Education	 8;	 and	 Andrall	 Pearson,	 ’Tough-Minded	
Way	to	Get	Innovative’	(May/June	1988)	HBR	66	No	3,	99	 	
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The objective of this research, as part of my contribution to knowledge, will be to 
critically examine the UK judicial and legislated deference from a psychology 
perspective; and demonstrates that such a legal regime offers a psychological 
advantage of achieving motivation on company directors. This in turn, enables 
company directors to maximize their business creativity in the best interest of 
companies. Company directors, as human beings, are prone to making errors in 
exercising their duty of care and skills within the context of business decision-making, 
with the consequence of yielding an adverse effect against the company and the 
shareholders. It is inevitable, that appropriate level of legal tolerance to business 
risk-taking must exist. 
To achieve the objective, the thesis will provide a critical evaluation of the doctrinal 
UK law relating to directors’ duty of care and skill in the context of their business 
decisions.  In doing so, the research will be based on both the common law and the 
statutes which allow the law to be fully traced and studied.  
The thesis will demonstrate the significance of creativity in directors’ business 
decision to the company by way of the relevant economics studies with the support of 
some relevant case laws.   
It will be argued by this thesis, the law, from a psychology perspective, is acting as a 
motivator to allow directors to fully engage in proper creative business 
decision-making. This is essentially done by way of judicial or legislated deference to 
 15 
sufficiently insulate company directors from negligence liability. This thesis will 
evaluate and identify business creativity being the factor underpinning proper judicial 
or legislated deference to directors’ decision-making and highlight business decisions 
that will not receive that protection.  
Part of my contribution to knowledge in this thesis will be to critically demonstrate 
that the UK legal regime provides a both doctrinal and normative approach to judicial 
or legislated deference relating to company directors’ business judgments. This is 
based on, from the psychology perspective, the types of business decisions 
underpinned by the policy argument based on the psychology theories of business 
creativity. In other words, this thesis will produce the end result of linking the 
psychology theories of motivation, creativity and types of business decisions to the 
judicial or legislated deference, which in turn, gives a new perspective of the legal 
regime beyond the exclusive perspective of the law. It also evaluates the justification 
of the law, from a psychology perspective; and examines the psychology value of the 
law in motivating directors’ business creativity.   
Through the combination of the law and other disciplines, this thesis will design a 
formula based on the Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision to ‘calculate’ 
and identify the types of business decisions, i.e., business judgments for the purpose 
of the application of judicial or legislated deference. The author acknowledges that 
business judgments are of unique nature and can, in rare cases, be subject to the 
‘borderline’ situation where the business judgment is ambivalent through the case law 
 16 
decisions. 15  The proposed formula, thus can appear to be limited by such 
ambivalence. Case studies have therefore been used in Chapter Five to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of the formula in identifying types of business decisions within the 
scope as wide as possible.  
To sum up, a big part of the originality of this research lies in an analysis of the policy 
arguments for proper judicial or legislated deference in combination with a number of 
external disciplines, namely, psychology (and to a lesser extent, the economic) 
theories relating to motivation and creativity in the context of directors’ business 
decision-making. In particular, the psychology theories known as intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivators, as well as, the types of business decision-making theory of H.A 
Simon and other scholars in the field. A formula will be created to assist the 
identification of types of business decisions for the purpose of the application of 
juridical and legislated deference.   
 
 
 
                                                
15	 As	mentioned	by	Keay	A	&	Loughrey	J,‘The	Concept	of	Business	Judgment’Legal	Studies	1,	11	
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/DFC0700879FEF7FF4
BD7E9A589A211C4/S0261387518000296a.pdf/concept_of_business_judgment.pdf>	 accessed	 5	
January	2019;	see	Chapter	Two	for	more	relevant	discussion.	 	 	 	
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
JUDICIAL OR LEGISLATED DEFERENCE, CREATIVITY AND TYPES OF 
BUSINESS DECISIONS 
In examining the origins of judicial and legislated deference within the English legal 
system, academic writers have generally placed their discussion on its history. 
References to English law cases have been made to discuss when judicial deference 
first and continuously appears in the English legal system and in turn, has shed some 
light on the origin of judicial deference in English law, i.e., judicial deference was 
originated from common law and subsequently codified into the Companies Act 
2006.  
The current statutory system relating to directors’ duty of care and skill based on 
Section 174 of the Companies Act 2006 representing a codification of the relevant 
common law. The derivative claim being set out in Part 11 of the Companies Act 
2006. Both have been directly or indirectly discussed which bring out a clearer picture 
on the scope and application of legislated deference. The application of legislated 
deference is based on the hypothetical director test adopted by the court. The test is 
used to see if the continuation of the derivative claim is in the interest of the company.  
As the UK legislated deference, in certain levels, bears a striking resemblance to the 
US business judgment rule (as Chapter Two of this thesis will show), the materials 
relating to business judgment rule and liability for negligence represents part of the 
core of my research as there are a large amount of relevant materials available for this 
 18 
research. It has been academically put forward in favour of business judgment rule 
protecting company directors against negligence liability by primarily relying on the 
understanding of the literal meaning of the arguments that judges are not business 
experts; and bounded rationality being the justifications of business judgment rule. 
The traditional factor justifying judicial deference on directors’ business decision 
based on the literal meaning that judges are not business expert has been put forward 
historically by judges and academic writers. One of the most prominent writers in 
recent years is Bainbridge who has discussed that judges have relatively less general 
business expertise than company directors, therefore, are not capable to judicially 
review the company directors’ business decision.16 Bainbridge has cited judges’ and 
other writers’ comments to support this argument.17 For instance, In Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Co where the judge remarked that ’the judges are not business experts.’18; and 
academic writers such as Posner have stated that ’Courts have trouble understanding 
the simplest of business relationships … judges must be generalists but they usually 
have narrow background in a particular field of law.’19 
This thesis will demonstrate the correct interpretation of the traditional factors 
justifying judicial deference. In other words, this thesis will show that when the judge 
                                                
16	 Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	‘The	Business	Judgment	Rule	as	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57	Vand	L	Rev	
83,	117	
17	 ibid	
18	 [1919]	170	NW	668	684	 	
19	 ‘A	Theory	of	Contract	Law	under	Conditions	of	Radical	Judicial	Errors’	(2000)	94	NW	UL	Rev	758	 	
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cited ’judges are not business experts’ or judges are ’ill-equipped …’20, the judges 
were actually referring to the business creativity of directors’ business 
decision-making; and not the amount of business expertise possessed by the judicial 
system. This thesis will lead to the conclusion that the policy argument underpinning 
judicial or legislated deference is therefore, placed on motivation, creativity and types 
of business decisions (see below for further elaboration). 
When it comes to types of business decisions within the context of directors’ business 
creativity, academic comparisons have historically been made, in the US legal studies, 
to demonstrate the difference between judges being able to deal with cases involving 
other professions’, such as medical practitioners’ decisions as opposed to company 
directors’ business decisions, is that medical practitioners’ decisions are regulated by 
their code of conduct that serves as a benchmark for judges to refer to when judging 
the cases for medical mal-practice. Such a benchmark, at the same time, also allows 
the defendants to defend the quality of their professional decisions. On the other hand, 
company directors’ business decisions are unique in nature and are not regulated by 
any existing code.  
The thesis will demonstrate that such a comparison between company directors’ 
business decision and other professions’ is over-simplistic as it is based on the 
assumption that every director’s business decision is unique. However, in reality this 
                                                
20	 A	 term	with	 similar	meaning	 to	 ‘judges	 are	 not	 business	 experts’	 that	 has	 been	used	by	 the	UK	
judges	to	justify	legislated	deference	in	cases	such	as	Iesini	v.	Westrip	Holding	Limited	[2010]	BCC	[85]	
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one can broadly categorize directors’ business decisions into unique and non-unique 
types. For instance, there can be situations where directors’ business decisions were 
non-unique as the decisions were subject to predefined rules as shown in the case of 
Thomas Saunders Partnership v Harvey21 where the defendant director’s business 
decision in connection with confirming if the flooring conforms to a particular 
specifications constituted a decision governed by the predefined standard of flooring 
measurement; or Smith v Van Gorkom22 where the director was found grossly 
negligent for not following the pre-define methodology to calculate the share price of 
the company in a proposed leverage buyout merger. This thesis argues that judges are 
equipped with the understanding and approach to distinguish the types of directors’ 
business decisions in order to determine whether or not the directors should be offered 
with protection of judicial or legislated deference. In doing so, this thesis will look, 
from the psychology perspective, into the types of business decisions that has been 
distinguished by judges. From a technical perspective and to be precise for the 
purpose of this thesis, the problems associated with the academic assumption of the 
unique type of directors’ business decisions have been identified and dealt with in 
detail as follows:  
1. Types of business decisions: the academic assumption, in the legal studies,  
does not provide a definition of uniqueness. This would arguably present 
                                                
21	 [1989]	30	Con	LR	103	(QB)	
22	 488	A2D	858	[Del.	1985]	
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difficulties for one to distinguish which business decision is unique and 
which one is not. To solve this issue, I will adopt H.A Simon’s psychology 
theory of types of business decisions to bring out much clearer than has been 
done so far as to the nuances on the type of business decision is concerned 
within the context of judicial or legislated deference;   
2. The absence of the ‘benefit’ as a component in the definition of unique 
business decisions: The adoption of the psychology theory of types of 
decisions alone is not sufficient to answer the question as to what a unique or 
creative business decision is. This is because the psychology theory of types 
of business decisions does not have the component of ‘benefit’ which is the 
essential element in a company director’s business decision. The component 
of ‘benefit’ is essential because, from the legal perspective, a director would 
have to act in the interest of the company; and   
3. Motivation: the theory of types of business decisions on its own is not 
inherently linked to the psychology concept of motivation. This thesis will 
show that the psychology concept of motivation is a central component to 
demonstrate the difference between non-business expert judges and 
non-business expert directors within the context of business decisions for the 
purpose of achieving a correct interpretation of the justification for 
deference.  
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To fill the gaps (as identified above) left by the US law academic assumption that 
relating to the uniqueness of all directors’ business decisions, this thesis combines the 
psychology theories of both types of business decisions proposed by H.A Simon; and 
creativity proposed by T.M Amabile. The result, this thesis makes the combination of 
both of the theories into a new concept known as judicial or legislated deference 
based on the Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions.  
SIGNIFICANCE OF BUSINESS CREATIVITY  
Another aspect of this thesis is to review the existing argument that judicial 
intervention by way of derivative lawsuit as to the substance of the directors’ business 
decisions will discourage the directors from entrepreneurial risk-taking to the 
detriment of the company. This thesis will identify business risk-taking, from the 
psychology perspective, as business creativity. This thesis will argue that whilst 
putting strong emphasis on risk-taking, the existing argument has not explained fully, 
the significance of risk-taking to the company. In other words, ‘preaching’ the fear 
that directors would become business risk-averse as a result of judicial intervention 
without the prior understanding the benefits of risk-taking (i.e., business creativity) to 
a company is meaningless.  
Part of Chapter Four will, therefore, be dedicated to examine the existing arguments 
relating to the significance of business creativity underpinning the concept of judicial 
or legislated deference based on Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions. 
Briefly I will mention, the significance of business creativity to a company as 
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including: increased customer loyalty and developing unique selling points, 
maximising resources, responding to trends and competition; and developing new 
selling points to build positive branding image and secure business loyalty. 
PSYCHOLOGY DEFINITIONS OF CREATIVITY  
The issue on the proposed models of creativity, namely, the personality-oriented 
measure or the product-oriented measure to be adopted in one’s field of creativity 
research has been a subject of discussion in psychology. The Product-Oriented 
Measure as a definition of creativity represents a widely used definition in the 
relevant field of studies.  I too have selected the Product-Oriented Measure as a 
defining component of my concept of Non-Programmed (Creativity) Business 
Decision because of its suitability to my research. As the components of the 
Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity, namely, the ‘novelty’ and ‘usefulness’ do 
not involve any unnecessary complexity and can be suitably used to define a company 
directors’ business  creativity. These are the required qualities that the 
Personality-Oriented Measure of Creativity with which the assessment is mainly 
placed on the personality traits of the test subject does not have.  
DIFFERENT THEORIES IN MOTIVATION 
The existing law studies have not explained with in-depth precisions as to how the 
directors can be discouraged from being business creative or why the directors are 
more business creative than the judiciary. This thesis argues that the answer to these 
questions can be found in psychology theory of motivation. This thesis will use the 
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theory of intrinsic and extrinsic motivators to demonstrate that the directors are prone 
to be motivated to be creative as opposed to judges. This is because judges are bound 
by a number of judicial constraints and are only generally concerned about deciding 
the quality of the decision within the context of duty of care. This in turn supports the 
psychology argument in favour of the courts’ current position that Non-Programmed 
(Creative) Business Decisions are not meant to be second-guessed by judges 
irrespective of their business expertise.  
This thesis will also adopt other motivation models such as Maslow’s Hierarchy of 
Needs to strengthen the Intrinsic and Extrinsic motivation theory. This thesis shows 
the understanding that Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs has been criticised for not being 
a model that reflects the hierarchical order universally between difference societies. 
Whilst accepting the criticism, this thesis argues that the model bears direct relevance 
to the research. The criticisms of the hierarchy of needs do not apply to the conditions 
set in this thesis, for instance, 1. the theory of hierarchy of needs is arguably not 
applicable to the society based on collectivism such as fascism or Maoism all of 
which do not represent the social circumstances of countries like the UK and the US; 
or 2. the argument that the role of sex has not been placed in Maslow’s hierarchy; 
however, this criticism bears no relation whatsoever to this thesis.  
On the English side, some existing academic studies have proposed that shareholders’ 
power of ratification over the director’s negligence (subject to the limitations, such as 
decisions made legally) (sections 239); the court’s discretion to relieve a director from 
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negligence claim (section 1157);23 and the grounds for the derivative claims (section 
260) respectively within the Companies Act 2006 are equivalent to the American 
concept of judicial deference leading to their conclusions that - since there has been a 
common law ‘implied’ business judgment rule in the UK (which has now mostly been 
enacted into the Companies Act 2006) an overt business judgment rule will create 
‘mischief’ to the existing system.   
An element of uncertainty exists within UK company law, as whilst academic 
concerns have been raised over the widening scope of derivative claim against 
company directors through negligence under Sections 174 and 260 without expressly 
incorporating into the statute, the common law ‘implied business judgment rule’ such 
as the internal management rule set in the case of Burland v. Earle24  or the 
requirement that directors had to benefit personally from the business decision 
(Daniels v. Daniels25& Pavlides v. Jensen26); and by allowing shareholders, for 
instance, to bring a derivative claim under the Companies Act without the need to 
demonstrate that the directors own a majority of shares in the company, would all 
inevitably make directors to feel more threatened; other writers such as Moore27 
continues to express the faith in the British legal system, maintaining that company 
                                                
23	 As	 the	 rationale	of	 the	Companies	Act,	 section	1157	 is	 for	 the	 court	 to	exercise	 its	discretion	 to	
relieve	directors	from	liability	rather	than	a	mere	deference	to	their	managerial	decision.	This	thesis	
will	therefore	not	cover	this	section	as	it	is	not	strictly	a	form	of	judicial	deference	within	its	scope.	 	
24	 [1902]	AC	83	(PC)	
25	 [1978]	CH	406	(Ch)	
26	 [1956]	2	WLR	224	(Ch)	
27	 Moore	on	Corporate	Governance	in	the	Shadow	of	the	State	(Hart	Publishing	2013).	
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directors are no more exposed to negligence liability under the new system than the 
common law because of shareholders’ power of ratification and the court’s discretion 
to grant the relieve to directors. Chapter Two of this thesis will discuss the courts’ 
deferential approach by way of discontinuing derivative action under sections 
263(2)(a) & 263(3)(b); and the similarities of such a legislated deference to the US 
business judgment rule.   
My thesis will demonstrate that 1. the uncertainty of the law will inhibit creativity and 
result in the wrong types of ‘diligence’ or ‘risk-taking’ to the detriment of the 
company (Conard); and 2. the English legislated deference under part 11 of 
Companies Act 2006 offers company directors a satisfactory degree of protection and, 
from a psychology perspective, promotes directors’ intrinsic motivation that leads to 
their business creativity.      
Similar to what this thesis set out to achieve, i.e., examining judicial or legislated 
deference from, a psychology perspective,  creativity, motivation and types of 
business decisions with analysis of cases laws from the UK and the US, Keay and 
Loughrey have in their very recent online article attempted to address the question on 
what a business judgment is by reference to the UK, the US and Australian laws. 
They borrowed the Knight’s concept of entrepreneurial judgment leading to the 
conclusion that the directors’ business decision that falls within the meaning of 
Knight’s concept of entrepreneurial judgment is the type of business decision to be 
deemed as business judgment. The other types of business decisions that are of 
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‘corporate governance functions’ have not been deemed by the courts as 
entrepreneurial and thus ‘are less likely to be viewed as business judgment’.28  
METHODOLOGY 
My concept of judicial deference based on types of business decisions and the 
doctrine of creativity is inspired by the combination of English and American law 
with theoretical thinking of various writers and researchers such as Teresa Amabile 
on the theory of creativity and Herbert A. Simon’s theory of programmed and 
non-programmed decisions.   
Comparative work in this research is essential as the concept of judicial deference is a 
well-developed component in US company law that can be used as part of my 
analysis in achieving the understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
relevant UK law. In doing so, my research will contrast the positions in the US, UK 
and to a lesser extent Australia (the country that has in recent years incorporated the 
American concept of business judgment rules into its statute) and Taiwan (Republic 
of China) with the recent cases that bears extreme relevance to programmed business 
decisions. It will bring out much clearer than has been done so far the nuances of 
when and how deference may be applied.  
                                                
28 	 Keay	 A	 &	 Loughrey	 J,	 ‘The	 Concept	 of	 Business	 Judgment’	 Legal	 Studies	 1	 <	
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/DFC0700879FEF7FF4B
D7E9A589A211C4/S0261387518000296a.pdf/concept_of_business_judgment.pdf>	 accessed	 5	
January	2019	
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By doing that, this thesis will evaluate, from psychology perspective as to how 
successful the UK regime is in line with motivation and business creativity in the 
context of company directors’ business decision making.  
Case studies method is defined by Thomas as 
Case studies are analysis of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, 
policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or 
more method. The case that is the subject of inquiry will be an instance of a 
class of phenomena that provides an analytical frame – an object- within which 
the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates.29  
An experimental demonstration will be carried out with a number of case studies in 
Chapters Four and Five leading to the conclusion that the concept designed serves as 
an effective tool in identifying the different types of business decisions available, e.g., 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions; and programmed business 
decisions.   
One advantage of carrying out this research is that there is no language barrier as both 
English law, US law and other areas of disciplines such as psychology adopt English 
as their primary language.    
                                                
29	 Thomas	G,	‘Sonia	is	typing.....	A	typology	for	the	case	study	in	social	science	following	a	review	of	
definition,	 discourse	 and	 structure’	(2011)	 QUINFS	 17	(6)	 511	 as	 cited	 in	
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_study.	>	accessed	in	23rd	July	2017	 	 	
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To assist me to implement the above methods, my research is data-based, seeking the 
information in the forms of the relevant journals’ articles, law, psychology and 
management text books, law case reports, legal dictionary, historical records and 
legislations. The relevant materials for my research have been obtained or are 
obtainable via libraries and internet data-bases such as Westlaw (English data-base - 
http://legalresearch.westlaw.co.uk/) Heinonline (an American data-base - 
http://home.heinonline.org/), Lexis Nexis (American, English and Australian database. 
- http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/) JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/) 
psycINFO (Behavioural and Social Science – 
http:/www.apa.org/pubs/databases/psycinfo/index.axps) and Laws and Regulation 
Database of Republic of China – Taiwanese law database (New Society for Taiwan) 
(http://www.taiwansig.tw). 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter 1: This chapter has presented an introduction including the description 
of the scope of research, research questions to be answered, in particular, the question 
as to whether or not business creativity represents the central factor governing the 
application of judicial deference. This chapter has given relevant overviews of the 
current regimes governing directors’ business decision-making in the USA and UK; 
the psychology studies relating to creativity, motivation, types of business decisions. 
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How each of these theories relate to judicial or legislated deference in the context of 
company directors’ business decision-making; and the methodology of my research.   
Chapter 2: This will analyse the different doctrinal concepts of UK and lesser extent, 
the American law, that are relevant to judicial evaluations of directors’ business 
decisions. This seeks to trace and answer the question as to the existence, origins and 
scope of judicial deference as well as legislated deference within the UK law to 
business decisions in the context of duty of care and skill cases. It will consider the 
relationship between judging the process by which directors take decisions and the 
substantive outcome of those decisions.  
Chapter 3: This will critically examine the underlying arguments proposed to support 
judicial and legislated deference to demonstrate the necessity of new theoretical 
underpinning of judicial and legislated deference in the context of company directors’ 
business decision-making. It will include analysis of the traditional factors, namely, 
that judges are not business experts and bounded rationality; and the real factor, i.e., 
company directors’ business creativity.    
Chapter 4: This will demonstrate, from an economics perspective, the significance of 
the theory of creativity and innovation in business decision-making. This also adopts 
the normative approach as It will critically analyse the value of the law, from the 
psychology perspective. It will explore the psychology theories of creativity and 
motivation; and how motivation underpins creativity. 
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Chapter 5: This will demonstrate the different types of business decisions such as 
Programmed, Non-Programmed, Hybrid and the Evolution of types of business 
decisions. This will discuss the inter-relation of creativity and motivation with each 
type of the business decisions and it will also contain a discussion as to their 
suitability for the application of judicial or legislated deference. Linking to Chapter 
Four, this chapter will essentially demonstrate, from a psychology perspective, that 
company directors’ agency problems30 relating to making of their Non-Programmed 
(Creative) Business Decisions cannot be overcome by derivative claims. This chapter 
will discuss the counter-strategies that can be adopted against company directors’ 
agency problems in the absence of judicial intervention on company directors’ 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions.    
Chapter 6: This will be a concluding chapter, which will draw together the preceding 
arguments leading the conclusion that UK judicial deference; and legislated deference 
under Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006 have been set out in line with the 
psychology theories of motivation, business creativity and types of business 
decisions.  
  
                                                
30	 An	 agency	 problem/agency	 Cost	 is	 ‘…	 economic	 concept	 concerning	 the	 cost	 to	 a	 ’principal’	 (an	
organization,	person	or	group	of	persons),	when	the	principal	chooses	or	hires	an	’agent’	to	act	on	its	
behalf.	 Because	 the	 two	 parties	 have	 different	 interests	 and	 the	 agent	who	 has	 the	 access	 to	 and	
control	 of	more	 relevant	 information,	 the	 principal	 cannot	 directly	 ensure	 that	 its	 agent	 is	 always	
acting	in	its	(the	principals')	best	interests.’	Lucian	Bebchuk	and	Jesse	Fried,	Pay	Without	Performance	
(Harvard	University	Press	2004)	(Preface	and	Introduction)	
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CHAPTER TWO - MAPPING BRITISH JUDICIAL 
DEFERENCE 
CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Unlike the term Business Judgment Rule - the American concept of judicial 
deference which is readily and expressly enshrined within its regime of company 
directors’ negligence in the context of their business decisions, British law does not 
have a set of rules with such a term. However, this does not mean that the British 
legal system refrains from insulating directors from negligence liability. Quite the 
contrary, traces of judicial and legislated deference can be found ‘scattering’ within 
the Common Law prior to the Companies Act 2006 and the Companies Act 2006 
respectively.  
The concept of directors’ negligence liability is being dealt with under Section 174 
Companies Act 2006. This concept includes the standard of conduct for the 
assessment of negligence liability. And it represents a direct codification of the 
relevant common law31 (Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co32; & Dorchester 
Finance Co v Stebbing33). It follows that, in order to fully trace the UK legislated 
                                                
31	 Companies	Act	2006,	Section	170(3)	which	states	that	company	directors’	general	statutory	duties	
are	 …	 based	 on	 certain	 common	 law	 rules	 and	 equitable	 principles	 as	 they	 apply	 in	 relation	 to	
directors	and	have	effect	in	place	of	those	rules	and	principles	as	regards	the	duty	owed	to	a	company	
by	 a	 director.	 This	 codification	 has	 also	 been	 noted	 by	 text	 books	 and	 journals,	 see	 for	 example,	
Sheikh,	 Company	 Hand	 Book	 (Bloomsbury	 Professional	 2016)	 549;	 Mayson	 and	 French	 and	
Ryan,	Company	 Law	(34th	 edn,	 OUP	 Oxford	 2017-2018)	 473;	 Tamo	 Zwinge,	 ‘An	 Analysis	 of	 Duty	 of	
Care	in	the	United	Kingdom	in	Comparison	with	the	German	Duty	of	Care’	(2011)	ICCLR	22(2)	31-41	 	
32	 [1925]	CH	407	(CA)	
33	 [1989]	BCLC	498	(Ch)	
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deference and its extent, it is important to have an overall understanding of the 
negligence regime under the 2006 Act. And to achieve the understanding, one has to 
first trace back to the historical development of the relevant common law. This is 
because with the statuary codification, the common law has become an essential 
instrument for the interpretation of the standard now shown in the statute.34 In 
addition, it is also paramount to examine other aspects of the relevant common law 
and the equitable principles including the rule of wrongdoer’s control that has not 
officially been codified into the 2006 Act; and the consequential impact of its 
abolition on the UK common law judicial deference. All are aimed to achieve a better 
understanding of the expected interpretation of the directors’ general duties under the 
Companies Act 2006.    
This chapter comprises of research undertaken which seeks to establish the diffidence 
of the court to interfere with the managerial decisions of company directors through 
the finding of judicial or legislated deference. This is done with an aim to specifically 
locate their existence within the relevant British law. This chapter will demonstrate 
that elements of judicial deference have heavily infiltrated different parts of the 
British negligence regime, and in order to provide a clear picture to the readers, this 
                                                
34	 Companies	Act	2006,	Section	170(4)	further	states	that	…	The	general	duties	shall	be	 interpreted	
and	applied	in	the	same	way	as	common	rules	or	equitable	principles,	and	regard	shall	be	had	to	the	
corresponding	 common	 law	 rules	 or	 equitable	 principles	 in	 interpreting	 and	 applying	 the	 general	
duties.	For	instance,	in	Kiani	v.	Cooper	[2010]	BCC	(Ch)	[36],	[37]	the	court	applied	the	subjective	test	
in	deciding	whether	or	not	the	director	was	acting	in	good	faith	to	having	instructed	her	husband	to	
covertly	transfer	certain	sum	of	money	from	the	company’s	bank	account	prior	to	the	disputed	event.	 	
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chapter will divide the whole relevant process through the course of a negligence 
lawsuit in three different stages. And they are as follows:  
- The Course of Negligence Action (Standard of Conduct) 
- Enforcement Stage; and  
- Post-Negligence Action Stage  
Research in each of the above stages/phases will be undertaken to seek to trace and 
answer the question as to the existence, origins and scope of judicial and legislated 
deference within the UK law to business decisions in the context of duty of care and 
skill cases. It will consider the relationship between judging the process by which 
directors take decisions and the substantive outcomes of those decisions. 
The finding of the UK judicial and legislated deference in the context of directors’ 
negligence relating to their business decision is, of essence, to the core of this thesis 
which is to establish substantively whether or not the whole negligence regime under 
the 2006 Act is in line with the psychology and management theories in connection 
with motivation and creativity within the context of directors’ business decisions. To 
put it from another perspective, whether or not creativity, motivation and types of 
business decisions actually underpin the existing judicial or legislated deference. The 
finding is also necessary to contribute to the formulation of a mechanism on which 
types of business decisions (non-programmed creative; and programmed non-creative) 
can be clearly identified and measured by the judge in deciding the enforcement of 
derivative negligence claim by way of judicial and legislated deference.   
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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE WITHIN THE COURSE OF NEGLIGENCE 
ACTION (STANDARD OF CONDUCT) 
COMPANY DIRECTORS’ DUTY OF CARE – THE BACKGROUND 
Section 174(2) of the Companies Act 2006 codified the common law doctrine 
by imposing a dual standard duty of care, skill and diligence.35  
Prior to the enhancement of Companies Act 2006, there was an extensive discussion 
and debate regarding the proposed codification. The Company Law Review laid out 
the followings recommendations as grounds in support of codification:  
The case for and against providing a clear restatement of directors’ duties has 
been examine by the Law Commissions and has been set out by us in 
Developing the Framework and Completing the Structure. We continue to 
recommend such a legislative statement. We do so for three main reasons:  
- It will provide a greater clarity on what is expected of directors and make the 
law more accessible. We believe that this will in turn help to improve standard 
of governance;  
- It will enable defects in the present law to be corrected in important areas 
where it no longer corresponds to accepted norm of modern business practice: 
this is particularly so in relation to the duties of conflicted directors and the 
power of the company in respect of such conflicts; and  
                                                
35	 ‘This	codified	common	law	duty	as	opposed	to	a	fiduciary	one’	–	see	Sheikh,	Company	Hand	Book	
(Bloomsbury	 Professional	 2016)	 549;	 Mayson	 and	 French	 and	 Ryan,	Company	 Law	(34th	 edn,	 OUP	
2017-2018)	 473;	 Tamo	 Zwinge,	 ‘An	 Analysis	 of	 Duty	 of	 Care	 in	 the	United	 Kingdom	 in	 Comparison	
with	the	German	Duty	of	Care’	(2011)	ICCLR	22(2)	31-41	 	
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It is in key element of addressing the question of ‘scope’ – i.e., in whose interest 
should companies be run – in a way which reflects modern business needs and 
wider expectations of reasonable business behaviour.  
The need for clear, accessible and authoritative guidance for directors on which 
they may safely rely, on the basis that it will bind the courts and thus be 
consistently applied, combined with the needs to clarify the law in the area of 
uncertainty and to make good the defects, make us all the more convinced that 
the case for a legislative restatement of directors’ duties, or codification, is well 
founded.36  
Kershaw has explained in a clearer perspective, the background of directors’ duties 
and the reasons for codification of directors’ duties into a one piece of legislation was 
a way to provide company directors (who are not normally legally trained to 
understand common law development) with a set of authority which clearly sets out 
the standard of conduct relating to duty of care (thereby avoiding ’ … ambiguities and 
unsolved tensions between existing cases’ 37 ). It is also intended through 
modernisation of the law to resolve the common law problem in slowly adjusting 
itself to the change of business environment.38  
                                                
36	 ‘The	 Modern	 Company:	 Internal	 Governance	 and	 External	 regulation’	 Company	 Law	 Review	
Steering	 Group:	 Final	 Report	 Chapter	 3	 as	 cited	 by	 Kershaw,	 Company	 Law	 in	 Context:	 Text	 and	
Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	2012)	318	
37	 Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	2012)	317	
38	 Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	2012)	317	 	
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The legislator has seized the opportunity to codify the common law doctrine of 
directors’ duty of care into statute. Thus, making sure that the modern law practice 
relating to directors’ duty of care is being brought up-to-date with an attempt to 
eliminate any uncertainty or ambiguities surrounding the common law or equitable 
principles.39 The problem as identified by Kershaw is that any problem of gaps and 
ambiguities relating to the common law or equity (both of which the 2006 Act relies 
for statutory interpretation), would persist and that the statute is not more than a 
re-statement of its underlying equity and common law legal principles.40  
Despite Kershaw’s criticism, Zwinge has pointed out that one clarification or 
certainty that the codification of 2006 Act has achieved in relation to directors’ duty 
of care is to address the issue related to the standard of care expected from directors 
that was articulated in Brazilian Rubber Plantation and Estate Ltd and re City 
Equitable Fire Insurance Co. In other words, the question of whether the standard of 
conduct is to be based on objective standard or a dual standard based on both 
objectivity and subjectivity that had confused many for years is now put to rest by the 
codification.41  
It follows that, the existing common law and equity principles have not been 
abolished by the 2006 Act. Rather, they are now the ‘instruments’ of which Section 
                                                
39	 See	 for	example,	Andrew	Hick,	 ‘Directors’	 Liabilities	 for	Management	Errors’	 (1994)	110	 LQR	39,	
391	 	
40	 Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	2012)	318	 	 	 	
41	 Tamo	Zwinge,	‘An	Analysis	of	Duty	of	Care	in	the	United	Kingdom	in	Comparison	with	the	German	
Duty	of	Care’	(2010)	ICCLR	22(2)	31-41	 	
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174 can function. It is therefore, academically and legally essential to first understand 
how the common law and equitable principles developed and how they apply in order 
for one to properly grasp the true meaning behind directors’ statutory duties of care.  
COMMON LAW AND EQUITY PRINCIPLES   
As mentioned above, due to the codification of the relevant common law and 
equitable principles re Companies Act 2006, it is essential to first understand how the 
relevant law developed and applied. I shall, therefore, in the following sections of this 
chapter, demonstrate how, through the development of common law, different types 
of business decisions have been identified by the courts in determining judicial 
deference. Precisely, the sections of the chapter will demonstrate how the law 
developed from being indistinguishing of all categories of business decisions, namely 
both business judgment and director’s internal control & functional responsibilities42 
or directors’ corporate governance functions,43 by way of modest standard duty of 
care and skill to the separation of both types of business decisions.     
                                                
42	 i.e.,	monitoring	and	supervision	or	to	acquire	the	skills	that	are	reasonably	expected	to	be	relevant	
to	the	company’s	business.	Examples	of	the	relevant	cases	include	Overend	Gurney	&	Co	v.	Gibb	[1872]	
LR	5	(HL)	580;	re	Brazilian	Rubber	Plantation	and	Estates	Ltd	[1911]	1	CH	425	(Ch);	Re	City	Equitable	
Fire	Insurance	Co	[1925]	CH	707	(CA);	Dorchester	Finance	Co	v	Stebbing	[1989]	BCLC	498	(Ch);	Norman	
v.	Theodore	Goddard	BCLC	1027	(Ch);	and	Re	Barings	plc	(No.	5)	[2000]	BCLC	532	(Ch)	which	will	all	be	
relevantly	discussed	in	the	latter	part	of	this	chapter.	 	
43	 See	 generally	 Keay	 A	 &	 Loughrey	 J,	 ‘The	 Concept	 of	 Business	 Judgment’Legal	 Studies	 1	 <	
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/DFC0700879FEF7FF4B
D7E9A589A211C4/S0261387518000296a.pdf/concept_of_business_judgment.pdf>	 accessed	 5	
January	2019	
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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE: MODEST STANDARD OF DUTY OF CARE 
AND SKILL 
Traditionally, common law did not allow derivative action on directors’ 
negligence (with the exception of fraud on minority shareholders of which I shall 
cover in greater detail in the part two of this chapter). Actions for negligence were 
taken against directors by company liquidator as a result.  However, a closer 
examination of the negligence action cases might reveal an element of judicial 
deference. In this section, I shall demonstrate that this element of judicial deference 
may have been based on a subtler approach; and shows the reluctance of the judges to 
hold directors liable for negligence despite the relevant actions that were available 
against them. In other words, instead of applying a straightforward deference in a 
fashion as seen in Section 263 Companies Act 2006, a subtle deferential approach has 
been exercised within the legal expectation relating to directors’ managerial 
decision-making.  The importance of going through the common law legal history is 
needed, as eventually the common law principle relating to action of negligence 
against directors was codified into the Companies Act 2006 of which relevant lawsuit 
can now be generally available to shareholders by way of derivative claims. It is, 
therefore, essential to know whether or not elements of judicial deference is available 
in the relevant common law as ultimately the common law affects how a derivative 
claim is to be conducted against directors under the statute. 
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Traditionally, liability attached to directors’ duties of care has been taken by the 
courts to be at its modest or minimum fashion.44  
As pointed out by writers such as Hicks, Tomasic and Tamo that it was commonly 
believed that directors were traditionally protected by judicial deference for breach of 
duty unless such a duty constitutes gross negligence (Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb45). 
This is because directors ‘…were treated as “trustees” or “quasi-trustees” who had 
“very few duties in common law at that time”’.46 For instance, in the case of Carlen v. 
Drury, the court of equity said that 
 … in order to obtain an inference a Case of Breach of Engagement, or Abuse 
of Trust, must be established to the perfect Satisfaction of the court; that 
persons will not according to their Duty attend to the ‘Interest of the Concern’ 
to give directors a wider scope of judicial deference in relation to their business 
decision- making power.47 The court further states that … This court is not 
                                                
44	 Nicholas	 Bourne,	 ‘Directors	 --	 Duty	 of	 Care	 and	 Skill’	 (2004)	 25	 Bus	 L	 Rev	 218	 as	 cited	 by	 Tamo	
Zwinge,	‘An	Analysis	of	Duty	of	Care	in	the	United	Kingdom	in	Comparison	with	the	German	Duty	of	
Care’	 (2011)	 22(2)	 ICCLR	 31,	 41;	 See	 also	 Grantham	 and	 Rickett,	 Company	 and	 Securities	 Law	
(Commentary	and	Materials)	(Thomson	Reuters	2001)	565		
45	 [1872]	 LR	 5	 (HL)	 580;	 and	 Tomasic,	 ‘Corporate	 Rescue,	Governance	 and	Risk	 Taking	 in	Northern	
Rock:	Part	2’	(2008)	Comp	Law	29(11),	333	
46	 Tamo	Zwinge,	‘An	Analysis	of	Duty	of	Care	in	the	United	Kingdom	in	Comparison	with	the	German	
Duty	of	Care’	(2011)	22(2)	ICCLR	31,	41	
47	 [1812]	 1	 V	&	 B	 154	 (Ch)	 158.	 Also	 cited	 by	Grantham	 and	 Rickett,	Company	 and	 Securities	 Law	
(Commentary	and	Materials)	(Thomson	Reuters	2001)	568;	see	also	Moore	on	Corporate	Governance	
in	the	Shadow	of	the	State	(Hart	Publishing	2013)	
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required on every occasion to take the Management of every playhouse and 
Brewhouse in the Kingdom.48   
Similar approach was taken by the court in Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd 
who stated ‘…. there is no appeal on merits from management decisions to court of 
law; nor will courts of law assume to act as a kind of supervisory board over decisions 
within the powers of management honestly arrived at.’ 49  
Again, these cases have established traces of judicial deference, i.e., unless directors 
were acting dishonestly or with gross negligence, the court will not interfere with the 
business judgment of directors.  
As discussed in the previous section, action for negligence against company directors 
has only been traditionally available to and exercisable by liquidators in the 
insolvency proceedings of companies (See for instance, Re City Equitable Fire 
Insurance Co50). When an action for negligence was brought to the court (as we can 
see from the latter part of this Chapter), and notwithstanding the gradual judicial 
‘encroachment’ on scope relating to directors’ management responsibility and 
standard of conduct relating to duty of care, (the approach of judicial deference 
somehow finds its way into the modern law practice through the statutory provisions 
of Sections 263(2)(a), 263(3)(b) of Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006) with 
                                                
48	 ibid	
49	 [1974]	AC	832	(PC)	[822],	[832]	 	
50	 [1925]	CH	407	(CA)	
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traditional preclusion of gross negligence via the pre-conditions of good faith on the 
part of the directors. The interpretation of these pre-conditions continued to be 
“imported” through the common law, e.g., Re D’Jan of London Ltd.51 
Now back to the traditional approach, as commented by Hicks ‘according to 
traditional view, there is no general professional standard of expertise needed to 
directors.’52  
A great degree of common law judicial deference was highlighted in re Brazilian 
Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd,53 where Nevill L J held that first, the directors 
were not grossly negligent by simply placing their trust and reliance on the judgment 
and information of  
… persons whom, it is said, they ought to have known to be interested. One of 
them Web (a leading London Solicitor at the time), was a person in position 
entitling his opinion and word to great weight, and though reflection would 
have shown the directors that he could not have been instructed to act on behalf 
of the company by persons independent of the promoters,54 I think the directors 
were not to be blamed for placing considerable reliance upon his assurances  
[the directors were apparently not aware that the information provided by Webb 
                                                
51	 [1994]	BCC	646	(Ch)	 	
52	 Andrew	Hicks,	 ‘Directors'	 Liability	 for	Management	Errors’	 (1994)	110	LQR	390	as	 cited	by	Tamo	
Zwinge,	‘An	Analysis	of	Duty	of	Care	in	the	United	Kingdom	in	Comparison	with	the	German	Duty	of	
Care’	(2011)	22(2)	ICCLR	31,	41;	Sheikh,	Company	Hand	Book	(Bloomsbury	Professional	2016)	549	
53	 [1911]	1	CH	425	(Ch)	
54(for the sale of the plantation)  
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was based on information provided by the promoters of the syndicate] … upon 
the whole I came to the conclusion that the directors believed that the contract 
was a beneficial one for the company, and that, notwithstanding the discrepancy 
in prices and the absence of an independent report, this conclusion was not 
arrived by the negligence on their part as directors …55 
As the issue of gross negligence was ruled out by the judge, the next question was 
whether or not the director was acting negligently. 
It was further held by Neville J, in support of judicial deference, by simply ruling out 
duty of care to the company in certain situations all together:  
A director’s duty has been laid down requiring him to act with such care as is 
reasonably to be expected from him, having regard to his knowledge and 
experience. He is, I think, not bound to bring any special qualifications to his 
office. He may undertake management of a rubber company in complete 
ignorance of anything connected with rubber, without incurring responsibility 
for the mistakes which may result from such ignorance.56  
                                                
55	 As	cited	by	Kershaw,	Kershaw	Company	Law	 in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	 (2nd	edn,	OUP	2012)	
421	 	
56	 1	CH	437	as	cited	by	Mayson	and	French	and	Ryan,	Company	Law	(34th	edn,	OUP	2017-2018)	495;	
Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	Oxford	2012)	420;	see	also	Tamo	
Zwinge,	‘An	Analysis	of	Duty	of	Care	in	the	United	Kingdom	in	Comparison	with	the	German	Duty	of	
Care’	(2011)	22(2)	ICCLR	31	-	41	
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Neville L J’s judgment placed a modest burden of responsibility upon directors in 
terms of their skills relevant to the company’s business. In other words, Neville L J’s 
effectively meant that a person can act as a director of a company without any 
knowledge whatsoever about the company’s business.   
The essence of Neville J’s judgment was that, as far as law was concerned, in re 
Brazilian Rubber Plantation and Estates Ltd, the scope of judicial deference was very 
wide as the standard of care was solely a subjective standard, In other words, and as 
Reed cites it, ‘a director “could be” in complete ignorance’57 of relevant knowledge 
of the company’s business but if he has, then he shall be assessed in accordance with 
the expertise that he possessed.58  
Neville J concluded that firstly, there is no obligation on the part of the directors to 
have any special qualification; and secondly, directors do not have any obligation to 
attend any company meeting or ‘take any definite part in the conduct of the 
company’s business.’59  
                                                
57	 1	CH	425	(Ch)	as	cited	by	Reed,	’Company	Directors	–	Collective	or	Functional	Responsibility’	(2006)	
Com	Law	171	 	
58	 Mayson	and	French	and	Ryan,	Company	Law	(34th	edn,	OUP	2017-2018)	495;	see	also	See	Andrew	
Hicks	 and	 S	 H	Goo,	Cases	 and	Material	 on	 Company	 Law	 (6th	 	 edn,	OUP	 2008)	 387;	 Also	 cited	 by	
Tamo	Zwinge,	 ‘An	Analysis	of	Duty	of	Care	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	 in	Comparison	with	 the	German	
Duty	of	Care’	(2011)	22(2)	ICCLR	31-41,	32	
59 See Grantham & Rickett, Company and Securities Law, Commentary and Materials (Thomson 
Reuters 2001) 565  
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To this end, the judges supported the ruling above by restating the ‘intermittent 
principles’ which had been first established in Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb60 and 
re-affirmed in re Cardiff Savings Bank; the Re Marquis of Bute’s Case61 that directors 
do not owe a duty to attend the company’s meetings but if he does, then must exercise 
reasonable care.62   
On the face of the case, Nevile J was only following the previous cases by requiring a 
modest standard of duty of care and skill owed by directors to their companies. 
However, to take a closer look at the case by drawing on the impact of the ruling on 
the liability of company director and the scope of action exercisable by insolvency 
liquidators, one can see that the judge applied a modest (subjective) standard of care 
as a way to refuse judicial intervention on actions against directors’ negligence.  
This, ruling reflects a judicial deference that was achieved through the modest 
standard of care and skill expected from the director.  
What was confusing here is that while Neville J imposed a subjective standard of care 
onto whether or not the expertise is possessed by the directors, but when it comes to 
the reasonable care exercised by directors who turns up at the meeting, he held that 
the reasonable care is to be assessed by what standard of care that ‘an ordinary man 
                                                
60	 [1872]	LR	5	(HL)	580	 	
61	 [1892]	CH	100	(Ch)	3	
62 	 Dignam	 &	 Lowry,	 Company	 Law	 (8th	 edn,	 OUP	 2014)	 359;	 Sheikh,	 Company	 Hand	 Book	
(Bloomsbury	Professional	2016)	549;	Grantham	&	Rickett,	Company	and	Securities	Law,	Commentary	
and	Materials	(Thomson	Reuters	2001)	566-567	
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might be expected to take in the same circumstances on his own behalf.’63 As I shall 
demonstrate in the immediate following that this would later be used by both Kershaw 
and Hick to argue that the standard of care imposed by Neville J was not purely 
subjective, rather, it was a dual standard. And in the context of this Chapter would 
have a different impact to the extent of or even the existence of judicial deference in 
the process of action for negligence, or by the standard of post- Companies Act 2006 
– Derivative claims.     
This brings it nicely to the immediate following, where judicial deference through 
modest and subjective standard of care and skill was arguably continued to be applied 
by Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co64. However, the certainty of 
judicial deference was dimed by the two schools of thoughts amongst modern 
scholars in connection with what standard of care was actually required by the judge.  
Much would depend on which school of thoughts is correct in determining the 
existence of or the extent of the judicial deference.    
In Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co65 a case which was widely cited as a leading 
case in directors’ duty of care prior to the 1990s, Romer J took a cumulative approach 
on the traditional common law principles including principles laid down in both re 
                                                
63	 Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	2012)	421	 	
64	 [1925]	CH	407	(CA);	also	as	cited	by	Zwinge,	‘An	Analysis	of	Duty	of	Care	in	the	United	Kingdom	in	
Comparison	with	the	German	Duty	of	Care’	(2011)	22(2)	ICCLR	31,	32	
65	 ibid	
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Cardiff Savings Bank or the Re Marquis of Bute’s Case66 and re Brazilian Rubber 
Plantations and Estates Ltd67introducing three propositions as follows: 
… (1) A director need not exhibit greater skill than can be expected of a person 
of his or her knowledge and experience. (2) A director is not bound to give 
continuous attention to the affairs of his company. His duties are of intermittent 
nature to be performed at periodical board meetings, and at meetings of any 
committee of the board upon which he happens to be placed. He is not, however 
bound to attend all such meetings, though he ought to attend whenever, in the 
circumstance, he is reasonably able to do. (3) in respect of all duties that, having 
regard to the exigencies of the business, and the articles of association, may 
properly be left to some other official, a director is, in the absence of ground of 
suspicion, justified in trusting that official to perform such duties honestly.68 
Adopting the same standard of subjective standard of care (proposition 1) as 
established in re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd69, Romer J attributes 
his position to Lord Hatherley LC’s judgment in Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb70: 
                                                
66	 [1892]	CH	100	(CA)	
67	 [1911]	1	CH	425	(Ch)	
68	 [1925]	 CH	 407	 (CA);	 also	 as	 cited	 by	 Tamo	 Zwinge,	 ‘An	 Analysis	 of	 Duty	 of	 Care	 in	 the	 United	
Kingdom	in	Comparison	with	the	German	Duty	of	Care’	(2011)	22(2)	ICCLR	31,	32;	see	also	Dignam	&	
Lowry,	Company	Law	(8th	edn,	OUP	2014)	359-360	
69	 Mayson	 and	 French	 and	 Ryan,	Company	 Law	(34th	 end,	 OUP	 2017-2018)	 494;	 Sheikh,	 Company	
Hand	Book	(Bloomsbury	Professional	2016)	549	 	
70	 [1872]	LR	5	(HL)	480,	494	-	495	 	
 48 
 ... I think it would be a very fatal error in the verdict of any Court of Justice to 
attempt to measure – the amount of prudence that ought to be exercised by the 
amount of prudence which the judge himself might think, under similar 
circumstances, he should have exercised. I think it extremely unlikely that many 
a judge, or many a person versed by long experience in the affair of mankind, as 
conducted in the mercantile world, will know that there is a great deal more 
trust, a great deal more speculation, and a great deal more readiness to confide 
in the probabilities of things, with regard to success in mercantile transactions, 
than there is on the part of those habits of life are entirely of a different 
character. 
Sheikh has also suggested that standard of duty of care imposed by the court in this 
case was a low standard as it was purely based on a subjective test.71 Looking from a 
different perspective, Farer, however, has suggested that despite the rather relaxed 
standard in Romer J’s judgment from the modern perspective, the standard 
nevertheless represent ’a tightening of the existing law at the time’.72 In other words, 
the scope of judicial deference could be said to be better defined by way of Romer J’s 
cumulative approach. But what we can see here was that the distinction between the 
                                                
71	 Sheikh,	Company	Hand	Book	(Bloomsbury	Professional	2016)	549	
72 Farrar, Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles and Practice (3rd edn, South Melbourne: OUP 
2008), 138 as cited by Tamo Zwinge, ‘An Analysis of Duty of Care in the United Kingdom in 
Comparison with the German Duty of Care’ (2011) ICCLR 22(2) 31, 32 
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functional & internal control responsibilities and the business judgment was still not 
clearly separated for the purpose of judicial deference.   
If the academic writers such as Farer’s, Mayson et al, and Sheikh’ s interpretation of 
the Romer J’s decision was correct, we can then see a continuation of an element of 
judicial deference by way of modest standard of care as proposed to that articulated 
by Neville J on Brazilian Plantation case.  The extent of the duty of care was 
subjective with the approach that as long as the directors were acting in good faith 
with his belief that the business decision was made in the interest of the company, the 
court shall be deferential to the action. Romer J at the same time, re-iterated the 
judgment laid down in Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb73 indicating judicial deference 
in favour of another type of business decision that is speculative and unbound by any 
predefined rules, i.e., business judgment.74  This judicial approach shows a respect 
and recognition from the court towards business judgment of directors that there can 
be no assumption of the right business decision upon the board, as per Romer J citing 
Lagunas Nitrate Co v. Lagunas Syndicate75, ‘It is perhaps only another way of stating 
the same proposition to say that directors are not liable for mere errors of judgment.’76  
The judicial approach to avoid second guessing the business judgment of the director 
remained the law in the eyes of the judges in subsequent cases such as Shuttleworth v 
                                                
73	 [1872]	LR	5	(HL)	480,	494-495	 	
74	 Re	City	Equitable	Fire	Insurance	Co	[1925]	CH	707	(CA)	77-78	
75	 [1899]	2	CH	392	(CA)	435	
76	 [1899]	2	CH	407	(CA)	429	 	
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Cox Bros & Co77  (adopting the bona fide test laid down in Sidebottom v. Kershaw, 
Leese and Company Limited78 and Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd.79  
To support the courts’ traditional deferential approach in the issue of business 
judgment as discussed above, Reed has referred to director disqualification cases to 
show that ‘the courts have declined to find unfitness on the basis of what has turned 
out to be commercial judgment (except in the case of gross negligence) in the 
substance of a business decision.’ – Re Lo-Line Electric Motors80; & Re McNulty’s 
Interchange.81  
 
  
                                                
77	 [1927]	2	KB	9	(CA)	
78	 [1990]	2	KB	9	(Ch)	18-20	 	 	
79	 [1974]	AC	821	(PC)	 	
80	 [1988]	 CH	 477,	 (Ch)	 486	 as	 cited	 by	 Reed,	 ‘Company	 Directors	 –	 Collective	 or	 Functional	
Responsibility’	Com	Law	171	 	
81	 [1989]	BCLC	712	(Ch)	cited	by	Reed,	‘Company	Directors	–	Collective	or	Functional	Responsibility’	
Com	Law	171	 	
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DORCHESTER FINANCE V. STEBBING [1989]82 
In reaching the judgment, Foster J accepted the company plaintiff’s submission made 
against the directors in regard to their breach of duties of care relating to the issues of 
oversight was CORRECTLY made. And the submission as made as follows:  
… a) A director is required to exhibit in performance of his duties such a degree 
of skill as may reasonably be expected from a person with his knowledge and 
experience. b) A director is required to take in performance of his duties such 
care as an ordinary man might be expected to take on his behalf. C) A director 
must exercise any power vested in him, as such honesty, in good faith and in the 
interest of the company and reliance was placed on re City Equitable Fire 
Insurance Co Ltd  83… and re Smith & Fawcett ltd 84 …85  
Consequently, Foster J held all the directors were liable for negligence and damages 
were awarded against them.  
The court this time held the directors liable to compensate the loss of the company 
without the finding of gross negligence.86 This is a deviation of the traditional view 
that liability was strictly based on gross negligence. 
                                                
82	 BCLC	498	(Ch)	
83	 [1925]	CH	407	
84	 [1942]	CH	304	
85	 Ibid	83	
86	 Grantham	&	Rickett,	Company	and	 Securities	 Law,	 Commentary	 and	Materials	 (Thomson	Reuter	
2001)	563;	Griffin,	Company	Law	Fundamental	Principles	(4th,	edn,	Longman	2005)	312	
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Foster J’s acceptance of the plaintiff company’s submission above represent a 
ground-breaking development relating to the issues of internal control and oversight 
(in this case, the directors’ failure to supervise another). In the interpretation of the 
interaction of the objective test based on the standard of an ordinary person and 
subjective standard test based on the level of a director’s actual skill, knowledge and 
experience i.e., a subjective test will only be applied when the directors possess and 
took certain knowledge, skill and experience into his office. For instance, an 
accountant as shown in the Dorchester case. However, there is no defense against an 
action for breach of duty of care and skill for the director who does not possess any 
special skill, as he would still be judged objectively against the baseline, i.e., the 
standard of an ordinary person.87  
Another interesting fact in this case as pointed out by Hick and Kershaw was, despite 
Foster J’s apparent taking of a segregated approach relating to skill and care; it was a 
case law development towards the direction of the segregation of the two duties. Once 
again, and like his predecessor, Foster J used the terms skill and care 
interchangeably.88   
Where Dorchester  departed from Brazilian Plantations was that the court was no 
longer prepared to accept the director’s defense that he does not owe a duty of care to 
                                                
87	 See	 Tamo	 Zwinge,	 ‘An	 Analysis	 of	 Duty	 of	 Care	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 in	 Comparison	 with	 the	
German	Duty	of	Care’	(2011)	22(2)	ICCLR	31,	32	 	
88	 Hick,	 ’Directors’	 Liabilities	 for	 Management	 Errors’	 (1994)	 110	 LQR	 390,	 391;	 and	 Kershaw,	
Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	2012)	428	 	
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the company that he serves on the basis of his absence in the relevant company board 
meetings.  In other words, the court took a more stringent approach with the 
interpretation that being attentive to the affairs of the company’s business is now part 
of the internal control or supervision. Therefore, a requirement to satisfy the objective 
test of an ordinary man.  This judicial approach was adopted in a number of 
subsequent cases, such as Re Westmid Packing Services Ltd; and re Baring Plc and 
Others (No. 5).89  In complying with the objective standard of duty of care, as 
pointed out by Hannigan, an executive director would have a general duty ’to oversee 
the activities of the company’, including a duty to properly sign cheques.90 This view 
while, generalising the legal position laid down by Foster J, is not however, strictly 
accurate. As Foster J’s decision on directors under a duty to exercise a general duty to 
oversee the activities of the company was also directed to both non-executive 
directors, namely, Hamilton and Parson (having taking into account the accountancy 
background of the three directors of course).91  Foster J commented: 
For a chartered accountant and an experienced accountant to put forward the 
proposition that a non-executive director has no duties to perform I find quite 
alarming … the signing of blank cheques by Hamilton and Parsons was in my 
judgment negligent, as it allows Stebbing to do as he pleased. Apart from that 
                                                
89	 [1998]	2	ER	124	(CA)	and	[1999]	1	BLCL	433	(Ch)	respectively.	Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	
Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	2012)	428;	Tamo	Zwinge,	‘An	Analysis	of	Duty	of	Care	in	the	United	
Kingdom	in	Comparison	with	the	German	Duty	of	Care’	(2011)	22(2)	ICCLR	31,	32	 	
90	 Hannigan,	Company	Law	(4th	edn,	OUP	2015)	245	
91	 Grantham	&	Rickett,	Company	and	Securities	Law,	Commentary	and	Materials	(Thomson	Reuters,	
2001)	563;	Farrar,	Farrar’s	Company	Law	(4th	edn,	Butterworths	Law	1998)	393	 	
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they not only failed to exhibit the necessary skill and care in the performance of 
their duties as directors, but also failed to perform any duty at all as directors of 
Dorchester.92  
Going back to the fundamental issue of the historical development of judicial 
deference relating to the issue of internal control or oversight, we are seeing a gradual 
separation of the types of directors’ business decisions by filtering out directors’ 
function & internal control responsibilities from business judgments for the purpose 
of judicial deference. This is so, not just as a result of the court’s confirmation of 
assessing the directors’ duty by way of dual standard test. But Foster J’s clarification 
on what is expected from a reasonable person now covers directors’ duty to be 
actively attentive to the company’s affairs. We also see that in the subsequent cases 
the court continued to adopt this stringent approach through an expectation that a 
reasonable man’s standard of being attentive to the company’s affair is not limited to 
a duty to attend the company’s meetings as specifically dealt with by Neville J in 
Briazillain Plantation Case, but also extents to a wider scope of duty to oversee the 
activities of the company. Once again, this shows a strong resemblance to the 
American business judgment rule whereby the decision of the directors complained is 
                                                
92Dorchester	Finance	v.	Stebbing	[1989]	BCLC	498	(Ch)	505	8	
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the type of decision refers to matters of inattention or oversight, then the defense of 
business judgment rule will not be available (Deal v. Johnson).93 
  
                                                
93	 [Ala.1978]	So.	2d	214,	362.	Also	cited	by	Arsht,	’The	Business	Judgment	Rule	Revisited’	(1979-1980)	
8	Hofstra	L	Rev	112	 	
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SUMMARY  
The historical development and gradual change of judicial deference in the 
process of negligence lawsuits relating to the issues of oversights and internal control 
in pre-1990s common law can be broadly divided into three stages. First, the 
existence of judicial deference reflected through the judicial imposition of the modest 
standard of care and skill. Standard of conduct was strictly based on subjective test 
with directors having no active duty to possess any relevant expertise or knowledge 
relating to the company’s business. In addition, no objective test could be generally 
imposed in the assessment relating to the issue of breach of duty which resulted in a 
wide scope of judicial deference in a number of areas including the strict application 
of the intermittent principles as established in Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibbs94 and 
shown in re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd.95   
This wide scope of judicial deference was arguably followed by Romer J in his 
famous three propositions in re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co.96 In Dorchester 
Finance v. Stebbing,97 the court had the opportunity to confirm the requirement of the 
dual standard of care as a mechanism in assessing directors’ breach of duty relating to 
the issue of internal control and supervision. This included the active roles of 
directors in overseeing the activities of the company as a whole. 
                                                
94	 [1872]	LR	5	(HL)	480	
95	 [1911]	1	CH	425	(Ch)	
96	 [1872]	CH	407	(CA)	
97	 [1989]	BCLC	598	(Ch)	
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Despite the stringent judicial approach adopted by the court in Dorchester Finance 
case relating to the issue of supervision and oversight, the courts continue to adopt a 
broad deferential approach to the issues relating to business judgments. I shall 
demonstrate in the latter part of this chapter that such a deferential approach remains a 
focused commonplace in the shareholders’ enforcement stage of director’s duties 
under Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006. 
In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated the existence of a wide scope of judicial 
deference within the common law by way of the imposition of the modest duty in the 
matter relating to directors’ business judgment. It has also demonstrated a gradual 
encroachment of directors’ right to deference relating to directors’ duty of internal 
control (as opposed to business judgment) to a point of near obliteration which took 
place with the clear imposition of the dual standard of care. 
 
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE: BUSINESS JUDGMENT VS FUNCTIONAL 
RESPONSIBILIY & INTERNAL CONTROL 
NORMAN V. THEODORE GODDARD [1991]98 
As the court felt that the standard adopted in the cases prior to 1990s was too 
low as a standard, this case represents the first case where the court drew a link 
between the common law and the statute and took the view that the dual standard duty 
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of care to possess the required business skills in common law was set out in Section 
214(4) of Insolvency Act 1986.99   
Section 214(4) states:  
…	 the	 facts	 which	 a	 director	 of	 a	 company	 ought	 to	 know	 or	 ascertain,	 the	
conclusions	which	he	ought	to	reach	and	the	steps	which	he	ought	to	take	are	
those	 which	 would	 be	 known	 or	 ascertained,	 or	 reached	 or	 taken,	 by	 a	
reasonably	diligent	person	having	both—	
(a)	 the	 general	 knowledge,	 skill	 and	 experience	 that	 may	 reasonably	 be	
expected	of	a	person	carrying	out	the	same	functions	as	are	carried	out	by	that	
director	in	relation	to	the	company,	and	
(b)	the	general	knowledge,	skill	and	experience	that	that	director	has.	
This approach is more stringent than all the previous common law approaches 
mentioned above as section uses the words, ‘ought to’. By relying on Section 214(4) 
of Insolvency Act, Hoffman J, ‘concluded that the relevant test of a directors’ duty is 
not merely a subjective test … he pronounced an objective requirement that the 
director must possess the skill “that may reasonably be expected from a person 
undertaking those duties.”’ Adding by way of an example, ‘a director who undertakes 
                                                
99 	 See	 Bird	 et	 al,	 Boyle	 &	 Bird’s	 Company	 Law	 (9th	 edn,	 Jordan	 Publishing	 Limited	 2014)	
612-613;		 Mayson	 and	 French	 and	 Ryan,	Company	 Law	(34th	 edn,	 OUP	 2017-2018)	 495;	 Sheikh,	
Company	Hand	Book	(Bloomsbury	Professional	2016)	549;	Tamo	Zwinge,	‘An	Analysis	of	Duty	of	Care	
in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 in	 Comparison	 with	 the	 German	 Duty	 of	 Care’	 (2011)	 22(2)	 ICCLR	 31,	 32;	
Dignam	&	Lowry,	Company	Law	(8th	edn,	OUP	2014)	361	
 59 
the management of the company’s properties is expected to have reasonable skill in 
property management, but not in offshore tax avoidance.’100  Indeed, the court this 
time further identified the difference between business judgment and directors’ 
functional responsibilities for the purpose of judicial deference by pushing an 
objective obligation onto directors’ ‘functional responsibility’101, i.e., to acquire the 
skills that are reasonably expected to be relevant to the company’s business.102 This 
represents an expansion of the objective duty relating to the issue of internal control 
that directors need to be attentive to the company affairs laid down in Dorchester 
Finance v. Stebbing.103 In that it creates a bridge linking the objective duty to the 
subjective duty. In other words, the objective standard first creates a duty to acquire 
the relevant skill, once this is satisfied, the court will move on to the subjective test in 
determining the director’s compliance of the standard of the expertise required. The 
result of this “bridging process” would almost guarantee directors to be examined 
through both objective and subjective standard and place them under an inevitable 
greater burden to defend an action of negligence.  
It is of little surprise that the court’s decision to adopt Section 214(4) Insolvency Act 
1986 for the interpretation of dual standard of care. This is because prior to 
                                                
100	 [1992]	 BCC	 14	 (Ch),	 15;	 also	 cited	 by	 Tamo	 Zwinge,	 ‘An	 Analysis	 of	 Duty	 of	 Care	 in	 the	United	
Kingdom	in	Comparison	with	the	German	Duty	of	Care’	(2011)	22(2)	ICCLR	31,	32;	Edmond	&	Lowry,	
‘The	Continuing	Value	of	Belief	for	Directors’	Breach	of	Duty’	(2003)	MLO	210	
101	 A	 term	given	by	Reed,	 ‘Company	Directors	–	Collective	or	Functional	Responsibility’	 (2006)	Com	
Law	172	
102	 Mwaura,	’Company	Directors’	Duty	of	Skills	and	Care:	 	 A	Need	for	Reform.’	(2003)	Com	Law	285	
103	 [1989]	BCLC	498	(Ch)	
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Companies Act 2006, judicial deference was generally available to protect company 
directors (who have acted in good faith and derived no personal benefit through his 
majority shares from the transaction) from derivative actions (except in the case of 
fraud on minority shareholders), with the exception to claims launched by liquidators 
in the event of companies’ insolvency (see for instance, Daniels v. Daniels104 and 
Barrett v. Duckett105). This judicial move can therefore, be seen as a way to 
standardise the interpretation of dual standard of test in line with deferential 
environment within the realm of derivative actions at the time, with the consequence 
of a clearer difference between duty of care (care relating to the issue of internal 
control; and issues relating to business judgment) and skills (duty to possess the skills 
to undertake the management of the company); and for the purpose of judicial 
deference, a clearer difference between types of business decisions, namely, business 
judgment and responsibilities relating to directors’ internal control and functions or 
corporate governance functions.  
 
RE D’JAN OF LONDON LTD [1994] 
Hoffman J held Mr D’Jan, the director liable for negligence on the ground that he had 
failed to read the insurance form before signing it. Like Dorchester Finance v. 
                                                
104	 [1978]	CH	406	(Ch)	
105	 [1995]	1	BCLC	243	(CA)	
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Stebbing,106 the court imposed liability upon the director without having the finding 
of gross negligence on the directors’ part.  
As Hoffman L.J. says, ’His breach of duty in failing to read the form before signing 
was not gross. It was a kind of thing which could happen to any busy man. Although 
as I have said, this is not enough to excuse it.’107   
In giving the judgment, Hoffman J, reaffirmed his view expressed in Norman v. 
Theodore Goddard108 that company directors’ duty of skill at common law was 
correctly reflected in the dual standard of skill in Section 214 Insolvency Act 
1986).109  As per In Hoffman L.J. Re D’Jan of London110 ‘in my view, the duty of 
care owed by a director at common law is accurately stated in section 214(4) of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 … Both on the objective and subjective test …’ 
No reference, however, was made by Hoffman J as to how he came out with this 
interrelation between the common law duty of care and Section 214. But without 
                                                
106	 [1989]	BCLC	498	(Ch)	
107	 Re	 D’Jan	 of	 London	 Ltd	 [1993]	 BCC	 464	 (Ch)	 450	 See	 also	 Gerner-Beurle	 and	 Edmunf-Phillipp	
Schuster,	‘The	Evolving	Structure	of	Directors’	Duties	in	Europe’	(2014)	15,	EBO	LR	191,	202	
108	 [1990]	BCC	14	(Ch)	
109	 Tamo	Zwinge,	‘An	Analysis	of	Duty	of	Care	in	the	United	Kingdom	in	Comparison	with	the	German	
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further investigation into the authority of Hoffman J’s interpretation, subsequent case 
law adopted this approach.111   
One thing for sure, however, is that the traditional judicial deference by modest 
standard of care during the process of negligence action at this stage of the common 
law development can be said to be completely and practically filtered out through the 
‘bridging process’ of the dual standard test as discussed in Norman v. Theodore 
Goddard above.  
RE BARING PLC (NO. 5) [2000] 
This is the case where the court placed a great emphasis on the responsibility of 
company directors relating to the matter of internal control, i.e., directors’ corporate 
function to delegate, followed up with the duty of supervision; and duty to possess 
management skill. It is in this area where we see a great departure from the pre-1990s 
common law rulings such as Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estate Ltd112; and 
Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co113 where the intermittent principles and the trust 
principle under Romer J’s three proportions represented the center of judicial 
deference by way of modest standard of care and skill. 
                                                
111	 As	pointed	out	by	Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	2012)	431;	
Dignam	&	Lowry,	Company	Law	(8th	edn,	OUP	2014)	359;	Sheikh,	Company	Hand	Book	 (Bloomsbury	
Professional	2016)	396	 	
112	 [1911]	CH	1	425	(Ch)	
113	 	 [1925]	CH	407	(CA)	
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In this case Jonathan Parker J referred to the ruling in Daniels v. Anderson114 and 
held that the extent of the directors’ duty relating to supervision would vary 
depending on ‘the size and business of the particular company  and the experience or 
skills that the director held himself or herself out to have in support of appointment to 
office.’115  
The tightening of directors’ duty to supervise was affirmed by Langley J in the 
subsequent case – Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Bowley116 and in turn, rejected 
Romer J’s propositions in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co:  
In respect of all duties, having regard to the exigencies of the business, and the 
articles of association, may properly be left to some other official, a director is 
in the absence of ground for suspicion, justified in trusting that official to 
perform such duty honestly.117    
Landley J further commented that ‘I do not think this statement does represent the 
modern law … at least if it means unquestioning reliance upon others to do their 
job’118  
                                                
114 	 [1995]	 16	 ASCR	 607,	 666	 cited	 by	 Reed,	 ‘Company	 Directors	 –	 Collective	 or	 Functional	
Responsibility’	(2006)	Com	Law	173	
115	 Re	 Barings	 plc	 [1999]	 BCLC	 433	 (Ch)	 488.	 See	 also	 Reed,	 ’Company	 Directors	 –	 Collective	 or	
Functional	Responsibility’	(2006)	Com	Law	173	 	
116	 [2003]	BCC	829	(QB)	
117	 [1925]	1	CH	407,	427-230	as	cited	by	Langley	J	in	Equitable	Life	Assurance	Society	v.	Bowley	[2003]	
EWHC	2263,	(QB)	[40]	
118	 ibid	[41]	
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With regards to directors’ duty to possess the necessary management skill, Jonathan J 
went one step further than Norman v. Theodore Goddard119 that not just directors 
need to possess the skill to manage the company, but they have ‘both collectively, and 
individually, a continuing duty to acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge and 
understanding of the company’s business to enable them properly to discharge their 
duties as directors’.120  Therefore, the duty of skill is a continuing process requiring 
directors to constantly update their knowledge of the company’s business.  
It should be noted that Keay and Loughrey have argued that the ‘courts’ position is 
ambivalent’,121 as in ARB International Ltd v. Baillie122, the court held that the 
director could take a ‘practical view’123 by delegation of tasks to his subordinate as 
far as the director first making sure with his subordinate have access to the him for 
advice or guidance when needed. 124   This approach, as Keay and Loughrey 
suggested, regarded the director’s decision-making process ‘as matters of 
judgment’125.  
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As mentioned above, the ambivalence of the courts’ position does or does appear to 
exist, however, if we were to take the director’s entitlement to delegate in ARB 
International Ltd v. Baillie as a business judgment, it is possible, from a perspective of 
the theory of types of business decisions (as focused in Chapter Four), to argue that 
the director’s level of supervision based on his assessment of his staff’s situation 
represents a type of business decision within another. In other words, the directors’ 
decision to delegate based on the proper assessment for his subordinate to ‘seek his 
advice if they had question’ represents a Non-Programmed (Creative) Business 
Decision 126  (as long as the decision of which the assessment was based was 
ill-defined) within the general duty of monitoring and supervision (a programmed 
business decisions).    
On the other hand, if the director’s decision fails to satisfy the condition of a 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions, one might argue that the court’s 
position in ARB International Ltd v. Baillie did not treat the director’s decision to 
delegate as a business judgment (in other words, the term ‘business judgment’ was 
wrongly used by the court to describe the corporate governance functions of the 
director), but part of the fulfillment of the director’s monitoring and supervision 
decision. This is because, as opposed to the directors in Re Baring (No. 5), the 
                                                
126	 A	Non-Programmed	(Creative)	Business	Decision	is	a	term	coined	by	this	thesis	to	describe,	from	a	
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director in ARB International Ltd v. Baillie had kept himself informed of the 
company’s business and undertaken assessment on his staff’s need to seek his advice. 
And as held by the court that the director ‘had adequately supervised the delegated 
functions.’127 
SUMMARY  
The post 1990s common law development of the negligence action relating to 
the issue of internal control, oversight and continuing duty to acquire the necessary 
management and business skill has been shaped towards the building of a more 
vigorous standard of care. The dual standard represents the official benchmark upon 
which company directors would be assessed. This in effect creates a ‘bridging process’ 
between the objective test and the subjective test, leading to the extinction of judicial 
deference based on the modest standard of care and skill founded in pre-1990s 
common law cases.  
However, the tightening of the standard does not appear to have applied to the matters 
of business judgment as we can see in the enforcement stage mentioned below.  In 
other words, the law started to set a clearer distinction between and directors’ 
responsibility relating to the matter of internal control, i.e., function to delegate 
followed up with the duty of supervision; duty to possess management skill; and 
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business judgment with the latter type of decision (business judgment) being 
protected by judicial deference.  
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE ON DIRECTORS’ BUSINESS JUDGMENTS 
(ENFORCEMENT STAGE) 
THE POSITION PRIOR TO THE COMPANIES ACT 2006 
A business judgment can be described as a business decision that is not bound by 
any predefined rule and deals mainly with ‘a great deal of speculations’128 and the 
decision maker needs to have a ‘great deal more readiness to confide in the 
probabilities of things’.129  As opposed to dealing with directors’ responsibilities 
relating to internal control or their functions as mentioned in the above section, this 
section will discuss the deferential approach applied by the courts insulating directors 
from liability for their decisions made within the context of business judgment. This 
section will demonstrate that provided the business decision/judgment was made by 
the directors in good faith, and acting as an appropriate independent organ of the 
company, the directors would historically be protected. From this perspective, the 
stage of enforcing company directors’ duty of care within the context of this research 
represents the crucial stage, whereby judicial deference can be clearly traced. Judicial 
deference at the enforcement stage is pre-dominantly found within the two main 
timelines, namely the legal position prior to Companies Act 2006 and the legal 
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position post-Companies Act 2006. The following will demonstrate that different 
scopes of judicial deference exist within each of these periods.     
The concept of judicial deference has historically been closely linked to the concept 
of derivative action. In order to understand the concept of derivative action, one has to 
start the discussion from the basics as laid down below: 
When it comes to legal enforcement of company directors’ duties, traditionally, under 
the common law, only the company itself, not the shareholders, can do so. And since 
the board of directors is empowered to manage the company under the articles of 
association, they would be seeking the relief on behalf of the company.   
This is rule famously laid down in the case of Foss v. Harbottle130 also known as ’the 
proper plaintiff rule’ as subsequently described by the judge in Prudential Assurance 
Co Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd (No.2)131 :  
… The Court of Appeal explained the effect of the rule when it stated that A is 
not usually able to take action against B in order to recover damage or relief on 
                                                
130	 	 [1843]	 2	 Hare	 461,	 489	 where	 the	 court	 held	 that	 the	 wrong	 doe	 by	 the	 promoter	 of	 the	
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behalf of C, when B has acted in such a way as to injure C. Sometimes this is 
known as the proper plaintiff rule.132 
As pointed out by Tang that the proper plaintiff rule is closely connected to the 
doctrine of companies being separate legal entity (originally stated under section 18 
Companies Act 1862 and later specified in the case of Salomon v Salomon & Co 
Ltd133), ‘… that once the company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any 
other independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself …’134 
As frequently mentioned by academic writers such as Wedderburn 135  that as 
companies being separate legal entities, the courts have historically been reluctant to 
interfere with company directors’ business judgment. This is because the judges took 
the attitude that, ’it is not the business of the court to manage the affairs of the 
company. That is for the shareholders and the directors.’ - Per Scrutton L.J., 
Shuttleworth v. Cox Bros & Co (Maindenhead) Ltd.136 The article, ’Editorial – A 
Statutory Derivative Action’ (2007) explained the justification for the proper plaintiff 
rule was to limit the number of litigations ‘than the interest of the company requires.’ 
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137 Plus the traditional courts’ diffidence to ‘interfere with the internal management 
of the company’138 from the hindsight. This is known as ‘the majority rule’ as stated 
by the judge in Carlen v. Drury (1812)139  that ‘This Court is not to be required on 
every occasion to take the management of every playhouse and brewhouse in the 
Kingdom.’ In subsequent cases such as Burland v. Earle, the court continues to show 
its diffidence in interfering with directors’ business decision/judgment, as per Lord 
Davey: ‘It is an elementary principle of the law relating to joint stock companies that 
the Court will not interfere with the internal management of the company acting 
within their powers, and in fact has no jurisdiction to do so.’140 
However, with the acknowledgement of the courts dated back to the nineteenth 
century regarding the impracticalities involving directors taking legal action against 
their fellow director within the same organization. For instance, as given by Keay, ’if 
directors who were in breach of their duties or were associated with those who had 
wronged the company controlled the board then no action would be instituted’,141 the 
courts, allowed (as an exception to the proper plaintiff rule) shareholders to take 
derivative action on the company’s behalf against directors. In other words, ‘it is that 
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companies’ money can only be properly expended for companies’ purpose. It cannot 
be expended for personal purposes of directors or of shareholders ...’142   
According to Keay, the term ‘derivative action’ was first used by the Court of Appeal 
in Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2);143 and It is a legal concept borrowed from the 
American jurisdiction - Meyer v. Fleming.144 This view is also supported by Mayson 
et al.145 As was the purpose of derivative action, it is described as ’The purpose of the 
derivative action [is] to place in the hands of the individual shareholder a means to 
protect the interest of the corporation from the misfeasance and malfeasance of 
'faithless directors and mangers’ - Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.146Indeed, as 
pointed out by Reisberg, that essentially, the court is imposing judicial control over 
the how derivative actions are to be carried out due to the purpose of ensuring the 
Rule of Foss v. Harbottle, i.e., that the action was brought in the interest of the 
company through its organs (through the general meeting of shareholders and the 
board of directors) as opposed to that of an individual shareholders. In other words, 
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‘… the individual shareholder is not enforcing the right which belong to him, but 
which rather vested in and therefore derived from the company.’147  
Despite the opportunity for shareholders to bring a derivative action against the 
directors through the exception to the proper plaintiff rule; directors still enjoyed a 
wide scope of judicial deference against shareholders’ derivative claim. This is so, as 
the decision to sue rested upon the company itself; and a dissatisfied member of the 
company was expected by law to accept the company’s constitution dictating who had 
the power to decide on litigation or ratification. Normally these people were the 
directors; and the courts traditionally diffidence to replace its view to that of the 
business judgment of the directors148 (John Shaw and Sons (Salford) Ltd v. Shaw149). 
On this basis, the exception to the proper plaintiff rule was based on the so called, ‘the 
rule of wrongdoers’ control’ or more precisely, ’fraud on minority shareholders’. As 
pointed out by academic writers such as Reisberg and Armour, it was deemed to be a 
fraud, as essentially, it refered to the situation where majority shareholders were ‘… 
endeavouring directly or indirectly to appropriate to themselves money, property or 
advantages which belong to the company or in which other shareholders were entitled 
to participate.’150 Or ‘… benefiting at the company’s expense.’151 In other words, the 
                                                
147	 Reisberg,	‘Judicial	Control	of	Derivative	Action’	(2005)	ICCLR	338	
148	 Mayson	and	French	and	Ryan,	Company	Law	(34th	edn,	OUP	2017-2018)	555-556	
149	 [1935]	2	KB	113	(CA)	also	has	been	cited	by	Mayson	and	French	and	Ryan,	Company	Law	(34th	edn,	
OUP	2017-2018)	466.	
150	 Reisberg,	‘Shareholders’	Remedies:	The	Choice	of	Objectives	and	the	Social	Meaning	of	Derivative	
Actions’	(2005)	EBOR	242	 	
151	 Armour	 et	 al,	 ‘Private	 enforcement	 of	 corporate	 law:	 an	 empirical	 comparison	 of	 the	 United	
Kingdom	and	the	United	States’	(2009)	JELS	694	
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power to litigate normally lied with the directors of the company152 (save for the 
event where the company is in an insolvent proceeding). In Burland v. Earle, Lord 
Davey said:  
But an exception is made to the second rule,153 where the person against who 
the relief is sought themselves hold and control the majority of the shares in the 
company, and will not permit an action to be sought in the name of the company. 
This is, however, a mere matter of procedure in order to give remedy for a 
wrong which would otherwise escape redress.154 
Mayson et al, proposed that the last sentence of Lord Davey indirectly indicated that 
the court would not allow derivative action if the decision of the directors not to sue 
was taken in good faith and in the interest of the company. This assertion is supported 
by the common law rule in subsequent cases (Taylor v National Union of 
Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area) 155).  
Because the company would only act in its benefits, in the case of Smith v Croft (No. 
2),156 the court shown its diffidence to interfere with the managerial decision of the 
board through its expressive respect of the corporate will of the company undertaken 
                                                
152	 Table	A,	Article	70	
153	 Proper	claimant	rule	
154	 [1902]	AC	83	(PC)	93	 	
155	 [1985]	BCLC	237	(HC)	255	respectively	cited	by	Mayson	and	French	and	Ryan,	Company	Law	(23rd	
edn,	OUP	2006-2007),	664	
156	 [1988]	CH	114	(Ch)	6	
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‘by an appropriate independent organ’.157 As a result, the permission to continue the 
derivative action was not allowed.  Knox J expressed his refusal to second-guess the 
directors’ business decision/judgment, on the basis that the appropriate independent 
organ’s decision not to continue the claim was made in the interest of the company; 
and Knox J’s decision was made with a reference to the judgment in Allen v. Gold 
Reefs of West Africa Ltd158 whereby the decision made by an appropriate organ on 
behalf of the company ’… must be exercised, not only in the manner required by the 
law, but also bona fide for the benefit of the company.’159 With further reference to 
other similar cases – Brown v. British Abrasive Wheel Co. Ltd160 and Sidebottom v. 
Kershaw, Leese & Co Ltd,161 Knox J concluded the court is diffident to ‘substitute its 
own opinion’ over the business judgment of the director as an appropriate 
independent organ. Therefore, the decision by the appropriate organ of the company 
not to continue the action against the director will be upheld, as long as such a 
decision-making power was exercised in the interest of the company.162 
Reed by reliance on cases such as Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co and 
Shuttleworth v Cox Bros & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd,163 has pointed that because judging 
business decisions/judgments (as opposed to the issue of management oversight as 
                                                
157	 [1988]	Ch	114	(Ch)	6	
158	 [1990]	1	CH	656	(CA)	
159	 Per	Lord	Lindley,	1	CH	656	(CA)	
160	 [1919]	1	CH	290	
161	 [1920]	1	CH	154	(CA)	
162	 Per	Knox	J,	Smith	v	Croft	(No.	2)	[1988]	CH	114	(Ch)	
163	 [1925]	CH	407	(Ch)	429	&	[1972]	2	KB	9	(CA)	32.	See	also	Reed,	‘Company	Directors	–	Collective	or	
Functional	Responsibility’	(2006)	Com	Law	170	
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happened in cases like re Baring Plc and Others (No. 5)164) involve an evaluation or 
judgment of pros and cons of particular transactions from hindsight, the courts have 
traditionally been deferential when it comes to directors’ decision that are of business 
judgment,165  as long as the decision was made by the directors acting as an 
independent appropriate organ of the company (Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co  
and Shuttleworth v Cox  Bros & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd 166).   
The consistency of the UK judicial deferential approach as shown in the above cases 
remained in the Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd167 with Lord Wilberforce 
with reference to Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd168 made a clear and unequivocal statement 
regarding the judicial deference to company directors’ business judgment as follows:  
… what is required is bona fide exercise of the power in the interest of the 
company: that once it is found that the director were not motivated by 
self-interest … the matter is concluded in their favour and that the court will not 
inquire into the validity of their reasons for making the issue169 … it would be 
wrong for the court to substitute its opinion for that of the management, or 
                                                
164	 [1999]	1	BCLC	433	(Ch)	 		
165	 Reed,	‘Company	Directors	–	Collective	or	Functional	Responsibility’	(2006)	Com	Law	170	 	
166	 [1925]	 CH	 407,	 429	 (CA)	 &	 [1972]	 2	 KB	 9	 (CA)	 32	 (KB).	 See	 also	 Reed,	 ’Company	 Directors	 –	
Collective	or	Functional	Responsibility’	(2006)	Com	Law	170	 	
167	 [1974]	AC	821	(PC)	
168	 [1967]	CH	254	(Ch)	
169	 [1974]	AC	821	(PC)	834	 	
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indeed to question the correctness of the management’s decision, on such a 
question, if bona fide arrived at.170   
On the basis of the above, Lord Wilberforce concluded that the court has no 
jurisdiction to judge the right and wrong in the quality of a business judgment.171  
Howard Smith Ltd Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd have become one of a leading case for 
the UK judicial deference and was relied or applied in many subsequent cases, 
notably, Redwood Mater Fund Ltd v. TD Bank Europe Ltd172; and Dalby v. Bodily173.  
It should be note that in regard to directors exercising their decision-making power in 
good faith or bona fide acting as an independent appropriate organ of the company for 
the purpose of invoking judicial deference, the standard of conduct relating the 
requirement of good faith is expected by the court to be “subjective” as unequivocally 
seen in the case of Travel Insurance Limited v. Scattergood and Others,174 where the 
judge applied the subjective principle laid down in cases from Re Smith and Fawcett 
Ltd175 through Bristol & West Building Society v. Mothew176 to Regencrest Plc v. 
Cohen,177 where ‘… it is perfectly clear that a directors’ duty is to do what he 
                                                
170	 ibid	
171	 ibid	
172	 [2002]	EWHC	2703	(CH)	
173	 [2004]	EWHC	3078	(CH)	
174	 [2002]	BCLC	1	(Ch)	
175	 [1942]	1	CH	304	(Ch)	306	
176	 [1998]	CH	1	18	(CA)	
177	 [2001]	2	BCLC	81	(Ch)	105a-h	 	
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honestly believes to be in the company’s best interest.’178 The judge was adamantly 
convinced that the requirement of good faith was to be based on the subjective 
standard even to the point where the directors’ alleged belief was so unreasonable in 
the eyes of an ordinary person; the court would still deem the directors’ state of mind 
in making the business decision based on good faith if ’it appears that the director did 
honestly believe that he was acting in the best interest of the company.’179 In 
conclusion, the court ruled that in order to dis-apply judicial deference, it would not 
be sufficient for the company to show that the business decision/judgment of the 
director had caused the damage to the company, nor the business decision was not 
reasonable in the standard of an ordinary man, the company must also show that the 
director ‘did not honestly believe that the’180 business decision was made in the best 
interest of the company. It should be noted that there have been cases where the court 
adopt the objective test to determine whether or not the director had acted in good 
faith. This sort of judicial decisions has been arguably made to avoid the situation 
pointed out by Bowen LJ in the case of Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co ‘Bona fide 
cannot be the sole test, otherwise you might have a lunatic conducting the affairs of 
the company, and paying away its money with both hands in the manner perfectly 
                                                
178	 Extrasure	Travel	Insurance	Limited	v.	Scattergood	and	Others	[2002]	BCLC	1	(Ch)	[90]	 	
179	 ibid	[90]	 	
180	 ibid	[97]	 	
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bona fide yet perfectly irrational.’181 Therefore, as held by the judge in the more 
recent cases, Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v. Lloyds Bank Ltd:  
The proper test, I think, in the absence of actual separate consideration, must be 
whether an intelligent and honest man in the position of a director of the 
company concerned, could, in the whole of the existing circumstances, have 
reasonably believed that the transactions were for the benefit of the company.182    
Similar approach was adopted by the court in Item Software (UK) Ltd v. Fassihi183 
that if the director had acted in the absence of considering the interest of the company 
separately,184 the court will objectively see if the business decision was a decision on 
which a reasonable director could have concluded.   
From a broader perspective, academic writers such as Langford & Ramsay have 
pointed out that the approach of the good faith test is ‘the duty is subjective in the 
sense that it is for the directors to determine what are the interests of the company 
and they must give actual consideration to the interests of the company.’185 However, 
‘objective factors can be used by the court to determine if the director honestly 
                                                
181	 [1883]	23	CH	654	(CA)	671	 	
182	 [1970]	CH	62	(Ch)	74	 	
183	 [2005]	ICR	450	(CA)	[41],	[44]	
184	 For	instance,	where	the	director	has	decided	not	to	disclose	the	relevant	business	information	to	
the	company	regarding	his	talk	with	third	party	company	for	the	benefit	of	another	company	of	which	
the	director	was	going	to	set	up.	ibid	[41],	[44]	
185	 Teele	 and	 Ramsay,	 ‘Directors’	 Duties	 to	 Act	 in	 the	 Interests	 of	 the	 Company	 –	 Subjective	 or	
Objective’	(2015)	JBL	179	 	 	
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believes the decision they made was in the interests of the company’186 where the 
business decision , in the court’s view, had not been taken to be in the company’s 
interest. This combined approach addresses the concern as raised by the judge in 
Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co.187 
The above-mentioned approach was adopted by the judge in a recent Irish Case 
known as Bloxham (in liquidation) v. Irish Stock Exchange ltd188 whereby the judge 
tried to maintain a balance between the avoidance of stepping into the shoes of the 
directors in their subjective belief of what was in the best interest of the company; and 
the objective steps taken by the court to ensure that the directors’ business decision 
had been taken to fulfill their subjective belief. The judge said:  
For Bloxham, the argument goes the other way; in favour of the objective 
analysis of every decision made by a board of directors. Here the problem with 
be that in objective analyzing decisions, the courts might be in danger of 
stepping into the shoes of directors. This is not appropriate. The court cannot 
displace a decision simply because it does not like it189 … Thus, it seems the 
best test for the exercise of the directors’ duties must involve a scrutiny of 
whether a presence or absence of reasonable grounds enable what is said 
                                                
186	 ibid	
187	 (n	131)	
188	 [2014]	IEHC	93	 	
189	 ibid	[9]	
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subjectively to be an honest decision to stand as being in the best interests of the 
company as a whole.190  
Briefly, this subjective approach relating to the directors’ business judgment (In 
determining the interest of the company) is important. As from a psychology 
perspective, the good faith requirement associated with judicial deference based on 
subjective standard is viewed to be an intrinsic motivator as opposed to extrinsic. For 
the purpose of the differences of the two types of motivations; and how each of these 
types decides the effectiveness of judicial deference with one arguably leads to 
directors’ business creativity; and the other does not, will be discussed substantively 
in Chapter Four.   
Boyle has pointed out an interesting fact that the enforceability subjecting to the 
condition of the continuing of the lawsuit in the best interest of the company (if not 
borrowed from the American law) shares a remembrance to the role/function of the 
special litigation committee191 in American derivative lawsuit whereby, the court will 
discontinue the lawsuit once it is satisfied by the finding of the special litigation 
committee that the action was not in the interest of the company.192 This is a relevant 
and important part of this chapter as I shall demonstrate in the next subsection that 
                                                
190	 ibid	[11]	
191	 A	 special	 litigation	 committee	 is	 set	 up	 by	 an	 independent	 board	 of	 director	 with	 the	 aim	 to	
successfully	convince	the	court	(through	both	legal	and	commercial	factors)	to	discontinue	the	action	
–	Model	Business	Corporation	Act	§	7.42.	 	
192	 Boyle,	 ‘The	 Judicial	Review	of	 the	Special	 Litigation	Committee:	The	 Implications	 for	 the	English	
Derivative	Action	after	Smith	v.	Croft’	(1990)	Comp	Law	3	
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similar concept to discontinue a derivative claim has been inherited by the Companies 
Act 2006 through the test of a hypothetical director under sections 263(2)(a) and 
263(3)(b).    
Back to the basics, the proper plaintiff rule aimed to ensure managerial decision being 
taken properly by an independent and appropriate organ of the company (rather than 
the court), however, the exception to the proper plaintiff rule allowed the minority 
shareholders to take derivative action, subject to the conditions that the director in 
question, must control the company in a particular situation,193 or as the judge in 
Burland v. Earle described it as ‘… hold and control majority shares of the 
company …’194; and that this control could lead to the directors gaining personal 
benefits from the alleged wrong. This fraud on minority rule massively restricted 
shareholders’ derivative remedies against directors to be available in the situations. 
For instance, where ‘the company had suffered a wrong but the wrongdoer were in 
control of the company, and preventing it from initiating an action against them in 
respect of that wrong.’195  Coupled with the internal management rule, it can be said 
that that the judicial deference on derivative action was, in common law, an indication 
of the court’s diffidence in interfering with directors’ business judgment.  
                                                
193	 ‘…a	derivative	claim	is	necessary	only	where	there	is	a	dispute	between	a	member	of	a	company	
and	 its	director	over	the	merits	of	bringing	a	claim	(which	alternatively	will	be	a	dispute	with	other	
members	 over	 the	merits	 of	 ratifying	 a	wrong	 so	 as	 to	 terminate	 the	 company’s	 cause	 of	 action).’	
Mayson	and	French	and	Ryan,	Company	Law	(23rd	edn,	OUP	2006-2007)	664	 	 	
194	 [1902]	AC	83	(PC)	93	
195	 Keay	and	Loughrey,	 ’Something	Old,	 Something	New	and	Something	Borrowed’	 (2008)	124	LQR	
469,	472;	see	also	generally,	Demetra	Arsalidou,	‘Litigation	Culture	and	the	New	Statutory	Derivative	
Claim’	(2009)	Co	Law	30(7)	206;	Cabrelli,	‘Derivative	Actions:	Part	of	Minority	Shareholders’	“Forensic	
Arsenal”	in	Scotland’	(2003)	SLT	73,	74	 	 	
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In other words, the judicial control of derivative action existed due to the courts’ 
reluctance to get involved in the internal management of the company. Consequently, 
claims such as ordinary negligence would not have been eligible for the permission 
from the court to proceed with the derivative action,196 as derivative action must have 
been brought against the directors on the ground of fraud on minority.  For instance, 
in the case of Smith v. Croft (No.2) the judge said:  
In my judgment … votes should be disregarded if, but only if, the court is 
satisfied either that the vote or its equivalent is actually cast with a view to 
supporting the defendants rather than securing benefit to the company, or that 
the situation of the person whose vote is considered is such that there is 
substantial risk of that happening.  The court should not substitute its own 
opinion but can, in my view, assess whether the decision-making process is 
vitiated by being or being likely to be directed to an improper purpose.197 
This explains the reason as to why cases against director’s ordinary negligence prior 
to Companies Act 2006 were brought against directors by companies’ liquidator in 
the insolvency of the companies, which in turn, represented an indirect way to which 
shareholders could derivatively instigate legal action against directors for their 
                                                
196	 See	Pendell,	‘Derivative	Claims:	A	Practical	Guide’	(2007)	Co	LN	1;	and	David	Kershaw,	‘The	Rule	in	
Foss	v.	Harbottle	is	dead:	Long	Live	the	Rule	in	Foss	v.	Harbottle’	(2015)	JBL	274-302,	274	
197	 [1988]	CH	114	(Ch)	186.	See	also	Pavlides	v.	Jensen	[1956]	(CH)	565	(Ch)	the	director	was	not	held	
to	have	gained	personal	advantage	from	his	business	decision,	thus	the	minority	shareholder	was	not	
entitled	to	bring	the	derivative	action.	
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negligence.198 Also, as pointed out by Armour et all that the wrongdoer’s control rule 
had rendered the standing to bring a derivative action extremely difficult, particularly 
to public trading companies. This was ‘due to rarity of blockholders’ combining with 
the concept of fraud on minority which requires the involvement of the wrongdoers 
gaining personal benefits from the alleged transaction at the company’s cost.’199   
As pointed out by academic writers such as Boyle, that this diffidence of the court to 
interfere with the business judgment of the directors was further manifested in the 
case of Smith v. Croft (No.2),200 whereby the court took steps to ensure the degree of 
difficulty in achieving the enforcement of derivative action by minority shareholders 
under the wrongdoer’s control rule through ’the most innovative feature’ known 
as ’majority within the minority’.201 Or as Stallworthy described, ‘the minority 
applicant will … be required to adduce evidence of majority support amongst the 
so-called independent minority.’202 This means that even if the claimants were 
minority shareholders, when taking out the majority directors/shareholders from the 
equation, the claimants became the minority within the group of non-directors – 
shareholders, then the Foss v. Harbottle exception could not apply. Consequently, the 
claimant would lose the right to sue.  In other words, derivative action would not 
                                                
198	 See	for	instance,	Barrett	v.	Duckett	[1995]	1	BCLC	243	(CA)	as	cited	by	David	Kershaw,	‘The	Rule	in	
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have been allowed if the decision of the majority shareholder not to sue had been 
taken independently of the directors targeted to be sued. This is because the decision 
not to sue would not constitute fraud on minority unless the decision was not taken in 
good faith and in the interest of the company.203 Looking at this from a simpler 
perspective, it can be said that the majority shareholders represented the company; 
and the court reverted to the principle of Foss v. Harbottle by not allowing derivative 
action when the company could not or unwilling to litigate.  
This broad extent of judicial deference shared a striking resemblance to the American 
concept of business judgment rule. This is so, in the sense that both rules precluded 
actions, such as action on ordinary negligence against the director satisfying a number 
of pre-conditions. Namely, acting in good faith without an element of self-interest 
through majority control or fraudulent on minority shareholders (Shaw v. Davis204; 
Kessler v. Ensley Co.205; Daniels v. Daniels206 & Grobow v. Perot;207 and Black v. 
Fox Hill North Community Assoc.208). In addition, the underlying principle for the 
judicial deference on both systems was based on judges’ diffidence to interfere with 
the decision-making powers of the director. As the judge in Kamin v. American 
                                                
203	 Smith	v.	Croft	(No.2)	[1988]	Ch	114	(Ch)	186	
204	 28A.	621	[1894]	
205	 123	Fed.	558	[1903]	
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Express Co209 stated that ’The director’s room rather than the courtroom is the 
appropriate forum for thrashing out purely business decisions which will have an 
impact of on profits, market prices, competitive situations or tax advantages.’ 
Similarly, the judge stated in Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb:210 
I think it extremely likely that many a judge, or many a person versed by long 
experience in the affair of mankind, as conducted in the mercantile world, will 
know that there is a great deal more trust, a great deal more speculation, and a 
great deal more readiness to confide the probability of things with regard to 
success in mercantile transactions, than there is on the part of those whose 
habits of life are entirely of a different character. It would be extremely wrong 
to import into the consideration of the case of a person acting as a mercantile 
agent in the purchase of a business concern, those principle of extreme caution 
which might indicate the course of one who is not at all inclined to invest his 
property in any venture of such a hazardous character.  
SUMMARY 
As opposed to company directors’ responsibilities relating to their internal 
control or functions, the legal position relating to derivative action against company 
directors in the context of their business judgment (prior to 2006 Act) was that the 
                                                
209	 383	NYS	2d	807	[1976]	Supreme	Court	as	cited	by	Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	‘The	Business	Judgment	
Rule	as	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57	Vand	L	Rev	98,	117	 	
210[1872]	LR	5	(HL)	480,	495	 	
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court adopted a very strict deferential approach. As the court was to affirm the 
fundamental principle of proper plaintiff’s rule through the right in decision making 
of the company exercisable by its collective shareholders and board of directors  
(all known as the appropriate independent organ of the company), directors were 
implicitly and indirectly protected by the court. Additional reasons for the judicial 
deference included the prevention of the non-business expert judges to second 
guess the business decision/judgment of directors, thereby risking the company 
being controlled of its corporate destiny; and excessive cases from clogging up the 
court system. Derivative action on ordinary negligence was thereby literally not 
possible unless the ‘wrongdoer’s control rule’ through element of fraud on minority 
can be established by the shareholders to the satisfaction of the court. Even if the 
wrongdoer’s control rule can be established, judicial deference could still be 
applied if the court was satisfied that the decision not to sue by way of business 
judgment was taken by the directors or other appropriate independent organ such as 
other shareholders; for the benefit of the company (Smith v Croft (No. 2)211) or that 
the directors’ business judgment was made, regardless of its correctness, if ‘bona 
fide arrived at’.212   
  
                                                
211	 [1988]	Ch	114	(Ch)	6	
212	 Howard	Smith	Ltd	v.	Ampol	Petroleum	Ltd	[1974]	AC	821	(PC)	834	 	
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LEGISLATED DEFERENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF DIRCETORS’ 
BUSINESS JUDGMENT - THE POSITION UNDER THE COMPANIES 
ACT 2006 
In the following section, I shall look into the changes of which the Companies Act 
2006 has brought upon the common law judicial deference (relating to directors’ 
business judgments) as per my discussion in the preceding sections. This section will 
demonstrate that despite the abolition of certain aspects of the common law judicial 
deference, the courts have retained the deferential approach on directors’ business 
judgment. This section will discuss how the relevant legislation is operated by the 
judges and where the legislated can be located.  
The common law strict extent of judicial deference has been significantly altered 
since the passing of Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006.213  The current consensus 
amongst lawyers and academic writers such as Gibbs, Kershaw, Lowry & Reisberg, 
Arsalidou, Almadani and Adeyeye is that the control of wrongdoers rule has been 
arguably abolished by the Companies Act 2006.214 This interpretation is witnessed by 
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Pearsson,	 2009)	 250;	 Davies,	 Gower	 and	 Davie,	 Davies,	 Gower	 and	 Davie’s	 Principles	 of	 Modern	
Company	 Law	 (8th	 edn,	 Sweet	 and	Maxwell	 2008)	 615	 all	 cited	 by	 Kershaw	 in	 ‘The	 Rule	 in	 Foss	 v.	
Harbottle	is	Dead:	Long	Live	the	Rule	in	 	 Foss	v.	Harbottle’	(2015)	JBL	2-26	
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the fact that as opposed to the common law, under the Act, derivative claims are now 
made available to shareholders against director’s negligence etc. (Section 260(3)). 
This  means that the relevant sections are not strictly a codification of the common 
law.215 This is further supported by the legislative history of Part 11 which would 
provide a clear indication of the enactment which is based on the Law Commission’s 
recommendations to abolish the control of wrongdoers’ rule with an aim to place 
companies to greater exposure to derivative claims. As overtly stated by Keay and 
Loughry that  
The aim behind this innovation, which is largely based upon the 
recommendations of the Law Commission, is the simplification and 
modernisation of the law in order to improve its accessibility.216  To achieve 
this, the arcane rule in Foss v. Harbottle, and the concept of ‘fraud in minority’ 
and ‘wrong doer’s control’, have been discarded and replaced by a judicial 
discretion to grant permission, which to be exercised by reference to statutory 
criteria set out in ss. 261-263 of the Act.217   
                                                
215	 'New CPRs	 Published	 for	 Statutory	 Derivative	 Claim'	 (2007)	 Co	 LN	 13,	 14;	 J.	 Paul	 Sykes,	 ’The	
Continuing	Paradox:	A	Critique	of	Minority	Shareholder	and	Derivative	Claims	under	the	Companies	
Act	2006’	 (2010)	CJQ	2-25,	8;	Kershaw,	 ’The	Rule	 in	Foss	v.	Harbottle	 is	dead:	Long	Live	 the	Rule	 in	
Foss	 v.	 Harbottle’	 (2015)	 JBL	 2,	 2.;	 Slaughter	 &	 May	 Online	 Article	 (2007)	
https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/39392/companies_act_2006_-_directors_duties_derivativ
e_actions.pdf;	accessed	2017	
216	 La	Commission,	Shareholder	Remedies:	Report	on	a	Reference	under	Section	3(1)(e)	of	 the	Law	
Commission	Act	 recommendations	 in	England	and	Wales	 (Law	Com.	No.	246,	Cm.	3769,	1997)	7	as	
cited	by	Keay	and	Loughrey,	 ’Something	Old,	Something	New	and	Something	Borrowed’	 (2008)	124	
July	LQR	469	 	
217	 ibid	482	
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The abolition of the common law wrongdoer’s control rule means that judicial 
deference is no longer automatically applicable to a proposed derivative claim. In 
other words, shareholders failure to establish any personal gain on the director’s 
majority control does not preclude the possibility of the director being sued, e.g., for 
negligence.218 However this does not mean an abolition of judicial deference all 
together at the enforcement stage of a derivative claim, nor does it indicate a 
reduction in the degree of deference. As I shall demonstrate in the latter part of this 
section, courts are still very much diffident in interfering with directors’ business 
decisions/judgments. In other words, the traditional common law concept of decision 
made bona fide by an independent appropriate organ of the company; and the judicial 
respect of Directors’ business judgment can still very much be found throughout Part 
11 of Companies Act 2006.  To understand this, I would first briefly introduce the 
judicial procedures under the Act and conceptually lead up to the aspects of which 
legislated deference is located.  
Kershaw has said that under Companies Act 2006: 
… once the action has been commenced the derivative claimant must apply to 
court for permission to continue the litigation just as under the old rules a 
litigant had to obtain permission to bring a derivative action in a preliminary 
hearing. The Act provides for a two-stage permission process. At the first stage 
                                                
218	 Gibbs,	 ‘Has	 the	 Statutory	 Derivative	 Claim	 Fulfilled	 its	 Objectives?	 A	 Prima	 Facie	 Case	 and	 the	
Mandatory	Bar:	Part	1’	(2011)	Co	Law	 	
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the court must determine on the evidence filed with the application whether 
there is a ‘prima facie case for giving permission’. At the second stage, where 
the permission decision is made, evidence from the company will also be 
admissible.219  
It has been taken that the new regime of the 2006 Act had set a lower standard as the 
burden of proving a prima facie case appears to have been now lifted from the 
shareholders as in the case of Wishart.220 Where the judge said that the burden of 
establishing a prima facie case should not be placed upon the shareholders, rather, it is 
for the court to disapprove a prima facie case if there is to be a refusal on permission 
to continue. In Wishart, to establish a prima facie case, the judge dealt with a number 
of basic elements including identifying the applicant as members of the company, the 
derivative nature of the application and the cause of action and facts relating to the 
application.221  The Wishart approach was adopted by the judge in a subsequent case 
in England and Wales known as Stimpson v. Southern Landlord Association.222  
                                                
219	 David	Kershaw,	 ‘The	Rule	 in	Foss	v.	Harbottle	 is	dead:	 Long	Live	 the	Rule	 in	 	 Foss	v.	Harbottle’	
(2015)	 JBL	2	7;	and	Keay	and	Loughrey,	 ‘Something	Old,	Something	New	and	Something	Borrowed’	
(2008)	124	LQR	469,	482	&	483;	Lightman,	‘The	Role	of	the	Company	at	the	Permission	Stage	in	the	
Statutory	Derivative	Claim’	 (2011)	CJQ	 	 30(1)	23,	24-28;	 Tang,	 ’Shareholders’	Remedies:	Demise	of	
the	Derivative	Claim?’	 	 (2012)	UCL	178	 	
220	 [2009]	CSIH	65	(CSIH);	2009	SLT	812,	[31].	See	also	Keay	and	Loughrey	’Derivative	Proceedings	in	
Brave	New	World	for	Company	Management	and	Shareholders’	(2010)	JBL	3	 	
221	 Keay	and	Loughrey	 ’Derivative	Proceedings	 in	Brave	New	World	 for	Company	Management	and	
Shareholders’	(2010)	JBL	3	 	
222	 [2010]	 BCC	 387	 (Ch)	 H13.8. See	 also Keay	 and	 Loughrey	 ’Derivative	 Proceedings	 in	 Brave	 New	
World	for	Company	Management	and	Shareholders’	(2010)	JBL	3	 	 	
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However, Lewison J. in Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd223 disagreed with Wishart 
approach and reverted the burden of establishing a prima facie case back to the 
applicants citing that this was a correct approach laid down in Prudential Assurance 
Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd.224 
If Lewison J.’s interpretation in Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd was correct, Keay has 
suggested that it would be sensible to mean that both first and second stages of the 
application being combined into one. Otherwise, it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, for one to disguise the nature of the two stages.225  However, duplication 
of works will be involved which is likely to result in higher cost. To this end, Keay 
has suggested that the first stage is only likely to involve limitations, ‘… to making 
sure that a claim is not bogus and should involve the court ensuring that the applicant 
is a member of the company and the application relates to derivative proceedings, as 
required by the court in Wishart.’226 
The second stage is where the court’s diffident in second-guessing the managerial 
discretion is found. To demonstrate this, one has to first set out the basic 
understanding of the law. Under the second stage, the applicant must satisfy good 
faith requirement and under Section 263(2)(a) Companies Act 2006. Under the same 
                                                
223	 [2010]	BCC	420	(Ch)	
224	 [1982] Ch	204	(CA)	
225	 Keay	and	Loughrey	 ’Derivative	Proceedings	 in	Brave	New	World	 for	Company	Management	and	
Shareholders’	(2010)	JBL	3	
226	 Keay	and	Loughrey	 ‘Derivative	Proceedings	 in	Brave	New	World	 for	Company	Management	and	
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section, the courts must refuse permission to continue a derivative action ‘If the court 
is satisfied that the person acting in accordance with Section 172 (duty to promote 
success of the company) would not seek to continue the claim.’227 In this respect, the 
statute retains the old common law rule for the judge to discontinue the derivative 
action, on the ground that the decision not to sue was taken by an appropriate 
independent organ of the company, e.g., directors, in good faith and for the benefit of 
the company228 - Smith v Croft (No. 2) where the judge said that ‘If it is an expression 
of the corporate will of the company by an appropriate independent organ that is 
preventing the plaintiff from prosecuting the action he is not improperly but properly 
prevented …’ 229 
Section 172 Companies Act 2006 provides that: 
1)	 A	 director	 of	 a	 company	must	 act	 in	 the	way	 he	 considers,	 in	 good	 faith,	
would	be	most	likely	to	promote	the	success	of	the	company	for	the	benefit	of	
its	members	as	a	whole,	and	in	doing	so	have	regard	(amongst	other	matters)	
to—	
(a)	the	likely	consequences	of	any	decision	in	the	long	term,	
(b)	the	interests	of	the	company's	employees,	
                                                
227	 See	also	Gibbs,	‘Has	the	Statutory	Derivative	Claim	Fulfilled	its	Objectives?	A	prima	Facie	Case	and	
the	Mandatory	Bar:	Part	1’	(2011)	Co	Law	41	
228	 Taylor	v.	National	Union	of	Mineworkers	(Derbyshire	Area)	[1985]	BCLC	237	(HC)	225	6	
229	 [1988]	CH	114	(Ch)	184	
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(c)	 the	 need	 to	 foster	 the	 company's	 business	 relationships	 with	 suppliers,	
customers	and	others,	
(d)	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 company's	 operations	 on	 the	 community	 and	 the	
environment,	
(e)	the	desirability	of	the	company	maintaining	a	reputation	for	high	standards	
of	business	conduct,	and	
(f)	the	need	to	act	fairly	as	between	members	of	the company.	
(2)	 where	 or	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 company	 consist	 of	 or	
include	 purposes	 other	 than	 the	 benefit	 of	 its	 members,	 subsection	 (1)	 has	
effect	 as	 if	 the	 reference	 to	 promoting	 the	 success	 of	 the	 company	 for	 the	
benefit	of	its	members	were	to	achieving	those	purposes.	
(3)	 the	 duty	 imposed	 by	 this	 section	 has	 effect	 subject	 to	 any	 enactment	 or	
rule	of	 law	requiring	directors,	 in	certain	circumstances,	 to	consider	or	act	 in	
the	interests	of	creditors	of	the	company.	
The Companies Act 2006 contains further provision in Section 263(3)(b) requiring the 
judge to take compliance of Section 172 into account in exercising its discretion on 
whether or not to permit continuance of the action.  
However, on the basis that Section 263(2)(a) requires firmly that the judge to refuse 
permission if the claimant is not acting in accordance to Section 172 whilst Section 
263(3)(b) asks the judge to take Section 172 into account on discretionary basis, 
confusion has arisen amongst some lawyers. As the Act does not provide legal 
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certainty as to how Sections 263(2)(a) and 263(b) co-exist, Andrew Keay has 
suggested that: 
 … perhaps one solution is to say that the judges are given the flexibility ’in the 
face of uncertainty associated with the Section 172 hypothetical director 
determination,’ that is, if the judge is uncertain as to whether a person would 
decide whether or not to continue the claim, he or she will not reject the 
application under Section 263(2)(a) and then he or she can assess the probability 
of a director continuing the action in the context of the factors in Section 263(3) 
and (4).230  
This approach appears to be correct in the recent cases of Mission Capital plc v. 
Sinclair where the judge was under the opinion that the notional director would not 
discontinue the claim under Section 172, the judges was also under the opinion that 
such a notional director would put too much degree of importance on continuing the 
action when considering the relevant evidence and information, ‘... and so, the 
permission application failed ultimately.’231  
                                                
230	 Andrew	Keay,	 ‘Application	 to	 Continue	Derivative	 Proceedings	 on	 behalf	 of	 Companies	 and	 the	
Hypothetical	Director	Test’	 (2015)	CJQ	346,	360;	Mission	Capital	Plc	v	Sinclair	 [2008]	EWHC	1339	as	
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231	 [2009]	 EWHC	 1339	 (Ch);	 [2008]	 BCC	 866	 (Ch).	 See	 also	 Andrew	 Keay,	 ‘Application	 to	 Continue	
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As pointed out by Kershaw while Section 263(b) requires the court to take into 
account of compliance of Section 172 on the part of ‘a person’, it ‘does not specify 
who this hypothetical person is.’232 Kershaw further pointed out that one ’would 
expect the court to ask whether a reasonable director acting in accordance with 
Section 172 would not seek to continue the claim.’233 
Through the lens of a hypothetical reasonable director the court are being asked, in 
effect to make their own business judgment about whether it makes sense for the 
continue the action commenced by the shareholders. The court therefore, becomes the 
filter mechanism for distinguishing between the potential good and bad – from the 
company’s perspective – of derivative claim.234  
When determining whether or not a hypothetical director is acting in accordance with 
Section 172, he or she must first satisfy the good faith requirement. This is based on 
an objective test as stated by Pennychuick J in Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v. 
Lloyds Bank Ltd235 as follows: 
The proper test, I think, in the absence of actual separate consideration, must be 
whether an intelligent and honest man in the position of a director of the company 
concerned, could, in the whole of the existing circumstances, have reasonably 
believed that the transactions were for the benefit of the company. 
                                                
232	 Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	2012)	613	
233	 Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	2012)	613	
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This means that if the hypothetical directors had acted without independently taking 
the company’s interest into account, the decision not to continue the action of the 
hypothetical director would still be deemed to have taken in good faith if the objective 
test can be passed.  
Under normal circumstances, and as mentioned in the preceding section discussing 
the wrongdoer control rule in the common law, the test for the good faith requirement 
in common law relating to decision taken by an appropriate independent organ of the 
company (the hypothetical director in this case) in determining what are the interests 
of the company will be subjected to a subjective approach236 (subject to the exception 
where the decision is a complete irrational one as identified by Bowen J in Hutton v. 
West Cork Railway237  then an objective test will apply). If we take the common law 
approach, the subjective approach will be taken by the court as a benchmark to assess 
whether or not the hypothetical director had acted, in good faith, to promote the 
success of the company in the course of discontinuing the derivative claim (see for 
instance, Kiani v. Cooper238). As pointed out by Reed, the common law subjective 
approach is particularly relevant where the commercial factor as opposed to legal 
                                                
236	 Extarsure	Insurance	Limited	v.	Scattergood	[2003]	1	BCLC	(Ch)	[90],	[97]	 	
237	 [1883]	23	CH	654	(CA)	571	
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factor of which the courts have traditionally refused to second-guess company 
directors’ business judgment.239     
For the purpose of Section 263(2)(a), the good faith requirement is linked to the 
success of the company, in that, the basis of which a hypothetical director would 
believe that the continuing lawsuit would be in the interest of the company would 
much depend on the success rate of the case, the legal cost plus the amount of 
compensation to be obtained (Franbar Holdings Ltd v. Patel240, Kiani v. Cooper241 & 
Zavahir v. Shankleman242).  
However, the legal factor with the amount of financial compensation is not the only 
factor to be considered. As mentioned above, there are also commercial factors (or as 
this thesis consistently describe – business judgments) of which a judge might also 
consider in light of section 263(2)(a). In the case of Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd, 
Lewison J make the following statement with reference to the opinions of Warren J; 
and Mr William Trowell Q in Airey v. Cordell243; & Franbar Holdings Limited v. 
Patel244 respectively in an attempt to resolve the potential inconsistencies on what 
                                                
239	 Reed,	’Company	Directors	–	Collective	or	Functional	Responsibility’	(2006)	Com	Law	171	 	
240	 [2009]	1	BCLC	1	(Ch)	11	
241	 [2010]	BCC	(Ch)	[44]	
242	 [2016]	EWHC	1534	(Ch)	as	cited	by	Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	
OUP	2012)	613;	See	also,	Zavahir	v.	Shankleman	 [2016]	EWHC	2772	 (CH)	 (CH	D	 (Companies	CT))	as	
covered	in	Case	Comment,	‘Application	for	Permission	to	Continue	Derivative	Claim	Refused’	(2016),	
CLN	 	
243	 [2007]	 BCC	 (Ch)	 785,	 800	 -	 ’If	 the	 test	 of	 a	 reasonable	 board	 is	 to	 be	 applied,	 it	 has	 to	 be	
recognised	that,	in	many	cases	at	least,	a	decision	either	way	could	be	one	which	at	reasonable	board	
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view a reasonable director would take in deciding whether or not he is acting in 
accordance with Section 172: 
… where many cases in which some directors acting in accordance with Section 
172, would think it worthwhile to continue a claim at least for the time being, 
while others also acting in accordance with Section 172, would reach the 
opposite conclusion. There are, of course, a number of factors that a director, 
acting in accordance with Section 172, would consider in reaching his decision. 
They include; the size of the claim; strength of the claim …. Any disruption to 
the company’s activities whiles the claim is pursued …and so on the weighing 
of these consideration is essentially a commercial decision, which the court is 
ill-equipped to take, except in a clear case.245 
With regard to the above statement, Lewison J simply concluded that ’If some 
directors would and others would not, seek to continue the claim, the case is one for 
the application of section 263(3)(b).’246 Indeed, as we can see from the statement, 
whilst the judge in Iesini acknowledged that the commercial factors represent part of 
the factors in Section 172, he refused to take those factors into account for the 
purpose of section 263(2)(a). This refusal was based on the traditional ground of 
‘judges are ill-equipped to take’,247 or, to put it simply, from a famous legal 
                                                
245	 Iesini	v.	Westrip	Holdings	Ltd	[2009]	EWHC	(Ch)	[80]	as	cited	in	Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	
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246	 ibid	
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expression - ‘judges are not business experts’ as expressed by the judge in Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co.248 Even though the main purpose of Lewison J’s statement above 
was to address the application difference between sections 263(2)(a) and 263(3)(b), 
one can see the classical judicial behaviour of the court’s diffidence in interfering 
with company directors’ business judgment. Thus, preserving the business creative 
discretion of directors, by citing the lack of business expertise amongst the judges 
(except in the case of gross negligence).    
Indeed, as Gibbs puts it, that the judge was not equipped to get himself involved in 
considering the commercial factors/business judgments and would therefore, prefer to 
stay within the confinement of the law than within the commercial realm, in deciding 
whether or not a hypothetical director would continue the action - ‘demonstrating 
there was no breach of duty and where it was impossible to say whether there was 
negligence.’249   
The court’s decision in Iesini followed the footstep of the decision in Overend Gurney 
& Co v. Gibb where the judge took a deferential approach on the basis that the court 
was not a business expert; and that the business judgment or Non-Programmed 
(Creative) Business Decision-making 250  should be the prerogative of company 
directors who are more prepared ‘to confide in probabilities of things, with regard to 
                                                
248	 170	NW	668,	684	[Mich.	1909];	see	the	two	terms	are	used	inter-changeably	in	Kenneth	B	Davis,	Jr,	
‘Once	More,	The	Business	Judgment	Rule’	(2000)	Wis	Law	Rev	573,	580	
249	 Gibb,	 ‘Has	 the	 Statutory	 Derivative	 Claim	 fulfilled	 its	 Objectives?	 A	 Prima	 Facie	 Case	 and	 the	
Mandatory	bar:	Part	1’	(2011)	Co	Law	43	
250	 (n	95)	
 100 
success in mercantile transactions, than there is on the part of those habits of life are 
entirely of a different character’.251 With Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb, there was a 
clear judicial deference in favour of the director, whereas with Iesini, the reason of 
judges not being business experts was used only for the purpose of the dis-application 
of Section 263(2)(a), which result in permission being initially suspended and opened 
an opportunity for the judge to conclude deference under section 263(3)(b).  Though 
in different ways, both deferential approaches indicated that the courts are diffident to 
interfere with directors’ business judgments. In other words, this shows the court to be 
continuously reluctant to ‘disrespect’ the internal management rule through its 
diffidence to interfere with the business judgment of the directors. And as my Chapter 
Three will demonstrate giving insight into the nature of business judgment - where the 
business decision-making is a matter of creativity.   
In order to determine whether or not the business decision is a business judgment, i.e., 
a creative decision,252 the judges have shown the tendency to try to make sure that 
there is an absence of any predefined rule of which the assessment of the decision can 
be based upon. For instance, the judge in Overene & Guerney v. Gibb classified the 
business judgment as the types of business decision with ‘a great deal more 
speculation’ and a great deal of ‘probability of things’. Similarly, as in the case of 
Lesini, we can see that court in struggling to reach a certainty as to what constitute 
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certain commercial decision, and eventually due to the uncertainty (or the absence of 
any predefined rule of which the business decision-making is bound), the court 
concluded to move the request to continue the claim to section 263(3)(b). This is the 
section where a non-exhaustive list of commercial factors can be taken into account in 
determining whether or not to discontinue the claim. This is so, because of the 
unavailability of a definite position.253 And therefore, it is a matter of internal 
managerial discretion of the directors. Indeed, Lewison J does not rule out situations 
in a clear case of weighing the business and legal factors, the possibility of accepting 
those business factors (to discontinue the permission sought), which arguably, is in 
line with the provisions of Section 172 that consists of a list of non-litigious factors.  
This consequently widens the scope of the application of judicial deference on the 
basis that factors that could discontinue derivative action are non-exhaustive both 
from legal and business (and for the purpose of this thesis – commercial factor in line 
with business creativity) perspectives.   
Where the court is able to calculate the merit of the hypothetical directors’ decision to 
continue the action, the court will interfere. As these decision are not traditionally 
being regarded as business judgments due to their predictability as was not being the 
type of decision that was excluded from judicial intervention in the case of Overend 
Gurney and Co v Gibb.254 Reisberg255 and Gevurtz256 have identified a number of 
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demerits of derivative litigation, e.g., in order to preserve the confidence of directors 
in their business decision-making, the litigation would bear a consequential effect on 
future directors with sufficient liability insurance or a massive increase of salary as an 
inducement to directors which ultimately has the effect of off-setting the monetary 
compensation received from the directors. 
Section 263(3)(b) and court’s diffidence to interfere with directors’ business 
creative discretions: as confirmed by Lewison J and illustrated by the academic 
writers such as Kershaw and more precisely by Keay and Gibbs, the judicial 
deference under Section 263 adopts a two-stage approach. This means that if the 
judge is not sure as to whether or not to refuse to discontinue the claim under section 
263(2), the judge will not grant the permission under Section 263(2) and the judges 
then ’must exercise its discretion in determine whether a claim can continue.’257 
Section 263 followed the common law approach in regard to the non-exhaustive list 
of ‘probabilities of things’ 258  regarding the transactions in business world, by 
containing a non-exhaustive list of factors that the judge is required to take into 
account in exercising such discretion and as pointed out by Gibbs, Keay and Lourey 
that the court would therefore, be able to take all relevant considerations into 
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account.259  The court’s right to the non-exhaustive list under section 263 was 
affirmed by the court in a recent case known as Stimpson v Southern Landlords 
Association260 to include a hypothetical director acting in good faith in line with 
section 172. Following the non-exhaustive list of factors available to judges, it can be 
said that the common law approach of judges refusing to second-guess business 
judgment of directors in order to preserve the business creative/managerial discretion 
exclusive to the board acting as an appropriate independent organ of the company261 
remains a factor. In other words, the traditional factor as seen in Howard Smith Ltd v. 
Ampol Petroleum Ltd262; Smith v Croft (No. 2)263; and Extrasure Travel Insurances 
Limited v. Scattergood and Others 264  that judges are ill-equipped to assess a 
commercial factor would first be applied on a subjective good faith basis to ignore 
section 263(2)(a) as seen in Iesini, and would also be likely due to judges’ diffidence 
in interfering with corporate management, be a factor for the judges to exercise their 
discretion to discontinue the derivative claim under section 263(3)(b). And as a 
specific part of internal business decision, I would argue and demonstrate, from a 
psychology perspective, in the following chapters, that directors’ business creativity 
                                                
259	 Gibbs,	 ‘Has	 the	 Statutory	 Derivative	 Claim	 Fulfilled	 its	 Objectives?	 A	 prima	 Facie	 Case	 and	 the	
Mandatory	Bar:	Part	2’	 (2011)	Co	Law	81;	and	Keay	and	Loughrey,	 ‘Something	Old,	Something	New	
and	Something	Borrowed’	(2008)	124	LQR	469,	473;	and	Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	
Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	2012)	620	
260	 [2010]	 BCC	 387	 (Ch).	 See	 also	 case	 comment	 ‘Stimpson	 v	 Southern	 Landlords	 Association:	
Permission	 to	 Continue	Derivative	 Claim	 Refused’	 (2010)	 Co	 Law	 277,	 283-284;	 and	 see	 also	 Tang,	
‘Shareholders’	Remedies:	Demise	of	the	Derivative	Claim?’	(2012)	UCL	182	 	
261	 Carlen	v.	Drury	[1812]	35	ER	61	(Ch);	Smith	v	Croft	(No.	2)	[1988]	(Ch)	114	
262	 [1974]	UKPC	3	(PC)	 	
263	 [1988]	CH	114	(Ch)	
264	 [2002]	1	BCLC	598	(Ch)	[90],	[97]	
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and the psychological impact as a consequence of the derivative claim logically 
represent an essential factor that justifies the court’s diffidence, hence, judicial or 
legislated deference.   
The court showed a clear diffidence in second-guessing the director’s business 
judgment in an attempt to preserve the internal management discretion of the 
company directors in Kleanthous v. Paphitis. 265  Where Newey J followed the 
no-threshold on the merits principles laid down by Roth J in Stainer v Lee266 & Lord 
Reed in Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd267 to conclude the general commercial 
factors, such as the adverse effect of litigation on the director’s business decisions to 
cause disruption to the company employees’ morale as a whole, including the senior 
management; and (for the purpose of this chapter) most importantly, losing company 
directors which in turn, would damage the company’s future trade performance; and 
any damage to the company’s reputation ‘as a result of publicity and disclosure 
arising from the litigation’.268 All will have ‘much force’269 in judges’ minds with 
the consequential result in the discontinuing of the derivative action.  
                                                
265	 [2011]	EWHC	(Ch)	[71],	[72]	&	[75]	
266	 [2010]	EWHC	1539	(Ch)	as	cited	by	Newey	J	in	Kleanthous	v.	Paphitis	[2011]	EWHC,	(Ch)	[	40]	
267	 [2009]	CSIH	63	(CSIH)	[37]	as	cited	by	Newey	J	in	Kleanthous	v.	Paphitis	[2011]	EWHC	(Ch)	[71],	[72]	
&	[73]	
268	 Kleanthous	v.	Paphitis	[2011]	EWHC	(Ch)	[71],	[72]	&	[73].	Also	mentioned	in	Kershaw,	Company	
Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	2012)	613	 	
269	 Kleanthous	v.	Paphitis	[2011]	EWHC	(Ch)	[71],	[72]	&	[73].	Also	mentioned	in	EWHC	2287	as	cited	
by	Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	2012)	622	
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As pointed out by Newwey J following Lord Reed in Wishart v Castlecroft Securities 
Ltd, the decision of the judge in Paphitis case in considering to discontinue the action 
by putting ‘much force’270 on the business factors beyond the mere success chance of 
the claim is indeed, closer in line with the provision of Section 172, as the section 
require the directors to take into account of the company’s welfare in general. This is 
including non-litigation factors, such as the likely consequences of the business 
decision to the company in the long-run.271   
By placing business factors in line with Section 172 as a justification to discontinue 
the lawsuit would mean that the court is unwilling to interfere with directors’ business 
judgment. This is achieved (in the event that there is a conflict between the legal and 
business factors) through its recognition of the danger of the company having a great 
chance of success in winning a case awarding a substantial damage against the 
director, at the expense of detrimentally affecting the corporate management of the 
company which could, and I argue, result in de-motivation on the directors’ business 
creativity. And in long run, damaging the company’s economy.272 This deferential 
approach bears a striking remembrance to the US business judgment rule, whereby 
                                                
270	 ibid	[73]	
271	 Wishart	v	Castlecroft	Securities	Ltd	[2009]	CSIH	65	(CSIH)	[37]	as	cited	by	Newey	J	in	Kleanthous	v.	
Paphitis	[2011]	EWHC	(Ch)	[71]	–	it	should	be	noted	that	the	judge’s	decision	to	discontinue	the	claim	
in	Kleanthous	v.	Paphitiswas	was	not	solely	attributed	to	 judges	being	unequipped	to	deal	with	the	
directors’	 commercial	decision,	 it	was	also	based	on	other	non-commercial	decision	 factors	 such	as	
availability	 of	 alternative	 remedies,	 i.e.,	 unfair	 prejudice;	 and	 that	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 money	
would	end	up	being	 returned	 to	 the	defendant	directors	anyway.	The	commercial	 factor,	however,	
plays	a	key	role	in	influencing	the	judge’s	decision.	 	
272	 See	 Chapter	 Four	 relating	 to	 the	 significance	 of	 directors’	 business	 creativity	 in	 companies’	
business.	 	
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judges are not prepared to interfere with the directors’ business decision in the fear of 
directors becoming risk adverse with consequential damage to the company’s trade 
performance in the future.273  
In other words, the deterrent by way of monetary value awarded to the company in 
short run can be under-deterrent.   This line of rationality has been pointed out by 
Reisberg where, the continuing of derivative action may, as described by Reisberg, 
‘have a chilling effect’ on the director’s willingness of business risk taking, thus hurts 
the corporate management as a whole. 274  Although the judge’s decision to 
discontinue the claim in Kleanthous v. Paphitis was not solely attributed to judges 
being unequipped to deal with the directors’ commercial decision. It was also based 
on other non-commercial decision factors such as availability of alternative remedies, 
i.e., unfair prejudice; and that the distribution of the money would end up being 
returned to the defendant directors anyway. The willingness of the court to put ‘much 
force’275 on commercial factors in discontinuing the derivative action in Paphitis case 
demonstrates a strong judicial diffidence in interfering with delegated managerial 
discretion exercised by the hypothetical director).276 And (as per my discussion in the 
preceding section of the chapter) this goes back to the traditional view by the 
judiciary that the decision of continuing the derivative action must be made, bona fide, 
                                                
273	 Alfred.	F.	Conard,	‘A	Behavioral	Analysis	of	directors’	Liability	for	Negligence’	(1972)	Duke	LJ	904;	
and	Einsenbeg,	‘The	Duty	of	Care	of	Corporate	Directors’	(1989-1990)	51	U	Pitt	L	Rev	958-959	 	
274	 Reisberg,	‘Shareholders’	Remedies:	the	Choice	of	Objectives	and	the	Social	Meaning	of	Derivative	
Actions’	(2005)	EBEOR	6(2)	227,	239	
275	 Kleanthous	v.	Paphitis	[2011]	EWHC	(Ch)	[73]	
276	 ibid	[75]	
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by an appropriate independent organ in the interest of the company (Smith v Croft (No. 
2)277).  
SUMMARY 
The common law policy that derivative action is totally not actionable unless 
wrongdoer’s rule is satisfied has been abolished by Part 11 of the 2006 Act. This, 
however, does not lead to a reduction of the courts’ deferential behaviour at the 
enforcement stage. Nevertheless, it does mean a shift of focus on the judicial 
determination of the application of legislated deference. Courts are now prepared to 
entertain derivative claim even if the director has not made a personal gain through 
majority control, but only on the basis that the action was justified by way of good 
faith and in the interest of the company. This in turn, broadens the scope of legislated 
deference through a list of non-exhaustive factors (both legal and business factors) 
that can be considered by the court. The availability of the non-exhaustive list of 
commercial factors under section 262(3)(b) reflects the court’s traditional approach to 
refrain from second-guessing directors’ business judgment. 
In other words, rather than judicial deference based on the limited scope of the 
application of wrongdoer’s control rule/fraud on minority, courts are finding 
themselves now in the position of able to adopt the deferential approach. A deferential 
approach closer in line with the prior common law approach to avoid minority 
                                                
277	 [1988]	CH	114	(Ch)	
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shareholders in disrupting the creative decision-making (or business judgment) of the 
board. This is done by having a wider discretionary power/task in determining 
whether or not the presumption of legislated deference can be rebutted by the 
shareholders. Shareholders are now subject to the hypothetical directors’ test with the 
risk of failing to continue the claim under a non-exhaustive list of factors from which, 
the judges can take the view that, from a bona fide perspective of a hypothetical 
director, the continuation of the derivative claim is not in the best interest of the 
company; hence legislated deference be applied.  
With the wider discretionary power contained in the Companies Act 2006, the court 
has in recent cases exercised a strong diffidence in interfering with managerial 
discretion of company directors in the face of the statutory procedures. The legislated 
deference, expressed in the cases, e.g., Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd,278  
Smith v Croft (No. 2)279 & Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd280 through the 
underlying principles that the business judgment being made, bona fide, by an 
appropriate independent organ (now the hypothetical director) of the company 
remains a commonplace - Stimpson v Southern Landlords Association 281 ; & 
Kleanthous v. Paphitis.282 As pointed out by Gibbs, ’Directors still have upper hand 
                                                
278	 [1974]	UKPC	3	(PC)	
279	 [1988]	CH	114	(Ch)	
280	 [1900]	1	CH	656	(CA)	
281	 [2010]	BCC	387	(CA)	
282	 [2011]	EWHC	(Ch)	2287	 	
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in these claims … the so-called balancing act of meritorious claims against directors’ 
good faith decision is skewed heavily towards directors.’283 
However, as the 2006 Act is still relatively young in comparison to its common law 
predecessor or the US business judgment rule, the statutory exposition under Section 
263 to assist judges to apply the legislated deference contains a non-exhaustive list of 
business factors which is opened to further exploring and analysis. This thesis aims to 
contribute to the understanding of: 1. the significance of business 
creativity284/business judgment as an appropriate basis underpinning judicial or 
legislated deference in directors’ business decisions, with the desiring effect of being 
in the interest of the company; and 2. how the absence of the legislated deference can 
be against the interest of the company by way of de-motivating directors’ business 
creativity. All these issues will be identified with a solid theoretical basis that leads to 
the formulation of a particular type of business decision, from a management 
psychology perspective, known as programmed and Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decision.     
MOTIVATION, CREATIVITY, SECTIONS 263 & 172 
‘Business creativity’ being part of delegated form of managerial discretion to 
board of directors acting as an appropriate independent organ of the company. Section 
                                                
283	 Gibbs,	 ’Has	 the	 Statutory	 Derivative	 Claim	 Fulfilled	 its	 Objectives?	 A	 prima	 Facie	 Case	 and	 the	
Mandatory	Bar:	Part	2’	(2011)	Co	Law	82	
284	 (n127)	
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172 requires the directors to promote the success of the company; and to do so 
requires the directors to take into account of a list of general factors such as the likely 
consequence of the business decision in the long run and the need to foster the 
company’s relation with its suppliers, customers and others all embodied in the 
delegated form of managerial discretion. It can be strongly argued that business 
creativity represents a specific factor that permeates most, if not all, the general 
factors on Section 172 list. 
In recent cases such as Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd;285 and Kleanthous v. 
Paphitis,286 judges have repeatedly expressed the significance of business creativity 
through the recognition of losing of directors and their business skills as commercial 
factors damaging the trade performance of the company to justify judicial/legislated 
deference. 
Not all types of business decisions are of creative nature, therefore, the objective 
standard of conduct based on a hypothetical director (within the context of Sections 
263(2)(a) and/or 263(3)(b)) will be part of the central focus relating to the necessity of 
my proposed judicial/legislated deference based on types of business decisions. It is 
the aspect of working out a mechanism of an existing concept of section 172 – 
judicial/legislated deference based on business creativity, that I shall borrow the 
normative approach of US business judgment rule with an explanation of the 
                                                
285	 [2009]	CSIH	65(CSIH)	
286	 [2011]	EWHC	(Ch)	
 111 
underlying justification from psychology which is primarily based on a set of clearly 
predefined conditions to give a clearer picture of the objective benchmark based on a 
hypothetical director.    
The above will lead to my following chapters, with chapter three dedicated to explore 
critically the traditional justifications for judicial/legislated deference; and chapters 4, 
5 and 6 which will be respectively dedicated to the research of the significance of 
creativity in the context of the company’s business and judicial deference from a 
psychology perspective; types of business decisions for the justification of application 
or non-application of judicial/legislated deference (for instance, business judgment vs 
directorial responsibility on internal control); and how my proposed system that 
specifically focus on ‘motivation’ and ‘creativity’ operates within the enforcement 
stage of derivative claim. 
With the end result, this research aims to demonstrate a better understanding and 
enhancement of the justification for company law’s deference under the enforcement 
stage of derivative claim, by demonstrating the operation of the law based on the 
mechanism involving my proposed types of business decisions.  
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the judicial deference within the British legal 
system in the context of company directors’ business decisions relating to the pre and 
post Companies Act 2006 eras.   
The judicial interference has taken place in the matters relating to directors’ duties in 
supervision or internal control. However, judicial deference remains constantly 
applicable in the matters relating to directors’ business judgment.  
With regards to derivative actions initiated by company shareholders, judicial 
deference insulating company directors from liability in the context of their business 
decision has been in existence within the British common law for over a century. 
There was almost no limitation as to the extent of the judicial deference, as derivative 
actions brought by shareholders of the company against company directors were 
mostly and practically not actionable. With the exception of the situation where the 
director in question retains majority control of the company; and that the directors had 
obtained personal interest as a result of their “majority control” from the transaction.  
The courts’ diffidence to interfere with the company’s management was based on the 
bona fide business judgment exercised by an appropriate independent organ of and in 
the interest of the company.  
The rule of wrongdoer’s control was abolished by Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006. 
Derivative claim is now also available to company members acting, in good faith, 
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without having to satisfy the fraud on minority on the part of the board. However, this 
does not lead to the extinction of judicial deference. The current extent of the 
deference legislated by the Act, signifies a departure from the traditional wrongdoer’s 
control rule/fraud on minority, and substitutes it with a deference embodied by a more 
sophisticated rule. In other words, shareholders who initiate the claim has to satisfy 
the hypothetical director test within the provision of Sections 263(2)(a) and 263(3)(b) 
under which the shareholders would have to convince the court that based on Section 
172, the hypothetical director would continue the derivative claim in good faith and in 
the interest of the company. From this perspective, one can see that the statute retains 
the common law principle laid down in the cases such as Taylor v. National Union of 
Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area),287 whereby the directors’ decision not to sue was 
not deemed a fraud on minority, provided the decision not to sue was taken, in good 
faith, and for the benefit of the company. Whilst the legislation continues to preserve 
the common law principle of respecting the managerial discretion of directors, acting 
as an appropriate independent organ of the company, the new law provides the judges 
with a ‘space’ to identify the type of business decisions that are of creative nature 
( which is in line with business judgments as described by the judge in Overend & 
Gurney v. Gibb288) that justify legislated deference. Consequently, this list of factors 
that judges would consider to be in the interest of the company is now non-exhaustive. 
It follows that Part 11 of the 2006 Act reveals that legislated deference on matters of 
                                                
287	 [1985]	BCLC	237	(HC)	255	
288	 [1872]	LR	5	(HL)	580	
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bona fide business judgment exercised by appropriate independent organ, in the 
interest of the company still operates within the Act. This thesis will demonstrate the 
justifications of British judicial and legislated deference, from perspectives of 
psychology; management and economics aspects of creativity. This thesis will lead up 
to the clarification of the availability of judicial or legislated deference determined by 
the types of business decision with creativity being the central factor.   
Unlike judicial deference relating to the matters of business 
judgment/Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions, 289  the standard of 
conduct (a test representing a judicial benchmark in which judges can assess the scope 
of directors’ duties in determining negligence) relating to the issue of internal control, 
oversight and the continuing possession of the relevant business skills has been the 
subject of debate and development in common law. The legal development being seen 
to be divided into pre-1990s and post-1990s with the court shifting from a judicial 
deference based on a passively low and modest legal expectation of skill and care 
based on a subjective test to a much more stringent approach through the introduction 
of the dual (objective and subjective) standard of care. Directors are now expected to 
be active as well as possessing the relevant skills in the company’s business.  This in 
effect leads to the extinction of judicial deference in the context of internal control 
and supervision.  
                                                
289	 (n127)	
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As the position of Section 174 Companies Act 2006 represents a codification of the 
common law approach; therefore, it is safe to conclude that judicial deference in the 
context of internal control, supervision and possession of the relevant skill for the 
company’s business remains extinct.  
In the next chapter, the focus will be on the justification of judicial or legislated 
deference based on the traditional factor known as “judges are not business experts” 
or “judges are ill-equipped” to assess company directors’ business judgment. Linking 
the discussion of its true meaning to company directors’ business creativity.   
  
 116 
CHAPTER THREE - JUDGES ARE NOT BUSINESS 
EXPERTS – A CONVENIENT MISUNDERSTANDING 
CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Two, I established that (in the same way as American business 
judgment rule) the UK judicial deference exists in the context of company directors’ 
negligence relating to their business judgment. I have also pointed out that the 
justification given by the judges to back up this deferential policy on the ground that 
UK courts are not commercially trained to judge business judgments (as coined by 
this thesis, from a psychology perspective, Non-Programmed (Creative) Business 
Decisions). Chapter Two, therefore, raises an interesting question, i.e., how does the 
argument based on judges’ business expertise actually represent the justification? In 
other words, when the judge said that he is not a business expert or commercially 
equipped to deal with director’s business judgment, does such a statement refer to the 
business expertise of the judges or the directors’ business creativity irrespective of the 
availability of the judges’ business expertise?  
This Chapter aims to critically examine the main argument known as ‘judges are not 
business experts’ traditionally raised by the academic writers, such as Bainbridge;290 
and judges in the American and the British cases (seemingly implied) respectively. 
                                                
290	 Stephen	M.	 Bainbridge,	 ‘The	Business	 Judgment	 Rule	 as	 Abstention	Doctrine’	 (2004)	 57	Vand	 L	
Rev	83	
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For instance, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co291 and Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd292 in 
favour of company law’s deference to protect the directors’ business decisions.   
My overall objective of this Chapter is to adopt a doctrinal approach by 
demonstrating that the issue of judges’ business expertise has been a long-standing 
misconception amongst the academics and practitioners, as the justification of the 
judicial and legislated deference. I will also adopt normative approach by critically 
examining the law’s relevant value position, i.e., that when judges’ refused to 
second-guess directors’ business decisions on the ground that, as judges, they 
were/are not business experts or commercially equipped to interfere with those 
business decisions, the relevant justifications were based on the directors’ 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions (a type of business decision that is 
not bound by any predefined rule (as fully discussed in Chapter Five); and satisfies 
the psychology definition of creativity (as set out in Chapter Four of this thesis).  
The following provides greater detailed information in relation to the steps taken to 
achieve the objective: 
The argument to be discussed in this chapter is primarily based on the suitability of 
judges to judicially review company directors’ business decisions. In doing so, the 
research is conducted from a perspective on whether or not judges need to be business 
                                                
291	 [1919]	170	NW	668,	684	 	
292	 [2009]	BCC	420	(Ch)	[85]	
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experts as a pre-requisite condition (‘the Traditional Factor’) for dealing with the 
relevant cases.   
Arguments and analysis will be presented to reveal that the Traditional Factor is based 
on a number of faulty assumptions the academic writers such as Bainbridge and 
Davis.293 To reveal the true meaning of the Traditional Factor as a factor in support 
of judicial or legislated deference, this chapter will introduce the factor based on the 
business creativity in the form of types of decision taken by company directors. This 
will connectively lead to the system as concluded in Chapter Two, whereby, both US 
and UK judges will selectively apply judicial or legislated deference on derivative 
claims against ordinary negligence based on whether or not the business decision in 
question was Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision.  
This Chapter will demonstrate that the judicial system, in reality, does not suffer from 
shortage of business expertise due to the availability of business expert judges or 
business expert witnesses. The chapter will move on to discuss the existing 
counter-argument against judicial or legislated deference based on non-directorial 
professions. This would lead to the understanding of the difference of the types of 
decisions made between company directorship and other professions. The aim of this 
exercise is to support the justification of judicial or legislated deference exclusively in 
                                                
293	 Stephen	M.	 Bainbridge,	 ‘The	Business	 Judgment	 Rule	 as	 Abstention	Doctrine’	 (2004)	 57	Vand	 L	
Rev	83,	117	–	Bainbridge	focused	his	discussion	on	writers	such	as	Davis’	interpretation	on	the	factor	
relating	to	judges’	business	expertise;	and	Kenneth	B	Davis,	Jr,	 ‘Once	More	Business	Judgment	Rule’	
(2000)	Wis	Law	Rev	573	
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favour of a person acting in the capacity of a company director on the ground of 
business creativity. In other words, this will set out the foundation identifying the 
difference between non-directorial professions and company directors in terms of the 
nature of their decisions. Namely, the decisions that can be assessed by a predefined 
protocol (with sufficient degree of business expertise); and the decisions that are 
creative in nature which cannot be assessed by any predefined protocol, thus 
rendering the question of business expertise capacity immaterial.  
In addition, this Chapter will normatively demonstrate that the psychology theory of 
bounded rationality can be used to support the traditional justification of judicial or 
legislated deference – ‘judges are not business experts’ from the perspective of 
directors’ Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions. In other words, judges or 
business expert witnesses are more boundedly rational than company directors within 
the context of Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision-making for companies. 
This is because company directors have better access to business connection or 
resources such as the close commercial relationship with other companies; and control 
of the company’s assets. In addition, directors are not subject to the time-constrain of 
the judicial system, as opposed to judges, in their business decision-making process. 
These elements mean that company directors are better motivated and better equipped 
to make Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions in the interest of the 
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company than business expert judges (who are, in the absence of judicial or legislated 
deference, to second-guess the business decisions).294   
This chapter will conclude that some writers including Davis295 & Bainbridge296 
have misidentified the shortage of business expertise within the judicial system for 
directors’ business creativity as the justification for judicial or legislated deference.  
This Chapter will conclude that when the judges said that they were not business 
experts; or that they were not commercially equipped to interfere with the decisions of 
the directors, they meant that they were not physically297 and psychologically298 
equipped to second guess the Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions of the 
directors.     
This chapter paves the way to allow this thesis, by way of Chapter Four and Five, to 
examine judicial or legislated deference from a perspective of psychology (in 
creativity, motivation and types of business decisions) and demonstrate that the 
company law’s  deference motivates company directors’ business creativity.   
                                                
294	 The	psychology	concept	of	motivation	is	closely	linked	to	business	creativity	and	both	will	be	dealt	
with	in	full	details	in	Chapter	Four.	 	 	
295	 (n	294)	
296	 ibid	
297	 The	 absence	 of	 pre-defined	 benchmark	 to	 assess	 the	 Non-Programmed	 (Creative)	 Business	
Decisions	renders	the	availability	of	business	expertise	in	the	judicial	system	immaterial.	 	
298	 More	boundedly	rational	than	company	directors	resulted	in	less	motivation	to	second-guess	the	
Non-Programmed	Business	Decisions.	 	
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It should be noted that for the purpose of this Chapter (and throughout this thesis) 
the term Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision is used interchangeably 
with the term – business judgment.   
THE TRADITIONAL FACTOR – ‘JUDGES ARE NOT BUSINESS 
EXPERT’ 
This section is to discuss the Traditional Factor used by the judges in both UK 
and US jurisdiction supporting judicial deference. The purpose of this section is to 
first enable the readers to understand the background of the Traditional Factor. Once 
the background is introduced, I will present my own analysis to demonstrate that the 
Traditional factors actually refers to the business creativity of the directors, as 
opposed to the questioning of the amount of business expertise within the judicial 
system to assess the business decisions of the directors.   
‘Judges are not business experts’299 represents one of the most famously quoted 
Traditional Factor by academic writers Davis & Bainbridge;300 and judges applying 
the business judgment rule. This Traditional Factor was explicitly given by the judge 
of Michigan Supreme Court in the case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co as a ground 
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justifying judicial deference to the business decision made by Henry Ford301 - the 
then director of Ford car manufacturing company.   
In his judgment, the judge further commented that, the fact that a business plan can be 
so sophisticated that: 
We are not, however, persuaded that we should interfere with the proposed 
expansion of the business of the Ford Motor Company. In view of the fact that 
the selling price of products may be increased at any time. The ultimate results 
of the larger business cannot be certainly estimated – The judges are not 
business experts.302  
The judge commented that the business plan, ’must often be made for a long future, 
for expected competition, for a continuing as well as an immediately profitable 
venture.’303 In other words, the judge meant that the business judgment is therefore, 
best to be left to the directors of the company who are more experienced in the 
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302	 Dodge	v.	Ford	Motor	Co	170	NW	668,	684	[Mich.	1919]	Rule	702	Federal	Rule	of	Evidence	2001	
defines	and	expert	as	a	person	with	‘scientific,	technical	or	other	specialized	knowledge’;	Cambridge	
Dictionary	as	‘A	person	with	high	level	of	knowledge	or	skill	relating	to	a	particular	subject	or	activity’	
Cambridge	Dictionary	http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/expert?q=expert+	accessed	
10th	September	2017;	or	by	the	definition	of	the	Expert	Witness	Institute	(EWI)	UK	as	’	the	expert	is	
anyone	with	specialist	knowledge	not	commonly	held,	or	 likely	 to	be	understood	by	a	 layman’	EWI	
http://www.ewi.org.uk/membership_directory_why_join_ewi/whatisanexpertwitness	 accessed	 June	
2017;	and	see	also	definition	of	expert	witness	in	para.	1.4.4.	
303	 Dodge	v.	Ford	Motor	Co	170	NW	668,	684	[Mich.	1919]	
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corporation’s business than the judges who are bound by the judicial paradigm. 
Judges are therefore, subject to ’more rigid training, more closely structured 
environment’304 than company directors.305 Looking at the issue from a slightly 
different perspective, we can summarily say that directors’ day-to-day business 
practice with their commercial experience being developed (in the context of the 
business world) makes them more suitable to make business decisions for the 
company (as in line with the statement of the judge in The Overend Gursey Co v. 
Gibb306). In view of this, I will argue that the term, ‘judges are not business experts’ 
should not be taken at its literal meaning referring to the insufficiency of the amount 
of business expertise in the judicial system.  Rather, it is the rigidity of the judicial 
system that prevents judges being less business creative than company directors. 
Judicial deference in this context is exercised by the judge in favour of the director, 
with the exception of the directors’ breach of duty of care that is so blatantly 
incompetent to a point that it does not require a business expert to evaluate the 
case.307  
                                                
304 	 Kirton	 and	 Pender,	 ‘The	 Adaption-Innovation	 Continuum.	 Occupational	 Type,	 and	 Course	
Selection’	 (1982)	 Psychol	 Rep	 Vol	 51,	 883	 as	 cited	 by	 Woodman	 et	 al,	 ‘Toward	 A	 Theory	 of	
Organizational	Creativity’	(1993)	Acad	of	Manag	Rev	Vol	18	No.2	293,	305	 	
305	 Stephen	M.	 Bainbridge,	 ‘The	 Business	 Judgment	 Rule	 as	 Abstention	Doctrine’	 (2004)	 57	Vand	 L	
Rev	 83,	 117.	 See	 Chapter	 Four	 for	 greater	 discussion	 on	 the	 judicial	 limitation	 from	 a	 psychology	
perspective.	 	
306	 [1872]	LR	5	(HL)	480,	495	as	cited	Marc	Moore,	Corporate	Governance	in	the	Shadow	of	the	State	
(Hart	Publishing	2013)	155	
307	 Melvin	A.	Eisenberg,	‘The	Duty	of	Care	of	Corporate	Directors	and	Officers’	(1989-1990)	51	U	Pitt	L	
Rev	945,	969	
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Following the latest part of the above paragraph that relates to directors’ obvious 
incompetency or gross negligence, a quick citing of examples of judicial interventions 
on directors’ business decisions, whereby the clarity of these cases present themselves 
are self-explanatory. These include the cases, for instance,the company director 
executed on behalf of the company an insurance form without first reading its content 
(Re D’Jan of London Ltd308); or the director made a completely uninformed decision 
leading to the substantial breach of directors’ duties in supervision (re Baring Plc and 
Others (No. 5)309). This view that judicial intervention would take place in a clear case 
relating to the gross incompetence of the director is also explicitly shared by another 
UK judge – Lewison J, in Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd. Consequently, this case led 
to the conclusion in support of judicial deference relating to directors’ business 
judgment by way of section 263(3)(b) Companies Act 2006 where there is a strong 
case supporting deference but not 100% conclusive.310 A corresponding US law case, 
whereby the director of a targeted company in a leveraged buy-out merger accepted a 
proposed sale price at an undervalue without having any prior consultation with any 
relevant financial experts to determine the actual value of the company. Consequently, 
                                                
308	 [1994]	1	BCLC	561	(Ch)	
309	 [1999]	1	BCLC	433	(Ch);	Kershaw,	Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	
OUP	2012)	428;	Tamo	Zwinge,	‘An	Analysis	of	Duty	of	Care	in	the	United	Kingdom	in	Comparison	with	
the	German	Duty	of	Care’	(2011)	ICCLR	31,	32	 	
310	 [2009]	BCC	420,	(Ch)	[85]	
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the court found the director grossly negligent; and allowed judicial intervention i.e., 
the director was not protected by business judgment rule (Smith v. Van Gorkam311).    
The decisions to insulate directors from negligence liability have been upheld by 
judges in a number of cases across both the UK and the US judicial spectrum. The 
substance of the justification for the legislated or judicial deference, appeared or 
prima facie to be the Traditional Factor questioning the availability of business 
expertise in the judicial system. For instance, in the UK, Lewison J’s approach to 
refuse to interfere with the director’s decision under section 236(2)(a), on the basis of 
the court being ‘ill-equipped’ to get itself to deal with the director’s business decision. 
This decision was subsequently affirmed by the judge in Stimpson v Southern 
Landlords Association.312  In the US, in Kamin v. American Express Co313 where the 
plaintiff shareholders brought a negligence action against the company director who 
had made the business decision to forfeit massive tax saving, as a result of their 
refusal to distribute dividends. The court ruled that the directors were entitled to the 
protection of the business judgment rule - ’The directors’ room rather than the 
courtroom is the appropriate forum for thrashing out purely business decisions 
                                                
311	 Smith	v.	Van	Gorkom	488	A	2d	858 [Del.	1985]	
312	 [2010]	BCC	387	 (Ch)	 as	 cited	 in	 the	 case	 comment	 ‘Stimpson	v	 Southern	 Landlords	Association:	
Permission	 to	 Continue	 Derivative	 Claim	 Refused’	 (2010)	 Co	 Law	 	 277,	 283-284;	 see	 also	 Tang,	
‘Shareholders’	Remedies:	Demise	of	the	Derivative	Claim?’	(2012)	UCL	182	 	
313	 383	NYS	2d	807	Supreme	Court	[1976]	
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which will have an impact of on profits, market prices, competitive situations or tax 
advantages.’314  
Three years after Kamin, the judges took the similar view in Auerbach v. Bennett. The 
Judge commented, ‘the responsibility for business judgments must rest with corporate 
directors; their individual capabilities and experience peculiarly qualify them for the 
discharge of that responsibility.’315 To support this view, the judge in Solash v. Telex 
Corp also said, ’Because businessmen and women are correctly perceived as 
possessing skills, information and judgment not possessed by reviewing courts … 
courts have long been reluctant to second guess such decisions when they appear to 
have been made in good faith.’316 
On the UK side, apart from Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd as mentioned above, other 
cases throughout the pre-2006 Act and post-2006 Act period, such as the Overend 
Gurney & Co v. Gibb;317 Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd;318 Allen v. Gold 
Reefs of West Africa Ltd;319 Smith v Croft (No. 2);320 Extrasure Travel Insurances 
Limited v. Scattergood and Others;321 and Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd322 are 
                                                
314	 383	 NYS	 2d	 807	 Supreme	 Court	 [1976]	 as	 cited	 by	 Stephen	 M.	 Bainbridge	 in	 ‘The	 Business	
Judgment	Rule	as	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57	Vand	L	Rev	98,	117	
315	 [1979]	 NYS	 393	N.E.	 2d	 994,	 1000	 as	 cited	 by	 Kenneth	 B.	 David,	 JR,	 ‘Once	More,	 The	 Business	
Judgment	Rule’	(2000)	WIS	L	Rev	573,	580	 	
316	 [1988]	(Del	CH)	13	Del.	J.	CORP.	L.	1250,	1262	as	cited	by	Kenneth	B.	David,	JR,	‘Once	More,	The	
Business	Judgment	Rule’	(2000)	WIS	L	Rev	573,	580	 	
317	 [1872]	LR	5	(HL)	580	
318	 [1974]	UKPC	3	(PC)	
319	 [1990]	1	CH	656	(CA)	
320	 [1988]	CH	114	(Ch)	
321	 [2002]	BCLC	598	(Ch)	
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cases where judges have all (if not amongst other non-commercial reasons – see for 
instance, the judges quoting in Kleanthous v. Paphitis the principles in Wishart v 
Castlecroft Securities Ltd (see ft 323 below)) refused to second-guess the business 
decision of the company. These were so, not just to preserve the decision-making 
power of the appropriate independent organ of the company, but also on the basis that 
the judges were simply not equipped to interfere with the business decision of the 
company.  This judicial diffidence in dealing with directors’ business resulted in 
only requiring the directors to satisfy good faith on subjective basis.  
It is interesting to note that whilst the UK judges have reached a similar conclusion on 
being diffident in interfering with directors’ decision that were regarded as business 
judgment, they were less explicit (as opposed to the American judges) as to how or 
where this judicial incompetence comes from.  
To look at the similarity of the expression used by both the UK and the US judges, the 
academic writer Gibbs said that that the judge was not equipped to get himself 
involved in considering the commercial factors and would therefore, prefer to stay 
within the confinement of the law than within the commercial realm in deciding 
whether or not a hypothetical director would continue the action. This demonstrated 
                                                                                                                                      
322	 [2009]	CSIH	63	(ED)	[37]	as	cited	by	Newey	J	in	Kleanthous	v.	Paphitis	[2011]	EWHC	2287	(Ch)	[71],	
[72]	&	[73].	Note:	the	judge’s	decision	to	discontinue	the	claim	in	Kleanthous	v.	Paphitiswas	was	not	
solely	attributed	to	judges	being	unequipped	to	deal	with	the	directors’	commercial	decision,	 it	was	
also	based	on	other	non-commercial	decision	factors	such	as	availability	of	alternative	remedies,	i.e.,	
unfair	 prejudice;	 and	 that	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 money	 would	 end	 up	 being	 returned	 to	 the	
defendant	directors	anyway.	 	
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that, ‘there was no breach of duty and where it was impossible to say whether there 
was negligence.’323 In other words, one is tempted to infer that whilst the term 
‘judges are not business experts’ were not specifically used by the judges in the UK, 
the judges were diffident in interfering with directors’ business judgment because 
they did not view themselves as business or commercial experts. Arguments will be 
presented in the latter part of this chapter that, in reality, the judges, instead of 
viewing themselves as not being business experts, they viewed themselves as being 
less business creative than company directors.  
Going back to the case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co,324 according to the judge, an 
example of judicial deference based on ‘judges are not business experts’ can be 
demonstrated in the situation, where a long-term business plan can be so sophisticated 
that involved elements of uncertainty. These elements of uncertainty resulted in a 
non-business expert judge to fail to recognize that the business plan had been 
formulated to achieve the success of the company’s business in the long-term at the 
expense of dividends payments to the shareholders in the short-term.  
This can be demonstrated in a typical business example where the company director 
decides to invest the profits to increase the number of new plants as a result of the 
director’s business judgment expecting an increase of demand for the company’s 
                                                
323	 Gibb,	 ‘Has	 the	 Statutory	 Derivative	 Claim	 fulfilled	 its	 Objectives?	 A	 Prima	 Facie	 Case	 and	 the	
Mandatory	bar:	Part	1’	(2011)	Co	Law	43	
324	 [1919]	170	NW	668,	684	
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products in the foreseeable future. This investment is done at the expense of the 
shareholders’ dividends. To put it simply – long-termism trumps short-termism.   
BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
The above section introduces the background of the Traditional Factor, i.e., ‘judges 
are not business experts’. In this part, I will concentrate my discussion on the nature 
of bounded rationality that relates to judges who are to deal with directors’ business 
decisions; and how the theory supposedly relates to the Traditional Factor, ‘judges 
are not business experts’.   
From an economic point of view, the factor that ‘judges are not business expert’ has 
been commonly linked to ‘bounded rationality’,325 a theory originally proposed by 
the psychology researcher - Herbert A. Simon, as a basis for mathematical modeling 
of decision-making.326  
The theory of ‘bounded rationality’ describes, ‘the inherent limits on the ability of 
decision makers to gather and process information’327. In other words, the rationality 
                                                
325	 Oliver	E.	Williamson,	The	Economic	Institution	of	Capitalism	(The	Free	Press	1985)	45,	46	as	cited	
by	 Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	 ‘The	Business	 Judgment	Rule	 as	Abstention	Doctrine’	 (2004))	 57	Vand	 L	
Rev	 83,	 118;	 see	 also	 Jeffrey	 Rachlinski,	 ‘The	 Uncertain	 Psychological	 Case	 for	 Paternalism’	 (2003)	
NWU	L	Rev	1168	
326	 See	generally	H.A.	Simon,	Models	of	Bounded	Rationality,	Volume	1,	Economic	Analysis	and	Public	
Policy	 (MIT	 Press	 1982)	 235;	 see	 also	 generally,	 M.	 Conant,	 ’The	 Anti-trust	 Per	 Se	 Rule:	 Judicial	
Decision-Making	Under	‘Bounded	Rationality’	(1980)	L	&	E	Con	Rev	49	
327	 See	generally	Paul	Milgrom	&	John	Roberts,	Economics,	Organization	and	Management	(Pearson	
1992)	 127-129	 defining	 the	 concept	 mostly	 by	 examples	 as	 cited	 in	 Stephen	 M.	 Bainbridge,	 ‘The	
Business	Judgment	as	an	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57	Vand	L	Rev	83,	118.	See	also	generally,	Jon	
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of an individual is subject to and applied after the limitation plus uncertainty of 
resources/conditions physically and cognitively. This is known as human 
limitations,328 for instance, humans are subject to limited memory and time. Thus, are 
prone to seek to maximize convenience by way of mental and physical shortcut to suit 
the decision maker’s self-interest.329 From this point of view, the decision maker is 
termed as ‘the satisficer’, i.e., someone who seeks a satisfactory solution to serve the 
decision maker’s self-interests, instead of an optimal solution for the actual 
circumstance or problem.330  
In other words, without being in the actual circumstances of the resources and the risk, 
one can no longer be able to reach a decision that represent his or her genuine 
preference in the actual circumstances despite being given an advanced warning. 
                                                                                                                                      
Elster,	 Sour	 Grapes:	 Studies	 in	 the	 Subversion	 of	 Rationality	 (3rd	 edn,	 Cambridge	 University	 Press	
October	1983)	 	 	
328	 See	 for	 example,	 Adrian	 Vermeule,	 Judging	 under	 Uncertainty:	 An	 Institutional	 Theory	 of	 Legal	
(Harvard	University	Press	2006)	155	
329	 Mental	 shortcut	 is	 also	 described	 as	 heuristics,	 i.e.,	 “a	 procedure	 for	 problem	 solving	 that	
functions	by	reducing	the	number	of	possible	alternatives	&	solutions	&	thereby	increase	the	chance	
of	solution.”	A.	Lewis,	The	Cambridge	Handbook	of	Psychology	and	Economic	Behaviour	 (Cambridge	
University	Press	2008)	43.	Example	of	Heuristics	would	be	that	people	tend	to	associate	higher	price	
with	 better	 quality	 and	 therefore,	without	 having	 going	 into	 a	 thorough	 research,	 decision	makers	
would	be	tempted	to	think	that	an	 item	of	higher	price	 is	of	better	quality	than	the	others	when	in	
fact	this	might	well	not	be	true.	Heuristics	can	sometimes	be	useful	but	runs	the	danger	of	reaching	a	
different	decision	had	the	decision	maker	being	given	 full	 information	 -	A.	Tversky	&	D.	Kahneman,	
‘Judgment	 under	 uncertainty:	 Heuristics	 and	 Biases’	 (1974)	 Vol	 185	 Science	 1124,	 1130;	 G.	
Gigenrenzer	 et	 al,	 ‘Fast	 &	 Frugal	 Heuristics:	 The	 Tool	 of	 Bounded	 Rationality’	 (2004)	 65	
<http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/rh/RH_Fast_2009.pdf>	last	accessed	20	May	2017	;	C.	Jolls	and	
C.	R.	Sunstein,	‘Debiasing	Through	Law’	The	Journal	Of	Legal	Studies’	(2006)	Vol	35	(1)	199-241;	and	
199,	203-206;	see	also	C.	R.	Sunstein,	‘What's	Available?	Social	Influences	and	Behavioral	Economics’	
(2003)	97	Nw	U	L	Rev	1295,	1312	
330	 Gigerenzer,	 Gerd,	 Selte	 and,	 Reinhard,	 Bounded	 Rationality:	 The	 Adaptive	 Toolbox	 (MIT	 Press,	 	
2002)	14	 	
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The assumption that humans are rational entities who are always able to make 
perfectly rational decisions have therefore, long been refuted by the concept of 
bounded rationality.331 As stated by Paul Slovic, the psychology professor,  ‘ … a 
revealed preference approach assumes that people not only have full information, but 
also can use that information optimally, an assumption that seems quite doubtful in 
the light of much research on the psychology of decision making.332 ‘  
It follows that, a bounded rational decision maker would be unlikely to effectively 
assess the situation and reach a rational decision, ‘… under the conditions of 
uncertainty and complexity, it becomes very costly and perhaps impossible, to 
describe the complete decision tree.’333 Empirical studies have shown that bounded 
rational decision makers have the tendency to minimize the efforts in reaching a 
proper decision when they face the conditions of uncertainty and complexity.334 For 
instance, the academic writers such Hagle, who has pointed out that it had been 
                                                
331 	 See	 Gigerenzer,	 Gerd,	 Selten	 and	 Reinhard,	 Bounded	 Rationality:	 The	 Adaptive	 Toolbox	
(Cambridge	(MIT	Press	2002)	14	 	 	
332	 Paul	Slovic,	The	Perception	of	Risk	(re-print	Ed,	Earthscan	Publications	2000)	82	 	
333	 Oliver	E.	Williamson,	Markets	and	Hierarchies:	Analysis	and	Antitrust	Implications	(Free	Press	1975)	
23	as	cited	 in	Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	 ‘The	Business	 Judgment	as	an	Abstention	Doctrine’	 (2004)	57	
Vand	L	Rev	83,	118.	See	also	generally	Hagle,	Timothy	M.	 	 ‘So	Many	Cases,	So	Little	Time:	Judges	as	
Decision	 Makers’	 (1990)	 <	
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/44208624_So_Many_Cases_So_Little_Time_Judges_as_D
ecision-makers	 >	 accessed	 June	 2017;	 and	 Ed.	 Douglas	 Madsen,	 Arthur	 H.	 Miller,	 and	 James	 A.	
Stimson.	Dubuque,	Iowa:	Kendall/Hunt,	In	American	Politics	in	the	Heartland	 	 (Kendall	Hunt	Pub	Co	
1991)	1	
334	 See	generally	Hagle,	Timothy	M,	‘So	Many	Cases,	So	Little	Time:	Judges	as	Decision	Makers’	(1990)	
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/44208624_So_Many_Cases_So_Little_Time_Judges_as_
Decision-makers	 >	 accessed	 June	 2016;	 and	 Ed.	 Douglas	 Madsen,	 Arthur	 H.	 Miller,	 and	 James	 A.	
Stimson.	 Dubuque,	 Iowa,	 In	American	 Politics	 in	 the	 Heartland	 (Kendall	 Hunt	 Pub	 Co	 1991)	 1.	 See	
generally	 Edward	 Tsang,	 ‘Computational	 Intelligence	 Determines	 Effective	 Rationality’	 (2008)	 IJAAC	
63–66	 	
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reported that judges suffer the tendency of over-reliance on judicial precedents as a 
way of ‘mental shortcut’ in dealing with law cases irrespective of the degree of the 
relevancy of the judicial precedents to the cases.335    
Other than Hagle, Bainbridge & Gulati; and Langlaise have also pointed out that 
judicial decision makers are no exception to the limitations of bounded rationality.336  
Schauer;337 Gluti and Bainbridge338 have argued that this is further reinforced by 
the agency cost economics. An agency cost is: 
… economic concept concerning the cost to a ’principal’ (an organization, 
person or group of persons), when the principal chooses or hires an ’agent’ to 
act on its behalf. Because the two parties have different interests and the agent 
who has the access to and control of more relevant information, the principal 
                                                
335	 See	generally	Hagle,	Timothy	M,	‘So	Many	Cases,	So	Little	Time:	Judges	as	Decision	Makers’	(1990)	
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/44208624_So_Many_Cases_So_Little_Time_Judges_as_
Decision-makers	>	accessed	June	1026	
336 	 E.	 Langlais,	 ‘An	 Analysis	 of	 Bounded	 Rationality	 in	 Judicial	 Litigations:	 The	 Case	 with	
Loss/Disappointment	 Averse	 Plaintiffs’	 (2010)	
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id,	’	…	Cognitive	biases	are	also	exhibited	by	well	
experienced	lawyers	and	judges.’,	1.	>	Accessed	2015;	see	also	generally,	Gulati	&	Bainbridge,	 ‘How	
do	 Judges	 Maximise?	 (the	 Same	Way	 Everybody	 Does	 –	 Boundedly)	 Rules	 of	 Thumb	 in	 Securities	
Fraud	Opinions’	(2002)	EMORY	LJ	83	 	
337	 F.	Schauer,	 ’Incentives,	Reputation	and	the	Inglorious	Determinants	of	Judicial	Behaviour’	(1999)	
68	 U	 CIN	 L	 Rev	 615	 as	 cited	 by	 Gulati	 &	 Bainbridge,	 ‘How	 do	 Judges	 Maximise?	 (the	 Same	Way	
Everybody	Does	–	Boundedly)	Rules	of	Thumb	in	Securities	Fraud	Opinions’	 	 (2002)	EMORY	LJ	83	
338	 Gulati	 &	 Bainbridge,	 ‘How	 do	 Judges	Maximise?	 (the	 Same	Way	 Everybody	 Does	 –	 Boundedly)	
Rules	of	Thumb	in	Securities	Fraud	Opinions’	 (2002)	EMORY	LJ	83;	and	Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	 ‘The	
Business	Judgment	as	an	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57	Vand	L	Rev	83,	118	
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cannot directly ensure that its agent is always acting in its (the principals') best 
interests.339   
In this context, it is arguable that the UK courts can be said to be the agents of the law. 
This can be observed when judges sworn the judicial oaths, the judge ‘… has 
acknowledged that he or she is primarily accountable to the law which he or she must 
administer. This involves putting aside private interests and preferences and being 
alert to attempts to influence decisions or curry flavour’;340 and ‘The primary 
responsibility for deciding whether a particular activity or course of conduct is 
appropriate rests with the individual Justice. The interests of justice must always be 
the overriding factor.’341 Being an agent of the law, in practice, can be influenced by 
the external constraints, for instance, the institutional constraint of adjudication 
system.342 Bainbridge have specifically argued that it would relate to the interest of 
judges to speed up the trial process343 because if judicial intervention ‘were employed 
                                                
339	 Lucian	 Bebchuk	 and	 Jesse	 Fried,	 Pay	 Without	 Performance	 (Harvard	 University	 Press	 2004)	
(Preface	 and	 Introduction);	 The	 term	 ‘the	 agency	 cost	 economics’	 was	 also	 cited	 by	 Stephen	 M.	
Bainbridge,	‘The	Business	Judgment	as	an	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57	Vand	L	Rev	83,	118	
340 	 See	 The	 Supreme	 Court,	 ‘Guide	 to	 Judicial	 Conduct	 and	 Complaints’	 (2	 January	 2019)	
<	https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/judicial-conduct-and-complaints.html>	 accessed	 15	 January	
2019	
341	 ibid	
342	 Julian	Velasco,	‘Structural	Bias	and	the	Need	for	Substantive	Review’	(2004)	Wash	U	L	Rev	Vol	82	
821,	839	
343	 Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	‘The	Business	Judgment	as	an	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57	Vand	L	Rev	
83,	 118;	 See	 also	 generally,	 Chancery	 Guide	
<www.chba.org.uk/for-members/library/.../chancery-guide-updated-october-2013>	 October	 2013	
accessed	in	2013	 	 	 	
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too frequently, it would consume a great deal of judicial resources’.344 In other words, 
judges would be overloaded with cases.  
Academic writer Andrew S. Gold is in agreement on the idea that judges can be 
adversely affected by agency cost and bounded rationality. He has expressed his view 
relating to the scenario that when making judicial determinations, judges are limited 
by substantial institutional constraint and thus, judges can easily succumb to bounded 
rationality. As a result, for difficult institutional choices, such as the institutional 
capacities, decision cost and other effects within the judicial system, ’judges are 
unable to put value to the variables that institutional analysis identifies as relevant.’345 
Gold further argued that humans’ cognitive biases can also be contributing to 
adjudicative process, therefore, when information is available on one variables as 
opposed to the other, judges who are subjected to the institutional constrains would 
inevitably put too much weight for one variable against the other which can lead to 
judicial error. ’And courts may be in a poor position to discover after the fact...’346 as 
they are confined in required institutional options.347    
                                                
344	 Julian	Velasco,	‘Structural	Bias	and	the	Need	for	Substantive	Review’	(2004)	Wash	U	L	Rev	Vol	82	
821,	839	
345	 DEL	CODE	ANN.	TIT.	8,	s102(B)(7)	(REPL.	VOL.	2001)	as	cited	by	Andrew	S.	Gold,	‘A	Decision	Theory	
Approach	to	the	Business	Judgment	Rule:	Reflections	on	Disney,	Good	Faith	and	Judicial	Uncertainty’	
(2007)	Mary	L	Rev	Vol	66	398-474,	453-454	 	 	
346	 Andrew	 S.	 Gold,	 ‘A	 Decision	 Theory	 Approach	 to	 the	 Business	 Judgment	 Rule:	 Reflections	 on	
Disney,	Good	Faith	and	Judicial	Uncertainty’	(2007)	Mary	L	Rev	Vol	66	398-474,	454	 	
347	 Andrew	 S.	 Gold,	 ‘A	 Decision	 Theory	 Approach	 to	 the	 Business	 Judgment	 Rule:	 Reflections	 on	
Disney,	Good	Faith	and	Judicial	Uncertainty’	(2007)	Mary	L	Rev	Vol	66	398-474,	453-454	 	
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Consequently, judges are more likely to succumb to limitations of bounded rationality 
when assessing a company business decision as opposed to company directors. In 
other words, cognitively, judges can be said to be de-motivated by the institutional 
constraint. On the other hand, directors are not subject to the institutional constraint of 
the judicial system, therefore, are relatively less boundedly rational than judges.348 
Looking at the comparison of resources possessed between judges and directors, 
when making business decisions for the company, the argument has been specifically 
expanded by academic writers such as Conard. Conard pointed out the problem that 
judges tend to decide cases alone,349 whereas directors typically operate within a 
board collectively with their research being relatively easier to be outsourced. This 
means that directors (as opposed to judges) tend to form a team for dealing with the 
company’s tasks and thus, bringing a wide range of different sets of business 
expertise, business assets and business connection into the decisionmaking process.350 
In other words, directors tend to possess comparatively more company experience and 
                                                
348 	 Kirton	 and	 Pender,	 ‘The	 Adaption-Innovation	 Continuum.	 Occupational	 Type,	 and	 Course	
Selection’	 (1982)	 Psychol	 Rep	 Vol	 51	 883	 as	 cited	 by	 Woodman	 et	 al,	 ‘Toward	 A	 Theory	 of	
Organizational	Creativity’	(1993)	Acad	Manag	Rev	Vol	18	No	2	293,	305.	Teresa	M.	Amabile,	‘A	Model	
of	Creativity	and	Innovation	in	Organisations’	(1988)	Res	Organ	Behav	Vol	10	167.	See	Chapter	Four	
for	detailed	analysis	of	motivation	affecting	the	level	of	a	person’s	bounded	rationality.	 	
349	 This	might	 not	 be	 true	 as	 judges	 decide	 complicated	 business	 cases	with	 the	 assistance	 of	 the	
expert	witnesses.	Canard’s	statement	regarding	judges	deciding	‘cases	alone’	 is	contrary	to	the	core	
of	this	chapter	which	argues	that	judges	do	not	suffer	from	the	lack	of	business	expertise.	But	judges	
are	not	and	are	not	meant	to	second-guess	business	creativity	of	company	directors	irrespective	the	
amount	of	business	expertise	at	their	disposal.	 	 	 	 	
350	 Alfred	A.	Conard,	‘A	Behavioural	Analysis	of	Directors’	Liability	for	Negligence’	(1972)	Duke	L	J	895,	
906	 	
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relevant resources that are all essential in assisting an individual to reach a proper 
business decision for the company.   
In the later part of this Chapter, I will argue (to a certain degree opposing Conard’s 
view above) that judges do not suffer from lacking business expertise due to the 
stringent selection of judges and the availability of expert witnesses at the judiciary’s 
disposal.  
BOUNDED RATIONALITY AS AN ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
TRADITIONAL FACTOR 
The above section introduces the psychology theory of bounded rationality.  
The objective of this section is to explain purely from the traditional perspective the 
inter-relationship between the Traditional Factor and the theory of bounded rationality 
to give an in-depth background of how the Traditional Factor being fully used to 
justify judicial deference. This section would serve as an introduction for the 
immediate following section, aiming not just to demonstrate that the Traditional 
factor was a reference to the directors’ Non-Programmed (Creative) Business 
Decisions, but also enables me to demonstrate the inter-relationship between directors’ 
business creativity and bounded rationality within the understanding of the 
Traditional Factor.     
Going back to the Traditional Factor that judges are not business experts. The theory 
of bounded rationality has been used as an argument to reinforce the factor that judges 
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in general are not suitable in dealing with directors’ business decisions. For instance, 
the court in the case of Shlensky v. Wrigley acknowledged judges are generalists and 
not experts in business, and that they possess limited knowledge in running the 
defendant’s company’s business. 351  As a result of the limitation in business 
knowledge, non-business expert judges are boundedly rational.  Eric A. Posner has 
said the following regarding some of the American judges:  
Courts have trouble understanding the simplest business relationship. This is not 
surprising. Judges must be generalists, but they usually have the narrower 
backgrounds in a particular field of law … Their frequent failure to understand 
transactions is well documented. One survey of cases involving consumer credit, for 
example, showed that the judges did not even understand the concept of present 
value … Skeptism about the quality of judicial decision making is reflected in many 
legal doctrines, including the business judgment rule in corporation law, which 
retrains court from second-guessing managers and directors …352   
American writer Gilmore has also pointed out the limitation severely faced by judges: 
The facts underlying a transaction or business practice or a social custom can be 
a glimpsed in judicial opinion only as a glass darkly. The courts themselves 
                                                
351	 237	NE	2n,	780	[III.	App.	1968]	as	cited	in	Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	 ‘The	Business	Judgment	as	an	
Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57	Vand	L	Rev	83,	119	
352	 Eric	A.	Posner,	‘A	Theory	of	Contract	Law	Under	Conditions	of	Radical	Judicial	Error’	(2000)	94	NW	
UL	REV	749,	758;	Shlensky	v	Wrigley	237	NE	2n,	780	[III.	App.	1968]	as	cited	in	Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	
‘The	Business	Judgment	as	an	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57	Vand	L	Rev	83,	119-120;	&	Stephen	M.	
Bainbridge,	The	New	Corporate	Governance	in	Theory	and	Practice	(OUP	USA	2008)	Chap.	3	,	121	 	
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burdened by judicial procedural limitation and restricted to adversary 
proceedings are poor institutions for finding out what the essential facts are or 
were … thus the inadequate judicial techniques make judicial opinion worthless 
as accounts of what is actually going on in the world.353   
The view that judges are limited by bounded rationality due to lacking of business 
expertise has once again been re-affirmed by Vice-Chancellor Glasscock in his 
Memorandum Opinion in more recent Delaware case of Re Goldman Sachs Group, 
Inc. Shareholder Litigation: 
So long as such individuals act within the boundaries of their fiduciary duties, 
judges are ill-suited by training (and should be disinclined by temperament) to 
second-guess the business decisions of those chosen by the stockholders to 
fulfill precisely that function.354   
As the above claimed, many judges (across many legal jurisdictions, including the US 
or the UK)355 are not experts in many fields, including company business. This adds 
to the notion that when making a judicial decision, judges often need to be guided by 
the relevant expert witnesses, for instance, accounting experts or financial experts in 
                                                
353	 G.	Gilmore,	The	Ages	of	American	Law	(Yale	University	Press,	1977)	88	as	cited	by	M.	Conant,	‘The	
Antitrust	Per	Se	Rule:	Judicial	Decision	Making	Under	Bounded	Rationality’	[1980]	L	Econ	Rev	53	 	 	 	 	
354	 [2011]	CA	No	5215-VCG,	1-2	[Del	CH	2011]	 (cited	also	 in	Stephen	M.	Bainbridge’s	recent	article,	
‘Judges	Are	not	Business	Experts,	But	So	What?’	(2011)	www.ProfessorBainbridge.com>	accessed	2nd	
June	2015	
355	 See	for	example,	In	Overend	Gursey	&	Co	v.	Gibb	[1872]	LR	5	(HL)	580,	495	and	RE	Brazilian	Rubber	
Plantations	and	Estate	[1911]	AC	477	(HL)	488	both	cited	by	Marc	Moore,	Corporate	Govenance	in	the	
Shadow	of	State	(Hart	Publishing	2013)	155	 	
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the fields of auditing and finance respectively (for example, judges using an auditor as 
an expert witness in the case of Smith v. Croft356).  
An expert witness is ‘a person who is a specialist in the subject, often technical, who 
may present his/her expert opinion without having being a witness to any occurrence 
relating to any lawsuit...’357 And the duty of expert witnesses is to ‘help the court on 
matters within their expertise’.358 
In the following section, I shall demonstrate that, contrary to the traditional 
understanding of the terms “judges are not business exerts” and “…judges are 
ill-equipped …” as a reference to the business expertise available within the judicial 
system, the true meaning of the terms actually refers to the directors’ business 
creativity irrespective of the availability of the judges’ business expertise. 
JUDGES ARE NOT BUSINESS EXPERTS VS. DIRECTORS’ 
MOTIVATION AND CREATIVITY 
In this part, I will argue that if the Traditional factor ’judges are not business 
experts’ is referring to the understanding of availability of the amount of business 
expertise within the judicial system. Such an understanding will be based on a number 
                                                
356	 [1986]	 1	 WLR	 580	 as	 cited	 by	 Boyle,	 ‘The	 Judicial	 Review	 of	 the	 Special	 Committee:	 the	
Implications	for	the	English	Derivative	Action	after	Smith	v.	Croft’	(1990)	Com	Law	3	 	
357 	 The	 Free	 Dictionary.com	 <	 http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/expert+witness>	
accessed	2nd	July	2017.	 	
358	 Civil	Procedure	Rules	35.3	 	
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of faulty assumptions made by academic writers such as David359 and Bainbridge.360 
The real meaning behind the phrase ‘judges are not business experts’ or judges are 
‘ill-equipped …’ should actually be referring to judges’ inability to second-guess 
directors’ business creativity irrespective of their business expertise. This argument is 
supported by the fact that business experts are available, either by way of business 
expert judges or business expert witnesses in the judicial system to deal with directors’ 
business decision matters that have been governed by predefined rules (programmed 
business decisions); and not business judgment (Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decisions).361 In other words, the phrase ‘ill-equipped to second-guess the 
business decision’ simply means that the expertise in the judicial system is not 
capable to replace or to second-guess the business creativity of company directors. 
This is because the issue is not about the assessment of a programmed business 
decision which can be assessed by a predefined benchmark; but business creativity, 
which is not subject to any predefined rule. For this reason, my thesis will argue that 
the real factor goes beyond the question of business expertise. 
First, let’s look at the problem with expert witnesses. Expert witnesses are arguably 
more susceptible to the influence of bounded rationality both physically, cognitively 
and psychologically than the directors as a result of having less hand-on experience to 
the company’s business and limited time and resources because expert witnesses are 
                                                
359	 (n	293)	
360	 ibid	
361	 See	Chapter	Two	in	general.	 	
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heavily subject to the institutional constraint of the judicial system.362 This is a 
domino effect passed on by the judges who are operating within the rigidity of the 
judicial system.  
The argument of bounded rationality against expert witnesses is further strengthened 
due to the fact that expert witnesses (being the agents of the state to act impartially 
within the scope of their duties but at the same time has to operate within the rigidity 
of the judicial constraint as mentioned above) can succumb to the risk of ‘agency cost 
economics’.363 This inter-connection between bounded rationality and agency cost 
means that judges cannot guarantee that the expert witnesses act in the best interest of 
the justice.364 This is because under the theory of agency cost economics, the expert 
witnesses are likely to suffer from a potential conflict of interest between the time 
spent on the case and the time spent to run their own business, thus boundedly 
rational in their decision-making.  In addition, they do not share the same risk as 
                                                
362	 Julian	Velasco,	‘Structural	Bias	and	the	Need	for	Substantive	Review’	(2004)	Wash	U	L	Rev	Vol	82	
821,	839;	Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	‘The	Business	Judgment	as	an	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57	Vand	
L	 Rev	 83,	 118;	 See	 also	 generally,	 Chancery	 Guide,	
<www.chba.org.uk/for-members/library/.../chancery-guide-updated-october-2013,	 October	 2013>	
accessed	 in	 2013;	 See	 also,	 Kirton	 and	 Pender,	 ‘The	 Adaption-Innovation	 Continuum.	Occupational	
Type,	 and	Course	 Selection‘	 (1982)	Psychol	 Rep	Vol	 51	 883	as	 cited	 by	Woodman	et	 al,	 ‘Toward	A	
Theory	of	Organizational	Creativity’	(1993)	Acad	Manag	Rev	Vol	18	No	2,	293,	305	
363	 Lucian	 Bebchuk	 and	 Jesse	 Fried,	 ‘Pay	 Without	 Performance’	 (Harvard	 University	 Press	 2004)	
(Preface	and	Introduction);	see	also	Cheffins	&	Bank,	‘Is	Berle	and	Means	Really	a	Myth?’	(2009)	The	
Business	History	Review	Vol	83	No	3,	444	 	
364	 See	 Husam	 F-Aldin	 Nizar	 Al-Walkawi	 and	 Rekha	 Pillai,	 ‘Internal	 Mechanisms	 of	 Corporate	
Governance’	 (2012)	 Journal	 of	modern	 Accounting	 and	Auditing	 vol	 18,	 549,	 548-658	 -	 ‘An	agency	
cost	 is	 economic	 concept	 concerning	 the	 cost	 to	 a	 “principal”	 (an	organization,	 person	or	 group	of	
persons),	when	the	principal	chooses	or	hires	an	“agent”	to	act	on	its	behalf.	Because	the	two	parties	
have	different	 interests	 and	 the	agent	has	 access	 to	 and	 control	of	more	 relevant	 information,	 the	
principal	cannot	directly	ensure	that	 its	agent	 is	always	acting	 in	 its	(the	principals')	best	 interests’	-	
Lucian	Bebchuk	and	Jesse	Fried,	‘Pay	Without	Performance’	(Harvard	University	Press	2004)	(Preface	
and	 Introduction);	 The	 term	 ‘the	agency	 cost	 economics’	was	 also	 cited	by	 Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	
‘The	Business	Judgment	as	an	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57	Vand	L	Rev	83,	118	 	
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company directors whose failed decision can result in bad consequences, such as 
losing the offices as directors by way of the market that operates as a corporate 
control, which in turn serves a reasonable degree of deterrence to making bad 
business decisions. And the same success as company directors when a business 
decision was made with an aim to benefit the company.  Company directors are 
therefore, intrinsically motivated to relentlessly pursue the success of a 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision in the best interest of the company as 
opposed to expert witnesses.365  
The argument proposed by Hagle;366 Bainbridge and Gulati367; and Langlaise368 that 
judges are not fit to second-guess directors’ Non-Programmed (Creative) Business 
Decision cases based on the assumption of bounded rationality, cannot, in my opinion, 
be overcome by the employment of expert witnesses. Nor can it be countered by the 
replacement of the non-business expert judges with a team of highly and 
commercially sophisticated people who possess a wide range of business knowledge, 
skills and experiences. This is because the degree of business expertise possessed by 
the expert witnesses or the judges bears no legitimacy. Business experts have no 
means to assess Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision/business judgment 
because this type of decision offers no benchmark for business experts to assess. As it 
                                                
365	 See	 Chapter	 Four	 that	 is	 massively	 dedicated	 to	 the	 topic	 on	 the	 inter-relationship	 between	
judicial	or	legislated	deference	and	motivation	from	a	psychology	perspective.	 	 	
366	 (n	336)	
367	 ibid	
368	 ibid	
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is purely based on business creativity of directors; and not bound by any predefined 
rule.369 In other words, business creativity involves a large degree of element relating 
to commercial speculation and uncertainty. It is not a question of right and wrong 
relating to the quality of a business judgment within the realm of the business expert’s 
professional understanding. Business creativity preventing judges from effectively 
examining the directors’ business decisions have been well documented in cases such 
as Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb;370 Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd;371 
and Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd.372  Similar examples can also be seen in the US 
case - Deal v. Johnson.373  In this case, the judge was able to get the answer on the 
straightforward business question from the company’s in-house commodities experts 
because the in-house commodities experts were equipped to assess the merits of 
certain commodities contract based on the pre-existing in-house records (programmed 
business decisions) and the making of this programmed business decision was a 
matter of assistance from a certified accountant through a predefined accountancy rule. 
The court was however, not able to rely on any business experts’ assistance to deal 
with the business judgment or Non-Programmed Business (Creative) Decision, i.e., 
                                                
369	 See	generally	H.A.	Simon,	The	New	Science	of	Management	Decisions	(Joanna	Cotler	Books	1965)	
370	 [1872]	 LR	5	 (HL)	580	as	 cited	by	Moor,	Corporate	Governance	 in	 the	 Shadow	of	 the	 State	 (Hart	
Publishing	2013)	155;	and	Tomasic,	‘Corporate	Rescue,	Governance	and	Risk	Taking	in	Northern	Rock:	
Part	2’	(2008)	Comp	Law	29(11),	333	
371	 [1974]	UKPC	3	(PC)	
372	 [2009]	EWHC	80	(Ch)	(where	the	judges	admitted	that	directors	have	better	business	connections	
with,	 for	 instance,	 suppliers	 and	 customers	 etc.;	 and	 that	 the	 court	 has	 to	 consider	 the	 financial	
impact	 of	 the	 claim	 on	 the	 company	which	 severely	 limited	 the	 access	 to	 the	 company’s	 financial	
resources);	 see	 also	 Stephen	M.	 Bainbridge,	 ‘The	 Business	 Judgment	 Rule	 as	 Abstention	 Doctrine’	
(2004)	57	Vand	L	Rev	98,	119	where	the	same	limitation	of	resources	applied	to	companies	in	the	US.	
373	 362	So	2d	217	[Ala.	1978]	 	
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speculative business decision taken by the director on whether or not night baseball 
games would indeed contribute significantly to the overall profit making or interest of 
the company in Shlensky v. Wrigley.374   
As explained above, because of the indifference of degree of suffering from the effect 
of bounded rationality by both expert and non-expert judges when facing directors’ 
business judgment or Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions, the real focus 
should be placed upon: 
The inherent inability of the judge or expert witnesses to properly determine the 
quality of a business decision that is of unique and creative nature. The business 
decision-making power is exclusively privileged to the company directors as an 
appropriate independent organ of the company; and  
That any judicial interference with such a business judgment would de-motivate 
directors from taking business risk, thus impairing directors’ business creativity 
(Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd375). In follows that when judges said that they 
were ‘ill-equipped …’ to determine on the right and wrong of the directors’ business 
decision, they actually meant that no expertise was ‘validly’ available to judge the 
business creativity which was unique to each individual director who were motivated, 
                                                
374	 237	ME	2d	776	[III.	App.	1968];	see	also	Avishamlom	Tor,	‘The	Fable	of	Entry:	Bounded	Rationality,	
Market	Discipline	and	Legal	Policy’	(2002)	101	Mich	L	Rev	498	 	
375	 [2009]	CSIH	63	(ED)	[37]	as	cited	by	Newey	J	in	Kleanthous	v.	Paphitis	[2011]	EWHC	2287	(Ch)	[71],	
[72]	&	[73]	
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thus relatively less boundedly rational, to strive for the success of the company (as 
pointed out by the judge in cases such as Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb376).   
To put it in a simplest way, the judiciary cannot properly assess the business judgment 
or Non-programmed (Creative) Business Decisions of company directors by relying 
on expert witness. Nor can it achieve this objective with a replacement of judges who 
are business experts. Therefore, the justification of whether or not judges are business 
experts is in reality referring to the business creativity of the director; and not the 
availability of business expertise in the judicial system. My thesis will argue that the 
real factor goes beyond the question of business expertise. The uniqueness and 
creativity of each business decision represents the core factor justifying judicial or 
legislated deference.   
To give a better understanding of my research, I would like to first discuss and 
demonstrate the validity of my proposed core argument, i.e., the argument based on 
the inter-relation between the company law’s deference and the concept of creativity 
by drawing a reference to an existing counter-argument proposed by academic writers, 
such as Arkes and Schipani; and Gevurtz. This counter-argument has been proposed 
against judicial deference underpinned by the Traditional Factor. The purpose of this 
referencing to these academic writers’ counter-argument is to first place the focus on 
                                                
376	 [1872]	 LR	5	 (HL)	580	as	 cited	by	Moor,	Corporate	Governance	 in	 the	 Shadow	of	 the	 State	 (Hart	
Publishing	2013)	155;	and	Tomasic,	‘Corporate	Rescue,	Governance	and	Risk	Taking	in	Northern	Rock:	
Part	2’	(2008)	Comp	Law	29(11)	333	
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the difference between a medical decision and a business judgment/Non-Programmed 
(Creative) Business Decision. The difference is based on the unpredictability and 
creativity of a business judgment as opposed to the predefined programmed nature of 
medical decisions. Once the difference is established, I would then be in the position 
to use this difference to demonstrate that the justification in favour of judicial 
deference is not to be answered by the amount of business expertise available. This is 
because there is no predefined benchmark on which business expertise can accurately 
judge the quality of a non-programmed business decisions. It is a question of directors’ 
business creativity.   
In short, I will first examine the counter-argument against judicial deference on 
business decisions in comparison to medical decisions. And then demonstrate the 
faultiness of this counter-argument in support of the view that Non-Programmed 
(Creative) Business Decision is the justification of judicial deference in the context of 
directors’ business decisions.  
This counter-argument is based on the question that if an individual accepts that 
judges are not business experts, therefore, are not fit to judge directors for their 
business decisions, it is at the same time arguable that judges are not experts in other 
professional areas such as medicine-practice. In other words, business decisions are 
not more complicated and sophisticated when comparing with say medical issues. 
Therefore, there should not be double standard within the judicial system when 
dealing with business and non-business decisions. From this counter-argument, it is 
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not difficult to see the reason why certain academic writers would want to see that 
judicial deference being applied to other professions or have the principle being 
abolished altogether in all aspects of law.377  The argument of consistency by 
comparing directors with other professions had also been mentioned or proposed by a 
number of other academic writers: 
For instance, ‘They do not explain, for example, why the same judge who presumably 
are able to resolve other commercial disputes are unable to decide whether a business 
decision was made negligently.’378; and   
‘Why the same judges who decide whether the same engineers have designed the 
compressors on jet engines properly … cannot decide whether a manager negligently 
failed to sack a subordinate who made an improvident loan.’379 
Now let’s look at the problem with Arkes and Schipani’s; and Gevurtz’s 
counter-argument. The problem is that, while understanding the fact that with 
professionals, for instance, medical doctors, who have to possess high level of the 
expert skills through obtaining the required medical qualifications and being regulated 
                                                
377	 Arks	&	Schipani,	‘Medical	Malpractice	v.	The	Business	Judgment	Rule:	Differences	in	Hindsight	Bias’	
(1994)	73	Or	L	Rev	587,	613-617	(as	cited	by	Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	‘The	Business	Judgment	Rule	as	
Abstention	 Doctrine’	 (2004)	 57	 Vand	 L	 Rev	 83,	 120);	 Gevurtz,	 ‘The	 Business	 Judgment	 Rule:	
Meaningless	Verbiage	or	Misguided	Notion?’	(1994)	CAL	L	REV	305	-	312	even	went	on	to	say	that	if	
judicial	deference	does	not	apply	to	other	professional	practices,	then	business	judgment	rule	should	
altogether	be	abolished	on	directors’	business	decisions.	 	 	
378	 Daniel	R.	Fischel,	 ‘The	Business	Judgment	Rule	and	the	Trans	Union	Case’	(1985)	Bus	Law	Vol	40	
1437	–	1455;	&	1439	 	
379	 Easterbrook	&	Fischel,	The	Economic	Structure	of	Corporate	Law	 	 (Harvard	University	Press	1991)	
94	as	cited	in	Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	‘The	Business	Judgment	Rule	as	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57	
Vand	L	Rev	83,	120	 	 	
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by their own predefined code of conduct and standard of care. All which would allow 
the court, when dealing with negligence and duty of care cases in medical malpractice, 
‘refer to the customary practice of the (medical) profession.’380 Academic writers 
have argued that the counter-argument, however, ignores the fact that no qualification 
requirement as a legal prerequisite for someone to take an office as a company 
director. Consequently, it is arguable that judges when deciding if a director has failed 
to exercise certain skills and thus fallen below the expected standard of conduct, 
judges have no effective ‘benchmark’ to rely upon in reaching a proper judicial 
determination.381  
The position regarding a non-business decision being capable of being assessed 
against a predefined benchmark was also mentioned by Melvin A. Eisenberg in his 
earlier article - ‘The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers’ in which he 
commented, ‘Physicians often can defend the quality of their decisions by pointing to 
established protocol or accepted medical practice, and fact-finders use such protocol 
or practices as objective benchmarks to test the quality of their decisions.’382   
The same view was echoed by Kenneth B. Davis. JR:  
                                                
380	 Hal.	R.	Arkes	&	Cindy	A.	Schipani,	‘Medical	Malpractice	v.	The	Business	Judgment	Rule	Differences	
in	Hindsight	Bias’	(1994)	73	Or	L	Rev	597	as	cited	in	Jeffrey	O’Connell	&	Andrew	S.	Boutros,	‘Treating	
Medical	Mal-practice	Claims	Under	the	Variant	of	the	Business	Judgment	Rule’	(2002)	77	Notre	Dame	
L	Rev	Vol	77:2	373,	382	
381	 As	argued	by	Greenhow,	Annete,	 ‘The	Statutory	Business	 Judgment	Rule:	Putting	 the	Wind	 into	
Directors’	Sails’	(1999)	Bond	L	Rev	Vol	11,	42	 	
382	 (1990)	51	U	Pitt	L	Rev	945,	964	
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We instead rely on expert testimony. Underlying that reliance is the assumption 
that there exists a generally accepted body of principles and procedures 
dictating how a reasonable neurosurgeon should respond in a variety of 
situations. Consequently, we are comfortable permitting the fact finder to draw 
interferences about what the defendant neurosurgeon should have done from the 
expert’s opinion on what he or she would have done if confronted with the same 
situation.383 
As we can see from the above, unlike directors’ Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decisions taken in a volatile business world; in the medical jurisdiction, 
benchmark is predefined. Indeed, similar non-deferential approach is also taken by the 
UK court in the context of medical negligence (as opposed to business judgments). 
For instance, the Montgomery Principle (Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board384) 
which states that medical physicians’ legal obligation of disclosure relating to types of 
treatments and any ancillary information to their patients represents a predefined 
protocol. This predefined protocol serves as an objective benchmark to assess the 
correctness of the medical decision.  Failing to observe the Montgomery Principle, 
the medical physicians will be found medically negligent. The Montgomery represents 
the landmark case in medical law and has been consistently applied. For instance, in 
                                                
383	 ‘Once	More,	 The	Business	 Judgment	Rule’	 (2000)	WIS	 L	Rev	573,	582;	 see	also	Charles	Hansen,	
‘The	 ALI	 Corporate	 Governance	 Project:	 of	 the	 Duty	 of	 Care	 and	 the	 Business	 Judgment	 Rule,	 a	
Commentary’	 (1986)	 41	 BUS	 Law	 1237,	 1240	 where	 Hansen	 pointed	 out	 the	 uniqueness	 of	 each	
directors’	business	decision	that	cannot	be	validly	assessed	by	any	pre-defined	benchmark.	 	
384	 [2015]	AC	1430	(SC).	 	
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the recent case known as Webster (A Child) v. Burton Hospital NHS Foundation,385 
whereby the programmed decision nature of the medical decision in the context of 
doctor’s duty to advise their patients the material risk on treatments is upheld.386 
To further the argument from another angle, Kenneth. B. David Jr has pointed out that 
as opposed to other professions (for instance, medical professions) which start with 
formal education as a pre-requisite for practicing the professions and followed by 
post-graduate vocational training courses and conferences, ‘Corporate directors, as a 
‘profession,’ lack any counterpart institutional arrangements to develop, debate, and 
disseminate professional standards.’387   
In other words, if an individual wishes to legally proclaim to be in a certain profession 
with specific skills such as a lawyer or a physician, he would have to first obtain the 
relevant qualification and practicing license. Indeed, the same principles apply even to 
a regular car driver who has to first obtain a required driving license. However, there 
is no such license as ‘the director’s license’ offering any benchmark to assess 
directors’ Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions. For the purpose of clarity, 
it is important to remember, as mentioned in Chapter Two, although directors are 
expected to possess the skills relevant to their business,388 the types of business 
decision made by directors within the provision of the predefined rule governing the 
                                                
385	 [2017]	EWCA	civ	62	(CA)	
386	 N.	Tavare,	‘Webster	(A	child)	v.	Burton	Hospitals	NHS	Foundation	(Case	Comment)’	(2017)	JPI	Law,	
C93-C96	 	
387	 ’Once	More,	The	Business	Judgment	Rule’	(2000)	WIS	L	Rev	573,	583	 	
388	 Norman	v	Theodore	Goddard	[1991]	BCLC	1027	 	
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running of the company’s business is not the same types of business decision in the 
form of business judgment that cannot be assessed with any predefined rule.   
Since there is no licensing requirement, there is no related vocational standard of 
conduct governing all types of business decisions of directors. Judges have no 
benchmark to rely upon when dealing with business judgment cases.  Therefore, as 
mentioned in Chapter two, judges, when dealing with business judgment of directors, 
the judicial emphasis is placed, not on the right and wrong of the business decision, 
rather, on whether or not ‘… such a question, if bona fide arrived at’. – as per Lord 
Wilberforce (Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd).389 
Now turning to the next question - can a counter-argument against the argument for 
lack of accepted protocol relating to directors, be proposed on the basis that there are 
training courses for company directors? For example, INSEAD Directors Training 
that helps to bring specific competences and credibility to the boards on which 
they serve? If so, courses like INSEAD Directors Training or the judicial expectation 
on which directors must exercise the corporate governance function or functional 
responsibility,390 can arguably be taken by the courts to serve as an objective 
benchmark. And the benchmark can be used by the court in determining directors’ 
negligence in the same way as other professions like medical practitioners.  I will 
                                                
389	 [1974]	UKPC	3	832	(PC)	
390	 including	the	possession	of	the	skill(s)	that	reasonably	be	expected	to	run	the	company’s	business	
(In	the	US,	the	case	reflects	these	types	of	scenarios	can	be	found	in	Deal	v.	Johnson	 362	So	2d	214	
[Ala.1978]	which	bears	striking	resemblance	to	Norman	v.	Theodore	Goddard	[1991]	BCLC	1027	(Ch))	
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demonstrate in the following, that in a volatile mercantile world, these predefined 
benchmarks will only be useful for directors’ programmed business decision; and not 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions.  
Before presenting my own analysis of the matter, I shall first refer to certain leading 
academic writers’ opinions on judges’ capability to assess the right and wrong of 
directors’ business decisions. Once this is done, I will demonstrate my analysis to 
differ from their view. 
Eisenberg has argued that the general training course is deemed to be an insufficient 
benchmark for the assessment of business judgment in the sense that unlike medical 
procedures, the unique nature and diverse backgrounds of each business decision 
makes directors able to ‘seldom shield’ the quality of their decisions by relying on 
any particular accepted protocol or practices. ‘… therefore, the fact-finders will 
seldom have an objective benchmark to guide them.’391 Consequently, Eisenberg 
argues (and as I will discuss below that I do not agree on this point) that there is a fine 
line between non-business expert judges who rely on certain protocols as a 
benchmark in deciding a business decision case, and business expert judges who 
arguably serve a more effective role in the context of director’s business decisions392.  
                                                
391	 Melvin	A.	Eisenberg	 in	 ‘The	Duty	of	Care	of	Corporate	Directors	and	Officers’	 (1990)	51	U	Pitt	 L	
Rev	945,	964	 	
392	 ibid	
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In other words, since there cannot be a licensing requirement on directors due to the 
diversification of the backgrounds and uniqueness of each business decision they 
make, there cannot be an effective relevant vocational code of conduct. Therefore, 
judges have no proper benchmark to rely upon to avoid uncertainty when dealing with 
directors’ business decisions.  
Eisenberg’s view in favour of judges needs to be business experts to assess directors’ 
business judgment is shared and more explicitly pointed out by Bainbridge who, 
however, had conveniently ‘forgotten’ Delaware Chancellors’ or judges’ highly 
qualified standard of review to insulate company directors from negligence liability 
by way of business judgment rule irrespective of the judges’ business expertise (see 
for instance, Aronson v. Lewis393). Thus, renders his own following statement (in my 
opinion) self-conflicting: 
Delaware chancellors sit at the ‘center of the corporate law universe’. Unlike other 
courts, which face corporate cases only episodically, such cases make up a very high 
percentage of the Delaware chancellor’s docket. The frequency with which they face 
such cases provide a strong incentive for Delaware’s chancellors to master both 
doctrine and the business environment in which the doctrine works … Because so 
many major corporations are incorporated in Delaware, Chancery court cases are 
often high-profile and the court’s decisions therefore, are subject to close scrutiny by 
                                                
393	 473	A	2d	805,	812	[Del.	1984]	
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the media, academics, and practitioners. The reputation of a Delaware chancellor thus 
depends on his or her ability to decide corporate law disputes quickly and carefully … 
For these reasons, the adage that ‘judges are not business experts’ cannot be complete 
explanation for business judgment rule.394   
To summarize, my understanding of the above is that, Bainbridge is saying that 
Delaware judges are business experts; and other non-Delaware judges do not usually 
have the in-depth experience and knowledge in dealing with corporate matters. This is 
because the majority of companies have been registered at Delaware. Therefore, 
Delaware judges have better chance to be exposed to sophisticated company law 
cases. It follows that the issue of the availability of the amount of business expertise 
of judges cannot be used to completely to justify judicial deference. In other words, 
Bainbridge believes that the availability of business expertise of judges justifies 
judicial deference to the extent of non-Delaware courts. However, he is struggling to 
be convinced that the factor represents a complete justification simply because of the 
existence of the Delaware judges exercising business judgment rule, who are also 
business experts.  
Here is where my argument differs from Eisenberg; and fills the ‘gap’ where 
Bainbridge struggled to find.  In my opinion, Eisenberg, Bainbridge and the other 
academic writers mentioned above have not correctly identified the real justification. 
                                                
394	 Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	‘Business	Rule	as	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57	Van	L	REV	83,	121	 	 	
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They have failed to realize that the real issue in determining the suitability of judges 
in directors’ business decisions cases does not lie on the question of whether or not 
the judges are business experts. The real factor justifies judicial deference lies on the 
directors’ creativity in their business decision. 
This can be clearly demonstrated in the famous American case known as Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co.395 In this case; the plaintiffs who were the minority shareholders of 
Ford Motor Company brought a lawsuit against Henry Ford, President of the 
Company who was also the majority shareholder through possessing 58 per cent of 
the outstanding capital stock.   
The minority shareholders claimed that Henry Ford’s decision to withhold special 
dividends for shareholders in favour of the proposed project to massively expand the 
company’s business by investing in new plants for car manufacturing was an act 
against the minority shareholder’s interest.  
In his defense, Ford claimed that his business decision was proposed having taken the 
country’s employment opportunity into account as the proposed investment would 
result in the company having to employ more workers. 
Ford nevertheless, admitted that he had told his fellow shareholders that their interest 
as members of the company was not a primary consideration in the business decision.  
                                                
395	 	 204	Mich	 459,	 170	NW	668	 [Mich.	 1919]	 as	 cited	 by	 Robert	 Hamilton,	Corporations	 Including	
Partnerships	and	Limited	Partnerships,	Cases	and	Materials	(West	Academic	1981)	Chapter	6,	313	 	 	 	
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The court ruled that Ford’s decision was unlawful in that a director is not entitled to 
solely benefit the public at the expense of the company’s shareholders through 
non-distribution of profits. This is because the company was in profit-making 
business, not a charity. 
Despite the ruling, in the process of reaching the judgment, the judges agreed that had 
the decision been made for profit seeking, they would not and were not capable to 
have interfered with the proposed expansion of the company’s business, as the 
ultimate result of such a business decision including a possible increase of the 
products prices could not be predicted. The judges recognized that directors’ need to 
be creative in the hope that a long-term business plan can be formed for business 
competition. The judges cited ‘judges are not business experts’ as a ground to justify 
their unwillingness to interfere with business judgment in general.396  Here, we can 
see that even though the judge used the term ‘judges are not business experts’ which 
has an apparent misleading effect indicating the capacity of business expertise within 
the judicial system, the intention of the judges to use such a term was to recognize 
that they are not equipped to second-guess the business creativity of the director397 
which is unique and could not be accurately assessed by any predefined rule. Through 
this deferential approach, the judge implied that the unpredictability of a possible 
                                                
396	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Michigan	 (1919)	 204	 Mich.	 459,	 170	 NW	 668	 as	 cited	 by	 Robert	 Hamilton,	
Corporations	 Including	 Partnerships	 and	 Limited	 Partnerships,	 Cases	 and	Materials	 (West	Academic	
1981)	Chapter	6,	313	 	 	 	
397	 Such	a	business	decision	had	been	made	by	the	director	as	an	independent	organ	of	the	company.	 	
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increase of the products’ prices was not an issue to be capably handled by the use of 
any business expert witnesses.    
In the British counterpart case known as The Overend & Gursey v. Gibb in which 
Lord Hatherley LC had adopted a similar approach by stating:  
I think it extremely likely that many a judge, or many a person versed by long 
experience in the affair of mankind, as conducted in a mercantile world, will 
know that there is a great deal more trust, a great deal more speculation, and a 
great deal more readiness to confide in the probabilities of things, with regard to 
success in mercantile transactions, than there is on the part of those whose 
habits of life are entirely of a different character. It would be extremely wrong 
to import into the consideration of the case of a person acting as a mercantile 
agent in the purchase of a business concern, those principle of extreme caution 
which might indicate the course of one who is not at all inclined to invest his 
property in any venture of such a hazardous character.398 
A further emphasis of the above statement was put forward by the judge in Dovey v. 
Cory:  
I do not think it desirable for any tribunal to do that which parliament has 
abstained from doing – that is, to formulate a precise rule for guidance or 
                                                
398	 [1872]	LR	5	(HL)	480,	495	as	cited	Marc	Moore,	Corporate	Governance	in	the	Shadow	of	the	State	
(Hart	Publishing	2013)	155	 	
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embarrassment of business men in the conduct of business affairs. There never 
has been, and I think there never will be, much difficulty in dealing with any 
particular case on its own facts and circumstances; and, speaking for myself, I 
rather doubt the wisdom of attempting to do more.399  
As we can see from the cases mentioned above, these cases have demonstrated the 
classic examples where judges have very clearly cited business 
judgment/Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions (the opposite type of 
business decision to programmed business decisions400) as opposed to the availability 
of the amount of business expertise within the judicial system, as a justification for 
judicial deference.  
This is evidenced by the fact that if the unpredictability involved in the creativity of 
the directors’ business decision can be judged simply by way of business expertise, 
then business expert witnesses or business expert judges can always be at the disposal 
of the judicial system, to validly assess the quality of directors’ business judgment 
without having the judicial diffidence as shown in the cases like Dovey v. Cory.401 
The fact is that Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions is not governed by 
any predefined rule and therefore, different directors or business experts can 
                                                
399	 [1901]	AC	477	(HL)	488	as	cited	Marc	Moore,	Corporate	Governance	 in	 the	Shadow	of	 the	State	
(Hart	Publishing	2013)	155	 	 	
400	 See	Chapter	Five	for	the	types	of	business	decisions.	On	this	basis	my	thesis	will	explore,	from	a	
psychology	perspective,	on	the	types	of	decisions	that	are	capable	of	being	examined	by	judges	based	
on	a	pre-defined	benchmark.	This	will	be	greatly	discussed	 in	Chapter	Five	regarding	the	 issues	and	
inter-relations	of	company	directors’	programmed	business	decisions	and	judicial	deference.	 	 	
401	 [1901]	AC	477	(HL)	488	
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potentially come out with different Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision to 
be taken in the interest of the company. The differences can largely be attributed to 
different degrees of commercial experience or business outlook of each individual 
decision maker; the prevailing business environment at the time the decision was 
made; and availability of resources & any other relevant factors. At this point, 
bounded rationality kicks in, with judges or business expert witnesses being more 
boundedly rational than the directors who have greater hand-on experience in the 
company’s business; greater degree of motivation to succeed for the company;402 
greater resourses available to achieve a more commercially minded decisions; and the 
absence of the judicial constraint that applies to judges dealing with a trial.   
In short, the issue of judges’ business expertise as a ground for judicial deference does 
not, in reality, exist.  
FINAL ANALYSIS  
The conclusion in the above paragraph is further evidenced by my final analysis 
in this chapter through the following paragraphs.  I will briefly use the psychology 
theory of motivation403 to argue that directors as opposed to judges are motivated to 
be business creative and are therefore, less boundedly rational in comparison. This, I 
                                                
402	 See	Chapter	Four	discussing	the	effect	of	judicial	or	legislated	deference	on	motivating	directors’	
business	creativity	from	a	psychology	perspective.	 	 	
403	 See	 Chapter	 Four	 for	 a	 greater	 intensive	 research	 relating	 to	 the	 inter-connection	 between	
directors’	psychology	theories	of	motivation	and	directors’	business	creativity.	 	 	
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will first explain the similarity of judges, business experts and directors in terms of 
business expertise and from there, the difference between the parties through 
motivation will be shown.   
First of all, primarily the aspect that relates to the ‘imperfection’ of both parties is 
similar to the imperfection of both judges and expert witnesses. In other words, 
similar to judges, company directors can also be subject to the risk of agency costs,404 
after all, most directors are not the owners of the company. Directors are merely 
acting as agents for the company, therefore, (as previously mentioned) Bainbridge’s 
argument that judges suffering from agency cost economics as opposed to company 
directors without further and proper justification, are, in my opinion, prima facie 
inconsistent, i.e., this argument is only showing one side of the coin.   
For the purpose of my discussion, I will call the above problems – the ‘Inconsistency 
Theory’.   
As already mentioned above, I will not solely place the reliance on the Inconsistency 
Theory as an argument against the theory that judicial or legislated deference based 
on the argument of ‘judges are not business experts’ referring to the judges’ expertise. 
I will, however, develop the main premises of my discussion from the perspective of 
the Inconsistency Theory. The aim of this approach is to demonstrate that judicial or 
                                                
404	 Although	 relatively	 less	 likely	 than	 judges	 and	 expert	 witness	 due	 to	 the	 punishment	 received	
under	market	that	operates	as	corporate	control.	 	
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legislated deference is justified with reference to directors’ business creativity, and 
not on the availability of judges’ business expertise.  
To give a clear view of the picture, I would first examine the issue from an opposite 
perspective by asking the question – since the Inconsistency Theory demonstrates that, 
when it comes to making of Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions, 
company directors are not much of ‘business experts’ to that of judges (This is 
because no predefined benchmark exists to both parties in accurately predicting the 
quality of the business judgment), then what makes or allows a non-business expert to 
act as a company director? And why is it that a non-business expert should not be 
expected to act as a judge? In other words, what are the differences between a director 
and a judge when both are under the circumstances of being ‘non-business experts’ to 
begin with?  
In the process of answering the above proposed question, I will also, at the same time, 
address another inconsistency issue pointed out by Fischel, i.e., that the problem of 
relying on the justification of ‘judges are not business expert’ is that, it does not 
‘explain why causing corporate managers to be more cautious is not beneficial much 
in the same manner that the effect of tort suits causing automobile drivers to be more 
careful is beneficial’.405 In other words, what Fischel means is that the problem with 
justifying judicial deference on the basis of the expertise of the judges in the field of 
                                                
405	 Daniel	R.	Fischel,	 ‘The	Business	Judgment	Rule	and	the	Trans	Union	Case’	(1985)	Bus	Law	Vol	40	
1437	–	1455,	1439	 	
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dispute is that in general, judges tend not to be experts. Therefore, if the expertise of 
the judges is to be relied upon as a justification for judicial deference, then we are 
going to see a double standard on business decision cases with possible deference; 
and non-business decision cases such as traffic negligence, without any deferential 
protection.   
Fischel’s argument is based on the faulty presumption that all types of business 
decisions made by company directors are pre-programmed in nature with the 
availability of a predefined system to assess the quality of the decision.  We need to 
look at the judicial deference from the perspective where justification which is based 
on directors’ Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions as opposed to the 
assessment of programmed decision in traffic disputes. And thus, judges are, not 
equipped to decide right and wrong in the quality of the Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decisions (as illustrated in cases such as Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd406 with reference to Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd;407 and Extrasure Travel 
Insurance Limited v. Scattergood and Others408). Once the distinction is clearly drawn 
between auto-mobile drivers who are bound by the predefined traffic rules; and 
company directors in the context of making a Non-Programmed (Creative) Business 
Decisions, then judicial deference in the context of directors’ business judgment will 
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407	 [1967]	CH.	257	(Ch)	
408	 [2002]	BCLC	1	(Ch)	
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not be irreconcilable, as opposed to the double standards that arise from justification 
on the basis of the availability of judge’s business expertise.   
In terms of business motivation, it is arguable (proposed by, for instance, Lord 
Hatherley LC; Lewison J; and Bainbridge) that the justifications for a non-expert 
director against a non-expert judge can be that a non-expert director tend to gain the 
business drive through commercial contacts and connections together with the 
financial resources that the company can offer to achieve the objective.  These 
factors  place a director in the role to carry on the business with the tendency of 
being business innovative and bubbling with creative and unique ideas (Overend 
Guerney & Co v. Gibbs 409; and Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd410). I will explain at the 
later part of this section that this tendency represents an essential element for the 
company’s success in an intensely competitive market.  
On the other hand,411 however, non-business expert judges who do not operate in the 
same mercantile world, do not have the inspirations, connections and resources that 
the company directors do and therefore, judges are arguably not acceptable to replace 
                                                
409	 [1872]	LR	5	(HL)	480	as	cited	by	Kershaw,	Kershaw	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	
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411	 (This	 chapter	 is	 written	 with	 the	 view	 that	 the	 issue	 of	 directors	 being	 driven	 by	 greater	
motivation	to	success	for	the	company	than	judges	is	being	fully	addressed	by	Chapter	Four)	
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company directors in business decision making (Overend Guerney & Co v. Gibbs;412 
and Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd413) as argued by Tor that this lacking of ‘intense 
competitive pressures’ allows ‘even more far-reaching expression of bounded 
rationality’.414 Consequently, judges are not equipped to second-guess the business 
creativity of company directors irrespective the amount of business knowledge 
possessed by the judges/judicial system.   
To be further precise, my next question is, if the non-business expert judges do not 
have the essential factors such as business inspirations, connections and resources 
possessed by company directors, then would so called the business expert judges do? 
As analysed in the following paragraphs, the answer is no.  
Business expert judges have higher awareness and understanding of commercial and 
corporate transactions as opposed to non-business expert judges. For instance, 
business expert judges will have better grasp of consumer credit, such as the concept 
of present value and they are most likely to be selected based on their business 
knowledge and sophistications as opposed to non-business expert judges who are 
selected on their good character and the presence of diversity on the range of persons 
available in the judicial system.415 Business expert judges, however, do not possess 
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the same business inspirations or motivation which can be either intrinsic (driven by 
deep interest and involvement in the work, by curiosity or personal enjoyment and 
satisfaction) and/or extrinsic (driven by an external motivation such as associated 
financial rewards).416 Business expert judges do not have the same level of business 
contacts as that of company directors. Thus, business expert judges are more 
boundedly rational than directors in the absence of these motivators which severely 
limit their capacity to understand and appreciate directors’ business creativity.  
 
                                                
416	 The	 interrelation	between	 creativity/innovation	 and	motivation	has	 been	heavily	 researched	by	
many	 researchers	 such	 as	 Amabile.	 How	 company	 directors	 have	 the	 tendency	 to	 possess	 higher	
degree	of	motivation	to	business	creativity	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	Four.	 	
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CONCLUSION  
The Traditional Factor – ‘judges are not business expert’ or ‘judges are 
ill-equipped …’ whilst appears to justify judicial or legislated deference from a 
perspective of the availability of business expertise within the judicial system, it does 
not fully stand up to close scrutiny. First, there is no shortage of business expertise in 
the judicial system for the purpose of assisting the judges to understand business 
transactions in general in the trial. Furthermore, Section 63 of Constitutional Reforms 
Act 2005 ensures (through the recruitment process) the availability of some business 
expert judges. Therefore, it is incorrect to assert that judges are not business experts.  
However, whilst business expertise can be treated as a standard to assess any business 
decision with a clear predefined rule; business expertise cannot serve as an effective 
benchmark to assess Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions, i.e., business 
creativity which takes the form of uniqueness based on the circumstances. Secondly, 
(as opposed to directors) greater limitation of bounded rationality affect judges as 
well as expert witnesses irrespective of the degree of their business expertise. This 
severely limits their capacity to properly understand the complexity of 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions. 
Whilst it is arguable that, when it comes to business creativity, as opposed to 
functional responsibility or corporate governance functions of directors, company 
directors are not all business experts and can also be limited by bounded rationality, 
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however, directors are ‘intrinsically’ motivated to be business creative in the interest 
of the company.417 
Therefore, judicial or legislated deference justified by the term ‘judges are not 
business experts’ is NOT referring to judges lacking business expertise but to the 
creative nature of directors’ business judgments. 
This chapter establishes the true meaning of the Traditional Factor justifying judicial 
or legislated deference based on company directors’ business creativity. Chapters 
Four and Five will respectively use the relevant psychology theory to define business 
creativity and types of business decisions; Chapters Four and Five will also use a 
number of economics theories, to discuss the significance of business creativity to the 
success of a company. And demonstrate, from a psychology perspective, that the 
company law’s deference promotes motivation that intrinsically enhances company 
directors’ business creativity.   
  
                                                
417	 See	Chapter	Five	for	the	theory	of	intrinsic	and	extrinsic	motivation.	 	
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CHAPTER FOUR - CREATIVITY, MOTIVATION AND 
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE  
CHAPTER INTRODUCTION – BREIF REVIEW OF CHAPTERS TWO & 
THREE 
Chapter Two discussed the existence of UK judicial deference in common law. 
Its similarities to the US business judgment rule with the protection being offered to 
company directors based on their business decisions that are of creative nature as 
opposed to the exercise of their pre-programmed functional responsibilities; and how 
the judicial deference found its way into the Companies Act 2006. Chapter Three 
examined and identified the factors that justify such a judicial or legislated deferential 
approach; and concluded that when the judges used the traditional term - ‘judges are 
not business experts’ or ‘judges are not equipped to …’ deal with company directors’ 
business judgment, they actually referred to their inability to interfere with directors’ 
business judgment or business creativity.418 This is because this type of business 
decisions, made by the directors, is of unique and creative in nature; and exclusively 
exercisable by the company directors as independent organs of the companies.       
  
                                                
418	 Or	as	duped	by	this	thesis	–	Non-Programmed	(Creative)	Business	Decisions	(see	Chapter	Five).	 	
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OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER FOUR 
As revealed by both Chapters Two and Three that company directors’ business 
decision-making is a creativity process that involves, often, a great deal of uncertainty. 
Such element of speculations, with the decision-making process not bound by any 
predefined rules, goes beyond the business expert’s capacity to assess. Business 
creativity, therefore, justifies, as well as provides a normative approach as to the 
application, from the judges’ perspective, judicial or legislated deference. Business 
creativity represents the central focus of this thesis; and it is a subject that has been 
heavily researched in psychology. This Chapter will, therefore, seek to use 
psychology studies to formulate a definition of creativity. The formulated definition 
underpins the proposed concept of creativity for the purpose of judicial or legislated 
deference within the context of company directors’ business decisions. 
One question that needs to be addressed in this thesis is the importance of finding out 
what is it about business creativity that has been desired so much focus by many 
companies. Apart from what has been covered in Chapter Three relating to the 
business experts’ judges’ inability to assess creativity, what are the economic benefits 
of business creativity to companies? To find out the answers, this chapter will aim to 
use the economics theories to explore and demonstrate the significance of creativity 
and innovation in directors’ business decision-making. The economics analysis links 
to the psychology theory of creativity in the sense that  psychology provides a 
suitable definition of business creativity; and  economics gives insights into the 
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economic or financial benefits of business creativity to companies. Examinations on 
the economic theories of creativity will be undertaken; and explanations will be given 
as to why definitions of creativity in economics are not as suitable for the purpose of 
this research as opposed to psychology. As this Chapter will show, the significance of 
business creativity is widely appreciated by many companies. 
Over the years, the law has been playing an important role in motivating company 
directors to be business creative for the benefit of companies. This Chapter will 
critically analyse psychology theories of motivation which underpins creativity. This 
Chapter will demonstrate how the current UK law has been made in line with the 
theories in psychology to recognize the importance of business creativity within the 
context of legislated deference; and such a deferential approach serves as a ‘motivator’ 
that ‘promotes’ company directors’ business creativity exercised in the interest of 
companies.   
In short, this Chapter aims to formulate the definition of company directors’ business 
creativity; discuss the economic benefits of business creativity to companies; and 
demonstrate how the current UK company law’s deference psychologically motivates 
company directors’ business creativity.  
This Chapter is not aimed to operate independently. It is aimed to closely link to 
Chapter Five as ‘phase one’ that leads to the types of business decisions. Chapter Five 
will, therefore, formally introduce my proposed concept known as Non-programmed 
 171 
(Creative) Business Decisions. Consequently, the final experiment (through case 
studies) on types of business decisions within the context of judicial or legislated 
deference will essentially be conducted towards the end of Chapter Five.   
The reason that this research is not a pure law research lies on the fact that the 
significance of business creativity to companies; the definition of creativity; and the 
inter-relationship between judicial or legislated deference, creativity and motivation 
cannot be fully answered by purely relying on law or legal studies (in the total 
absence economics and psychology). This is due to insufficient research in this 
field.419 This insufficiency leaves the ‘gaps’ preventing the advancement of this 
research. 
I have overcome this limitation by going beyond the law; and using other fields of 
studies where sufficient researches have been specifically undertaken relating to 
business creativity and motivation. This will involve the economics where a large 
amount of studies undertaken to establish the significance of creativity in company 
directors’ business decision-making; the field of psychology (including managerial 
psychology) where a substantial amount of research on creativity has been done; and 
again, the field of psychology (including managerial psychology) on the issue of 
                                                
419	 For	 the	purpose	of	clarification,	 the	subject	of	 law	and	creativity	has	been	done	numeral	 times.	
However,	 this	 field	 of	 studies	 has	 been	 mainly	 conducted	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 intellectual	
properties	law	in	the	context	of	psychology.	For	instance,	studies	addressing	the	issue	on	whether	or	
not	 patent	 &	 copyright	 law	 promotes	 creativity;	 see	 for	 instance,	 G	 N	 Mandel,	 ‘To	 Promote	 the	
Creative	Process:	Intellectual	Property	Law	and	the	Psychology	of	Creativity’	(2011)	Notre	Dame	L	Rev	
Vol	 86;	 or	 Bucafusco	 et	 al,	 ‘Experimental	 Tests	 of	 Intellectual	 Property	 Law’s	 Creativity	 Threshold’	
(2014)	Tex	L	Rev	1921	
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motivation for the same reason.  By exploring the other fields of studies, the ‘gaps’ 
identified in the field of legal studies can be fully answered.  
CHAPTER FOUR BREAKDOWN 
To succinctly cover the points mentioned above, each heading of this chapter is 
set out in logical order.  Specifically, I shall break down the chapter into the 
following sections:  
a. This chapter will first deal with the primary issue, i.e., formulation of the 
definition of creativity. The definition will be crafted specifically for the 
application of judicial or legislated deference in the context of directors’ business 
decisions. The creativity definition needs to be formulated as it serves as a 
component used to identify business creativity for the purpose of this research. In 
other words, it forms an essential part of my final proposed concept of 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions. Psychology studies in creativity 
definitions have been massively undertaken by experts. Accordingly, psychology 
will be the main source on which my research in this area will be conducted.   
b. Once a common understanding of the definition of business creativity or the 
business innovation is established, this chapter will move on to deal with the 
second issue, i.e., the significance of business creativity. If business creativity is 
not important to the interest of companies, then there is no point to justify judicial 
or legislated deference in the context of directors’ business decisions on the 
ground of creativity. Therefore, this chapter will seek to explore and establish the 
significance of business creativity to companies. This will be done by relying on 
economic arguments with the support of some law case studies.  
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c. Finally, this chapter will discuss the theories of motivation in psychology. This 
aims to demonstrate how company directors’ business creativity can be motivated 
by the law. To compensate the limitation of the relevant research in the law 
relating to directors’ business decisions, this section will demonstrate through the 
psychology theories that even though Articles of Association can be drafted to 
allow companies to engage in all types of business; and legislated deference 
(under Part 11 of Companies Act 2006) insulates directors from negligence 
liability in relation to their business judgment, the relevant legal regime has not 
been explicitly drafted to encompass creativity. Consequently, gaps have been 
created for this research to establish, from a psychology perspective, on UK 
company law’s deference to provide an insight as to how the law motivates 
directors’ business creativity.  
d. In addition, I will use the psychology theory of motivation to demonstrate that 
directors are more business creative than judges even when both parties are 
non-business experts. This supports the conclusion in Chapter Three, i.e., that the 
justification for judicial deference lies on business creativity of company directors. 
And not on the Traditional Factor interrogating the business expertise of judges. 
This chapter enables me to look at how directors’ business creativity is motivated 
by judicial or legislated deference leading up to Chapter five – Types of Business 
Decisions. This Chapter is done with an aim to complete the construction of the 
central component of this thesis which is known as Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decision.  
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DEFINITION OF CREATIVITY 
As mentioned in the above introduction, this chapter will first define creativity. 
Followed by the discussion of the significance of business creativity to companies.  
As the central objective of this thesis is to examine UK judicial or legislated 
deference (from a psychology perspective), on how the system promotes company 
directors’ intrinsic motivation of wanting to make Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decisions, a suitable definition of creativity needs to be in place to achieve 
the central objective.  
As mentioned in Chapter Two, although the court has historically been able to 
differentiate the distinction between business decisions that take the form of business 
judgment; and director’s functional responsibilities governed by predefined rules, 
with the former types being eligible for judicial deference. The legal identification 
alone, however, presents difficulties in examining the law under the field of 
psychology. This is because psychology has its own method of identifying 
creativity/innovation. And to achieve an effective interdisciplinary research, it would 
be necessary to first understand creativity in psychology by way of seeking an 
appropriate definition amongst a number of the relevant definitions. This is because 
creativity in psychology has been defined in different ways depending on the goals of 
the studies.    
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As economics was selected to examine the significance of creativity to companies, I 
shall also go through the relevant definitions in economics.  I shall demonstrate that 
although each of the definitions was formulated pertaining to innovation, they are not 
as useful as the definition in psychology which has been closely linked to the studies 
of motivation for the purpose of this research.  
The difficulties of selecting a suitable definition of creativity has been widely 
recognized by many academic writers, for instance, Reilly and Clemen have said, ‘We 
readily recognize creative acts and often use the adjectives like novel, insightful, 
clever, unique, different, or imaginative. But coming up with coherent and useful 
definition of the term creativity is not easy.’420 
And Prentky has philosophically commended on the formulation of a suitable 
definition being centered very much on the objective of the study that one is trying to 
achieve, ‘What creativity is, and what is not, hangs at the mythical albatross around 
the necks of scientific research on creativity.’421 
As indicated from the quotes above, there have been a great diversification and 
fragmentation of the terms ‘creativity’ or ‘innovation’ which have resulted in 
analytical and conceptual approach to creativity problematic. Dimock has said that: 
                                                
420 	 Robert	 T.	 Clemen	 and	 Terence	 Reilly,	Making	 Hard	 Decisions	 with	 Decision-Tools	(1st	 edn,	
Brooks/Cole	2004)	219	
421	 Prentky	R.	A.,	 ‘Mental	Illness	and	Roots	of	Genius’	(2001)	Creat	Res	J	95	(as	cited	by	Mark	Batey	
and	 Adrian	 Furnham,	 ‘Creativity,	 Intelligence	 and	 Personality:	 A	 critical	 review	 of	 a	 Scattering	
Literature.’	(2008)	Genet	Soc	Gen	Psychol	Monogr,	355)	 	
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Directly or indirectly, and over a long period of time, a great deal has been 
written about creativity. But no one theory is presently completely accepted. 
One reason for this is that different fields of knowledge require different factors 
in combination422  
and ‘a second factor is that some commentators stress one factor, and others stress 
different ones in theory evaluations of relative importance.’423   
Consequently, academic writers such as Dimock,424 Gunday,425 Amabile,426 Reilly 
and Clement427 have all pulled together a number of different thoughts from other 
academic schools with attempts to come to their own conclusions as to which 
definition is the most appropriate for the purpose of their studies. 
Similar to many writers, 428  due to the closely identical features between the 
terminologies, both the terms ‘creativity’ and ‘innovation’ will at times be used 
interchangeably in most part of this chapter.  
                                                
422	 M.	Dimock,	‘Creativity’	(1986)	Public	Administration	Review,	46	(1),	3,	3	-	4;	see	also	De	Sousa	et	al,	
‘Creativity,	Innovation	and	Collaboration	Organizations’	(2012)	IJOI	1,	2	 	
423	 ibid	 	
424	 ibid	 	
425 	 Gunday	 et	 al,	 ‘Effect	 of	 Innovation	 Types	 of	 Firm	 Performance’,	 (2009)	 4	 <	
http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/13660/1/Gunday_et_al_Effects_of_Innovation_on_Firm_Performan
ce.pdf>	accessed	16th	July	2016	
426	 Teresa	M.	Amabile,	‘A	Model	of	Creativity	and	Innovation	in	Organisation’	(1988)	J	Organ	Behav,	
125,	126	
427	 Robert	T.	Clemen	and	Terence	Reilly,	Making	hard	Decisions	with	Decision-Tools	(1st,	Brooks/Cole	
2004)	219	
428	 L.D.	McLean,	 ‘Organizational	 Culture’s	 Influence	 on	 Creativity	 and	 Innovation:	 A	 Review	 of	 the	
Literature	and	Implications	for	Human	Resource	Development’	(2005)	Adv	Develop	Hum	Resour	226,	
227	 	
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Once again, a reminder, this section is closely linked to the Types of Business 
Decisions in Chapter Five for the purpose of formulating a complete concept of 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions as part of contributions to human 
knowledge. Therefore, the ultimate case studies to demonstrate how the designed 
definition of creativity can be applied in law will only be conducted at the end of 
Chapter Five. This section, therefore, serves as a preliminary stage for the proposed 
concept.  
TYPES OF ECONOMICS DEFINITIONS OF INNOVATION/CREATIVITY  
Broadly speaking, there are three types of innovations in the field of business 
and economics which have been reviewed in consolidation by Oslo Manual. Oslo 
Manual is ‘a handbook on measuring innovation activities, It forms the conceptual 
basis of many recent innovation surveys, where amongst the most important is the 
Europe-wide Community Innovation Survey (CIS).’429  
The three types of economic creativities are: 1. Product and process innovation (these 
include financial innovation); 2. Marketing Innovation; and 3. Organisational 
Innovations.430 
The definitions of each type of economic innovations are generally discussed below 
to demonstrate their natures. Conclusion will be drawn to determine if any of the 
                                                
429	 Torben	Schubert,	‘Marketing	and	Organizational	Innovations	in	Entrepreneurial	Innovation	Process	
and	their	Relation	to	Market	Structure	and	Firm	Characteristics’	(2010)	Rev	Ind	Organ,	189,	212	
430	 (n.8)	See	also	generally	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	Oslo	Manual,	
(1st	edn,	Eurostat,	European	Commission	2005)	
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types of economic innovations is suitable to be used to identify a Non-Programmed 
(Creative) Business Decision within the context of UK company law’s deference. 
Each of the definition has been selected to ensure that all the areas relevant to each 
types of innovation are covered.    
As mentioned above, the economic definitions of innovation have been chosen for 
this research to answer the question pertaining to why they (as opposed to psychology) 
are not suitable definitions for the purpose of this research. Thus, the center point of 
this research is the examining of the effect of UK company law’s deference (from a 
psychology perspective, NOT from an economic perspective) in motivating business 
creativity.  
PRODUCT AND PROCESS INNOVATION  
It is commonly and traditionally recognised amongst writers such as Weiss, Gunday 
et al, and Lederman, that product and process innovation are interlinked as they are 
‘closely related to the concept of technological developments’431, hence they are 
being classified under the same category.432  
                                                
431 	 Gunday	 et	 al,	 ‘Effect	 of	 Innovation	 Types	 of	 Firm	 Performance’,	 (2009)	 4	 <	
http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/13660/1/Gunday_et_al_Effects_of_Innovation_on_Firm_Performan
ce.pdf>	accessed	16th	July	2016	
432 	 Gunday	 et	 al,	 ‘Effect	 of	 Innovation	 Types	 of	 Firm	 Performance’,	 (2009)	 4	 <	
http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/13660/1/Gunday_et_al_Effects_of_Innovation_on_Firm_Performan
ce.pdf>	accessed	16th	July	2016;	See	also	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	
Oslo	Manual,	(1st	edn,	Eurostat,	European	Commission	2005)	(also	cited	by	Ginday	et	al	in	the	above	
article);	Pia	Weiss	 ‘Adoption	of	Product	and	Porcess	 Innovation	 in	Different	Markets:	The	 Impact	of	
Competition’	(2003)	Rev	Ind	Organ,	301,	314;	Daniel	Lederman,	‘An	International	Multilevel	Analysis	
of	Product	Innovation’	(2010)	JIBS	606,	608	 	
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Oslo Manual defines Product Innovation as ‘ … implementation or commercialisation 
of a product with improved performance characteristics such as to deliver objectivity 
new or improved services to the consumer.’433 Similar to Oslo Manual, but putting 
stronger emphasis on the technology of the industry as opposed to consumer needs, 
other academic researchers such as Anderson and Tushman, have defined product 
innovation as ‘technological discontinuities that advance by an order of magnitude the 
technological state-of-the-art which characterizes an industry.’434   
A process innovation can be defined as ‘… the implementation or adoption of a new 
or significant improved production, delivery methods. It may involve changes in 
equipment, human resources, working methods or a combination of these.’435 Or 
‘generally as changes in throughout technology for an organisation or operating units, 
such as plants, that are new to the industry.’ – Bigoness and Perreault.436  
MARKETING INNOVATIONS  
As the name suggests, marketing innovation is predominantly marketing or 
product or service promotion orientated. It has been defined that ‘A marketing 
                                                
433 	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development,	 Oslo	 Manual,	 (1st	 edn,	
Eurostat,	European	Commission	2005)	9	
434P.	 Anderson	 and	 M.	 Tushman,	 ‘Managing	 Cycles	 Through	 Technological	 Change’	 (1991)	 	 RTM	
26-34	 (as	 cited	 by	 Danupol	 Hoonsopoon	 and	 Guntalee	 Ruenrom	 ‘The	 Impact	 of	 Organizational	
Capabilities	 on	 the	 Development	 of	 Radical	 and	 Incremental	 Product	 Innovation	 and	 Product	
Innovation	Performance’	(2012)	JMI	250,	251)	
435 	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development,	 Oslo	 Manual,	 (1st	 edn,	
Eurostat,	European	Commission	2005)	9	
436	 WJ	 Bigoness	 ‘A	 Conceptual	 Paradigm	 and	 Approach	 for	 the	 Study	 of	 Innovators’	 (1981)	 Acad	
Manag	 J	68	 (as	cited	by	 John	E.	Ettlie	and	Ernesto	M.	Reza,	 ‘Organizational	 Integration	and	Process	
Innovation’	(1992)	AMJ	795,	796)	
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innovation is the implementation of new marketing method involving significant 
changes in product design or packaging, product replacement, product promotion or 
pricing.’437 Kotler said that: 
Marketing innovation is primarily targeting at ‘addressing customers’ needs 
better, opening up new markets or newly positioning a firm’s product on the 
market with the intention of increasing the firm’s sale. Marketing innovations 
are strongly relating to pricing strategies, product package designed properties, 
product placement and promotion activities …  
And similarly, Levitt believes marketing innovations is defined as implementation by 
company that are ‘specifically charged with dreaming up new marketing methods 
designed to fulfilled specific customers’ needs that management or marketing 
researches have spotted or designed simply to increase the efficiency of 
distribution.’438 
  
                                                
437 	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development,	 Oslo	 Manual,	 (1st	 edn,	
Eurostat,	European	 Commission	 2005)	 49	 (as	 cited	 by	 T	 Schubert,	 ’Marketing	 and	 Organizational	
Innovations	 in	 Entrepreneurial	 Innovation	 Process	 and	 their	 Relation	 to	Market	 Structure	 and	 Firm	
Characteristics’	(2010)	Rev	Ind	Organ	189,	190);	and	Gunday	et	al,	‘Effect	of	Innovation	Types	of	Firm	
Performance’	 (2009)	 3,4	 	 <	
http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/13660/1/Gunday_et_al_Effects_of_Innovation_on_Firm_Performan
ce.pdf>	accessed	16th	July	2016;	and	P	Kotsler	,	Principles	of	Marketing	(1st,	Pearson,	1991)	as	cited	by	
Gunday	 et	 al,	 ‘Effect	 of	 Innovation	 Types	 of	 Firm	 Performance’,	 (2009)	 1,	 	 3	 <	
http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/13660/1/Gunday_et_al_Effects_of_Innovation_on_Firm_Performan
ce.pdf>	 	 accessed	16th	July	2016	 	
438	 ‘Growth	and	Profits	through	Planned	marketing	Innovation’	(1960)	JM	1,	2	
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ORGANISATIONAL INNOVATIONS  
As the name suggests, organisational innovation is very much organisational 
or management orientated. For instance, Oslo Manual states that organisational 
innovation should involve, ‘the introduction of significant changed organisational 
structures; the implementation of advanced management techniques; and the 
implementation of new or substantially changed corporate strategic orientations.’439  
In short, Organisational Innovation is defined as ‘…the implementation of a new 
organisational method in the firm’s business practices, workplace organisation or 
external relations.’440 This definition suggests that organizational innovation is of 
non-programmed nature as opposed to company directors’ predefined functional 
responsibilities, e.g., a hypothetical directors’ decision to discontinue a derivative 
claim based on a predefined legal cost and compensation obtainable in a derivative 
claim Franbar Holdings Ltd V. Patel.441 An example of a successful organizational 
innovation within the corporate setting would be Ford Motors Ltd who introduced  
‘line assembly’ arrangement on work distributions between each of the work stations 
                                                
439	 Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	Oslo	Manual,	(1st,	Eurostat,	European	
Commission	2005)	36-37	 	
440 	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development,	 Oslo	 Manual,	 (1st	 edn,	
Eurostat,	European	 Commission	 2005)	 51	 (as	 cited	 by	 T	 Schubert,	 ’Marketing	 and	 Organizational	
Innovations	 in	 Entrepreneurial	 Innovation	Process	 and	Their	Relation	 to	Market	 Structure	 and	Firm	
Characteristics’	(2010)	Rev	Ind	Organ	189,	190);	and	Gunday	et	al	‘Effect	of	Innovations	Types	of	Firm	
Performance’	 	 (2009)	 3.	 <	
http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/13660/1/Gunday_et_al_Effects_of_Innovation_on_Firm_Performan
ce.pdf>	accessed	16th	July	2016;	
and	 P	 Kotsler,	Principles	 of	 Marketing	(1st,	 Pearson,	 1991)	 (as	 cited	 by	 Gunday	 et	 al,	 ‘Effect	 of	
Innovation	 Types	 of	 Firm	 Performance’	 (2009)	 1,	 	 3	 	 <	
http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/13660/1/Gunday_et_al_Effects_of_Innovation_on_Firm_Performan
ce.pdf>	accessed	16th	July	2016)	
441	 [2009]	Bus	L	R	D14	 	
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set up with different groups of factory workers to facilitate the achievement of speedy 
mass-production of cars with less cost.442 
 THE ECONOMIC DEFINITIONS ARE NOT SUITABLE FOR THIS RESEARCH 
Although it is undisputed that the above three types of innovations are economic 
activities which are closely interrelated. Each of the definitions is nevertheless, 
defined to cover a specific area of innovation. They are not definitions that are of 
generic nature for the purpose of this research. The independence of the definitions 
can be shown, for instance, when a company launches an innovative product but such 
a product is incapable to achieve the market popularity without having a creative 
marketing strategy in place to promote the product. To do so, the company needs first 
to be organisationally creative to negotiate a contract to govern the operation of the 
business relationship between the company and its marketing agent.443   
As each of the definitions only exclusively emphasises a specific area of creativity, I 
do not find them being suitable definitions of creativity for the purpose of this 
research. To be more precise, it can be argued that to effectively apply the definitions, 
one has to first determine whether or not the directors’ business decision falls under 
product/process, marketing or organizational activities.  
                                                
442 	 H.	 Ford	 &	 S	 Crowther,	 ‘My	 Life	 and	 Work’	 (1922)	 	
<https://archive.org/details/mylifeandwork01crowgoog>	accessed	19th	November	2017	
443 	 See	 in	 general,	 for	 instance,	 T	 Schubert,	 ’Marketing	 and	 Organizational	 Innovations	 in	
Entrepreneurial	 Innovation	Process	and	 their	Relation	 to	Market	Structure	and	Firm	Characteristics’	
(2010)	Rev	Ind	Organ	189,	190	
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However, in the real business world, company directors are in general, engaged in a 
very wider range of business activities which are often flexible and unpredictable (as 
commented by the judges in Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb 444; and Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Co445) The over-specific definitions in economics would present difficulties to 
examine the current company law’s deference within the context of directors’ 
business decisions. This is because under the current law, the two legal components of 
deference have been designed to take a general view into business decisions from a 
broader perspective. Namely, 1. That the director has to act as an appropriate 
independent organ of the company, in the process of making a bona fide decision for 
the benefit of the company (Section 263(2)446); and 2. That the decision made by the 
director (or hypothetical director acting under section 172 within the operation of 
sections 263(2) & 263(3)(b)447) forms a business judgment or Non-Programmed 
(Creative) Business decisions as opposed to a functional responsibility/corporate 
governance function or programmed business decision.448   
A particular definition of creativity in Psychology has been defined to be closer in 
line with the two fundamental conditions for establishing judicial or legislated 
deference. This is discussed in the next sections.   
  
                                                
444	 [1872]	LR	5	HL	480,	495	
445	 [1909]	170	N.W.	668,	[684]	
446	 The	Companies	Act	2006.	 	
447	 The	Companies	Act	2006.	 	
448	 See	Chapter	Five	for	the	definition	of	programmed	business	decisions.	 	
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SUMMARY 
Economics has classified business innovation into a number of specific types.  
However, this over-specification limits the scope of which the definitions can be 
freely and flexibly used to examine, from a non-legal perspective, the type of business 
judgment exercised by company directors. This is so, because business judgments are 
unique in each case and can involve different elements in the commercial world that 
can be ranging from one specific type to another.  
One single definition of innovation or creativity that can be used to embody or to 
apply to all types of business innovation is, therefore, desirable.  
TYPES OF DEFINITIONS OF CREATIVITY IN PSYCHOLOGY 
Similar to the above discussions, in the following sections, I shall first introduce each 
type of the psychology definitions. And then discuss the issue as to whether or not 
each of the definition is in line with the law. I shall demonstrate that the 
Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity is the most desirable definition that can be 
said to be closely related to the two fundamental components449 of company law’s 
deference within the context of company directors’ business decisions.  
Broadly speaking, definitions of innovation in psychology can be divided into two 
schools of thoughts, namely, the Personality Oriented Measure of Creativity; and the 
                                                
449 Namely: 1. The director acting as an appropriate independent organ of the company, in the process 
of making a bona fide decision for the benefit of the company (Section 263(2)); and 2. That the 
decision made by the director (or hypothetical director acting under section 172 in the operation of 
sections 263(2) & 263(3)(b)) is a business judgment as opposed to functional responsibilities.  
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Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity. In other words, historically, psychology 
researchers have been trying to figure out if innovation is inborn or socially 
produced.450  
PERSONALITY ORIENTED MEASURE OF CREATIVITY 
This is a theory which is in support of inborn creativity. As pointed out by 
Dimock that this is: 
One of the oldest and most widely supported in intuitionism. ‘Don’t ask me how 
I do it, I just know.’ This is what a born carpenter often says and he may have 
little or no formal education … he has mental picture of how things are put 
together and work, and hence he knows intuitively what to do and in what order 
to do them. Others try just as hard but never seem to succeed … intuitionism is 
a highly respectable approach to creativity. Some of the best scientists give this 
as the principal explanation of creativity …451  
Findlay and Lumsden have described Personality Oriented Measure of Creativity by 
stating that, ‘We will use the term creativity to refer to the constellation of personality 
and intellectual traits shown by individual who, when given a measure of free rein, 
spend significant amount of time engaged in the creative process.’452 
                                                
450	 Marshall	Dimock,	‘Creativity’	(1986)	PAR	3,	3;	see	also	Teresa	M.	Amabile,	‘A	Model	of	Creativity	
and	Innovation	in	Organisations’	(1988)	Res	Organ	Behav	140,	167	 	
451	 Marshall	Dimock,	‘Creativity’	(1986)	PAR	3,	3	 	
452	 Findlay	 and	 Lumsden,	 The	 Creative	Mind:	 Journal	 of	 Social	 and	 Biological	 Structures	 (Academic	
Press	 1988)	 as	 cited	 by	 both	 Teresa	 M.	 Amabile,	 ‘A	 Model	 of	 Creativity	 and	 Innovation	 in	
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Other than reference to an individual being born with unique creative ability, Roger 
believes that these unique personality and intellectual traits must also be shaped by 
the availability of resources, background or circumstances of which the individual is 
subjected to. In other words, to be creative, one must not just possess the right 
personality and intellectual traits, he or she must also be in the right place and right 
time. This is known as the Process Oriented Measure of Creativity – a sub-branch of 
the Personality Oriented Measure of Creativity.453    
Due to the almost exclusive emphasis being put on personality and intellectual traits 
of an individual, certain researchers such as Kirkpatrick and Edwin;454 and Zaccaro455 
have developed and extended Personality Oriented Measures of Creativity theory into 
finding and explaining leadership success.  The Personality Oriented Measure of 
Creativity involved complex assessment and observation of each individual subjects, 
for instance, by using the method of personality inventory checking.456  
PRODUCT-ORIENTED MEASURE OF CREATIVITY 
As mentioned above, the Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity represents 
another major school of thoughts in psychology. This relates to the studies of human 
                                                                                                                                      
Organizations’	 (1988)	 Res	 Organ	 Behav	 123,	 167;	Michal	 D.	Mumford,	Handbook	 of	 Organisational	
Creativity	(1st	edn,	Academic	Press	2011)	361	
453	 See	 generally,	 Rogers,	 C.,	 ‘Towards	 a	 Theory	 of	 Creativity’	 (1954)	ETC:	 A	 Rev	Gen	 Sem	 11,	 249	
(generally	cited	by	Teresa	M.	Amabile,	 	 ‘A	Model	of	Creativity	and	Innovation	in	Organisations’	(1988)	
Res	Organ	Behav	123,	140)	
454	 S.A	Kirkpatrick	and	Edwin.	A	Locke	‘Leadership:	Do	Traits	Matter?’	(1991)	Acad	Manag	Pespect,	48	 	 	
455	 Stephen	J.	Zaccaro	,	‘Trait-Based	Perspective	of	Leadership’	(2007)	Am	Psychol	 	 6	 	
456	 Teresa	M.	Amabile,	‘A	Model	of	Creativity	and	Innovation	in	Organization’	(1988)	Res	organ	Behav,	
126	 	
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creativity. It now in fact, represents the most popular theory amongst the theorists and 
researchers457 due to the flexibility on which a wide scope of psychology studies can 
be conducted. This is because as opposed to the Personality Oriented Measure of 
Creativity, where the focus of assessment on creativity is being put on an inborn 
personality or intellectual traits of an individual; the Product-Oriented Measure of 
Creativity is ‘assumed that creativity can be studied by using a normal population not 
just exceptional individual‘458 and ‘that creativity can be viewed as the property of 
products rather than people.’459 As suggested by Amabile and her critics that one of 
the advantages of the Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity is that the creativity can 
be easily, consistently, reliably and objectively assessed by experts or non-experts in 
the field of the particular idea or product in terms of its creativeness. Such measures 
are considerably and relatively more straightforward than relying ‘…on either person 
or process measures in identifying creativity’ due to the complexities involved in the 
observation and assessment on each individual test-subject with requirements of 
different personality and intellectual traits on different areas of creativity.460  
                                                
457	 Teresa	 M.	 Amabile,	 ‘A	 Model	 of	 Creativity	 and	 Innovation	 in	 Organisation’	 (1988)	 	 Res	 organ	
Behav	125,	126;	and	Clement	et	al,	Robert	T.	Clemen	and	Terence	Reilly,	Making	hard	Decisions	with	
DecisionTools	(1st	edn,	Cengage	Learning,	2004)	218	 	
458	 Teresa	M.	Amabile	‘The	Social	Psychology	of	Creativity’	(1983)	J	Pers	Soc	Psychol	357;	and	Joseph	
R.	LaChapelle,	‘Review	on	the	Social	Psychology	of	Creativity’	(1985)	NAEA	47,	47	 	
459	 The	word,	 ‘product’	does	not	mean	that	 it	 is	restricted	to	a	product	 in	 its	 literal	sense.	 It	simply	
refers	to	any	creative	act.	See	this	chapter	below	for	greater	discussion	in	the	psychology	meaning	of	
the	word,	‘product’.	 	 	
460	 Teresa	M.	Amabile,	‘A	Model	of	Creativity	and	Innovation	in	Organisation’	(1988)	Res	Organ	Behav,	
126,	167	 	
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The contemporary proponents of the Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity include 
Woodman et al; Amabile; Oldham & Cummings; and Slater. The proposed definitions 
between the writers can contain slight variations, for instance, the use of the words, 
‘novelty’, ‘new’ or ‘Originality’. But largely the universally accepted conditions to 
establish a Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity lie on two key factors, namely: 
product’s novelty and usefulness.461 I shall discuss each of the factors in greater 
details below.  
However, to go into the meaning of the above two conditions, one has to first 
understand the meaning of the word - ‘product’ within the definition. There is a 
limitation in the interpretation of the word, ‘product’ within the existing literatures, in 
the sense that most of the writers do not specifically interpret the term ‘product’, 
rather, it is indirectly referred to as creative in general sense.462   
This means any creative act can be considered as a product within the meaning of 
Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity. Amabile has been relatively more blatant 
and specific than some of the other writers on the term ‘product’: 
                                                
461	 Teresa	M.	Amabile,	‘A	Model	of	Creativity	and	Innovation	in	Organization’	(1988)	Res	organ	Behav	
Vol	 10,	 125,	 126;	 Teresa	M.	 Amabile,	 ‘Innovation	 -	 How	 to	 Kill	 Creativity’	 (1988)	 HBR	 77,	 78;	 and	
Woodman	et	al,	‘Towards	the	Theory	of	Organizational	Creativity’	(1993)	ABR	293;	and	Douglas	Slater,	
‘Creativity	in	Organization	–	the	Goose	which	Can	Lay	Golden	Eggs’	(2001)	RSA	Journal	32	
462	 See	for	instance,	Marshall	Dimock,	Creativity	(1st	edn,	Wiley	on	behalf	of	The	American	Society	for	
Public	Administration,	 1986);	Douglas	 Slater,	 ‘Creativity	 in	Organization	–	 the	Goose	which	Can	 Lay	
Golden	 Eggs’	 (2001)	 RSA	 Journal,	 32,	 (2001);	 and	 Giles	 Hirst	 et	 al,	 ‘A	 Cross-Level	 Perspective	 on	
Employee	Creativity:	Goal	Oriented,	Team	Learning	Behaviour,	and	Individual	Creativity’	(2009)	AOM	
290	
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If we take individual ideas or product that can be reliably identified as creative 
by experts, then we can look at the person’s qualities, the environmental 
factors … corresponding to the production to those ideas or products. Thus, the 
definition used here is based on products (ideas): creativity is the production of 
novelty and useful ideas by an individual or small group of individuals working 
together.463   
Here, the term, ‘product’ clearly goes beyond the literal meaning of product. It 
includes the product in its literal sense, as well as ideas, such as creative form of 
services or as this research is centrally focusing on – company directors’ 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions. 
In the following, I will discuss each of the two components which forms a 
Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity, namely, 1. Novelty; and 2. Usefulness.  In 
doing so, I will discuss different views of the two components from different 
psychology researchers; and demonstrate that certain researchers’ view of the two 
components are useful for my research due to the conceptual flexibility.  
Novelty: The term ‘Novelty’ or ‘originality’ has been the subject of constant debate 
amongst the academic researchers. For instance, Newell, Shaw and Simon have 
suggested that the condition of ‘novelty’ refers to the literal meaning of ‘new’, in the 
                                                
463	 Teresa	M.	Amabile,	'	A	Model	of	Creativity	and	Innovation	in	Organization'	(1998)	Res	organ	Behav	 	
125,	126	
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sense that the product of thinking ‘should be unconventional … it requires the 
modification or rejection of previous acceptance of ideas’464 Jackson and Messick 
agreed with Newell, Shaw and Simon on the novelty but went further to say that 
novelty must contain an element of ‘Transformation of Constraint’465, in that, the 
product must ‘involve the transformation of materials in overcoming the conventional 
restrains’. 466  Similarly, Dacey and Madaus cited Bruner’s explanation that the 
element of transformation refers to an ‘effective surprise’, i.e., that the product 
produces ’a shock of recognition following which there is no longer astonishment.’467 
Dimock took the term ‘novelty’ into a completely new level by ambitiously claiming 
that the originality of the ‘product’ must be ‘new possibly revolutionary in its wide 
circle of effects. Like atomic fission or understanding the circulation of blood in the 
human system.’468    
To place the Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity into the context of company 
directors’ business decisions, the strict compliance with the condition with the 
                                                
464	 Newell,	Shaw	and	Simon,	‘The	Process	of	Creative	Thinking’	(1958)	presented	at	a	Symposium	on	
Creative	Thinking,	University	of	Colorado,	1,	4	
465	 ‘The	Person,	the	Product	and	the	Response:	Conceptual	Problems	in	the	Assessment	of	Creativity’	
(1965)	J	Pers,	Vol	33,	309	as	cited	by	A.	Reza	Arastec	and	J.D.	Arastec,	Creativity	in	the	Life	Circle	(E.	J. 
Brill	1968),	72	
466	 ‘The	Person,	the	Product	and	the	Response:	Conceptual	Problems	in	the	Assessment	of	Creativity’	
(1965)	J	Pers	Vol	33,	309	as	cited	by	A.	Reza	Arastec	and	J.D.	Arastec,	Creativity	in	the	Life	Circle	(E.	J. 
Brill	1968)	72	 	
467	 Bruner,	 J.S.	On	 knowing,	 (Cambridge,	Mass:	 Harvard	University	 Pres,	 1962)	 (as	 cited	 by	 John	 S.	
Decey	and	George	F.	Facilitation,	‘Creativity:	Definition,	Explanation	and	Facilitation’	(1969)	IJE	Vol	3,	
No	1,	55,	56)	 	 	
468	 M.	Dimock,	‘Creativity’	(1986)	PAR	Vol	46,	No	1,	3,	3	
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interpretation that the product must be new cannot be accepted for the purpose of this 
research.  
Despite the fact that it is at the same time being acknowledged that the task must be 
open-ended, such interpretation fails to see the ‘gap’ and the conflict between the 
requirement of ‘strict new response’ and the condition of open-ended task. For 
instance, a company director who is facing a problem that is open-ended in solution 
This means that there is no predefined single solution governing the approach to 
resolve the problem. The director is then having the options to apply a number of 
solutions which might have already been used or applied by a third party in the past - 
a common situation occurred within the context of directors’ business decisions (see 
for example, the negotiation of an overage agreement in the case of Hildron Finance 
Limited v. Sunley Holdings limited469 as one of the cases in the case studies at the 
latter part of this chapter).   
As mentioned at the beginning of the subsection that the term -’novelty’ has been the 
subject of different interpretations between researchers and writers. And that the ‘gap’ 
identified in this paragraph can be overcome by another interpretation of the term 
‘novelty’. For instance, renowned psychologist H.A Simon has concretely defined the 
term ‘novelty’ through his proposed concept of Non-Programmed Decision which 
offers a higher degree of flexibility in the sense that whilst the condition of ‘strict new 
                                                
469	 [2010]	EWHC	1681	
 192 
response’ can be an element within the novelty contained in a non-programmed 
decision, it is however, not essential; as novelty or matters that are of 
non-programmed are defined by the absence of a predefined or ill-defined rule that 
governs the way in which the decision (or product) is made.470   
Similarly, other researchers such as Karry; and Maitland have argued that the strict 
compliance of ‘new response’ to the problem cannot be realistic in the real world and 
much would depend on the nature of the objective that the decision maker is trying to 
achieve. Karry has said, ‘Creativity depends on previous knowledge, and therefore, 
depends to some extent on reproduction.’471 Likewise, Maitland has pointed out: 
The Zen Calligrapher and landscape painter, however, paint in the manner of 
the masters of their tradition. Yet these works are inspired and original paintings, 
and what we look for when appreciating them is not an original solution to an 
aesthetic problem, but a creative performance. The implication is that we cannot 
comprehend creative activities unless we also know the nature of the object 
towards which the activity aims.472  
Indeed, as Maitland has brilliantly summed up that ‘creativity is a form of human 
freedom’473 therefore, novelty is not about literal newness but a decision that is free 
                                                
470	 See	generally	H.A.	Simon,	The	New	Science	of	Management	Decisions	(1st	edn,	Prentice-Hall,	1965)	
471	 Kerry	Freeman,	‘Rethinking	Creativity’:	A	Definition	to	Support	Contemporary	Practice’	(2010)	Art	
Education	Vol	63	No	2,	13	 	
472	 J.	Maitland,	‘Creativity’	(1976)	 	 J	Aesthet	Art	Crit	Vol	34	No	4.	397,	408	 	
473	 J.	Maitland,	‘Creativity’	(1976)	J	Aesthet	Art	Crit	Vol	34	No	4	397,	408	 	
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from the restrictive governing of any predefined regulations. This view was 
subsequently backed by the empirical studies of Amabile and Giltomer which yielded 
the result that ‘imposing restrictions on how subjects may choose to complete a task 
has also proven detrimental to creativity.’474    
This interpretation of novelty is very much in line with the legal understanding of 
business judgment within the operation of judicial deference or legislated deference 
under section 263(3)(b). As discussed in Chapter Two, business judgment is 
inherently non-programmed which is not subject to any predefined rule475, for 
instance, where the judge in Overend Guerney & Co v. Gibb took into account of the 
ill-defined business environment when describing the type of business decisions as a 
‘…conduct ... a great deal of more speculation … and a great deal more readiness to 
confide in the probabilities of things…’476; or Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd477; and 
Kleanthous v. Paphitis478 where the judge in considering section 263(3)(b), expressed 
a general deferential principle on the list of non-exhaustive commercial factors 
(exclusively emphasizing directors’ business decisions that are not subject to any 
predefined policy) as opposed to company director’s functional responsibilities which 
                                                                                                                                      
;	 see	also	Kristina	 Jaskyte	and	Audrone	Kisieline,	 ‘Determinants	of	Employee	Creativity:	A	Survey	of	
Lithuanian	Non-Profit	Organisations’	(2006)	VOLUNTAS	Vol	17	No	2	133,	139	 	
474	 T.	Amabile	and	J.	Giltomer,	‘Children’s	Artistic	Creativity:	Effects	of	Choice	in	Task	Materials’	(1984)	 	
Unpublished	Manuscript,	Bradies	University	 (as	 cited	by	Beth	A.	Hennessey,	 ‘Social,	 Environmental,	
and	Developmental	Issues	and	Creativity’	(1995)	Edu	Psychol	Rev	Vol	7	No.	2	163,	168)	
475	 It	should	be	stressed	that	the	scope	of	predefined	rules	in	the	context	of	Novelty	is	not	limited	to	
legal	 rules,	 it	 includes	 non-legal	 rules	 such	 as	 conventions;	 and	 policies,	 for	 instance,	 companies’	
constitutions	of	which	company	directors	are	bound	to	follow	in	their	decision-making	process.	
476	 LR	5	HL	480,	495	
477	 [2009]	BCC	420,	(Ch)	[85]	
478	 [2011)	EWHC	(Ch)	[71],	[72]	
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is of programmed nature. For instance, director’s duty of internal control management 
and corporate oversight as shown in the case of re Baring plc and others (No. 5), 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Baker.479  The inter-connection between 
UK company law and the condition of Novelty is explored in greater details in the 
latter part of the chapter under the sub-heading: Product Oriented Approach & UK 
Company Law’s Deference. 
Usefulness: The term ‘usefulness’ within the definition of a Product-Oriented 
Measure of Creativity Theory does not refer to any specific result and for the purpose 
of this Chapter, the term ‘usefulness’ does not mean that the business decision of a 
director has to result the company in making any financial gain or avoiding an 
undesirable consequence, in order for a business decision to be ‘useful’ within the 
definition of creativity. This is so, as academic writers such as Kanter explicitly 
pointed out that the condition of usefulness in creativity can be successfully 
implemented through ‘…the process of bringing new, problem solving idea into 
use … Innovation is the generation, acceptance, and implementation of new ideas, 
processes, products or services.’ 480  
Departing from Kanter’s definition, the condition - ‘new’ has been removed by 
Parkhurst, which presents a definition to be closely in line with psychologist S. H. 
                                                
479	 [1999]	1	BCLC	433	 	
480	 R.M	 Kanter,	The	 Change	 Masters	(1st	 edn,	 New	 Yorik,	 Simon	 and	 Schuster,	 1984)	 (as	 cited	 by	
Teresa	M.	Amabile,	‘A	Model	of	Creativity	and	Innovation	in	Organisation’	(1988)	Res	organ	Behav	Vol	
10,	126)	
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Simon’s concept of non-programmed nature of creativity, i.e., the decision-making 
process is not bound by any predefined rule. It follows that the condition ‘usefulness’ 
is defined in a more problem-solving oriented fashion as ‘the ability or quality 
displayed when solving hitherto unsolved problems, when developing novel solutions 
to problems others have solved differently, or when developing original and novel (at 
least to the originator) products’.481 Or within the company directors’ business 
decision-making context - developing a business judgment482 to achieve the legal 
requirement imposed by section 172 companies Act 2006, i.e., act in the way he 
considers in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company. 
In line with Parkhurst, Barron and Harrington have further elaborated the term - 
usefulness as ‘…  achievement in which there are novel products to which one can 
point as evidence, such as inventions, theories, buildings, published writings, 
paintings and sculptures and films; laws; institutions; medical and surgical treatments 
and so on …’483  
Therefore, for instance, a business decision to make a non-waterproof smartphone 
into a waterproof smartphone would satisfy the requirements of ‘usefulness’. This is 
because the waterproof function is an idea of problem-solving proposed to be put into 
                                                
481	 Parkhurst	H.P.	‘Confusion,	Lack	of	Consensus,	and	the	Definition	of	Creativity	as	a	Construct’	(1999)	
J	 Creat	 Behav	 33	 1,	 21	 (as	 cited	 by	Mark	 Batey	 and	 Adrian	 Furnham,	 ‘Creativity,	 Intelligence	 and	
Personality:	A	Critical	Review	of	a	Scattering	Literature’	(2008)	Genetic,	Social	and	General	Psychology	 	
Monographs	123(4),	355)	
482	 Or	as	coined	by	this	thesis	–	a	Non-Programmed	(Creative)	Business	Decision.	 	 	
483	 Frank	Barron	and	David	M.	Harrington,	 ‘Creativity,	 Intelligence	and	Personality’	(1981)	Annu	Rev	
Psychol	32,	431,	439	-476	 	 	 	
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use. At which point, the implementation of the business idea or decision by the 
company is the final key element to establish the ‘usefulness’ condition within the 
provisions of the Product-Oriented Measures of Creativity.484 The question as to 
whether or not the waterproof smartphone is a product of profit-making for the 
company is irrelevant within the context of the ‘usefulness’ condition.  
The term ‘usefulness’ therefore extents to the ‘product’ (business decisions in the 
context of this research) which is being made with an aim to achieve usefulness but 
failed to reach a positive conclusion financially or non-financially to the company. In 
other words, in the context of company directors’ business decision-making, the 
condition ‘usefulness’ would operate if the decision was made, bona fide, and in the 
interest of the company.485 This is because company directors’s fiduciary duties in 
the business decision-making process is confined by law only to make the decision, 
not for the benefit of third party, but for the benefit of the company. In other words, 
directors’ business decisions have to be decisions ‘that would be most likely to 
promote the success of the company’ – section 172 Companies Act 2006. It should be 
noted that Keay and Loughrey have adopted a similar approach to the above which, I 
would argue, ‘indirectly’ pointing out the essential element of ‘usefulness’ in the 
                                                
484	 R.M	 Kanter,	The	 Change	 Masters	(1st	 edn,	 New	 York,	 Simon	 and	 Schuster,	 1984)	 (as	 cited	 by	
Teresa	M.	Amabile,	‘A	Model	of	Creativity	and	Innovation	in	Organization’	(1988)	Res	organ	Behav	Vol	
10,	126)	
485	 Douglas	 Slater,	 ‘Creativity	 in	Organization	 –	 the	Goose	which	 Can	 Lay	 Golden	 Eggs’	 (2001)	 RSA	
Journal	Vol	148,	No	5497,	32;	Andrall	E.	Pearson,	‘Tough-Minded	Ways	to	get	Innovative’	(May/June	
1988)	HBR	66	No	3,	99	
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context of directors’ fiduciary duties.486  This is done via Knight’s concept of 
entrepreneurial judgment, i.e., Knight had argued that when making a business 
judgment, directors would have to act ‘as if they are entrepreneurs’487. This, as argued 
by Keay and Loughrey, must include the judgment being ‘designed to advance, the 
interests of’488 the company. The writers summed up this as follows:  
These decisions may display entrepreneurial ability in terms of risk taking and 
risk assessment or even in terms of creativity and innovation, but … do not 
advance the interests of the corporate enterprise and so should not be protected 
by business judgments. In sum, it is possible to conceptualize business 
judgment in the ability sense as entrepreneurial judgment: it is consistent with 
the scope and application of directors’ fiduciary duties, and with the focus on 
risk-taking in discussion of directors’ judgment.489  
The concept of ‘usefulness’ above coincides with the subjective element in the legal 
process of determining whether or not deferential approach should be taken in the 
directors’ favour by the court under section 263(2)(a). In which the court is to decide 
on whether or not the decision was made by the director, who was acting bona fide, as 
an appropriate independent organ of the company and in the interest of the company 
                                                
486 	 Keay	 A	 &	 Loughrey	 J,	 ‘The	 Concept	 of	 Business	 Judgment’	 Legal	 Studies	 1,	 14	 <	
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/DFC0700879FEF7FF4B
D7E9A589A211C4/S0261387518000296a.pdf/concept_of_business_judgment.pdf>	 accessed	 5	
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487	 ibid	 	 	
488	 ibid	
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(the conditions as seen in the cases such as re Smith Fawcett Ltd490; Extrasure Travel 
Insurance Ltd v. Scattergood & Others491; and Stimpson v Southern Landlords 
Association.492). The inter-connection between UK company law and the condition 
Usefulness is explored in greater details in the latter part of the chapter under the 
sub-heading: Product Oriented Approach & UK Company Law’s Deference.  It 
should be stressed that from a legal perspective, company director in the process of 
making a business decision must exercise his relevant power as an appropriate 
independent organ of the company of which, from a psychology perspective, the 
decision must be non-programmed in nature. In other words, there must not be any 
rule preventing the director from acting in the circumstance, as an appropriate 
independent organ of the company. This brings in the need to look into the 
complimentary concept of types of decisions proposed by H. A. Simon, of which, will 
be covered in Chapter Five.  
The broad extent of the condition Usefulness was pointed out by Slater, ‘For 
creativity also involves making a mess, and wasting time, and playing apparently 
aimless games of ‘what if?’ and ‘just supposed we …?’493 This concept can further 
be evidenced by Pearson494 who has logically pointed out, that in practice, business 
                                                
490	 [1942]	1	(Ch)	304,	306	
491	 [2002]	BCLC	1	(Ch)	[90],	[97]	
492 BCC 387 (Ch) (also as cited in the case comment, ‘Stimpson v Southern Landlords Association: 
Permission to Continue Derivative Claim Refused’ (2010) Co. L.N. 277, 283-284); see also Tang, 
‘Shareholders’ Remedies: Demise of the Derivative Claim?’ (2012) UCL 182 
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 199 
innovation strategies tend to require gradual and incremental development and that 
directors are aware that business innovation strategies rarely work the first time as 
they were introduced. Director would have to put the original concepts of business 
innovation strategies into ‘experiments’ or ‘trial & error steps’ and gradually shape 
the strategies into their final forms.  
The uniqueness on each trial & error step taken often cannot be fairly and properly 
assessed by any existing standard of care for ordinary negligence due to the inevitable 
risks involved. From the legal perspective, this psychology concept of ‘experiments’ 
or ‘trial and error’ manifested within the non-programmed freedom in creativity 
coincides with Newwey J’s understanding in Paphitis	case by following Lord Reed in 
Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd to discontinue the actions against the directors for 
the making of their Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions.  The courts’ 
rulings were passed through the recognition of the danger that even though the 
companies had great chances of success in winning the cases, resulted in a substantial 
damage being awarded against the directors; the consequences of the companies’ 
success in the case might be at the expense of disrupting the board dynamics and 
de-motivate the directors from being business creative. This would in turn, damage 
the company’s economy in the long run.495 This deferential approach bears a striking 
resemblance to the US business judgment rule whereby judges are diffident in 
interfering with directors’ business judgment in the fear of directors becoming 
                                                
495	 See	the	above	section	dealing	with	significance	of	creativity	to	companies.	 	 	
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risk-adverse with the consequential damage to the company’s trade performance in 
the future.496  
SUMMARY 
Personality Oriented Measure of Creativity exclusively focuses on the personal 
and intellectual traits of an individual (re personal and intellectual traits of a company 
director in this research). Therefore, it is not suitable to be used as a definition of 
creativity for the purpose of deciding whether or not a decision is creative within the 
context of this research. This is because the main question to be answered by this 
research centers on the business decisions of company directors within the context of 
legislated deference under the Companies Act 2006, rather than company directors as 
a people. In comparison to Personality Oriented Measures of Creativity, Product 
Oriented Approach is more appropriate for the purpose of this research. Through 
Product Oriented approach, one can measure up, to a reasonable level, the uniqueness, 
innovation and creativity of directors’ business decisions that are beyond the judges’ 
capability to second-guess, and in turn, serves as a justification for UK company 
law’s deference.  Another main point that this research aims to focus on, is the 
significance of directors’ business creativity to their companies. In other words, this 
research is to focus on the aspect of showing that the law promotes and motivates 
                                                
496  Alfred. F. Conard, ‘A Behavioral Analysis of Directors’ Liability for Negligence’ (1972) Duke L.J. 
904; and M. A. Eisenbeg, ‘The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors’ (1989-1990) 51 U Pitt L Rev 
958-959 
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directors’ business creativity from a psychology perspective. This research is not 
conducting a journey in search of a creative genius.   
The interpretation of novelty as a condition for establishing creativity varies between 
different academic researchers. Company directors’ day to day business decisions 
seldom represent a strictly new response to problem-solving. Rather, there can be 
situations where directors are facing with a number of existing options to solve 
problems or achieve corporate objectives. Therefore, strict compliance with the 
common interpretation of novelty with reference to the literal meaning of the word, 
‘new’ cannot be accepted as a condition for creativity for the purpose of this research. 
Instead, a fusion of PProduct-Oriented Measure of Creativity and H.A Simon’s 
concept of non-programmed decision-making, i.e., a decision-making process which 
is not being governed by any predefined regulation will be adopted to construct a 
definition of creativity specifically apply to company directors’ business decisions 
within the context of judicial or legislated deference.   
The second criteria to establish creativity within the definition of Product-Oriented 
Measure of Creativity concept within the context of directors’ business decisions 
(including ‘trial & error’ process) lies on the condition of ‘usefulness’. This simply 
means that, in order for a business decision to be creative, the condition of novelty 
alone is not sufficient; the decision has to be made, bona fide, by a director and in the 
interest of the company.  
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As mentioned at the beginning of this section, a full demonstration of the application 
of the definition will be conducted in case studies towards the end of Chapter Five.  
PRODUCT ORIENTED APPROACH AND UK COMPANY LAW’S 
DEFERENCE 
This section is written with an aim to trace the elements of Product Oriented 
Approach of Creativity within the UK company law’s deference under the Companies 
Act 2006.  
As mentioned above, Product Oriented Approach of Creativity consists of two main 
components, namely, 1. Novelty; and 2. Usefulness.   
Novelty is defined as a decision that is free from the governing of any predefined 
regulations; and usefulness in the context of company directors’ business decision 
can be defined as a decision that is made in good faith and in the interest of the 
company.  
As mentioned in Chapter Two, legislated deference within the current Part 11 of the 
Companies Act 2006 in the context of company directors’ negligence is 
pre-dominantly found in the enforcement stage of negligence lawsuit.  With regards 
to the types of business decisions, the company law’s interference has been presumed 
inapplicable in the matters relating to directors’ duties in supervision or internal 
 203 
control.497 However, judicial or legislated deference remains constantly applicable in 
the matters relating to directors’ business judgments, for instance, under the 
enforcement stage of derivative lawsuit in Companies Act 2006, initiated by company 
shareholders.  
Judicial deference over company directors’ business decisions in the context of 
derivative claim has been in existence within the British common law for over a 
century (cases laid down this legal principle include Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd498; Smith v. Croft (No. 2)499 and Extrasure Travel Insurances Limited v. 
Scattergood and Others.500). There was almost no limitation as to the extent of the 
judicial deference, as derivative actions brought by shareholders of the company 
against company directors were mostly not actionable, with the exception of the 
situation where the director in question retained majority control of the company and 
that the directors obtained personal interest, as a result of their ‘majority control’, 
from the transaction.501 The courts’ diffidence to interfere with the company’s 
management was based on the bona fide business judgment exercised by the 
appropriate independent organ and in the interest of the company.  
                                                
497	 For	instance,	re	Baring	Plc	and	Others	(No.	5)	[1999]	1	BCLC	433	(CA)	
498	 [1974]	UKPC	3	(PC)	 	
499 Ch 114 (as cited by Mayson and French and Ryan, Company Law (23rd edn, OUP Oxford 
2006-2007) 664 
500	 [2002]	1	BCLC	598,	(Ch)	[90]	[97]	
501	 For	instance,	Pavlides	v.	Jensen	[1956]	(CH)	565	(Ch)	
 204 
The rule of wrongdoer’s control was abolished by Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006. 
Derivative claim is now also available to company members acting in good faith, 
without having to satisfy the fraud on minority on the part of the board. However, this 
does not lead to the extinction of judicial deference. The current extent of judicial 
deference, signifies a departure from the traditional wrongdoer’s control rule/fraud on 
minority, and substitutes it with legislated deference embodied by a more 
sophisticated rule. As shareholders who initiate the claim have to satisfy the 
hypothetical director test within the provision of Sections 263(2)(a) and 263(3)(b). 
Both under which the shareholders would have to convince the court that based on 
Section 172, the hypothetical director would continue the derivative claim in the 
interest of the company.  This list of factors that judges would consider to be in the 
interest of the company is non-exhaustive. It follows that Part 11 of the 2006 Act 
reveals that legislated deference on matters of bona fide (broadly on subjective 
standard basis) business judgment exercised by appropriate independent organ in the 
interest of the company still operates within the Act.  
To apply the two components of Product Oriented Approach of Creativity to the 
above, one can see a number of related traits. First, that the deferential approach 
being only applied to business judgment (as opposed to directors’ functional 
responsibilities/corporate governance functions, for instance, the directors’ 
responsibility to follow the company’s predefined management policy). This is in line 
with the condition of novelty, whereby it is a condition on which the making of 
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business decisions cannot be bound by a predefined rule. As demonstrated in the case 
of Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd 502 where the judge refused to second-guess the 
business judgment of the director because the judges were not equipped to get 
themselves in considering the commercial factor of which involves ‘a great deal more 
of speculations …’  - Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb.503 
Second, the condition of usefulness (a condition on which the directors’ business 
decision has to be made in good faith in the interest of the company) is reflected in 
s263(2)(a) of the Companies Act 2006. This retains the old common law rule for the 
judge to discontinue the derivative action on the ground that the decision to 
discontinue the legal action was taken by an appropriate independent organ. In other 
words, a business decision taken by directors in good faith and for the benefit of the 
company (Taylor v. National Union of Mindworkers (Derbyshire Area)504 and Smith v 
Croft (No. 2)505).  Section 263(2)(a), the good faith requirement is linked to the duty 
to promote success of the company under section 172. This forms the basis of which a 
hypothetical director would believe whether or not the continuing law suit would be 
in the interest of the company, would much depend on the success rate of the case, the 
                                                
502	 [2009]	BCC	420,	(Ch)	[85]	
503	 [1872]	LR	5	(HL)	480,	495	(as	cited	by	Marc	Moore	in	Corporate	Governance	in	the	Shadow	of	the	
State	(Hart	Publishing;	UK	edn,	2012)	155)	 	 	
504	 [1985]	 BCLC	 237	 (HC),	 225	 (also	 as	 cited	 by	Mayson	 and	 French	 and	 Ryan,	Company	 Law	(23rd	 	 	
edn,	OUP,	2006-2007)	664	
505	 [1988]	CH	114	(Ch)	
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legal cost plus the compensation obtainable (Franbar Holdings Ltd v. Patel506, Kiani v. 
Cooper507 & Zavahir v. Shankleman508 )  
SUMMARY 
To sum up, by definition, a business decision that is a commercial factor of 
which the judge is not equipped to second guess, coincides with the condition of 
Novelty; and the legal requirement that the decision must be made in the interest of 
the company to enable the hypothetical director (acting in good faith) not to pursue an 
action of negligence, coincides with the condition of Usefulness. The definition of 
Product Oriented Approach of Creativity within the concept of non-programmed 
decision509 is the most suitable definition to achieve the objective of showing, from a 
psychology perspective, that the Companies Act 2006 legislated deference promotes 
and motivates directors’ business creativity (see the relevant section, at the latter part 
of this chapter, demonstrating the interrelationship between company law’s deference 
and the theories of motivation in psychology).   
  
                                                
506	 [2008]	EWHC	1534	(Ch)	
507	 [2010]	BCC	(Ch)	[44]	
508	 [2016]	EWHC	1534	 (Ch)	 (as	 cited	by	Kershaw,	Company	Law	 in	Context:	 Text	and	Materials	 (2nd	
edn,	OUP	Oxford,	28th	June	2012)	613);	See	also,	Zavahir	v.	Shankleman	(2016)	EWHC	2772	(Ch)	(CH	D	
(Companies	 CT))	 also	 as	 covered	 in	 Case	 Comment	 by	 an	 anonymous	 writer,	 ‘Application	 for	
Permission	to	Continue	Derivative	Claim	Refused’	(2016)	Co.	L.N.	7	 	
509	 Chapter	Five	is	dedicated	to	the	discussion	of	the	psychology	and	management	theory	of	types	of	
business	decisions	of	programmed	and	non-programmed	nature.	 	
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IMPORTANCE OF BUSINESS CREATIVITY/INNOVATION TO 
COMPANIES 
The above section covers the formulation of the appropriate definition of 
business creativity. This section aims to explore the significance of business 
innovation to companies. This section represents a significant part of my thesis as it 
serves as one of the grounding roles to connect to the central argument of this 
research, i.e., that the element of business creativity or innovation is the central role 
justifying courts’ deferential approach (both in common law and the Companies Act 
2006) in favour of company directors. This is so, not just for the benefits of the 
directors themselves, but more importantly, for the benefits of companies. In other 
words, to present a successful argument in favour of company law’s deference that 
yields the benefit of motivating company directors in making creative business ideas, 
one needs to first understand the significance of creativity in the business context.   
To begin the discussion on creativity, it is, once again, important to be reminded the 
understanding of the technical difference between the terms ‘creativity’ and 
‘innovation’. Broadly speaking, these two terms are interchangeable as they all refer 
to one common and essential feature, i.e., creative ideas or inventions. The reason for 
the terms being used ‘interchangeably’ within the academic literature as pointed out 
by De Sousa et al was: 
… because researchers of creativity and innovation come from different 
backgrounds and failed to make necessary convergence. The field of creativity 
 208 
is closer to field of behavioural sciences (like psychology and education) while 
researchers in the field of innovation come from areas related to the field of 
management, economics, public administration or political science.510   
De Sausa et al further agreed with Basadur that there is no difference between 
creativity and innovation in organisational levels on the basis that they cannot be 
separated; they carry the same meaning with the same objectives.511    
For the purpose of this research, the terms - creativity and innovation, will be also 
used interchangeably in most part of the discussion due to their identical and 
inseparable features.  
Essentially, my proposed concept of Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions 
will also be regarded as a fusion of two fields of studies, namely, psychology and 
management as the term (Creative) is based on the definition in the field of 
psychology whilst, the term Non-Programmed Decision is based on the existing 
concept in the field of management.512 As mentioned at the Introduction of this 
chapter, the external disciplines, namely, economics, psychology and management 
fields of studies are chosen for this research due to a substantial amount of researches 
                                                
510	 De	Sousa	et	al,	‘Creativity,	Innovation	and	Collaboration	Organizations’	(2012)	IJOI	1,	2	
511 	 M.S.	 Basadur,	 ‘Organizational	 Development	 Interventions	 for	 Enhancing	 Creativity	 in	 the	
Workplace’	 (1997)	 J	 Creat	 Behav	 57,	 (as	 cited	 by	 De	 Sousa	 et	 al,	 ‘Creativity,	 Innovation	 and	
Collaboration	Organizations’	(2012)	IJOI	1,	2)	
512	 Although	 some	 topics	 in	management	overlap	with	psychology,	 e.g.,	 the	 theories	of	motivation	
and	 types	of	 decisions	overlap	with	 the	behavioural	 psychology.	 See	 for	 instance,	Adrian	 Furnham,	
The	Psychology	of	Behaviour	at	Work:	The	Individual	in	the	Organisation	(	2nd	edn,	Psychology	Press,	
2005)	530	
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that have been undertaken on the 1. significance of innovation to companies; 2. 
creativity achieved through motivation; and 3. types of decisions respectively. They 
are chosen to compensate the lack of the relevant researches in the field of studies of 
law.   
As mentioned in the Introduction of this chapter (ft 415), the issue of lack of research 
of creativity in law for the purpose of this thesis only refers to creativity within the 
context of company directors’ business decisions and the related company law’s 
deference. The current amount of research that relates to ‘law and creativity’ is 
mainly undertaken in the context of intellectual property law. 
As the terms, creativity and innovation are now clarified, in the following part, I will 
focus my discussion on the significance of business creativity to companies.   
Toynbee (An American researcher and historian) has pointed out that creativity or 
innovation is the ‘mankind’s ultimate capital assets’, it is a god-given right to 
mankind. Thus, withholding or inhibiting creativity would be so serious that it can 
result in a matter of life and death for any society.513  
                                                
513	 A.	 Toynbee,	 ‘Has	 America	 Neglected	 Her	 Creative	 Minority?’	 	 EPE	 (1962)	 7,	 7;	 see	 also	 A.	
Toynbee	 ‘Is	 America	 Neglecting	 Her	 Creative	 Minority?’	 (1964)	 EPE	 as	 cited	 by	 Calvin,	 ed	 Taylor,	
Widening	Horizons	in	Creativity:	The	Proceedings	of	the	Fifth	Utah	Creativity	Research	Conference,	(1st	
edn,	 John	 Wiley,	 New	 York	 1964)	 9	 (as	 cited	 by	 Mark	 Batey	 and	 Adrian	 Furnham,	 ‘Creativity,	
Intelligence	 and	 Personality:	 A	 critical	 review	 of	 a	 Scattering	 Literature’	 (2008)	 Genet	 Soci	 Gene	
Psychol	Monog,	355)	 	
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To illustrate the importance for the society to promote creativity or innovation, 
Toynbee made a comparison between man and other types of organic life forms by 
pointing out that God has withheld mankind from special attributes of other animal 
such as ‘ … the shark’s teeth, the bird’s wings, the elephant’s trunks, and the hound’s 
or horses’ racing feet.’514  He argued that the sense of creativity planted in mankind 
means that mankind has to perform functions of all the marvelous physical assets that 
are given to every specimen of non-human life forms. Therefore, any failure to 
maximize the ultimate resources, i.e., creativity, humans are, in effect, condemning its 
species into the ‘least effective’ species on the face of the planet. 515 
F Cainelli, R. Evangelista and M. Savona took the significance of creativity or 
innovation from economics point of view, they said, ‘It is widely acknowledged that 
technological change and innovation are the major drivers of economic growth and 
are at the very heart of the competitive process.’516; Likewise, Douglas Slater has 
pointed out that innovation/creativity is a sword that gives ‘competitive edge’517, a 
survival or success tool in the business world.   
Over the past decades, a large amount of economic literatures has been produced to 
demonstrate the close connection between business creativity and the enhancement of 
companies’ competitiveness. Companies need to be competitive in order to survive in 
                                                
514	 A.	Toynbee,	‘Has	America	Neglected	Her	Creative	Minority?’	 	 (1962)	EPE,	Inc.	7,	8	
515	 A.	Toynbee,	‘Has	America	Neglected	Her	Creative	Minority?’	 	 (1962)	EPE	7,	8	 	
516	 F	 Cainelli,	 R.	 Evangelista	 and	M.	 Savona,	 ‘Innovation	 and	 Economic	 Performance	 in	 Services:	 a	
Firm-Level	Analysis’	(2006)	Cam	J	Econ,	435,	435	 	
517	 Douglas	Slater	‘Creativity	in	Organizations’	(2001)	RSA	Journal,	32,	32	 	
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a commercially competitive environment. Earlier writer Schumpeter first argued that 
companies’ business competitiveness revolves around innovation, as a creative 
commercial product would either enable the enterprise to continue competing with its 
business rivals or achieve a temporary market monopoly which ensures the company 
a stable stream of revenue to further its advancement in innovative products for future 
competition.518  
Researchers such as G.R. James, Pearson, Antonelli and Johnson have argued that as 
the years have gone by since Schumpeter’s postulation of the significance of business 
innovation, the world has experienced a massive progression in both product sector as 
well as the ‘the rapid development of the service sector, especially finance 
services’.519 As a result, many companies’ business is no longer restricted within a 
small locality. Advancement of technologies such as computer and new information 
technologies have enormously shortened the ‘distance’ of business markets globally 
between many countries. Thus, markets have become much more competitive than 
ever, and requires business creativity as a solution to this increasing level of business 
competition (Cummings and O’Connell).520 In other words, and from an overall 
perspective, companies need - 
                                                
518	 J.A.	Schumpeter,	Theory	of	Economic	Development:	An	Enquiry	 into	Profits,	Capital,	 Interest	and	
the	Business	Circle	(1st	edn,	HUP,	Cambridge	M.A	1934)	
519	 G.R.	James,	‘Employers’	Organization	in	the	21st	Century’	(1997)	ILO	Publications,	4,	4	
520Cummings	 and	 O’Connell,	 ‘Organizational	 Innovation’	 (1978)	 J	 Bus	 Res	 6,	 33-50	 	 (as	 cited	 by	
Woodman,	Sawyer	and	Griffin	 	 ‘Towards	 the	Theory	of	Organizational	Creativity’	 (1993)	HUP,	293,	
306)	
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the ability to respond effectively to new trends and to provide an efficient, 
personalised service to customers and clients. The transformation of business 
activities, through technological envelopment, the shorter life-circle of business 
ideas and products, and the need for new skills require new management 
strategies and new form of work organisation.521  
Teresa M. Amabile, a renowned academic writer, has given business creativity a 
general term by describing the principle as all about ‘problem-solving’ and the needs 
to expose company employees including directors to creativity through ‘various 
approaches to problem-solving’.522 But specifically, she has also been in support of 
business innovation as an essential element for the success of a business. She has 
argued that innovation is an absolute and vital element for long-term corporate 
success. This is because the business world is often volatile, and that the pace of 
change can be rapidly accelerating. As a result, no company that continues to deliver 
the same products and services in the same way could long survive. On the other hand, 
corporations that anticipate through creativity and innovation toward this changing 
world are much more likely to be successful in both dominating a significant part of 
                                                
521	 ibid	
522	 Teresa	M.	Amabile,	‘How	to	Kill	Creativity’	(1998)	HBR,	77,	84	
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their market shares and being excellent in their cost operations in general523 by way 
of having established their unique selling points to the consumers.524 
One best example of an increase need to business creativity has been indicated by a 
recent economic report, i.e., Oslo Manual. Oslo Manual states that innovation allows 
the firms to get ‘a monopoly position due either to patent (legal monopoly) or to the 
delay before competitors can imitate it. This monopoly position allows the firm to set 
a higher price than would be possible in a competitive market’525 thereby enhance the 
company’s profitability.  
However, the success of this market monopoly position will significantly depend on 
the life-circle of the business product or ideas as indicated by Oslo Manual that ‘New 
technology competes with established ones and in many cases replace them.’526  The 
competitive threat from business rivals has been further intensified, ‘because it is 
possible today to replicate quality almost anywhere in the world.’527 This had been 
                                                
523	 Teresa	M.	Amabile	 ‘Motivating	Creativity	 in	Organisations:	On	Doing	What	You	Love	and	Loving	
What	You	Do’	(1997)	Calif	Manag	Rev	39,	40	 	 	
524	 Articles	pointing	out	the	danger	of	both	UK	and	US	companies,	in	focusing	on	increasing	company	
share	 values,	 based	 on	 short-term	 equity	 market	 incentives,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 optimal	 successes	
founded	on	long-term	innovation	investments,	 included	Sir	George	Cox,	 ‘Overcoming	Short-termism	
within	 British	 Business	 –	 The	 Key	 to	 Sustain	 Economic	 Growth’,	 (An	 Independent	 Review	
Commissioned	 by	 Labour	 Party	 2013)	 para.	 54;	 Allan	 G	 Hallsworth,	 ‘Short-Termism	 and	 Economic	
Restructuring	 in	 Britain’	 Econ	 Geogr	 (1996)	 35;	 N.	 Tanden	 &	 B.	 Efron,	 ‘How	 to	 Foster	 Long-Term	
Investment’	 (2015)	
<http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/12/07/2015/how-foster-long-term-innovation-investment
>	accessed	17th	November	2017;	and	Roger	L	Martin,	‘Yes,	Short-Termism	Really	is	a	Problem’	(2015)	
HBR	<https://hbr.org/2015/10/yes-short-termism-really-is-a-problem>	accessed	17th	November	2017	
525 	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development,	 Oslo	 Manual,	 (1st	 edn,	
Eurostat,	European	Commission	2005)	16	
526 	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development,	 Oslo	 Manual,	 (1st	 edn,	
Eurostat,	European	Commission	2005)	16	 	
527	 G.R.	James,	‘Employers’	Organization	in	the	21st	Century’	(1997)	ILO	Publications,	4,	4	
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agreed by academic writers, for instance, Segerstrom, who had stated that, ‘Firms 
invest significant resources in research and development activities to discover 
qualitatively imposed products and capture associated profits. When they are 
successful, other firms, attracted by these profits, imitate, and thus they accelerate the 
development and production of new products.’528 This means that on the one hand, 
small companies are gaining the edge of competitiveness through either simple copies 
or creative ideas based on an existing originality, but on the other hand, directors 
working for the companies in the temporary market monopoly position are 
increasingly facing the needs to make quick and decisive creative business decisions 
in order to satisfy the global business market where ‘the competitive differentiation 
will come from swiftness to the market and innovation.’529 As Segestrom has said 
that, ‘Other firms devote resources to imitate new superior products, and successful 
innovations cannot count on earning dominant firm profits forever. Because of 
product innovation, individual products eventually become obsolete.’530 
Over the years, the significance of business innovation and its connection to business 
competition through the ability to respond swiftly to the market trends have been 
widely promoted by countries. For instance, the Australian government in its business 
guide to investors, has recently encouraged companies to not just having the ability 
only, on operating the business, for the current markets. But, more importantly, the 
                                                
528	 Paul	S.	Sergerstrom,	‘Innovation,	imitation,	and	Economic	Growth’	(1991)	J	Political	Econ,	807	 	
529	 G.R.	James,	‘Employers’	Organization	in	the	21st	Century’	(1997)	ILO	Publications,	4,	4	
530	 Paul	S.	Sergerstrom,	‘Innovation,	imitation,	and	Economic	Growth’	(1991)	J	Political	Econ,	807,	826	 	
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ability to adopt to the needs of swift innovation, i.e., the ability to anticipate the likely 
trend in the future among consumers and thereby create ‘an idea product or service to 
meet the future demand rapidly and effectively’.531   
Prior to 2002, the American Council on Foreign Relation has asserted that over the 
past many decades, the US has managed to amass a disproportionate share of the 
world’s wealth because of its relentless pursuit of business and product creativity. 
This is demonstrating that business innovation is ‘a central catalyst of steady 
economic performance.’ 532 Ahlstrom also argued in 2010, that: 
… as recently as little more than a century ago, the purchasing power of an 
American was one tenth of what it is today; the United States and several other 
countries have experienced sustained economic growth over the past two 
centuries, while others lagged considerably … The salience of growth is evident 
in that well-managed, growing firms can do much more for their employees and 
customers.533    
The survival and the success of the US companies, in Ahlstrom’s view, had been 
achieved because ‘The firms bring to the market cutting-edge and novel innovations, 
                                                
531	 Queensland	Government,	 ‘Queensland	Government	Business	Guide	for	 Investors’,	 (Business	and	
Industrial	 Portal	 2015)	
<https://www.business.qld.gov.au/business/business-improvement/becoming-innovative-business/w
hy-business-innovation-important>	accessed	16th	July	2016	
532	 B.	Steil,	G.D.	Victor	&	R.P.	Nelson,	Technological	Innovation	and	Economics	Performance.	A	Council	
on	Foreign	Relations	Book	(1st	edn,	A	CFR	Book.	Princeton	University	Press,	2002)	
533	 David	Ahlstrom,	‘Innovation	and	Growth:	How	Business	Contributes	to	Society’	(2010)	AOM	11,	12	
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which in turn create new business growth while delivering novel goods and services 
to the market place.’534 
Ahsltrom’s view on significance of innovation was recently echoed by Professor John 
Kay in his 2012 report, where he described business innovation to companies as ‘the 
source of their competitive advantage535’. Kay stated that some companies have the 
tendency of adopting short-termism approaches at the expense of the development of 
the company’s ‘capacity for innovation’536 – ‘a decision that we subsequently 
regret’.537 Labour Party’s 2013 Report of which the former institute of Directors boss, 
Sir George Cox, said that the UK companies have become primarily focused on 
shorter term gain at the expense of long term Research and Development (R & D) 
which has the consequence of ‘impairing the development of international UK 
competitive businesses.’538 He further said that this problem of short-termism must 
be addressed, otherwise, ‘the UK will inevitably fall behind not just the rapidly 
developing economies, but also its traditional competitors.’539 The decline of the 
British economy as a result of the corporate or financial system that ‘are geared to the 
                                                
534	 ibid	 	 	 	
535	 Professor	John	Kay,	‘The	Kay	Review	of	UK	Equity	Markets	and	Long-Term	Decision	Making’	(2012)	
Final	 Report,	 14	
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/253454/bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf	>	accessed	6th	March	2019	
536	 ibid	
537	 ibid	
538	 Sir	George	Cox,	‘Overcoming	Short-termism	within	British	Business	–	The	Key	to	Sustain	Economic	
Growth’,	(An	Ind	Rev	Com	by	Labour	Party	2013)	para.	54	
539	 Sir	George	Cox,	‘Overcoming	Short-termism	within	British	Business	–	The	Key	to	Sustain	Economic	
Growth’,	(2013)	(An	Ind	Rev	Com	by	Labour	Party	2013)	para.	54	
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vagaries of short term success …’ had also been mentioned by Professor 
Hallsworth.540  
The UK is not the only country that suffers from the problem of corporate 
short-termism. The necessity of companies avoiding short-termism, and the 
significance of companies continuously fostering long-term innovation investments, 
have in recent years, been pointed out by Tanden and Efron. Stating that the recent 
shift of corporate focus amongst American companies on raising their share values by 
achieving short-term corporate targets, yielding quick return to investors at the 
expense of R & D will be against the companies (or even the US economy as a whole) 
in the long run.541  This is supported by 2015 survey undertaken by National Science 
Foundation - Division of Science Resources Statistics which has revealed that the US 
companies have been gradually focusing less on basic scientific R&D. This, 
according to President Obama, may have negative impact on the US Economy in long 
run.542 The danger of corporate short-termism to the US economy is also being 
echoed by academic writer Roger Martin of Toronto University in his recent article.543  
                                                
540	 See	 generally	 Allan	 G	 Hallsworth,	 ‘Short-Termism	 and	 Economic	 Restructuring	 in	 Britain’	 Econ	
Geogr	(1996)	 	
541 	 N.	 Tanden	 &	 B.	 Efron,	 ‘How	 to	 Foster	 Long-Term	 Investment’	 (2015)	
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<https://hbr.org/2015/10/yes-short-termism-really-is-a-problem>	
 218 
Indeed, empirical evidence around the world has repeatedly proven that business 
innovation represents an indispensable key to a company’s success and economic 
growth. For instance, business innovation explains much of the GDP (Gross Domestic 
Products) growth in China from 1981-2004 through its aggressive pursuit of research 
and development (R&D) for technological, organisational and service innovation.544 
One reason for this positive link, as asserted by Ahlstrom, is that innovation promotes 
new product and services which generate economic growth as a result of the constant 
increase of demand for them by the society due to the beneficial features of these 
products and services.   
As concluded by Ahstrom, ‘Profits do matter. But good firms supply far more than 
just profits for their owners: they bring innovation into the market, which in turn 
provide economic growth, employment, and significant improvements to people’s 
lives.’545 
Apart from Ahlstrom, this school of thought where business innovation leads to 
competitiveness, then followed by economic growth to the society and finally 
positively benefits back to the company is shared by many other academic writers, 
                                                
544	 See	 Peilei	 F,	 ‘Innovation	 Capacity	 and	 Economic	 Development:	 China	 and	 India’	 (2011)	 Econ	
Change	Rest	44	(2/1)	43	
545	 David	Ahlstrom,	 ‘Innovation	and	Growth:	How	Business	Contributes	to	Society’	 (2010)	AMJ	 ,	11,	
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such as Arthur546, Barro & Sala-i-Martin; and Baumol & Strom.547 These writers 
have placed much emphasis on success of companies based on business creativity and 
argued that if the society hinders or ‘de-motivate’ the companies from innovation, the 
consequence can be devastating not only to the companies themselves but to the 
growth of the economy as a whole. In other words, there is a close relationship based 
on mutual benefits between the companies and the countries that they are benefiting.  
Academic writers Pfeffer, as well as, Hammel further argued that business creativity 
depends on the talented employees but when facing a creatively competitive market, 
these employees will only be willing to continue to stay with the company if the 
company continues to exhibit the willingness to innovate and operates within the 
creative framework. This is because people do not want to have years of their lives 
wasted in a less creatively competitive company where its potential business 
advancement is constrained with no or little prospect of pay rise. In comparison, 
creative companies tend to offer competitive job package in order to attract talent; and 
have higher potential of giving better pay to the employees.  
In addition, as with directors having intrinsic motivation to seek business creativity, a 
company willing to embrace innovation are more likely to offer those directors a job 
environment with enhancement of their intrinsic motivation that leads to job 
                                                
546	 Arthur	Lewis,	‘Competing	technologies,	Increase	Returns,	and	Lock-In	by	Historical	Events’	(1989)	
EJ.	Vol	99,	No	394	 	 	
547	 Barro	&	Sala-i-Martin,	Economic	Growth	 (Cam.	M.A.	The	MIT	Press	2004);	 and	Baumol	&	Strom	
‘Entrepreneurship	and	Economic	Growth’	(2007)	SEJ	 (both	cited	by	David	Ahlstrom,	 ‘Innovation	and	
Growth:	How	Business	Contributes	to	Society’	(2010)	AMJ	11,	11)	 	 	
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satisfaction. 548  Therefore, when a company continues to lose its creative 
competitiveness, many of the most capable employees (including directors and other 
key employees) will be head-hunted by the company’s rivals. This vicious circle will 
continuously affect the company’s ‘ability to re-generate growth’.549   
It follows that, business innovation has the advantage of motivating the company’s 
employees to participate its activities, thus making them to be more active and loyal 
to the company.550  As Cox and Blake have said that, ‘Constantly innovating and 
improving business practices is also likely to help you attract better staff members and 
retain more of your existing staff – something which is crucial to the long-term health 
and performance of your business’.551  
Oslo Manual is in support of this argument by arguing further that business 
innovation ‘has led to a better appreciation of the importance of the conditions, 
regulations and policies within which markets operates – and hence the inescapable 
role of governments in monitoring and seeking to find-tune this overall 
                                                
548	 More	 information	 regarding	directors’	 intrinsic	motivation	 to	 creativity	and	how	 the	 current	UK	
company	 law	 serves	 as	 a	motivator	 from	psychology	perspective	will	 be	discussed	 in	 details	 at	 the	
latter	part	of	this	chapter	
549	 Gary	Hamel,	‘Bring	Sillicon	Valley	Inside’	(1999)	HBR,	70;	and	Jeffrey	Pfeffer,	The	Human	Equation:	
Building	Profits	by	Building	People	First,	(Boston:	Harvard	Business	School	Press,	1998)	(both	as	cited	
by	David	Ahlstrom,	 ‘Innovation	and	Growth:	How	Business	Contributes	 to	Society’	 (2010)	AOM,	11,	
13)	
550	 Queensland	Government,	 ‘Queensland	Government	Business	Guide	for	 Investors’,	 (Business	and	
Industrial	 Portal	 2015).	
https://www.business.qld.gov.au/business/business-improvement/becoming-innovative-business/wh
y-business-innovation-important.	accessed	16th	July	2016	
551	 See	also	Taylor	H.	Cox	and	Stacy	Blake,	‘Managing	Cultural	Diversity:	Implication	for	Organisation	
Competitiveness’	(1991)	EJ,	46,	50	 	
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framework.’552 This economic argument can also be manifested (and to repeat what 
has been previously emphasized in this thesis) in support of the current Companies 
Act 2006 promoting directors’ business creativity based on the discontinuation of 
derivative action in the interest of the company.  
As the central argument of this thesis, the 2006 Act that excludes any improper legal 
intervention, either intentionally or unintentionally, aims to prevent company 
directors from being risk adverse in business creativity. From a psychology 
perspective, as argued by this thesis, the absence of such legislate deference within 
duty of care liability regime will either result in directors from refusing to accept the 
directorship553 or (as argued by Canard) directors exercising ‘care’ or due diligence 
only to protect themselves rather than achieving business growth through creativity. 
For instance, directors taking ‘care’ to keep up long and unnecessary records and 
trails of papers justifying their business decisions or seeking external consultations 
where in the situation would be unnecessary to do so which inevitably cause delay to 
or miss the business opportunity.554 This mal-practice can also, in many situations, 
incur unnecessary expenses to the company.555 Directors’ risk adverse behaviour is 
                                                
552 	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development,	 Oslo	 Manual,	 (1st	 edn,	
Eurostat,	European	Commission	2005)	17	
553	 See	for	instance,	Annete	Greenhow,	‘The	Statutory	Business	Judgment	Rule:	Putting	the	Wind	into	
Directors’	(1999)	Sails’	BondLawRw,	33,	42;	Keneth	E.	Scott,	‘Corporation	Law	and	the	American	Law	
Institute	 Corporate	 Governance	 Project’	 (1982-1983)	 35	 Stan	 Law	 Rev,	 927,	 936;	 see	 also	 Julian	
Velosco,	’Structural	Bias	and	the	Need	for	Substantive	Review’	(2004)	Wash	Univ	Law	Rev,	913,	917	 	
554	 Alfred	F.	Conard,	‘A	Behavioral	Analysis	of	Directors’	Liability	for	Negligence’	(1972)	Duke	L	J,	904	
555	 Alfred	F.	Conard,	‘A	Behavioral	Analysis	of	Directors’	Liability	for	Negligence’	(1972)	Duke	L	J,	904	
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due to the factors, as Segerstrom has suggested, that business innovation can be costly, 
time- consuming and involves uncertainty.556 
This is connected to the conclusions in Chapters Two and Three that, similar to US 
business judgment rule, the UK law (as shown in both common law and Companies 
Act 2006) recognizes, by way of deferential approach, the uncertainty and uniqueness 
of directors’ business judgment or Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions 
(Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb557; and Kleanthous v. Paphitis558) while retaining the 
legal intervention (through the codification of the common law into the 2006 Act) on 
directors’ programmed business decisions, i.e., directors’ business decisions of which 
the assessment of the related duty of care can be achieved through certain predefined 
rules, such as the company’s internal control policy (Re Baring plc (No. 5)559).  
Concerning motivation, this chapter will, on the sub-section below, demonstrate that 
the law offers deference insulating company directors from derivative lawsuit in the 
context of their Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions/business judgment. 
Judicial or legislated deference, according to psychology studies, have direct 
contributions to directors’ intrinsic motivation in creativity. In other words, the 
section dealing with motivation in this chapter will demonstrate that the UK law is 
legislated very much in line with the theories of motivation in psychology, in the 
                                                
556	 Paul	S.	Segerstrom,	‘Innovation,	imitation,	and	Economic	Growth’	(1991)	J	Political	Econ,	807,	826	 	
557	 LR	5	(HL)	480,	495	
558	 [2011]	EWHC	2287	(Ch)	[71],	[72]	
559	 [1999)	1	BCLC	(CA)	433	
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sense that deferential approach under the 2006 Act facilitates directors’ intrinsic 
motivation which promotes directors’ business creativity. 
Finally, business innovation that results in macroeconomic (economic system in large 
scale) growth is not only achieved through companies and firms competing with each 
other; or companies’ business innovation benefiting the people. It is also about 
companies forming an alliance to create business innovation through the processes of 
technological infusion involving ‘incremental improvement both to new and 
established technologies’ 560 .  This mutual advantage and support between the 
companies, either among the competitors or producers and suppliers create mutual or 
macro-economic growth.561 Therefore: 
… it provides a foundation on which wealth can be accumulated by more and 
more people over a prolonged period of time, innovation can mitigate conflicts 
among different interest groups over the allocation of resources and returns: an 
increase in the living standard of one interest group does not have to come at the 
expense of another.562  
And hence, promote growth of economy as a whole.  
                                                
560 	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development,	 Oslo	 Manual,	 (1st	 edn,	
Eurostat,	European	Commission	2005)	16	
561 	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development,	 Oslo	 Manual,	 (1st	 edn,	
Eurostat,	European	Commission	2005)	16	
562	 Mary	O’Sullivan,	‘The	Innovative	Enterprise	and	Corporate	Governance’	(2000)	Camb	J	Econ,	393,	
393	
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CASE STUDIES 
In this section, I will use five law cases from both English and American legal 
jurisdictions563, to give an insight as to how business innovation in the context of 
directors’ business decisions impacts positively to the financial and economic interest 
of the company. As the chosen cases are law cases which the writer of this thesis was 
not a party, the writer had no influence to the development or the outcome of the 
cases. These five cases have been selected randomly within the pool of cases where 
the contextual conditions are relevant to the economics theories discussed above, 
specifically ranging from:  
- The preservation of the company’s business competitiveness through business 
creativity either secured by intellectual property right or business investment;  
- Promotion of macro-economy growth, thereby benefits the company, e.g., business 
creativity as resources being allocated between different companies leading to the 
achievement of further business creativity, with an aim to benefit the companies 
financially in ‘partnership’ from a macroeconomics perspective564;  
- Cost-saving or effective cash-flow; and  
                                                
563	 Together	they	serve	as	an	analytical	 framework	suitable	for	the	jurisdictional	background	of	this	
thesis	
564	 Macroeconomics	 is	 referring	 to	 the	behavior	 and	 structure	of	 economy	as	 a	whole	 for	 instance	
economy	regionally,	nationally	or	globally.	O’Sullivant	et	al,	Economics:	Principles	 in	Action	 (Prentice	
Hall;	Student	edn,	2006)	57	
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- Promotion or maintenance of the values of the company’s assets, i.e., effective 
management of its property portfolio. 
Business innovation covers vast areas of business activities, ranging from product 
innovation through legal protection of copyright and patent to organisational 
innovation, which include company directors’ business decisions in negotiating with 
external parties for procurement of contracts of products or services. For instance, a 
real estate overage agreement.565 
However, majority of successful business creative decisions do not end up in legal 
dispute. Therefore, there is a limitation on how case law can offer to bring out the true 
essence of the benefits of business innovation. In addition, as already mentioned 
earlier on in this chapter, psychology and management also do not offer sufficient 
analysis into the economic benefits of the significance of business innovation to 
companies. As explained in the latter part of this chapter, the relevant researches are 
primarily focusing on the psychology and the management aspects of 
creativity/innovation. Both in the formulation of the definition of creativity & 
motivating creativity; and, as Chapter Five will cover, types of business decisions. 
The limitations in psychology and management explain why economics needs to be 
relied upon in this research for the studies of significance of business innovation. 
                                                
565 See for example, case study three - Hildron Finance Limited v. Sunley Holdings Limited [2010] 
EWHC 1681 Ch 
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Now going back to the law, as briefly mentioned above, most of the law cases that 
directly involve the question relating to directors’ Derivative claim case – duty of 
directors to act in their powers, contained in section 172 Companies Act 2006, do not 
fully portrait the significance of what business innovation can bring to a company. 
These cases are, as the nature of law suit suggests, primarily involving the issues on: 1. 
whether or not there was a creative business decision; 2. was such a decision made 
bona fide in the interest of the company; and 3. was such a decision made by the 
director as an appropriate independent organ of the company.  For instance, in the 
case of Smith v Croft (No.2)566 where the court showed diffidence to interfere with the 
director’s business decision on the basis of a decision being a Non-Programmed 
(Creative) Business Decision/business judgment made by the director, acting as an 
appropriate independent organ of the company; and in the case of Kleanthous v. 
Paphitis 567  where the court once again, refused to second-guess the directors’ 
business judgment on the basis that only the director (as opposed to the court), who is 
an appropriate independent organ of the company is equipped to make bona fide 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions.    
In addition, derivative law suit usually occurred because the company suffers or is 
allegedly suffering from a financial loss as a result of the company directors’ business 
decision gone wrong. Consequently, derivative law suit cases do not usually bring out 
                                                
566	 [1988]	Ch	114,	(Ch)	[184]	
567	 [2011]	EWHC	2287	(Ch)	[73],	[75]	 	
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the best picture of business innovation. In other words, they do not effectively 
demonstrate the economics benefits mentioned in this section. Any benefit of 
innovation out of breach of duty of care cases tend to be speculative568 (For instance, 
in Overend Gurney & Co v Gibb569 the judge ruled that company directors were not 
liable for his business decision because the decision made in a mercantile world is full 
of speculation with ‘readiness to confide in the probabilities of things’570; or in Iesini 
v Westrip Holdings Ltd 571 where the court refused to second-guess the commercial 
decisions of the directors due to the uncertainty in relation to the outcome of the 
commercial decisions). 	
Or in certain law cases, where the court acknowledged the legality of the business 
decision exercised by the directors as an appropriate independent organ of the 
company, but held that the directors’ decision was made for an improper purpose. 
Thus, rendering any economic benefit to the companies speculative. For example, in 
company takeover bid cases such as Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd572; Howard Smith Ltd v. 
Ampol Petroleum Ltd; and Extrasure Travel Insurances Limited v. Scattergood and 
Others573	
                                                
568	 Reed, ‘Company Directors – Collective or Functional Responsibility’ (2006) Com Law 171	
569	 [1872]	LR5 (HL) 480, [480], [495]	
570	 ibid	
571	 [2009]	BCC 420 (Ch) [85]	
572	 [1967]	Ch	254	(Ch)	 	
573	 [2002]	1	BCLC	598	(Ch)	[90],	[97]	
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The following case studies 2 and 5 involved actions for breach of duty of care against 
the directors leading to speculative benefits to the companies, i.e., these cases 
involved the courts’ acceptance of the business decisions based on the principles that 
the decisions were made in the interest of the companies; and the courts were not in 
the position to second-guess the business creativity of the directors.  To overcome 
the limitation resulted by the speculative nature relating to the economic benefits of 
which the company might ultimately enjoy, I have also selected three other cases 
which are not fundamentally concerning breaches of duties of care cases. The 
advantage of these cases is that the cases’ outcomes have articulated the clear, 
non-speculative benefits to the companies concerned. Thus, offer clear and direct 
perspectives linking to the importance of business innovation to companies - 
generally discussed in this chapter.   
It is important to note that due to the sequential development of Chapters Four and 
Five of this thesis, the purpose of the current case studies is not to show whether or 
the directors’ business decisions fits into the proposed definition of creativity, or as 
this thesis would call it, Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision. The 
following case studies are simply conducted to demonstrate the benefits of creativity 
to companies. The direct and indirect case studies, including the revisiting of the cases 
in this case studies, demonstrate whether or not a particular business decision 
constitutes a Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision will be undertaken in 
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Chapter Five, where all the elements of business creativity underpinned by the 
concepts of types of business decisions are fully covered.  
CASE STUDY NO. 1: SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS (UK) LIMITED V APPLE INC. 
[2012] EWHC 
Facts:  Since the launch of first I-phone in 2007, Apple Inc. enjoyed a massive 
market success over its product innovation. Apple protected its legal position 
regarding its product creativity through registrations of a large number of design 
patents, registered trademarks and trade dress rights. In 2011, Apple filed a global law 
suit against Samsung Electronics Co. Samsung Electronics Co was the rival and the 
then acting component supplier of Apple for a number of alleged infringements of 
intellectual property rights owned by Apple.  Apple claimed that several of 
Samsung’s Android phones and tablets had infringed its patents, trademarks, user 
interface and style. 574  Samsung denied the allegations, and in 2011, filed a 
counter-claim against Apple for infringement of Samsung’s patent for mobile 
telecommunication technology.575   
As part of the ongoing global law suits on intellectual property infringement between 
the Apple Inc and Samsung Electronics Co (the two corporate giants who own  
                                                
574	 See	Kane	et	al,	‘Apple:	Samsung	Copied	Design’	(2011)	(The	Wall	Street	Journal,	Dow	Jones	and	
Company)	<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703916004576271210109389154>	 	
Accessed	16th	July	2016	
575	 Erik	 Larson,	 ‘Samsung	 Sues	 Apple	 in	 UK	 Following	 US	 Iphone	 Patent	 Suit’	 (2001)	 (Bloomberg	
Business	 Week,	 Bloomberg)	
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-06-30/samsung-sues-apple-in-london-following-u-s
-iphone-ipad-patent-lawsuit.>	Accessed	16th	July	2016	
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disproportionate market shares in the Information Technology and smart-phone 
market). Samsung in 2012, sought a declaration from the UK High Court that ‘three 
of its Galaxy tablets computers (the Tab 10.1, Tab 8.9 and tab 7.7) do not infringe. 
Apple counter-claims for infringement.’576  
Despite Apple’s counter-claim, Samsung successfully obtained the declaration after 
Judge Birss ruled in favour of Samsung. In the judgment and in particular, the 
distinctive innovation between iphone and Samsung, his honour said: 
The extreme simplicity of iphone design is striking. Overall it has undercoated 
flat surfaces with a plate of glass on the front all the way out to a very thin rim 
and a blank back. There is a crisp edge around the rim and a combination of 
curves, both at the corners and the sides. The design looks like an object of the 
informed user would want to pick up and hold. It is an understated, smooth and 
simple product. It is a cool design.577    
And in the judicial conclusion based on the overall impression compared, his honour 
said: 
The informed user’s overall impression of each of the Samsung Galaxy Tablets 
is the following. From the front they belong to the family which includes the 
Apple design; but the Samsung products are very thin, almost insubstantial 
                                                
576	 Samsung	Electrics	(UK)	Ltd	V	Apple	Inc.	[2012]	EWHC	(Ch)	[1]	 	
577	 ibid	[182]	 	
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members of that family with unusual details on the back. They do not have the 
same understated and extreme simplicity which is possessed by the Apple 
design. They are not as cool. The overall impression produced is different.578  
In concluding the case, His Honour Judge Birss stated that ‘The Samsung Tablets do 
not infringe Apple’s registered design No. 000181607-0001.’579 
Comment: This case demonstrates Point 1 of the economic benefits, i.e., the 
preservation of the company’s business competitiveness through business creativity 
secured by intellectual property right. As mentioned in the earlier part of this chapter, 
that business innovation enables the company to achieve market monopoly coupled 
with the legal protection through intellectual property registration, the life-circle of 
innovative products is maintained for a period of time. Indeed, Apple’s creative 
business decision in its tele-communication technology contributed massively to the 
existence of today’s ‘Apple Kingdom’.  However, also as discussed in the previous 
section, that the competitive threat from business rivals is now aggravated, ‘because it 
is possible today to replicate quality almost anywhere in the world.’580 Therefore, the 
rival companies, (Samsung in this case) can, in my opinion, be said to have gained the 
edge of competitiveness through creative ideas based on an existing originality.581 As 
indicated by Oslo manual that ‘a firm may take a reactive approach (Samsung under 
                                                
578	 ibid	[190]	 	
579	 ibid	[191]	 	
580	 G.R.	James	‘Employers’	Organization	in	the	21st	Century’	(1997)	ILO/OIT,	4,	4	 	
581	 ibid	
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the present case) and innovate to prevent losing market shares to an innovative 
competitor (Apple under the present case).’582   
Business creativity has contributed to the great business success of both companies. 
The success of Apple was based on business innovation; and Samsung has won many 
law suits on intellectual property right against Apple because of Samsung director’s 
business judgment to invest in the products that demonstrates the novelty of its 
products by way of business innovation.  
This case also demonstrates Point 2 of the economic benefits, i.e., Business creativity 
as resources being allocated between different companies leading to completion of 
further business creativity with an aim to benefit financially to the companies in 
‘partnership’ from macroeconomics perspective. On the macroeconomic growth side, 
(as briefly mentioned in the facts section above) despite this legal dispute, Samsung 
continued to act as a key part supplier for the innards of the iphones and ipad lines.583 
The business relationship between the parties had started both before the 
commencement of the alleged intellectual property right infringement legal 
proceedings and continued even during the process of the litigation. It is reported that 
a former Apple executive has said that: 
                                                
582 	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development,	 Oslo	 Manual,	 (1st	 edn,	
Eurostat,	European	Commission	2005)	16	 	
583	 Zac	 Hall,	 ‘Samsung	 Remains	 as	 a	 Key	 Supplier	 for	 Apple’s	 Iphone	 Despite	 Patent	 Dispute,	
Competition’	 (9TO5MAC	 2015)	 <http://9to5mac.com/2015/02/24/samsung-apple-iphone-supplier/>	
accessed	16th	July	2016	
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Samsung is the world’s biggest maker of some of the most sophisticated parts 
that Apple craves, such as processors, memory and high-resolution screens. 
Apple also has more than a half-decade invested in working with Samsung to 
build custom chips. Replicating that elsewhere is daunting.584  
Samsung’s business innovation on its component products has limited Apple’s 
choices for a number of years. This is a classic example of resources allocation to 
achieve an innovation process, where the directors of a number of companies had 
made business decisions to form alliance with each other in order to implement 
business creativity with the benefit of boosting up the level of international trade.585 
And in turn, benefits the economy through which ultimately benefits the companies 
themselves.586 
CASE STUDY NO. 2: DODGE V FORD MOTOR CO 170 NW 668 [MICH 1919] 587 
Facts: Henry Ford - the company director of Ford car manufacturing company 
decided to re-invest the company profits into developing a number of plants and 
                                                
584	 Lessin	 J.E.	 ‘Apple	 Finds	 It	 Difficult	 to	 Divorce	 Samsung’	 (The	Wall	 Street	 Journal,	 July,	 2013)	 <	
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324682204578513882349940500>	 accessed	 16th	
July	2016	 	 	
585	 Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	Oslo	Manual,	(1st,	Eurostat,	European	
Commission	2005)	16;	See	also	in	general	Huang.	Y,	 ‘Debating	china’s	Economic	Growth:	The	Beijing	
Consensus	or	the	Washington	Consensus?’	(2010)	Acad	Manag	Perspect,	31,	47	
586	 Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	Oslo	Manual,	(1st,	Eurostat,	European	
Commission	2005)	16;	See	also	in	general	Huang.	Y,	 ‘Debating	china’s	Economic	Growth:	The	Beijing	
Consensus	or	the	Washington	Consensus?’	(2010)	Acad	Manag	Perspect,	31,	47	
587	 See	also	Robert	Hamilton,	Corporations	including	Partnership	and	Limited	Partnership,	Cases	and	
Materials	(2nd,	West,	1981)	816	
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machinery in anticipation of an increase car sale in the future. This business decision 
was made at the expense of withholding dividends from the shareholders.   
The company shareholders were not happy with the director’s business decision, 
brought an action against the director for breach of duty of care and loyalty relating to 
shareholder wealth maximization on which under the one roof - both breaches of duty 
of care and loyalty overlapped. Consequently, being the instruments claimed against 
the director.588 During the ruling, the judge commented that it was not within the 
capability of the judge to conclude whether or not the director’s forecast of a massive 
increase of the company sale in the near future was accurate.589 However, it later 
turned out that the director’s forecast was correct and that the acquisition of the 
additional plant and machinery were indeed the correct business move to meet a rise 
in the number of cars within the company’s production-line as a result of an increase 
in the consumers’ demand. 
                                                
588	 Bernard	S.	Sharfman,	‘Shareholder	Wealth	Maximization	and	its	implementation	under	Corporate	
Law’	 (2007)	 FLA.	 LAW.	 REV.	 386,	 391;	 see	 also,	 Ewoud	Hondius	&	Andre	 Janssen,	Disgorgement	 of	
Profits:	Gain	Based	Remedies	Throughout	the	World	(1st	edn,	Springer	International	Publishing,	2015)	
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articles	regarding	companies	focusing	on	short	term	gain	as	the	expense	of	long	term	investment	(see	
Sir	 George	 Cox,	 ‘Overcoming	 Short-termism	within	 British	 Business	 –	 The	 Key	 to	 Sustain	 Economic	
Growth’,	 	 (An	 Ind	 Rev	 Com	 by	 Labour	 Party	 2013)	 54;	 Allan	 G	 Hallsworth,	 ‘Short-Temism	 and	
Economic	 Restructuring	 in	 Britain’	 Econ	 Geogr	 (1996)	 35;	 N.	 Tanden	 &	 B.	 Efron,	 ‘How	 to	 Foster	
Long-Term	 Investment’	 (2015)	
<http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/12/07/2015/how-foster-long-term-innovation-investment
>	accessed	17th	November	2017;	and	Roger	L	Martin,	‘Yes,	Short-Termism	Really	is	a	Problem’	(2015)	
HBR	<https://hbr.org/2015/10/yes-short-termism-really-is-a-problem>	 	
589 	 Robert	 Hamilton,	Corporations	 including	 Partnership	 and	 Limited	 Partnership,	 Cases	 and	
Materials	(2nd	edn,	West,	1981)	816	
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As part of his defense, the director claimed that the business expansion also yielded 
the benefit of employing, ‘more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system 
to the greatest possible number …’  
The court refused to hold the director liable for breach of duty of care against the 
company for the proposed expansion of the business on the ground of business 
judgment or, from a psychology perspective, Non-Programmed (Creative) Business 
Decision of the company director.590  
Comments: This case demonstrates the benefit mentioned earlier, i.e., the 
preservation of the company’s business competitiveness through business creativity 
through long-term business investment; and another benefit also mentioned earlier, 
i.e., promotion or maintenance of the values of the company’s assets, i.e., effective 
management of property portfolio. 
The company director’s proactive approach to gain strategic market position against 
the company’s competitors, through his forecast of a rise in demand for Ford’s cars in 
the near future. This business decision is implemented by investing the profits to 
further the research and development of the company’s products. This is important, as 
the continuing supply of the company’s products will maintain customer loyalty and 
prolong the life span of the company’s products through research and development 
                                                
590	 Dodge	 v.	 Ford	Motor	 Co	 170	 n.w.	 668,	 684	 [Mich.	 1919];	 see	 also	 Stephen	M.	 Bainbridge,	 ’The	
Business	Judgment	Rule	as	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57,	Vand	L	Rev	83,	98	
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for further innovative technology, thus ensuring the continuation of the company’s 
market monopoly or competitiveness. These economic benefits to the company were 
also recognized by the court.591  
This case also demonstrates the benefit mentioned earlier, i.e., Promotion of 
macro-economy growth, thereby benefits the company. The director of the company 
also claimed that the proposed business expansion would help the economy by 
increasing the employment rates of the country. This argument is in line with the 
economists’ assertion that business innovation results in macro-economy growth and 
which would eventually benefit the company through an increase of consumers’ 
ability to spend with an up rise in demand for the products and services. It can 
therefore be argued from the perspective that, this economic interpretation, in turn, 
supports the legal concept as mentioned by Macey in his review and commentary on 
the case, that the director has managed the company to maximize the profits of the 
shareholders.592  
  
                                                
591	 Dodge	 v.	 Ford	 Motor	 Co.	 170	 n.w.	 668,	 684	 [Mich.	 1919];	 for	 the	 significance	 of	 companies’	
long-term	 innovation	 investment,	 see	N.	Tanden	&	B.	Efron,	 ‘How	to	Foster	Long-Term	 Investment’	
(2015)	
<http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/12/07/2015/how-foster-long-term-innovation-investment
>	accessed	17th	November	2017	
592	 J.R.	Macey,	 ’A	Close	Read	of	an	Excellent	Commentary	on	Dodge	v.	Ford’	(2008)	Va	L	&	Bus	Rev,	
1384	 	 	
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CASE STUDY NO. 3: HILDRON FINANCE LIMITED V SUNLEY HOLDINGS 
LIMITED [2010] EWHC 1681 (CH) 
Facts: In 1986, the directors of the seller company sold a large block of flats. 
The relevant contract of sale contained a provision for the overage payment. This 
provision provides that a share fifty percent proceeds of sale to be paid to the seller 
company upon the subsequent sale of the porter’s flat with two pre-conditions to be 
satisfied: 1. when the porter’s flat was no longer required to accommodate a resident 
porter; and 2. that the flats were sold in an open market.   
The Leasehold Reform Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 came into force 
after the sale which allowed the tenants of the flats to acquire the flats by way of 
collective enfranchisement rights. When the porter flat ceased to be occupied by the 
resident porter, the tenants exercised their right under the new law which prevented 
the seller company from selling the flats in the open market, thereby rendering the 
overage provisions void.  The freehold of the porter’s flat was transferred to the 
tenants at a price of twenty thousand pounds, one third lower than that of the price 
that could have been obtainable in the open market; but fifty percent higher than the 
original price when the flat was sold in 1986.  
Because the original buyer was no longer liable to pay the overage to the seller. The 
overall calculation of profits meant the original buyer did not have to pay 50% of the 
sales proceeds to the seller had the porter’s flat being sold in the open market. The 
Buyer was over £71,917.00 better off without the overage being paid out. 
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No issue of directors’ negligence was raised in this case. The court had to decide 
whether or not it is willing to re-construct the overage provision in the seller’s favour 
by setting aside the requirement of the Leasehold Reform Housing and Urban 
Development Act 1993.  
Comments: This involves the parties in the property disposal having entered into an 
agreement containing the words – “open market” as a condition to operate the overage 
provisions in the contract. Thereby, resulted in the seller company not gaining the 
overage payment when the subsequent change of law allowed the purchaser to sell the 
property outside of the open market.  
This case demonstrates the benefits previously mentioned, namely, cost-saving or 
effective cash-flow; and promotion or maintenance of the values of the company’s 
assets, i.e., effective management of property portfolio. As a general principle of 
overage mechanism, this case demonstrates the importance of organisational 
creativity in the sense that the business innovation manifested through the overage 
agreement represents an innovative business policy relating to the business 
relationship with external business counterpart.593 Although overage represents a 
general concept of property disposals that links to potential future investment, each 
                                                
593 	 Gunday	 et	 al,	 ‘Effect	 of	 Innovation	 Types	 of	 Firm	 Performance’,	 (2009)	 1,	 4	 	 	
<http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/13660/1/Gunday_et_al_Effects_of_Innovation_on_Firm_
Performance.pdf>	accessed	16th	July	2016.	See	also	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	
and	Development,	Oslo	Manual,	(1st	end,	Eurostat,	European	Commission	2005)	(also	cited	by	
Ginday	et	al	in	the	above	article)	
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overage mechanism is a Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision. This is so 
because such type of business decision is uniquely and creatively designed to bring 
mutual benefits for both buyers and sellers in their particular circumstances. In this 
case, the buyer was able to acquire the property with a good price, thereby achieved 
cost-saving/effective cash-flow. In turn, the buyer promised contractually to pay an 
extra value of the property through subsequent sale of the property that mutually 
benefits both parties. When the buyer’s overage liability was frustrated by the 
introduction of the 1993 Act, the buyer made a Non-Programmed (Creative) Business 
Decision to legally deny that the overage provision in the agreement had been 
triggered.594 Consequently, the buyer was allowed to keep all the sales proceeds.  As 
the judge said in the case that the overage provision had been agreed ‘with the agreed 
steps to be taken in that event both narrowly and prescriptively formulated’.595 
On the other hand, the selling company did not obtain the overage payment due to the 
restrictive drafting of the provisions in the overage agreement, it nevertheless, 
represents the typical business innovation situation involving ‘trial and errors’ with 
the necessity to undertake business risk for future success. As Lord Wilberforce and 
Lewison J have respectively concluded in Howard Smith Ltd Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum 
Ltd; and Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd that the courts have no jurisdiction to judge 
                                                
594	 Hildron	Finance	Ltd	v.	Sunley	Holdings	Ltd	[2010]	EWHC	1681	(Ch)	[37]	
595	 Ibid	[37]	
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‘the correctness in the quality of’ a business judgment;596 and are ‘ill-equipped’ to 
assess the quality of a business judgment.597    
Even though, the business project between the parties can hardly bring the positive 
effect on the macro-economy due to the considerable small scale of the project. This 
case, nevertheless, demonstrates the economic benefits of allocation of resources 
through innovation process by way of the specific overage provisions. Such business 
creativity helps to bring the buyer’s funds and the seller’s property together working 
towards the achievement of a common creative objective, i.e., the future growth in the 
property investment.598 
CASE STUDY NO. 4: BOWMAN V MONSANTO CO. 596, U.S. [2013] 
Facts: Monsanto Co had created transgenic soybeans which placed itself in a 
market monopoly position.599 In an attempt to continue dominating the market, 
Monsanto registered a patent protecting its exclusive legal right in producing the 
transgenic beans. The Defendant Vernon Hugh Bowman, a farmer, purchased the 
transgenic soybean seeds from the local seller who had entered into a licence for the 
use of those transgenic soybeans with their patent holder – Monsanto Co. The licence 
had imposed restrictions on any third-party buyer including Mr. Bowman from using 
                                                
596	 [1974]	AC	821	(PC)	832	 	
597	 Iesini	 v.	Westrip	 Holdings	 Ltd	 [2009]	 EWHC	 (Ch)	 80	 (also	 as	 cited	 in	 Kershaw,	 Company	 Law	 in	
Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	Oxford	2012)	615-616)	
598	 Mary	O’Sullivan,	‘The	Innovative	Enterprise	and	Corporate	Governance’	(2000)	Camb	J	Econ,	393,	
393;	 and	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development,	 Oslo	 Manual,	 (1st	 edn	
Eurostat,	European	Commission	2005)	16	 	
599	 Andrew	Pollack,	‘As	patent	Ends,	a	Seed’s	Use	Will	Survive’	The	New	York	Times	(2009)	
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the seeds for more than a single season or from saving the seeds replicated from the 
crops produced by the original seeds purchased.  
After purchasing the transgenic soybean seeds the Defendant informed Monsanto that 
he had replanted the seeds produced from the crop harvested from the year before. 
Monsanto sued the Defendant for breach of the terms of the licence to use the 
transgenic soybeans. Monsanto argued that the Defendant had produced a new 
product by way of using the second regeneration seeds for planting without first 
obtaining the essential second license and thus was liable for infringement of the 
patent. 
Both the lower court and the Supreme Court reached unanimous decisions in favour 
of Monsanto with the conclusion that the replication of the seeds from the previous 
crops constituted an infringement of patent. Thus, held the Defendant liable  
The patent of the transgenic soybeans was due to expire in 2014 and Monsanto said 
that on expiry of the patent, the company would allow farmers to use the soybeans 
without a licence. However, the company had confidence that the farmers would 
move on to use the new type of soybean seeds as the beans’ DNA had been upgraded 
to produce higher yields together with addition of other desirable characteristics.600      
                                                
600	 Andrew	Pollack,	‘As	patent	Ends,	a	Seed’s	Use	Will	Survive’	 	 The	New	York	Times	(2009)	
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Comment: Similar to cases mentioned above, this case demonstrates the economic 
benefit, i.e., the preservation of the company’s business competitiveness through 
business creativity secured by intellectual property right. Monsanto had the power to 
monopolise the soybeans market because of the directors’ business decision for 
product innovation, i.e., the investment to develop the transgenic soybeans. This case 
further demonstrates that an innovative company was able to prevent the company’s 
competitors’ imitation of the products through business creativity that qualifies for 
patent registration; and the company’s ability to control the use of the product from its 
buyers by way of a licence to use.  
When the product reached the end of its life-circle, i.e., upon the expiry of the patent 
in 2014, the company would be very likely to continue its monopoly of the market 
through its continuing creativity. The result – the upgraded soybean seeds. 
CASE STUDY NO. 5: SHLENSKY V WRIGLEY 237 M.E. 2D 776 [III. APP. 1968] 
Facts: Between 1961-1965 the director of a baseball club known as Chicago 
Cubs consistently refused to install field lights which prevented the night baseball 
games to be played at Wrigley Field. Wrigley Field was a place where the company 
owned many properties in the area.  
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The plaintiff shareholder of Chicago Cubs was not happy with the director’s business 
decision, brought a derivative action against the director for violating his duty of 
care.601  
Comment: This case demonstrates the economic benefits, namely, the preservation of 
the company’s business competitiveness through business creativity; cost-saving; and 
promotion or maintenance of the values of the company’s assets, i.e., effective 
management of property portfolio. 
In this case, the court recognized the benefits of this business innovation that 
emphasized long-term gain over short-termism. The benefits are shown as follows:  
- preservation of the company’s reputation: due to the peculiar location of the baseball 
field, i.e., the baseball field was at a highly populated residential area with the 
neighbourhood being extremely vulnerable to loud noises and disturbances. It would, 
therefore, be in the best interest of the company’s reputation to avoid having night 
baseball games.  
- avoid unnecessary cost (part of the company’s cost cutting policy). The 
neighbourhood’s objection to the local government’s planning permission for the 
proposed night baseball games would anyway prevent the night games project from 
going ahead. The chance of success on the local residents’ objection could be further 
                                                
601	 Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	‘The	Business	Judgment	Rule	as	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	 	 57,	Vand	L	
Rev	83,	101	
 244 
enhanced on the ground that their properties values would be adversely affected by 
the introduction of night baseball games. Had the planning permission being rejected, 
the company would have suffered a financial loss in the preparation, equipment and 
advertising costs for the night games; and 
- the value of the company’s own real estates including the baseball field at Wrigley 
Field could also be substantially and adversely affected as a result of the proposed 
night baseball games.  
The court acknowledged that all the benefits mentioned above were speculative, 
however (similar to the UK courts’ approach in Howard Smith Ltd Ltd v. Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd602; and Lesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd603) this did not prevent the court 
from ruling in favour of the defendant director by way of deference through the 
business judgment rule. This ruling was made on the basis that the court had no 
jurisdiction or capability to judge the right or wrong in the quality of the director’s 
bona fide Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision. To this, the judge cited the 
same point that had been raised in the case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.604   
This case demonstrates the point suggested in the introduction part of the case studies, 
i.e., the benefits of innovation involved in cases with elements of breach of duty of 
                                                
602	 [1974]	AC	821	(PC)	832	
603	 (2009)	EWHC	(Ch)	80	(also	as	cited	in	Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2th.	
OUP	Oxford,	28	Jun.	2012)	615-616)	
604 170 nw 668, 684 [Mich. 1919] (as cited in Shlensky v. Wrigley 237 M.E. 2d 776 179-181 (lll. App. 
173 1968) 
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care tend to be speculative. In the process of making a business judgment, the court 
would allow a leeway for speculation as it is a part of trial and error process – an 
essential part of creativity and encouragement of creativity.     
SUMMARY 
Business creativity or innovation is problem solving. Companies need to be 
creative in business in order to remain competitive in this ever-increasing competitive 
market. This is so, as the advancement of modern technology such as internet has 
brought what had been originally constrained within the local markets onto the 
international stage; with product life circle shorten as a result.   
As shown by the five law case studies above, business innovation not just being used 
at the day to day business negotiation, but also enables companies to compete with 
each other on equal terms by overcoming the barrier of patent rights; or to achieve 
market monopoly.   
MOTIVATION AND ITS INTER-RELATIONSHIP WITH CREATIVITY 
In the earlier part of this chapter, I established the suitable definition on which 
the company law deference, including UK judicial or legislated deference under the 
Companies Act 2006 can be assessed, from a psychology perspective. The assessment 
is linked to the issue on whether or not the law motivates business creativity 
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This section is written with an aim to seek to answer the question on whether or not 
the law actually motivates or works to facilitate motivating creativity.    
MOTIVATION 
In this section, I will be discussing the interrelation between creativity and 
motivation. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the legal proceedings only 
focus on the legal aspects of the pre-conditions to trigger deference, namely, 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision (bona fide business judgment) of 
directors acting as an appropriate independent organ of the company (for instance, re 
City Equitable Fire Insurance Co605). Therefore, there is a limitation of research in the 
relevant law relation to motivation and creativity.  
This section will compensate such limitation by purely relying on the field of 
psychology with the objectives to answer the question on how company directors’ 
creativity can be motivated, from a perspective of the existing motivation theories 
which have been linked to creativity.606 It will demonstrate through psychology 
theories, that the current law of deference has been formulated very much in line with 
psychology concepts of motivation and business creativity. In other words, this 
section will show that the current law serves as a ‘motivator’ with the function of 
promoting ‘intrinsic motivation’ which leads to the promotion of business creativity.   
                                                
605	 [1925]	Ch.	707	(CA)	[77],	[78]	
606	 See	 Chapter	 Three	 for	 company	 directors’	 business	 creativity	 as	 a	 real	 justification	 for	 judicial	
deference.	 	
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Psychology studies have shown that creativity cannot be maximized without 
motivation.607 This section will interrogate the types of motivators that have been 
primarily used to achieve creativity. Detailed analysis of the types of motivators 
through the existing relevant theories of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation will be 
undertaken with research limitations either be explained or filled up by reference to 
law cases. 
Apart from the theories of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, this section will also 
explore other theories of motivation which have (in psychology) been less commonly 
linked to creativity but will be used in this research as another perspective to achieve 
a deeper understanding of the interrelation between motivation and creativity.  
Once the section establishes the interrelations between motivation and creativity, I 
will deal with the issue of the UK law and motivation with an aim to demonstrate that 
the law is in line with the psychology in the aspect of motivating directors’ business 
creativity.   
Motivation is a psychology theory adopted to explain the human behaviour. In general 
term, motivation is a driving force behind a person’s mind and action ranging from 
basic needs such as satisfying physical hunger through eating and drinking, to more 
                                                
607	 R.	Koestner	et	al,	‘Setting	Limits	on	Children’s	Behaviour:	The	Differential	Effect	on	Controlling	vs.	
Informational	 Styles	 on	 Intrinsic	 Motivation	 and	 Creativity’	 	 (1984)	 J	 Pers	 233,	 246-247;	 T.	 M.	
Amabile,	‘Motivation	and	Creativity:	Effect	on	Motivational	Orientation	on	Creative	Writers’	(1985)	J	
Pers	 Soc	 Psychol	 293,	 299;	 T.	M.	 Amabile,	 ‘Entrepreneur	 Creativity	 Through	Motivational	 Synergy’	
(1997)	 J	 Creat	 Behav	 31(1),	 18(26)	 (as	 cited	 by	 K.	 Jaskyte,	 ‘Determinants	 of	 Employee	 Creativity:	 A	
Survey	of	Lithuanian	Non-Profit	Organisations’	(2006)	VOLUNTAS	Vol	17	No.	2,	133,	139)	
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advanced needs such as striving for monetary gain and fame; or being intrinsically 
enjoying certain activities such as creativity.  
There are a number of academic definitions of motivation. For instance, academic 
writers and researchers, A. J Elliot and M. Covington defined motivation basically as 
a person’s direction to behaviour or the factors that cause a person to repeat or 
terminate a behaviour.608 And Guay et al defined motivation as ‘reasons underlying 
behaviour’.609 
However, the definition of motivation does not help to explain its interrelationship with 
creativity because it is not specifically explored due to the availability of different types 
of motivations, with some having different effects on innovation. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this research, the following contains a number of motivation theories and 
models that have been selectively presented. These are presented on the basis of their 
sophistication and relevancy to demonstrate the interrelation between motivation and 
creativity.  
  
                                                
608	 A.	J	Elliot	and	M.	Covington	‘Approach	and	Avoidance	Motivation’	(2001)	Edu	Psychol	Rev	13,	73	 	
609	 Guay,	F.,	Chanal,	J.,	Ratelle,	C.	F.,	Marsh,	H.	W.,	Larose,	S.,	&	Boivin,	M.	‘Intrinsic,	Identified,	and	
Controlled	Types	of	Motivation	for	School	Subjects	in	Young	Elementary	School	Children’	(2010)	Br	J	
Educ	Psychol	Vol	80(4),	711,	712	
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INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC MOTIVATIONS 
INTRINSIC MOTIVATION  
‘The labour of love aspect is important. The most successful scientists often are 
not the most talented. But they are the ones who are impelled by curiosity. They’ve 
got to know what the answer is.’ – Arthur Schawlow (Winner of the Nobel Prize in 
Physics).610 
The above quote signifies intrinsic motivation as an essential element that motivates 
or encourages a person’s creativity. Indeed, intrinsic motivation has been postulated 
as the essential element of creativity by many academic researchers such as Amabile 
611; Deci and Ryan;612 Oldham and Cummings;613 and Gagne & Deci.614  
Intrinsic motivation has a number of definitions; all pointing to the same direction 
despite the using of different expressions. Notable definitions of intrinsic motivation 
include the following: 
                                                
610	 Arthur	Schawlow,	‘Going	For	Gap’	Interview	in	The	Stanford	Magazine	(Fall	1982,	42)	(as	cited	by	
Teresa	M.	Amabile,	‘Motivating	Creativity	in	Organizations:	On	Doing	What	You	Love	and	Loving	What	
You	do’	[1997]	Calif	Manag	Rev	Vol	40	No.	1,	39,	39)	 	 	
611	 Teresa	M.	Amabile,	The	 Social	 Psychology	 of	 Creativity	(1st	 edn,	 Springer-Velag,	New	York	 1983)	
and	‘Motivational	Synergy:	Toward	New	Conceptualizations	of	Intrinsic	and	Extrinsic	Motivation	in	the	
Workplace’	[1994]	HRMR,	3,	183-201	
612	 E.L.	Deci	and	R.M.	Ryan,	Intrinsic	Motivation	and	Self-determination	 in	Human	Behavior	(1st	edn,	
Plenum,	New	York	1985)	
613	 Oldham	and	Cummings,	 ‘Employee	Creativity:	Personal	 and	Contextual	 Factors	at	Work.’	 (1996)	 	
Acad	Manag	J,	39(3),	507	 	
614	 M.	Gagne	&	E.	L.	Deci,	‘Self-determination	Theory	and	Work	Motivation’	(2005)	J	Organ	Behav	26,	
331	
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- ‘Self-desire to seek out new things and new challenges, to analyze one’s capacity, to 
observe and to gain knowledge’;615   
- ‘Driven by deep interest and involvement in work, by curiosity, enjoyment, or 
personal sense of challenge.’;616 
- ‘The doing of an activity for its inherent satisfactions rather than some separable 
consequences.’; 617 
- ‘Intrinsic Motivation involves people doing an activity because they find it 
interesting and derive spontaneous satisfaction from the activity itself.’;618  or 
- ‘… a tendency to engage in activities for their own sake, just for the pleasure of 
derived in performing them, so far the satisfaction of curiosity … those rewards can 
include feelings of wonder, even awe; pride in job well done; and the pleasure of 
learning something new.’619 
                                                
615	 R.	M.	Ryan	and	E.	L	Deci,	 ‘Self-Determination	Theory	and	the	Facilitation	of	 Intrinsic	Motivation,	
Social	Development,	and	Well-Being’	(2000)	Am.	Psychol.	55(1):	68	
616	 Teresa	M.	Amabile	 ‘Motivating	Creativity	 in	Organisations:	On	Doing	What	You	Love	and	Loving	
What	 You	Do’	 (1997)	 Calif.	Manag.	 Rev.	 Vol	 40.	 No.	 1,	 39,	 44;	 See	 also	 R.	M.	 Ryan	 and	 E.	 L.	 Deci,	
‘Intrinsic	 and	 Extrinsic	 Motivations:	 Classic	 Definitions	 and	 New	 Directions’	 (2000)	 Contemp	 Educ	 	
Psychol	25.	54-67,	66	 	 	
617	 R.	M.	and	Deci,	 E.	 L,	 ‘Intrinsic	 and	Extrinsic	Motivations:	Classic	Definitions	and	New	Directions’	
(2000)	Contemp	Educ	Psychol	25.	54-67,	66	 	
618	 Porter	and	Lawler,	Managerial	Attitudes	and	Performance	(Richard	D.	Irwin,	Inc.	(1968))	(as	cited	
by	Gagne	and	Deci,	‘Self-determination	Theory	and	Work	Motivation’	[2005]	J	Organ	Behav	26,	331,	
331)	
619	 M.V	 Covington	 and	 K.J	 Muller,	 ‘Intrinsic	 Versus	 Extrinsic	 Motivation:	 An	 Approach/Avoidance	
Reformulation’	[2001]	Educ	Psychol	Rev	Vol	13,	No.2,	157-176,	163	
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Over the years, intrinsic motivation is widely known and accepted by academic 
researchers as playing an essential part in creativity. For instance, Amabile has 
concluded through her research that ‘maintaining creativity depends on 
maintaining intrinsic motivation’. 620  Unfortunately, unlike other part of this 
research (for instance, the significance of business creativity to a company) where law 
cases can be used to demonstrate the subject matter; it is not possible to use law cases 
to examine the mindset relating to company directors’ intrinsic motivation. This is so, 
as currently law cases within the context of directors’ business decisions, judges do 
not explicitly seek to identify creativity and motivation as the key element and 
co-element respectively to justify deference.621 Therefore, they do not “consciously” 
look into directors ‘intrinsic motivation and its positive impact on directors’ creative 
business decisions. I attempt to overcome this research limitation by using non-law, 
real case examples of entrepreneurs as follows: 
Example 1: Sir Richard Branson, a successful entrepreneur revealed to The Guardian 
Newspaper in his 2012 interview that when he first started his own business, i.e., the 
publications of the student magazines, it was only a small business venture due to lack 
of business capital. And with the his passions to the magazine business, he was 
intrinsically motivated to come out with an innovative idea of providing young people 
                                                
620	 Teresa	M.	Amabile,	‘Entrepreneur	Creativity	Through	Motivational	Synergy’	(1997)	J.	Creat	Behav	
31(1),	 18(26)	 (as	 cited	 by	 K.	 Jaskyte,	 ‘Detreminants	 of	 Employee	 Creativity:	 A	 Survey	 of	 Lithuanian	
Non-Profit	Organizations’	(2006)	Vol	17	No.	2,	133,	139)	
	
621	 See	 Chapter	 Three	 on	 the	 misidentification	 of	 justification	 of	 judicial	 deference;	 company	
directors’	business	creativity	as	the	real	justification	of	judicial	deference.	 	
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with a voice to key issues such as the Vietnam war. This business creativity enabled 
him to have a unique selling point622 to continue the publications of the magazines. 
Eventually, this business idea became very popular. This popularity enabled him to 
raise funds through selling advertisements in each issue of the magazines and 
achieved the business growth.  
Richard Branson concluded that, ‘… running a business will be a tough experience, 
involving long hours and many hard decisions – it helps to have that passion623 to 
keep you going.’624   
Example 2: Sir James Dyson, the founder and director of Dyson Ltd also admitted In 
ABC NEWS 24, that his business creativity in the Dual Cyclone bag-less vacuum 
cleaner was motivated intrinsically of which he also believes to be the same motivator 
in any engineering business.  
I love boring prosaic products making them better and making them more 
interesting. I like starting with products that other people ignored. You know … 
vacuum cleaners look like bag of soap; they look like no one ever loves them. 
But you know, pick up a windsurfer or ski, you can see the person who 
developed that was passionate about it. And I have absolute passion about rather 
                                                
622	 For	 Unique	 Selling	 Point	 as	 an	 advantage	 of	 business	 innovation,	 please	 see	 the	 above	 section	
relating	to	significance	of	business	innovation.	 	 	
623	 I.e.,	intrinsic	motivation	for	the	purpose	of	this	thesis	
624	 As	quoted	by	Alex	Bath,	‘You	Need	Passion	and	Energy	to	Create	a	Truly	successful	Business’	The	
Guardian	(London	25th	June	2012)	 	 	
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boring things ... I do it because I am passionate, not because I do it for 
money.625  
In answering the question as to why his company remained private, Dyson answered 
that he is passionate in his own creativity and that ‘the last thing I wanted to do was to 
sell out to somebody who tells me what to do …’.626 This statement indicates to me 
that the negative effect of controlling extrinsic motivator627, i.e., a third party’s 
imposition of control with the threat of punishment, such as legal intervention on 
director’s business judgment in the absence of company law’s deference.  
This real-life example is being supported by research results of the economics and 
psychology researchers. Such as Knight who believed that directors are motivated by 
the ‘desire to excel, to win a game’628; Tierney, Farmer and Graen who found that 
company employees who were intrinsically motivated were able to produce ‘high 
                                                
625	 James	Dyson	on	Art	of	Invention	(ABC	New	24)	
626	 James	Dyson	on	Art	of	Invention	(ABC	New	24)	 	
627	 A	form	of	de-motivator	in	psychology	which	yields	negative	effect	on	one’s	creativity;	this	will	be	
discussed	in	full	details	in	the	following	section.	 	
628 	 F	 Knight,	 Uncertainty,	 and	 Profit	 (Boston:	 Houghton	 Mifflin	 1921)	 as	 cited	 by	 Keay	 and	
Loughrey,	 ’The	 Concept	 of	 Business	 Judgment’	 Legal	 Studies	 1	 <	
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/DFC0700879FEF7FF4B
D7E9A589A211C4/S0261387518000296a.pdf/concept_of_business_judgment.pdf>	 accessed	 5	
January	 2019	 N.B.	 Keay	 et	 al	 mentioned	 in	 the	 article	 that	 there	 is	 a	 conflict	 of	 understanding	
between	 Knight’s	 view	 on	 directors’	 motivation	 and	 the	 agency	 theorists.	 They	 argued	 that	 the	
empirical	 question	of	 the	 two	 conflicting	 arguments	 remains	 unanswered,	 the	 law	 (notably	 section	
172	Companies	Act	2006)	that	required	directors	to	act	in	the	interest	of	the	company	would	keep	the	
directors	at	bay.	On	this,	Chapter	Five	of	this	thesis	will	discuss	the	counter-strategies,	as	proposed	by	
Kraakman	et	al,	against	agency	costs	with	an	attempt	to	demonstrate	the	balance	between	the	tween	
conflicting	thoughts,	namely	directors’	motivation	to	succeed	for	the	companies;	and	the	agency	cost	
theory.	 	
 254 
creative outputs’;629 and the similar earlier empirical studies of Amabile which 
revealed that intrinsic motivation plays an indispensable role in initiating and 
sustaining companies’ employees, including senior management, involving in tasks of 
creativity.630  
In Amabile’s experiment, a number of groups of test subjects were chosen with one 
group ‘the controlled group’ comprised with creative writers. The second group being 
writers who are being given with a set of questions that associate with intrinsic 
motivation, i.e., all the items that deal with intrinsic aspect of creativity, for instance, 
questions such as you enjoy becoming involved with ideas, characters, events, and 
images in your writing; and you feel relax when writing; and the final test group was 
given with questionnaires that deal solely with extrinsic reasons for creativity (with 
element of punishment for failure). For instance, you know that writing ability is one 
of the major criteria for acceptance into graduate school; and you have heard of cases 
where one of bestselling novel or collection of poems has made the author financially 
secure.  
After the test subjects completed the questionnaires by ranking the order of 
importance of each question, they were asked to write a short poem with the first and 
                                                
629 	 Tierney,	 Farmer	 and	 Graen	 ‘An	 Examination	 of	 Leadership	 and	 Employee	 Creativity:	 The	
Revelation	 of	 Traits	 and	 Relationships’	 (1999)	 Pers	 Psychol	52(3).	 591	 as	 cited	 by	 K.	 Jaskyte,	
‘Determinants	of	Employee	Creativity:	A	Survey	of	Luthuanian	Non-Profit	Organizations’	(2006)	Vol	17	
No.	2,	133,	134	
630	 	 Teresa	 M.	 Amabile	 ‘A	 Model	 of	 Creativity	 and	 Innovation	 in	 organizations’	 (1988)	 Res	 Organ	
Behav,	 Vol	 10.	 123	 (as	 cited	 by	 K.	 Jaskyte,	 ‘Detreminants	 of	 Employee	 Creativity:	 A	 Survey	 of	
Lithuanian	Non-Profit	Organizations’	(2006)	Vol	17	No	2,	133,	134)	
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last line consist of the word, ‘laughter’.  N.B. the members of the controlled group 
were simply requested to write the poem without first completing the questionnaire. 
The result of the experiment proved intrinsic motivation enhanced creativity but when 
extrinsic motivation with negative consequence (i.e., if the predefined rules had not 
been followed) was introduced, intrinsic motivation reduced:   
After the study was complete, we asked several poets to judge these poems, 
using a procedure established in earlier research (cf. Amabile, 1982n, 1983a). 
The results were quite dramatic. As might be expected, the writers in the control 
group wrote poems that were judged fairly high on creativity; these were, after 
all, creative writers. The writers in the intrinsic group wrote poems that were 
judged as somewhat higher in creativity than those in the control group, but the 
difference was not large. The most important result comes from the extrinsic 
group. Those writers produced poems that were judged much lower in creativity 
than the poems produced by either of the other groups.631  
Amabile further commented: 
Consider the implications of this study for ‘real world’ work environments. 
These writers entered the laboratory with an intrinsic motivational orientation 
toward writing. Apparently, we were not able to increase that intrinsic 
                                                
631	 Teresa	 M.	 Amabile,	 ‘A	 Model	 of	 Creativity	 and	 Innovation	 in	 Organizations’	 [1988]	 Res	 Organ	
Behav,	Vol	10,	123,	139	
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orientation much; the creativity of the intrinsic group isn’t notably higher than 
the creativity of the control group. On the other hand, with a terribly brief and 
simple manipulation, we significantly reduced the creativity of the writers in the 
extrinsic group. People who had been writing creatively for years, who had long 
standing interests in creative writing, suddenly found their creativity blocked 
after spending barely five minutes thinking about the extrinsic reasons for doing 
what they do. If such a brief and subtle written manipulation would have such a 
significant impact on the creativity of highly motivated individuals, consider the 
potential effects of people who find themselves in those environments every 
day.632   
Similar to the interrelationship of intrinsic motivation and creativity as shown in 
Richard Branson’s and Dyson’s cases discussed above, Amabile has further described 
the significance of intrinsic motivation to creativity by quoting the example of Robert 
Carr, a primary inventor of the first pen computer who responded to an offer of 
business opportunity from Jerry Kaplan with excitement: 
Jerry, it is not a question of whether I want to do this. I have to do this. This is 
important. This is profound … It is not very often that opportunities like this 
                                                
632	 Teresa	 M.	 Amabile,	 ‘A	 Model	 of	 Creativity	 and	 Innovation	 in	 Organizations’	 [1988]	 Res	 Organ	
Behav,	Vol	10,	123,	139	 	
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came along – something really big, a chance to really make a difference. Maybe 
once a decade or so, I think you have got one here. 633 
With the ground rules now being set on the issue of intrinsic motivation positively 
influencing creativity; now let us quickly re-visit the question raised in Chapter Three, 
on why company directors should be regarded as being more business creative than 
judges, even though both parties might possess the same level of business expertise. 
In other words, judges (irrespective the levels of their business knowledge) do not 
possess the same level of intrinsic motivation/business drive to achieve the business 
success of the company. Thus, are psychologically exposed to a greater degree of 
bounded rationality in assessing business creativity. Consequently, as concluded in 
many cases, Judges have admitted of being ill-equipped to assess Non-Programmed 
(Creative) Business Decisions (as shown in Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb634; and	
Lesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd635;	and Kamin v. AM. Express Co636).  
This leads to Chapter Three conclusion that the justification for judicial deference lies 
on creativity of directors’ business decisions and not on the traditional understanding 
of the factor by questioning the business expertise of judges.  
                                                
633	 As	cited	by	Teresa	M.	Amabile,	 ‘Motivating	Creativity	 in	Organisations:	On	Doing	What	You	Love	
and	Loving	What	You	Do’	[1997]	Calif	Manag	Rev,	Vol	40.	39,	39-38	
634	 [1872]	LR	5	(HL)	480,	495	
635	 [2009)	BCC	420	(Ch)	[85]	
636	 383	N.Y.S.2d,	810-11	[1976]	 (as	cited	 in	Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	 ‘The	Business	 Judgment	Rule	as	
Abstention	 Doctrine’	 (2004)	 57	 Vand	 L	 Rev	 98,	 120);	 Stephen	 M.	 Bainbridge,	The	 New	 Corporate	
Governance	in	Theory	and	Practice	(1st	edn,	Oxford	University	Press,	1987)	Chap	3,	111	 	 	
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From a psychology perspective, this lack of intrinsic motivation constitutes the ‘block’ 
of judges’ business creativity for the company. Thus, judges are more inclined than 
company directors to succumb to bounded rationality (‘the inherent limits on the 
ability of decision makers to gather and process information’637) caused by the 
judicial constrains and the greater limitation on access of information at any one 
time.638  In other words, Judges’ interest and cognitive style are not constructed for 
the achievement of business innovation for the company through their judicial 
decisions. Rather, without judicial or legislated deference regime in place, judges will 
be merely acting to decide judicially on the quality or the outcome of a business 
decision within the limited time and resources.  
The existing resources and structural framework imposed by the judicial system on 
the judges, as being universally put by Daley, ‘develop the habit of searching for the 
correctness instead of potential.’639 Indeed, as mentioned by Woodman et al that 
researchers have established that an individual’s creativity depends on the match 
between his or her cognitive style and his or her training or problem solving 
                                                
637	 Paul	Milgrom	&	John	Roberts,	Economics,	Organization	and	Management	(1st	edn,	Pearson	1992)	
127,	127-129	(as	cited	by	Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	‘The	Business	Judgment	as	an	Abstention	Doctrine’	
(2004)	57	Vand	L	Rev	83,	118)	 	
638	 Henry	 Mintzberg,	Mintzberg,	 Henry	 Mintzberg,	Mintzberg	 on	 Management:	 Inside	 Our	 Strange	
World	of	Organizations	(1st	edn,	The	Free	Press,	New	York	1989)	67 	
639	 Kristin	E.	Daley,	‘Taking	Care	of	Your	Creativity’	(2005)	The	Journal	of	Museum	Education,	Vol	30,	
No.1	Encouraging	Creativity,	23,	25,	29	
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objective.640 Woodman et al drew an example by making a comparison between 
Research and Development (R&D) personnel and engineering instructors: 
Kirton and Pender demonstrated that Research and Development personnel 
were more innovative than engineering instructors and apprentices. Kirton and 
Pender explained that engineering instructors and apprentices are bound by a 
narrower range of paradigms, more rigid training, and more closely structured 
environment than R&D personnel.641   
This theory coincides with the concept of bounded rationality as both apply to the 
situations where under the limitation of the existing organisational structure, and for 
the purpose of this research, the judicial system in which the judge who is bound by 
the limitation of resources and judicial paradigms, such as judicial precedents. As 
Kirton puts it: 
… when confronted with the problem, he642 does not see it as a stimulus to 
query or change the structure of the problem, but seeks the solution within the 
structure, in ways already tried and understood, ways which are safe, sure and 
predictable. He can be relied upon to carry out a thorough, disciplined search 
                                                
640	 Woodman	et	al,	 ‘Toward	A	Theory	of	Organizational	Creativity’	(1993)	The	Acad	Manag	Rev,	Vol	
18,	No	2,	293,	305	 	
641 	 Kirton	 and	 Pender,	 ‘The	 Adaption-Innovation	 Continuum.	 Occupational	 Type,	 and	 Course	
Selection’	 (1982)	 Psychol	 Rep	 Vol	 51,	 883	 (as	 cited	 by	 Woodman	 et	 al,	 ‘Toward	 A	 Theory	 of	
Organizational	Creativity’	(1993)	Acad	Manag	Rev,	Vol	18,	No.	2,	293,	305)	
642	 ‘he’	refers	to	judges	for	the	purpose	of	this	thesis.	 	 	
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for ways to eliminate problems by ‘doing things better’ with a minimum of risk 
and a maximum of continuity and stability.643   
And as Amabile has said that: 
 … but it is clear from the empirical research (e.g., Findlay & Lumsden, in 
press; Simon, 1983) that the important distinction is not the amount of 
knowledge, but the way in which that knowledge is stored and the ease in which 
it can be accessed. If information is stored according to rigid algorithms …. 
Creativity is less probable. 644 
In other words, the findings by Findlay & Lumsden demonstrate that the rigid 
algorithms within the judicial system refer to the fact that, no matter how much 
entrepreneurial knowledge a business expert judge possesses, he is ill-equipped to 
deal with creative and innovative business decisions of company directors, as ‘it is not 
possible to ‘have too much knowledge’; it is possible to have too many algorithms’.645   
                                                
643	 M.K.	Kirton,	 ‘Adaptors	and	Innovators	 in	Culture	Clash’	(1978)	Curr	Anthropol	Vol	19	No.	3,	611,	
612	
644	 Teresa	 M.	 Amabile,	 ‘A	 Model	 of	 Creativity	 and	 Innovation	 in	 Organisations’	 (1988)	 Res	 Organ	
Behav,	Vol	10,	140,	123-167	
645	 Teresa	 M.	 Amabile,	 ‘A	 Model	 of	 Creativity	 and	 Innovation	 in	 Organisations’	 (1988)	 Res	 Organ	
Behav,	Vol	10,	140,	123	-	167	 	 	
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The idea that people in different occupations are led to different cognitive styles was 
also re-affirmed by other writers such as Hayward and Everett.646 
The above psychology analysis supports the notion of judicial or legislated deference 
on the grounds that judicial system is not equipped to interfere with company 
director’s business creativity647; and the law promotes motivation of director’s 
business creativity through judges’ diffidence to interfere with directors’ 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision.    
EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION  
Extrinsic motivation is another type of motivation which is often being used as an 
opposite factor of motivation to compare with intrinsic motivation. Gagne and Deci 
have made a comparison between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation as: 
Intrinsic motivations involve people doing an activity because they find it 
interesting and derive spontaneous satisfaction from the activity itself. Extrinsic 
motivations, in contrast, requires an instrumentality between the activity and 
some separable consequences such as tangible or verbal rewards, so satisfaction 
                                                
646	 Hayward	and	Everett,	 ‘Adaptors	 and	 Innovators:	Data	 From	Kirton	Adaptor	 Inventory	 in	 a	 Local	
Authority	Setting’	J	Occup	Organ	Psychol	56	339-342	(as	cited	by	Woodman	et	al,	‘Toward	A	Theory	of	
Organizational	Creativity’	(1993)	Acad	Manag	Rev,	Vol	18,	No	2,	293,	305)	
647	 For	instance,	Howard	Smith	Ltd	v.	Ampol	Petroleum	Ltd	(1974)	UKPC	3;	Lesini	v.	Westrip	Holdings	
Ltd	(2009)	BCC	420	[85]	decided	under	section	263(2)(a)	of	the	Companies	Act	2006;	and	Kleanthous	v.	
Paphitis	 [2011]	 EWHC	2287	 [71],	 [72]	 comment	 on	diffidence	made	under	 section	 263(3)(b)	 of	 the	
Companies	Act	2006.	 	
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comes not from the activity itself but rather from the extrinsic consequences to 
which activity leads.648 
Originally, Extrinsic motivation was only referring to external rewards that associate 
with an autonomous act carried out by an individual. For instance, monetary rewards 
given in exchange of an individual’s work.649 However, researchers soon realised the 
insufficiency of definition by limiting the scope of extrinsic motivation in rewards.  
As external or extrinsic motivator can in many circumstances include forms of threat, 
control or punishment. Consequently, extrinsic motivation has been sub-divided into 
two different sub-types. This division ensures the revised definition covers all 
possible areas of extrinsic motivation.  Amabile has contributed into this area vastly 
with the following sub-types. Namely: enabling extrinsic motivation and controlling 
extrinsic motivation. In the following section, I will discuss each of the sub-types of 
extrinsic motivators in both general; and specific context to company directors in 
business decision making and creativity.  
                                                
648	 M.	Gagne	and	E.L.	Deci,	 ‘Self-determination	Theory	and	Work	Motivation’	 (2005)	 J	Occup	Organ	
Psychol,	Vol	26	No	4,	331,	331	 	
649	 See	for	example,	M.	Gagne	and	E.L.	Deci.,	‘Self-determination	Theory	and	Work	Motivation’	(2005)	
J	Occup	Organ	Psychol,	Vol	26	No	4,	331	 	
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Enabling Extrinsic Motivation/Motivator: where motivation is driven by ‘… the 
desire to attain some goal that is apart from the work itself …’.650 For instance, the 
desire to obtain a promised reward or meet a deadline or win a competition.651  
The general consensus amongst psychology researchers is that ‘we are more creative 
when we are internally motivated then when we are externally motivated.’652; and that 
‘as extrinsic motivation increases, intrinsic motivation must necessarily decline...’.653   
However, researchers have understood that, in reality, it is not possible to exclude one 
from another. For instance, a company director is intrinsically creative but at the same 
time, receiving monetary rewards from the company for his creative business 
decisions. Indeed, as argued by Covington and Muller that ‘clearly, it is a mistake to 
define intrinsic motivation as absence of expectations for extrinsic payoff.’654 As a 
result of the seemingly inseparable two motivators, researchers have worked to 
understand that ‘under certain conditions intrinsic and extrinsic motivation have been 
found to combine in complementary fashion’.655 This complimentary fashion refers 
to the extrinsic motivator that enables intrinsic motivation as argued by Deci & Ryan 
                                                
650	 Teresa	M.	Amabile	 ‘Motivating	Creativity	 in	Organisations:	On	Doing	What	You	Love	and	Loving	
What	You	Do’	California	Management	Review	Vol	40	No	1	(1997)	39-38,	44	
651 Teresa M. Amabile ‘Motivating Creativity in Organisations: On Doing What You Love and 
Loving What You Do’ (1997) Calif Manag Rev Vol 40 No 1, 44, 39-38  
652	 Donald	Woods,	‘Creativity’	(1989)	JCST,	Vol	18,	No.	4,	259,	259;	and	see	generally,	T.	M.	Amabile,	
‘How	to	Kill	Creativity’	(1998)	HBR,	77-87	 	
653	 M.	Gagne	and	E.L.	Deci,	‘Self-Determination	Theory	and	the	Social	Psychology	of	Creativity’	(2000)	
PI,	Vol	11,	No	4,	293,	295	
654M.V.	 Covington	 and	 K.J.	 Muller,	 ‘Intrinsic	 Versus	 Extrinsic	 Motivation:	 An	 Approach/Avoidance	
Reformulation’	(2001)	Edu	Psychol	Rev,	Vol	13,	No	2,	157,	162	 	
655	 M.	Gagne	and	E.L.	Deci,	‘Self-Determination	Theory	and	the	Social	Psychology	of	Creativity’	(2000)	
PI,	Vol	11,	No	4,	293,	295	
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that extrinsic motivator ‘supports a sense of competence without undermining 
self-determination should positively contributes to intrinsic motivation’656. In other 
words, ‘… when individuals believe they can obtain rewards by being creative, they 
become more creative.’657  
From company directors’ point of view, enabling extrinsic motivators refer to: 
- Rewards, such as status, financial rewards, fame and recognition achieved through 
the implementation of their business decisions as directors. In other words, in the 
context of directors’ business decisions, Enabling Extrinsic Motivator occurs 
naturally once creativity is achieved through Intrinsic Motivator and then in turn, 
Enabling Extrinsic Motivator will arguably enhance or encourage the director’s 
Intrinsic Motivator.658 I coin this process with the term – The spiral of Motivator. The 
word, ‘Spiral’ is used due to the endless expansion of the process; and/or 
- As the definition suggests, enabling extrinsic motivator can take the form of 
directors’ creative business decision justifying the company’s prior approval of 
allocating additional resources to sufficiently enable the director to undertake the 
research of the creative project; and eventually lead to the execution of the innovative 
business decision. The former motivators act as enhancers of the directors’ original 
                                                
656	 E.L.	Deci	&	R.	M.	Ryan,	Intrinsic	Motivation	and	Self-determination	 in	Human	Behaviour	(1st	edn,	
Springer	Science	&	Business	Media,	New	York	1985)	(as	cited	by	Hennesy,	‘Self-Determination	Theory	
and	the	Social	Psychology	of	Creativity’	(2000)	PI,	Vol	11,	No	4,	293,	295)	
657	 Linda	Shanock	et	al,	‘Rewards,	Intrinsic	Motivation,	and	Creativity:	A	Case	Study	of	conceptual	and	
Methodological	Isolation’	(2003)	Creat	Res	J	Vol	15,	Nov	2	&	3,	121,	128	
658	 ibid	
 265 
desire or intrinsic motivation to be creative and innovative. The latter motivator 
increases the directors’ confidence to implement the business decision, thus, making 
the directors significantly less boundedly rational both psychologically and 
financially than judges in judging a business decision.  
From judges’ perspective (irrespective of the degree of their business expertise), when 
dealing with lawsuit cases, they can be motivated by limited extrinsic motivator, i.e., 
reduction of caseload by concluding the present case. This serves as an extrinsic 
reward that often can be obtained by judges within their judicial power. Therefore, 
Canard’s argument of different types of care applies.659 In other words, these 
extrinsic motivators subject the judges to a great degree of bounded rationality, and 
thus rendering them ill-equipped to interfere with directors’ Non-Programmed 
(Creative) Business Decisions. This is so, because the extrinsic motivator is based on 
cutting down the caseload, rather than the actual interest of the company. Similar to 
the above analysis on intrinsic motivation, this psychology analysis on the law from 
the perspective of enabling extrinsic motivation, once again, supports the notion of 
judicial deference on the grounds that judicial system is not equipped to interfere with 
director’s business creativity660; and the law motivates director’s business creativity 
                                                
659	 Alfred.	F.	Conard,	‘A	Behavioral	Analysis	of	directors’	Liability	for	Negligence’	(1972)	Duke	L	J,	904	 	 	
660	 For	 instance,	 Howard	 Smith	 Ltd	 v.	 Ampol	 Petroleum	 Ltd	 [1974]	 UKPC	 3;	 and	 Lesini	 v.	 Westrip	
Holdings	 Ltd	 [2009]	BCC	420	 [85]	decided	under	 section	263(2)(a)	 of	 the	Companies	Act	 2006;	 and	
Kleanthous	 v.	 Paphitis	 [2011]	 EWHC	 2287	 [71],	 [72]	 comment	 on	 diffidence	 made	 under	 section	
263(3)(b)	of	the	Companies	Act	2006.	 	
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through judges’ diffidence to interfere with directors’ Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decision.   
ENABLING EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION DILUTING INTRINSIC 
MOTIVATION 
It is worth of mentioning here that in certain situation, enabling motivator can 
decrease one’s intrinsic motivation. This has been shown in Deci’s experiment on two 
groups of students who were at the initial stage of the experiment, intrinsically 
motivated at the experimental activities. One group of students was offered with 
extrinsic rewards and the other group without. When both groups were offered to 
participate the second-round experimental activities, the group that was initially 
offered with extrinsic reward showed a ‘withdrawal symptom’, i.e., a significant 
decrease of intrinsic motivation in the activity as opposed to the other group. This 
experiment has provided a useful understanding on the negative effects of extrinsic 
environmental constraints on people’s intrinsic motivation.  Dermer said:  
Deci explains his finding by reasoning that when a person is intrinsically 
motivated, he perceives the locus of causality of his behaviour to be within 
himself, i.e., he is motivated solely by the internal satisfaction the task provides. 
But when the performance-contingent extrinsic rewards are imposed, the 
perceived locus of causality of his behaviour shifts to his environment, he 
 267 
perceives himself now working for money, and his intrinsic motivation 
declines.661  
The question now is whether or not company director’s creativity can be 
detrimentally affected or diluted by the ‘extrinsic monetary rewards662’? I do not think 
so. This is because, with Deci’s experiment, the test subjects had prior knowledge that 
the accomplishment of the task would yield the extrinsic monetary rewards.663 This is 
clearly different to company directors engaging in creative business decision-making, 
as with company directors, the outcome that could be generated by the creative 
business idea is unknown or uncertain as shown in the case of Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Co.664 Therefore, such a reward comes not by choice. This can be backed up by two 
independent research results namely, Amabile’s finding in 1983, that: 
A person’s extrinsic rewards interacts with his or her choice. Monetary reward 
given for performance on a task for which the individual has no choice can 
                                                
661	 As	cited	by	Jerry	Dermer,	‘The	Interrelationship	on	Intrinsic	and	Extrinsic	Motivation’	(1975)	Acad	
Manag	J	vol	18,	No	1,	125,	127	
662Director	 extrinsic	 reward/remuneration	 ‘is	 defined	 as	 payment	 or	 compensation	 received	 for	
services	or	employment	and	includes	base	salary,	any	bonuses	and	any	other	economic	benefits	that	
an	employee	or	executive	receives	during	employment’.	 	 This	directorial	remuneration	is	provided	to	
ensure	that	directors	are	doing	a	good	job	for	the	company.	Kaplan	Financial	Knowledge	Bank	(2012)	
<	 http://kfknowledgebank.kaplan.co.uk/KFKB/Wiki%20Pages/Directors%27%20remuneration.aspx>	
accessed	25	November	2017	 	
663	 This	 is	arguably	different	 to	company	directors’	 remunerations	as	such	payment	 is	contractually	
made	on	regular	basis	and	the	decision	of	whether	or	not	to	pay	the	remunerations	to	directors	are	
made	 by	 the	 directors	 themselves.	 Therefore,	 there	 is	 no	 ‘withdrawal	 symptoms’	 as	 described	 in	
Deci’s	experiment	above.	In	fact,	according	to	Maslow’s	Hierarchy	of	needs,	directors’	remuneration	
is	a	necessity	to	keep	up	his	intrinsic	motivation	on	creativity	in	order	to	first	satisfy	the	lower	needs,	
i.e.,	physical	and	safety	needs	before	the	higher	needs	can	be	triggered.	P.	Singh	et	al,	‘Organisational	
Culture	and	Its	Impact	on	managerial	Remuneration’	(1977)	IJIR,	vol	13,	No	1,	1-14;	Fuller	&	Dornbush,	
‘Organisational	Construction	of	 Intrinsic	Motivation’	(1988)	Sociol	Forum,	Vol	3	No	1,	1-3;	and	Lloyd	
Greene	and	George	Burke,	‘Beyond	Self-Actualisation’	(2007)	JHHSA,	Vol	30,	No	2,	116,	124	 	
664	 [Mich	1919]	170	NW	668	
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enhance creativity. But when individual is offered a reward for consenting to 
perform the task, creativity may actually be undermined.665  
This is also supported by Deci et al: 
The Deci et al (1999) meta-analysis also confirmed CET hypotheses (Cognitive 
Evaluation Theory) that specified limiting conditions to the undermining effect. 
Namely, it showed that when rewards were given independent of specific task 
engagement (as might be the case with salary) or when the rewards were not 
anticipated (as might be the case of unexpected bonuses), tangible extrinsic 
reward did not undermine intrinsic motivation.666    
Another reason (from the legal perspective) is that enabling extrinsic motivator does 
not dilute company directors’ creativity because usually the ultimate beneficiary of 
the extrinsic reward would be the company and not its directors, as shown in the case 
re. Walt Disney Co Derivative Litig.667 where directors negotiated a directorship 
contract with a third party for the sole benefit of the company. As mentioned in the 
earlier part of this chapter, that the definition of creativity entails the essential 
component known as ‘usefulness’ which refers to the existence or possible existence 
of extrinsic rewards for the company. In other words, under the component of 
‘usefulness’, the director has to make the business decision with an intention to 
                                                
665	 Woodman	et	al,	‘Toward	a	Theory	of	Organizational	Creativity’	(1993)	Acad	Manag	Rev,	Vol	18,	No	
2,	293,	321	
666	 Deci	et	al,	‘Self-determination	Theory	and	work	Motivation’	J	Organ	Behav,	Vol	26,	No	4,	331,	332	 	 	
667	 (2005)	(Disney	V).	07	A.	2d	693	
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benefit the company. This allows situations of trial and error, as not every business 
decision is guaranteed to produce an outcome that actual benefits the company.   
Therefore, directors have to satisfy condition of ‘usefulness’, in order for their 
business decision to be classified as creative within the definition of creativity. This 
psychology analysis of the enabling extrinsic motivator within the definition of 
creativity demonstrates that the law, i.e., section 263(2)(a) of the Companies Act 2006 
requiring the business decision being made by the director bona fide (linking to 
section 172), in the interest of the company (‘interest’ = extrinsic reward to the 
company) does not dilute director’s intrinsic motivation of creativity.668 
CONTROLLING EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION/MOTIVATOR 
Controlling Extrinsic Motivator refers to restrictions on how works are to be 
done and possibly coupled with punishment or risk or threat (uncertainty) of 
punishment for failure to achieve the objective. Controlling motivator is known to be 
incompatible with an individual’s intrinsic motivation and hence a block to 
creativity.669 This is so, because it is aimed to find fault with ideas as they arise, 
instead of allowing ideas to flow freely. 670   
                                                
668 Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (2nd edn, OUP Oxford 28 Jun. 2012) 613; 
Extarsure Insurance Limited v. Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC (Ch) [90], [97]; and Franbar Holdings 
Limited v. Patel [2009] 1 BCLC 1 (Ch) 11  
669	 Teresa	M.	Amabile	 ‘Motivating	Creativity	 in	Organisations:	On	Doing	What	You	Love	and	Loving	
What	You	Do’	(1997)	Calif	Manag	Rev	Vol	40,	No	1,	45,	39-38;	see	also	Joseph	R.	LaChapelle,	‘Review	
on	the	Social	Psychology	of	Creativity’	(1985)	National	Art	Education	Association,	47	
670 	 Robert	 T.	 Clemen	 and	 Terence	 Reilly,	Making	 Hard	 Decisions	 with	 DecisionTools	(1st	 edn,	
Brooks/Cole	2004)	226	 	
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Several empirical studies have revealed that Extrinsic Controlling Motivator serves as 
a de-motivator to people’s creativity. For instance, a study conducted by Folger, 
Rosenfield and Hays671 where two groups of people with intrinsic motivation to 
perform a particular experimental task were chosen; with Group One being given a 
choice to perform the task in exchange of reward. But the reward would only be given 
upon the condition that the experimental task was to be completed in accordance to 
the given rule. In other words, the reward was offered with an element of control and 
punishment if the test subjects failed to complete the given task. On the other hand, 
Group Two was given the promise that the reward would be given irrespective 
whether or not the experimental task was completed. In other words, no element of 
controlling extrinsic motivator was present. The result showed that Group One (with 
choice being given on the reward and punishment) was psychologically restricted by 
and diverted its focus on the controlling extrinsic reward/punishment, thereby 
performing significantly less creative than Group Two where no choice was given on 
reward/punishment.   
Another similar experiment was conducted by Amabile, Henessey and Grossman672 
which yielded with the same result. ‘Thus, this study demonstrated that it is not 
                                                
671	 Folger,	Rosenfield	and	Hays,	‘Equity	and	Intrinsic	Motivation:	the	Role	of	Choice’	(1978)	J	Person	
Soc	Psychol	36,	557-564	(as	cited	by	Hennessey,	‘Social,	Environmental	and	Developmental	Issues	and	
Creativity’	(1995)	Edu	Psychol	Rev,	Vol	7,	No	2,	Toward	an	Educational	Psychology	of	Creativity,	Part	I,	
163,	167)	
672	 T.	Amabile	and	J.	Gitomer,	‘Children’s	Artistic	Creativity:	Effects	of	Choice	in	Task	Materials’	(1986)	
Unpublished	 manuscript,	 Brandeis	 University	 (as	 cited	 by	 Hennessey,	 ‘Social,	 Environmental	 and	
Developmental	 Issues	 and	 Creativity’	 (1995)	 Edu	 Psychol	 Rev,	 Vol	 7,	 No	 2,	 Toward	 an	 Educational	
Psychology	of	Creativity,	Part	I,	163,	167)	 	
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reward per se but rather the functional significance of reward as controlling of 
performance that undermines creativity.’673  
Amabile has concluded that, ‘… punishments associated with the outputs, thus 
increasing the presence of extrinsic motivation and its …negative effect on intrinsic 
motivation.’674    
In addition, these psychology studies have demonstrated the difference between the 
legal restriction and the market regulation. In that, as opposed to legal restriction by 
way of duty of care regime (in the absence of judicial or legislated deference), 
directors’ intrinsic motivation is less likely to be affected adversely by market 
regulation. This is because with market regulation, the element of punishment comes 
with less or no choice. In other words, directors can be derivatively sued for their 
negligence within the process of business creativity, but they will not be sued for 
adopting a more conservative business approach without taking business risk arisen 
from creativity. However, directors can be removed from the board for either causing 
financial loss to the company as a result of their business negligence; or they can be 
removed from the board for not making the company commercially competitive as a 
result of lacking innovation.  
                                                
673	 Hennessey,	 ‘Social,	 Environmental	 and	Developmental	 Issues	 and	Creativity’	 (1995)	 Edu	Psychol	
Rev,	Vol	7,	No	2	Toward	an	Educational	Psychology	of	Creativity,	Part	I,	163,	167)	
674	 Teresa	M.	Amabile,	‘How	to	kill	Creativity’	(1998)	HBR,	76	No	5,	76,	76	-78	 	
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Empirical studies have also been conducted by Amabile and Gitomer on the effect of 
controlling extrinsic motivator on creativity from another perspective. This time, the 
element of choice was associated with the freedom of carrying the task, rather than 
associated with the given or withdrawal of reward as a form of punishment. In other 
words, the controlling element was related to the “no choice condition” whereby the 
no choice condition group was asked to implement a specific task only. The result 
shows that the test subjects with the given choice of freedom of expression 
significantly out-performed in creativity over the test subjects in no choice condition. 
This result was clearly in line with Maitland’s position (as mentioned in the 
sub-section of Definition of Creativity) that ‘creativity is a form of human freedom’675 
Certainly, in the context of corporate management activities, there has been a rise of 
so called the “Active Investors” where attempts have been exercised to vigorously 
influence the corporate board’s business decisions through external means such as 
threat of litigations and public relations campaign etc.676 As this research is primarily 
focused on the legal or judicial influence on directors’ creativity; the exact extent to 
which other non-legal or non-judicial external means to influence directors’ business 
decisions will be the subject of another research. This had also been agreed by Deci 
and Ryan that:  
                                                
675	 J.	Maitland,	‘Creativity’	(1976)	J	Aesthet	Art	Crit,	Vol	34,	No	4,	397,	408;	see	also	Kristina	Jaskyte	
and	 Audrone	 Kisieline,	 ‘Determinants	 of	 Employee	 Creativity	 -	 A	 Survey	 of	 Luthuanian	 Non-Profit	
Organisations’	(2006)	Voluntas,	Vol	17,	No	2,	133,	139	 	 	
676	 Tom	C.W.	 Lin	 ‘Reasonable	 Investor(s)’	 (2015)	B	U	 L	 Rev,	 472,	 472-473;	 and	Maria	Welker	 et	 al,	
‘Shareholder	Activism	and	Alienation’	(2011)	Curr	Anthropol,	Vol	52,	No,	S3,	62	 	
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When autonomous, people experience themselves as initiator of their own 
behaviour; they select desired outcomes and choose how to achieve them. 
Regulation through choice is characterized by flexibility and the absence of 
pressure. By contrast, being controlled is characterised by greater rigidity …677 
Once again, the results of these experiments further support the view that the 
legislated deference under the Companies Act 2006 effectively removes controlling 
motivator; and promotes intrinsic motivation on directors’ business creativity.  
CONTROLLING EXTRINSIC MOTIVATOR AS A POSITIVE FACTOR DOES 
NOT APPLY TO DIRECTORS BUSINESS JUDGMENT 
This will then lead us to explore another psychology finding. Fuller & Dornbush; 
and Muller have argued that the negative effect of extrinsic control motivator can be 
removed if such a controlling system ‘are explicitly and legitimately allocated, when 
workers cannot choose what tasks they will perform...’678; and ‘ when social 
information communicates a clear benchmark for judging one’s own performance 
(rather than obtrusively controlling action), intrinsic motivation may rise’.679  In 
other words, Fuller & Dornbush, and Muller have argued that extrinsic motivator does 
                                                
677	 E.	 L.Deci	and	R.M.	Ryan,	 ‘The	Support	of	Autonomy	and	the	Control	of	Behaviour’	 (1987)	 J	Pers	
Soc	 Psychol	 53,	 1024,	 1025	 (as	 cited	 by	 Linda	 Shanock	 et	 al,	 ‘Rewards,	 Intrinsic	 Motivation,	 and	
Creativity:	A	Case	Study	of	conceptual	and	Methodological	 Isolation’	 (2003)	Creat	Res	 J	Nov.	2	&	3,	
121,	122)	 	
678	 Fuller	&	Dornbush,	‘Organisational	Construction	of	Intrinsic	Motivation’	(1998)	Social	Forum,	Vol	3	
No	 1,	 1	 –	 5;	 See	 also	 in	 general,	 K.J.	 Muller,	 ‘Intrinsic	 Versus	 Extrinsic	 Motivation:	 An	
Approach/Avoidance	Reformulation’	(2001)	Edu	Psychol	Rev	Vol	13	No	2,	157	 	
679	 Fuller	&	Dornbush,	‘Organisational	Construction	of	Intrinsic	Motivation’	(1998)	Social	Forum,	Vol	3	
No	 1,	 1	 –	 5;	 See	 also	 in	 general,	 K.J.	 Muller,	 ‘Intrinsic	 Versus	 Extrinsic	 Motivation:	 An	
Approach/Avoidance	Reformulation’	(2001)	Edu	Psychol	Rev	Vol	13	No	2,	157	 	
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not negate an organisational worker’s intrinsic motivator if certain conditions are 
satisfied, namely, 1. That the individual worker has no choice in deciding whether or 
not to perform the work; 2. That the controlling system is well organised which would 
be used as a benchmark in judging or evaluating the performance of the workers; and 
3. That the importance of such a benchmark to the work performed is clearly 
communicated to the worker.680    
Having set out the psychology argument above, my research finding shows that this 
psychology principle does not apply to directors’ business decision within the realm 
of creativity for the flowing reasons:  
- As mentioned above, the principle only works when the directors in their business 
decision-making process have no choice in deciding the performance of the work. 
However, in reality, when directors are engaging in Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decisions, they have a choice on whether or not to implement such a 
business decision or on how the decision is to be implemented without being 
restricted by any predefined rule (as defined by H.A. Simon). This is also indicated in 
the experiment results of Folger et al681; and Amabile et al682 mentioned above. 
                                                
680	 See	 generally,	 Fuller	 &	 Dornbush,	 ‘Organisational	 Construction	 of	 Intrinsic	 Motivation’	 (2001)	
Sociol	 Forum,	 Vol	 3	 No	 1,	 1,	 5;	 K.J.	 Muller,	 ‘Intrinsic	 Versus	 Extrinsic	 Motivation:	 An	
Approach/Avoidance	Reformulation’	(2001)	Edu	Psychol	Rev,	Vol	13	No	2,	157	
681	 Folger,	Rosenfield	and	Hays,	‘Equity	and	Intrinsic	Motivation:	the	Role	of	Choice’	(1978)	J	Person	
Soc	Psychol	36,	557-564	(as	cited	by	Hennessey,	‘Social,	Environmental	and	Developmental	Issues	and	
Creativity’	(1995)	Edu	Psychol	Rev,	Vol	7,	No	2,	Toward	an	Educational	Psychology	of	Creativity,	Part	I,	
163,	167)	
682	 T.	Amabile	and	J.	Gitomer,	‘Children’s	Artistic	Creativity:	Effects	of	Choice	in	Task	Materials’	(1986)	
Unpublished	 manuscript,	 Brandeis	 University	 (as	 cited	 by	 Hennessey,	 ‘Social,	 Environmental	 and	
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Furthermore, the principle of ‘types of due cares and diligence’ put forward by 
Conard, arguing that when company directors are facing potential legal threats 
requiring directors to exercise due diligence relating to the implementation of a 
business decisions, directors would exhibit risk adverse tendency by exercising due 
diligence undesirable to the company, for instance, keeping up unnecessary paper 
trails and consulting professionals unnecessarily all for the purpose of safeguarding 
their own positions that causes extra expenses and unnecessary delay to the company, 
rather than in the best interest of the company; and  
- The psychology principle only applies to programmed business decisions, i.e., 
business decision governed by a predefined rule, for instance, internal control policy 
that company directors are required to be attentive (Dorchester Finance v. Stebbing683) 
within the psychology concept of types of decisions proposed by H.A Simon. To put 
it simply, the psychology principle does not apply to business decisions involving 
creativity.  As mentioned in the earlier part of this Chapter dealing with the proposed 
Definition of Creativity, the fundamental rule for creativity is human freedom (H.A 
Simon; Maitland; Dimock; and Jaskyte & Kisieline)684; in the context of this research, 
that refers to the situation where the directors’ business decision is not being governed 
                                                                                                                                      
Developmental	 Issues	 and	 Creativity’	 (1995)	 Edu	 Psychol	 Rev,	 Vol	 7,	 No	 2,	 Toward	 an	 Educational	
Psychology	of	Creativity,	Part	I,	163,	167)	
683	 [1989]	BCLC	498	(Ch)	
684	 See	 generally	 H.A.	 Simon,	The	 New	 Science	 of	 Management	 Decisions	(1st	 edn,	 Prentice-Hall,	 	
1965);	J.	Maitland,	‘Creativity’	(1976)	J	Aesthet	Art	Crit,	Vol	34,	No	4,	397,	408;	M.	Dimock,	‘Creativity’	
(1986)	Public	Adm	Rev,	Vol	46,	No	1,	3,	7;	and	Kristina	Jaskyte	and	Audrone	Kisieline,	‘Determinants	of	
Employee	Creativity:	A	Survey	of	Luthuanians	Non-Profit	Organisations’	(2006)	VOLUNTAS,	Vol	17,	No	
2,	133,	139	 	 	
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by any predefined rule or benchmark. Therefore, the principle of controlling extrinsic 
motivator being a positive factor corroborating with intrinsic motivator only applies to 
a programmed business decision, i.e., business decision that is governed by 
predefined rules; and not a non-programmed business decision within the realm of 
human freedom of creativity. 
It should be noted that the corresponding research of Fuller and Dornbush above was 
not about creativity. The research was within the objective of looking into the 
interrelationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivators within organisations that 
leads to job satisfaction. However, Fuller and Dornbush’s research remains relevant to 
my own research due to its relevance to the concept of programmed business 
decisions of which shall be fully discussed in the Chapter Five.  
CONTROLLING EXTRINSIC MOTIVATOR AND UK COMPANY LAW’S 
DEFERENCE 
In the above, I have demonstrated that Part 11 of UK Companies Act 2006 had 
been formulated to promote directors’ intrinsic motivation with the effect of 
promoting directors’ business creativity.  
To examine the same point from the perspective of the psychology theory of 
controlling extrinsic motivation, the promotion of directors’ business creativity is 
currently achieved through the Companies Act 2006 with the continuity of the 
common law approach of judicial diffidence on directors’ power of making 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions. In doing so, the law effectively 
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excludes the element of controlling extrinsic motivator from the directors’ 
decision-making process.  In other words, as shown in the cases such as Iesini v. 
Westrip Holdings Ltd685 the court adopted a very similar deferential approach as 
shown in the earlier common law case of Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb686; and 
Stainer v Lee687 where the judges excluded the controlling extrinsic element by 
refusing to impose punishment upon the director for the outcome of their business 
judgments. The Judge’s ruling were based on the condition that that such a business 
decision had been made by the director (as an appropriate independent organ of the 
company) in good faith, and in the interest of the company.688  From a psychology 
perspective, one can summarily conclude that the law which offers freedom to 
directors, in their business decision-making process, is ‘characterized by flexibility’689 
as opposed to ‘rigidity’.690  
LOCUS OF CONTROL & MASLOW’S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS  
In the following section, I will explore a number of other motivation theories in 
support of my argument that company directors’ business creativity requires 
                                                
685	 [2009]	BCC	420	(Ch)	[85]	&	[86]	
686	 [1872]	L	R	5	(HL)	580	 	
687	 [2010]	EWHC	1539	(Ch)	(as	cited	by	Newey	J	in	Kleanthous	v.	Paphitis	[2011]	EWHC	2287	(Ch)[40])	
688	 Stimpson	v	Southern	Landlords	Association	[2009]	EWHC	1556	(Ch)	[7]	
689	 E.	 L.Deci	and	R.M.	Ryan,	 ‘The	Support	of	Autonomy	and	the	Control	of	Behaviour’	 (1987)	 J	Pers	
Soc	 Psychol	 53,	 1024,	 1025	 (as	 cited	 by	 Linda	 Shanock	 et	 al,	 ‘Rewards,	 Intrinsic	 Motivation,	 and	
Creativity:	A	Case	Study	of	conceptual	and	Methodological	 Isolation’	 (2003)	Creat	Res	 J	Nov.	2	&	3,	
121,	122)	
690	 E.	 L.Deci	and	R.M.	Ryan,	 ‘The	Support	of	Autonomy	and	 the	Control	of	Behaviour’	 (1987)	 J	Pers	
Soc	 Psychol	 53,	 1024,	 1025	 (as	 cited	 by	 Linda	 Shanock	 et	 al,	 ‘Rewards,	 Intrinsic	 Motivation,	 and	
Creativity:	A	Case	Study	of	conceptual	and	Methodological	 Isolation’	 (2003)	Creat	Res	 J	Nov.	2	&	3,	
121,	122)	
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motivation and that the current legal system that insulates directors from negligence 
liability motivates directors’ creativity. I will further use the theory of Maslow’s 
Hierarchy of Needs to support my argument that company directors being more 
business creative than judges, even though both parties can be non-business experts. 
This eventually links back to the previous conclusion that the justification for judicial 
or legislated deference lies on creativity of directors’ business decisions and not on 
the traditional understanding on questioning the business expertise of judges. These 
theories have been selected for the following research because of their interrelation to 
intrinsic motivation that motivates business creativity.   
J.S. Eccles and A. Wigfield have proposed a theory of motivation based on self-worth 
and locus of control. They argued that people can be more motivated when they are 
being put in a position that allows them to feel that they are in control of their ultimate 
success.691 In other words, people need to first possess or be given a sense of 
self-worth or self-importance that directly relates to the task in order to be creative 
and successful in delivering an excellent completion of that task.  This theory has 
been used by researchers (e.g., Seeman; Deci; and Shapira)692 in intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation to support their findings that ‘tasks controlled from above hold 
                                                
691	 See	generally,	J.S.	Eccles	and	A.	Wigfield,	‘Motivational	belief,	Values	and	Goals’	(2002)	Annu	Rev	
Psychol	Vol	53,	109	
692	 M.	 Seeman,	 ‘Alienation	 Studies’	 (1975)	 Annu	 Rev	 Sociol,	 191;	 E.L.	 Deci,	Intrinsic	Motivation	(1st	
edn	 Plenum	 Publishing	 Company	 Limited,	 1975);	 and	 Z.	 Shapira,	 ‘Expectancy	 Determinants	 of	
Intrinsically	Motivated	 Behaviour’	 (1976)	 J	 Pers	 Soc	 Psychol,	 1244	 (all	 cited	 by	 Fuller	 &	 Dornbush,	
‘Organisational	Construction	of	Intrinsic	Motivation’	(1998)	Social	Forum,	Vol	3	No.	1,	1,	4)	
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less intrinsic value since they failed to offer the individual a feeling of challenge or 
efficacy (Deci, 1975; and Shapira, 1976).’693   
This theory of motivation was further used to support the enhancement of intrinsic 
motivation by Woodman & Schoenfeldt in which they claimed an indispensable link 
between locus of control and intrinsic motivation. In particular, Woodman & 
Schoenfeldt claimed ‘highly creative people tend to have an internal locus of 
control’.694 This theory has been tested by Shalley and Oldham with result indicating 
otherwise. However, the reason for such conflicting results between two different 
experiments was simply due to different experiments involved different experiment 
tasks. Shalley and Oldham adopted a simple assembly task which required the test 
subject to strictly follow a predefined rule – a task which had no significance to 
creativity. Whereas the other experiments adopted a more complex - non-programmed 
tasks, that contained elements of freedom or creativity.695  
The theories of self-worth and locus of control were presented in line with another 
important and more comprehensive psychology and management theory known as 
self-actualization within the hierarchy of needs proposed by Abraham Maslow in his 
                                                
693	 Fuller	&	Dornbush,	‘Organisational	Construction	of	Intrinsic	Motivation’	(1998)	Social	Forum,	Vol	3	
No.	1,	1,	4	
694	 Woodman,	Sawyer	and	Griffin,	 ‘Towards	 the	Theory	of	Organizational	Creativity’	 (1993)	Acad	of	
Manag	Rev,	Vol	18,	293,	306	 	 	
695	 C.E.	 Shalley,	 G.R.	 Oldham	 &	 J.F.	 Porac,	 ‘Effect	 of	 Goal	 Difficulty,	 Goal	 Setting	 Method,	 and	
Expected	External	Evaluation	on	Intrinsic	Motivation.’	(1987)	Acad	Manag	Rev,	Vol	30,	No	3,	553,	561	 	
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article, ‘A Theory of Human Motivation’ published in 1943.696 This theory has also 
been used by a number of psychology researchers in support of their findings relating 
to intrinsic motivation (Argyris; Hackman; Oldham; and Basadur). 697  And is 
consistently deemed by writers such as Rakich, Longest and Darr as ‘one of the most 
important and enduring theory of motivation’.698  
It should be noted that Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs is chosen for this thesis despite 
being shrouded with some criticisms, for the reasons that it compliments with and 
supports the interrelationship between Intrinsic Motivator and Controlling Extrinsic 
Motivator theory within creativity as discussed earlier on.699 The main focus of the 
needs within the hierarchy in the context of this thesis lies on Safety/Security Need. 
More precisely in the context of this thesis, the need to be free from the fear of 
lawsuit.  In other words, it argues that ‘that once basic substance needs are met, the 
individual invariably pursues these higher order psychological drives within 
organisations.’700  
                                                
696	 Abraham	 H.	 Maslow,	 ‘A	 Theory	 of	 Human	Motivation’	 (1943)	 Psychol	 Rev	 50(4)	 370;	 See	 also	
generally,	 Abraham	 H.	 Maslow,	Motivation	 and	 Personality	(3rd	 edn,	 Longman,	 1987)	 Chapter	 11:	
Self-Actualization	People:	A	Study	of	Psychological	Health	 	
697	 Fuller	&	Dornbush,	‘Organisational	Construction	of	Intrinsic	Motivation’	(1993)	Social	Forum,	Vol	3	
No	1,	1,	3;	See	also	M.S.	Basadur,	‘Organisational	Development	Interventions	for	Enhancing	Creativity	
in	the	Workplace’	(1995,	1997)	J	Creat	Behav,	31(1),	59,	61	 	 	
698 	 Rakich,	 Longest,	 Darr,	 ‘Managing	 Health	 Services	 Organizations’	 (2000)	 Baltimore:	 Health	
Professions	Press	(as	cited	by	L.	Greene	and	G.	Burke,	 ‘Beyond	Self-Actualisation’	 (2007)	JHHSA,	Vol	
30,	No	2,	116,	117)	
699	 L.	Greene,	‘Beyond	Self-Actualisation’	(2007)	JHHSA,	Vol	30,	No	2,	116,	124	 	
700	 Fuller	&	Dornbush,	‘Organisational	Construction	of	Intrinsic	Motivation’	(2007)	Social	Forum,	Vol	3	
No.	1,	1,	3;	and	L.	Greene	and	G.	Burke,	‘Beyond	Self-Actualisation’	(2007)	JHHSA,	Vol	30,	No	2,	116,	
124	 	
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Furthermore, the criticisms of the hierarchy of needs do not apply to the conditions set 
in this thesis, because: 1. the theory of hierarchy of needs is arguably not applicable to 
the society based on collectivism. Collectivism refers to authoritarian states or 
systems such as fascism or Maoism701 all of which do not represent the social 
circumstances of countries like UK and US; or 2. the argument that the role of sex has 
not been placed in Maslow’s hierarchy702 of which, bears no relation whatsoever to 
this thesis.  
The summary statements linking intrinsic motivation to Maslow’s Hierarchy of needs 
can be ‘…man’s tendency to actualize himself, to become his potentialities … ‘703 
and an individual’s creativity was realized, ‘…because it is satisfying to him, because 
this behaviour is felt to be self-actualizing’704 
Under the theory of hierarchy of needs, as the name of the theory suggests, there are a 
number of specific needs arranged in hierarchical orders or as often been depicted, in 
the shape of a pyramid with the lowest level starts from 1. the basic needs which 
generally refer to physiological needs such as food, shelters, oxygen or other basic 
                                                
701	 R.	Cianci,	and	P.A.	Gambrel,	 ‘Maslow’s	Hierarchy	of	Needs:	Does	 it	Apply	 in	a	Collective	Culture’	
(2003)	JAME	8(2):	143,	161	 	
702	 D.	Kenrick,	‘Rebuilding	Maslow’s	Pyramid	on	an	Evolusionary	Foundation’	(Psychology	Today	2010)	
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/sex-murder-and-the-meaning-life/201005/rebuilding-maslo
w-s-pyramid-evolutionary-foundation>	 accessed	 16th	 July	 2016;	 see	 also	 V.	 Griskevicius	 et	 al,	
‘Renovating	the	Pyramid	of	Needs:	Contemporary	Extensions	Built	Upon	Ancient	Foundations’	(2010)	
Perspect	Psychol	Sci	5,	292	 	
703	 Carl	Rogers,	On	Becoming	a	Person:	A	Therapist\'s	View	of	Psychotherapy	(1st	edn,	Mariner	Books,	
1961)	350,	350,351	 	
704	 C.	R.	Rogers,	 ‘Towards	 the	Theory	of	Creativity’	 (1954)	Rev	Gene	Sem	11,	249,	252	 (as	 cited	by	
Linda	 Shanock	et	 al,	 ‘Rewards,	 Intrinsic	Motivation,	 and	Creativity:	A	Case	 Study	of	 conceptual	 and	
Methodological	Isolation’	(2003)	Creat	Res	J,	Vol	15,	Nov,	2	&	3,	121,	122	
 282 
elements for human survival, therefore, must be firstly satisfied before any other 
needs; 2. safety needs which refer to physical, psychological or economical safety 
such as safety from physical war, the protection of law or elements that relates to 
financial  security respectively; 3. social needs which refer to an individual’s 
inter-personal relationship with people surrounding him or needs to feel a sense of 
belonging and acceptance within his social circle; 4. esteem needs which refer to the 
needs to be respected by both the individual himself and the others or a sense of 
contribution towards an accomplishment of a given task; and 5. the highest and final 
level of needs is known as self-actualization needs which can refer to a person’s 
feeling of realizing his potential through life-time achievements, continuous focus on 
personal growth, problem solving, life appreciation or peak experience of oneself.705 
This can include attaining to a particular high level of position within an organization. 
For instance, holding an office as a director of a large international I.T. company and 
continuing advancement of his directorial career. As pointed out by Maslow, the 
importance of self-actualization is that its essence of creativeness is a complete 
acceptance of oneself with the freedom of expression without the threat of being 
                                                
705	 A.H.	Maslow,	 ‘A	Theory	of	Human	Motivation’	 (1943)	Psychol	Rev,	Vol	50,	370;	Huitt,	 ‘Maslows	
Hierarchy	 of	 Needs’	 (2004),	 (as	 cited	 by	 JMHA	 Redmond,	 'Need	 Theories'	 (Confluence	 2015)	 <	
https://wikispaces.psu.edu/display/PSYCH484/2.+Need+Theories>	 accessed	 16th	 July	 2016;	see	 also	
Kristin	E.	Daley,	‘Taking	Care	of	your	Creativity’	(2005)	JME,	Vol	30,	No	1,	Encouraging	Creativity,	23,	
24.	 	 	
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‘controlled’ by another. 706  This effectively demonstrates the interrelationship 
between intrinsic & extrinsic motivation and the Hierarchy of needs.   
As self-actualization represents the most advanced need within the hierarchy, an 
individual could only attain to such a level after he has been first satisfied with lower 
level of needs, e.g., physical, security and social needs. This process is known as 
‘fulfillment progression’.707 For instance, a person who has a potential to be a great 
artist is arguably not being able to fully realize his talent if the focus is diverted to 
satisfying the lower level of needs such as the needs to earn enough money to keep 
his life-style up to a reasonable level or the needs to be insulated from constant threat 
of legal actions.708 
To put the combining theories of locus of control and Maslow’s into the context of 
this research, it is reasonable and logical to deduce and conclude that an individual is 
much less likely to strive for the best interest of the company without first regarding 
the company’s business as a platform of his own ambition through his directorship in 
the company. After reaching the directorial office, he is not in the position of being 
motivated to be self-actualised by way of being creative in his business decision 
making until his physical and safety needs within Maslow’s hierarchy can be 
                                                
706	 A.	H.	Maslow,	‘Creativity	in	Self-Actualised	People’,	84	(as	cited	by	Kristin	E.	Daley,	‘Taking	Care	of	
your	Creativity’	(2005)	JME,	Vol	30.	No.	1,	Encouraging	Creativity,	23,	24	&	29	 	 	 	
707 	 JMHA	 Redmond,	 'Need	 Theories'	 (Confluence	 2015)	 <	
https://wikispaces.psu.edu/display/PSYCH484/2.+Need+Theories>	accessed	16th	July	2016	
708	 As	 described	by	 L.	 S.	Daniel	 et	 al,	Psychology:	 European	(1st	 edn,	 Palgrave	Macmillan,	New	York	
2011)	486-487	
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continuously satisfied, e.g., free from being sued for ordinary negligence relating to 
the quality of his creative business decisions.  Maslow has specifically link safety 
needs to ‘an immedicable necessity of a viable political, social, or economic system 
and that is to more creative people.’709 As pointed out by Whittington and Evans, this 
process of moving around the hierarchy of needs means that the achievement of each 
level of needs is not perpetual and that an overlap of needs is more than likely to 
occur throughout a person’s lifetime. Therefore, company directors need to be 
constantly reassured that the lowers needs are revisited to prevent the ‘needs 
deficiency’,710 in order to maintain creativity for continuously satisfying the advance 
needs.   
Whittington and Evans’s finding that ‘…each of these needs operates at all times, 
although one deficient set dominates the individual at one time and 
circumstance …’711 is also supported by O’Connor and Yballe that the hierarchy of 
needs is an, ‘ongoing process that involves dozens of little growth choices …’.712 
                                                
709	 A.H	Maslow,	The	Further	Reaches	of	Human	Nature	(1st	edn,	Penguin	/	Arkana,	1993)	93	(as	cited	
by	L.	 	 Green	and	G.	Burke,	‘Beyond	Self-Actualisation’	(2007)	JHHSA,	Vol	30,	No	2,	116,	124	
710	 See	 generally,	 Whittington	 and	 Evans,	 ’The	 Enduring	 Impact	 of	 Great	 Ideas’	 (2005)	 Prob	 Pers	
Manag,	2,	114;	and	Abraham	H.	Maslow,	Motivation	and	Personality	(3rd	edn,	Longman	1987)	Chapter	
11:	Self-Actualization	People:	A	Study	of	Psychological	Health	(all	as	cited	by	JMHA	Redmond,	'Need	
Theories'	 (Confluence	 2015)	 <https://wikispaces.psu.edu/display/PSYCH484/2.+Need+Theories>	
accessed	16th	July	2016)	
711	 Whittington	&	Evans	 in	 ‘The	Enduring	 Impact	of	Great	 Idea’	 (2005)	Prob	Pers	Manag	2,	114	 (as	
cited	 by	 JMHA	 Redmond,	 'Need	 Theories'	 (Confluence	 2015)	 <	
https://wikispaces.psu.edu/display/PSYCH484/2.+Need+Theories>	accessed	16th	July	2016)	
712	 O’Connor	and	Yballe,	‘A.	H.	Maslow	Revisited:	Construction	a	Road	Map	of	Human	Nature’	(2007)	
J	 MANAG	 EDU,	 31(6),	 738	 (as	 cited	 by	 JMHA	 Redmond,	 'Need	 Theories'	 (Confluence	 2015)	 <	
https://wikispaces.psu.edu/display/PSYCH484/2.+Need+Theories>	accessed	16th	July	2016)	
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From another perspective, as the process of hierarchy of needs reflects different levels 
of needs and therefore, diligence to achieve a specific type of the needs can be 
observed from company directors’ behaviour, which ultimately might be problematic 
towards achieving the objective of creativity. This can be seen under the legal regime 
of duty of care in the absence of judicial or legislated deference of which, rather than 
primarily focus on creativity that justifies judicial or legislated deference (as being 
currently shown in the Companies Act 2006), the law requires directors to primarily 
focus on exercising ‘due diligence’ up to the objective standard of a ‘reasonable man’; 
or act within the realm of objective standard of ‘reasonableness’ respectively, in order 
to avoid the threat of negligence liability. Furthermore, the uncertainty relating to the 
application of the standard of a reasonable man as argued by academic writers such as 
Greenhow713; Davis714; Bainbridge715; and Gardner716, yield a greater risk of incurring 
the liability and thereby, gives rise to a stronger crave psychologically for safety 
needs above any other higher needs amongst Maslow’s’ Hierarchy.  
In addition, the threat of holding a company director liable for his negligence due to 
the poor outcome of his business judgment may result in an increase of diligence. 
However, as the theory of hierarchy of needs dictates, that there can be a different 
type of diligence serving different level of needs. A person, therefore, needs to 
                                                
713	 Annete	Greenhow,	‘The	Statutory	Business	Judgment	Rule:	Putting	the	Wind	into	Directors’	Sails’	
(1999)	BondLawRw	Vol	11,	42	
714	 KB	Davis	Jr,	‘Once	More,	The	Business	Judgment’	(2000)	WIS.L	Rev.	573,	582	
715	 Stephen	M.	Bainbridge	in	‘Business	Rule	as	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57	Van.	L.	RV.	83,	121	
716	 John	Gardner,	'Many	Faces	of	the	Reasonable	Person'	(Oxford	University	Research	Archive	2015)	<	
http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9e724c9c-89c0-4ec0-bafd-4e3125081558>	accessed	17th	July	2016	
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understand that efforts must be made to ensure that the types of diligence can be 
selectively encouraged to meet the desirable result for the company.   
Once again, referring back to the concept of types of diligence given by Conard, using 
the concept of motorist, Conard explained, ‘Diligence in motorist may take in the 
form of watching more alertly to avoid impacts with other vehicles, or watching more 
alertly to avoid violating traffic rules such as stop signals, speed limits and median 
lines, or watching more alertly for police who might detect violation of traffic 
rules.’717 
Likewise, different needs and diligence can be formed when it comes to company 
directors. As discussed above, the need for creativity - an end-product deemed to be 
associated with the advanced need in ‘the motivation hierarchy’ can only be achieved 
intrinsically by having all the basic needs being satisfied in advance.  
MOTIVATION AND THE UK JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
In the section, I will discuss judicial deference under Part 11 of the Companies 
Act 2006 and the interrelation between the court’s existing deferential approach, 
motivation and business creativity.  
  
                                                
717	 Alfred.	F.	Conard,	‘A	Behavioural	Analysis	of	directors’	Liability	for	Negligence’	(1972)	Duke	L	J	904	 	 	
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THE POSITION UNDER COMPANIES ACT 2006 
After the abolition of the Wrongdoer’s Control Rule by Part 11 of the 
Companies Act 2006, the courts are now prepared to entertain derivative action.  
However, company law’s interference can only be invoked on the basis that the 
derivative action can be justified by way of good faith, initiated in the interest of the 
company.   
This in turn, broadens the scope of judicial/legislated deference through a list of 
non-exhaustive factors (both legal and business factors) that can be taken into account 
by the court.  
In recent cases such as Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd718; and Kleanthous v. 
Paphitis719 judges have repeatedly expressed the significance of business creativity 
through the recognition that judicial intervention of directors’ Non-Programmed 
(Creative) Business Decisions would result the companies in question in losing their 
directors. These ‘commercial factors’ (the term used by the judges to distinguish from 
‘legal factors’ - Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd [2009] per Lewison J720) were 
considered to have the consequence of reducing the directors’ business creativity 
which in turn, damaging the companies’ future trade performance. These cases are 
presented with principles that confirm that the law recognizes the negative effect of 
                                                
718	 [2009]	CSIH	63	(CSIH)	
719	 [2011]	EWHC	2287	(Ch)	
720	 Iesini	v.	Westrip	Holdings	Ltd	[2009]	EWHC	2526	(Ch)	80	(also	as	cited	in	Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	
Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn.	OUP	Oxford,	28	Jun.	2012)	615-616)	 	 	
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controlling extrinsic motivator or the negative effect of legal punishment on directors’ 
business creativity.   
In the case of Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd, the judge acknowledged that the 
commercial factors represent part of the factors in Section 172, he refused to take 
those factors into account for the purpose of section 263(2)(a) on the ground that 
‘judges are ill-equipped to take’721 and as already established in Chapter Three, the 
term, ‘judges are not equipped to take’ was not meant in the traditional sense referring 
to business expertise of judges; rather, it refers to the rigidity of the judicial system 
that results in judges being psychologically less business creative than company 
directors. In other words, from a psychology perspective, it can be said that, as 
opposed to company directors, judges are not intrinsically motivated to be business 
creative.    
The legal recognition of the broad spectrum of which a controlling extrinsic motivator 
can be invoked is deeply embedded to the point that even if judges cannot be certain 
what constitutes commercial factor under Section 263(2), judges would still have the 
non-exhaustive list of factors that the judge is required to take into account in 
exercising such discretion. And as pointed out by Gibbs, Keay and Loughrey that the 
court would therefore, be able to take all relevant considerations into account.722 
                                                
721	 ibid	[85]	
722	 Gibbs,	 ‘Has	 the	 Statutory	 Derivative	 Claim	 Fulfilled	 its	 Objectives?	 A	 prima	 Facie	 Case	 and	 the	
Mandatory	Bar:	Part	2’	 (2011)	Co	Law	81;	and	Keay	and	Loughrey,	 ‘Something	Old,	Something	New	
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The court’s right to the non-exhaustive list under section 263 was affirmed by the 
court in a recent case known as Stimpson v Southern Landlords Association723 to 
include a hypothetical director acting in good faith. This is in line with section 172. 
Following the non-exhaustive list of factors available to judges, it can be said that the 
common law approach of judges refusing to second guess the managerial discretion of 
the board remains a factor. In other words, the common law rulings as seen in 
Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd724; Smith v Croft (No. 2)725; and Extrasure 
Travel Insurances Limited v. scattergood and Others726 that judges are ill-equipped to 
assess a commercial factor would first be applied on a subjective good faith basis to 
ignore section 263(2)(a) as seen in Lesini, and would also be likely (due to judges’ 
diffidence in interfering with corporate management) be a factor for the judges to 
exercise their discretion to discontinue the derivative claim under section 263(3)(b).  
As already demonstrated in both Chapter Three and this chapter, directors’ business 
creativity and the psychological impact on such creativity as a consequence of the 
derivative claims would logically represent a commercial factor that essentially 
justifies the court’s diffidence. Hence, legislated deference. To achieve a complete 
                                                                                                                                      
and	Something	Borrowed’	(2008)	124	LQR	469,	473;	and	Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	
Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	2012)	620	
723	 [2010]	BCC	387	(Ch)	 (as	cited	 in	 the	case	comment	 ‘Stimpson	v	Southern	Landlords	Association:	
Permission	 to	 Continue	 Derivative	 Claim	 Refused’	 (2010)	 Co.	 L.N.277,	 283-284;	 see	 also	 Tang,	
‘Shareholders’	Remedies:	Demise	of	the	Derivative	Claim?’	(2012)	UCL,	182	 	
724	 [1974]	AC	821	(PC)	
725	 [1988]	Ch	114	(Ch)	
726	 [2002]	1	BCLC	598,	(Ch)	[90],	[97]	 	
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understanding of this argument, it is essential to also focus on the types of business 
decisions which will be explored fully in Chapter Five leading to the final conclusion.  
SUMMARY 
Psychology researchers have long found that an individual’s intrinsic motivator 
being the key element to his/her creativity. On the other hand, extrinsic motivation, in 
particular, controlling extrinsic motivation has been constantly found to be 
detrimental to one’s intrinsic motivation which would eventually lead to block of 
creativeness. Under the observation of the current thesis, it can be argued that any 
legal regime strictly based on negligence liability without an appropriate judicial or 
legislated deference in place, within the context of company directors’ business 
decisions, constitutes a controlling extrinsic motivator which is detrimental to 
directors’ business innovation.     
It has been argued that extrinsic motivator can only be adopted to enhance intrinsic 
motivation that leads to creativity if the extrinsic motivator is properly managed. My 
research has established that the enabling extrinsic motivator does not need the 
proposed management within this research context. This is because the ‘withdraw 
symptoms’ of the external reward does not apply to the setting of company directors 
in their business decision making-process. This is due to the fact that the outcome of 
the creative business idea is unknown or uncertain, which in turn renders the external 
rewards not coming by choice. Furthermore, under the usual circumstances, the 
external rewards go to the company, not the individual director. Therefore, the chance 
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of the directors’ intrinsic motivation be diluted by enabling external motivator does 
not exist.  
The benefit of proper management of extrinsic controlling motivator does not apply to 
company directors under the research scenario as controlling regulations do not 
co-exist with creativity. The argument to overcome controlling extrinsic motivator by 
proper management is further evaporated when one considers company directors 
having the options to implement business decisions which allow them to be risk- 
adverse through the exercise of different types of due diligence - due diligence not 
exercised for creativity but for self-protection.  
However, the ‘management’ argument can be applied to a different type of business 
decision made by directors within the concept of types of decision postulated by H.A. 
Simon. Coupled with the necessity to accurately define the condition of ‘novelty’ 
within the definition of creativity, this would then lead to the necessity of having the 
entire Chapter Five dedicated to the types of business decisions in order to complete 
the examination of the UK law based on my proposed concept of Non-Programmed 
(Creative) Business Decisions.  
My research has also found that judges (irrespective of their business knowledge) are 
not intrinsically motivated to be creative as opposed to company directors due to the 
existing concept of different occupation leads to different problem-solving approach. 
This explains the reason as to why company directors are in the position to make 
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business decisions for the company whereas judges are not, even though both sides 
can be business or non-business experts. This in turn, supports the conclusion in 
Chapter Three that the justification for judicial or legislated deference should be 
based on creativity of directors’ business decisions and not on the traditional 
understanding of questioning the amount of business expertise of judges.  
To apply the psychology theory of motivation on the UK law, this research argues 
that the current UK legislated deference regime under the Companies Act 2006 
excludes controlling extrinsic motivator; and generates an intrinsic motivator which 
has the beneficial effect on the motivation of company directors’ business creativity.  
Finally, the importance of intrinsic motivation to company directors’ business 
creativity through the application legislated deference under the Companies Act 2006 
can be further supported by the theories of locus of control and Maslow’s Hierarchy 
of Needs. These theories also serve as an additional evidence to support the 
conclusion in Chapter Three, i.e., the real justification for judicial deference does not 
lie on the business expertise of judges; rather, it lies on the issue of business creativity 
that stems from different needs and priorities of directors and judges resulting in 
different levels of psychological limitations via bounded rationality; and 
understanding in business creativity.  
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CONCLUSION 
One of the aims of this research is to put forward a new perspective in 
understanding the justification of judicial or legislated deference in favour of 
company directors’ business decisions. Another aim is to adopt the normative 
approach. This is done by evaluating business creativity as the justification of the law; 
and the psychological value of the law in motivating directors’ business creativity. 
This chapter is built, with Chapter Three serving as a foundation, to further 
demonstrate that the traditional argument of the factor relating to judges’ business 
expertise is a faulty assumption; rather, the real justification on judicial or legislated 
deference is actually based on creativity relating to company directors’ business 
decisions. In doing so, this chapter has demonstrated (by adopting the studies in the 
field of economics) the significance of creative business decisions to corporations. 
This has led to the conclusion that ignoring business creativity would be a seriously 
misjudgment in this increasingly competitive global business market.  
Creativity in the context of company directors’ business decisions is not an 
established concept in UK company law. To overcome this research limitation, I have 
broadened my research to include the fields of psychology and management of which 
vigorous studies have been conducted in creativity. This cross-disciplinary research 
enables me to formulate a definition of creativity on which the psychology theories 
can be used to assist judges to identify directors’ creative business decisions on which 
judicial or legislated deference is to be based; and to express proper justification of 
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judicial or legislated deference. However, this chapter alone does not complete the 
entire part of my proposed concept, as my proposed definition of creativity combines 
H.A. Simon’s concept of types of decisions. The concept of types of business 
decisions needs to be relied upon to offer a complete alternative analysis of the 
distinctions of directors’ decisions that is business judgment and decisions that are not 
business judgment.  In addition, this psychology concept of creative type of business 
decision needs to be vigorously discussed and ‘experimented’ through legal case 
studies in the next chapter.  
Chapter Four explores the essential interrelation between company directors’ 
creativity and motivation. Through these studies, I have demonstrated the importance 
of judicial or legislated deference within the context of directors’ business decision. 
From a psychology perspective, without the legal protection to insulate company 
directors from negligence liability, the law can be a controlling extrinsic motivator 
that destroys directors’ level of creativity. This in turn, would have negative impact 
on the company’s business competitiveness and the country’s economy as a whole.   
This chapter also explores specifically into the interrelations between motivation, 
business creativity and current legislated deference (sections 263(2)(a) & 263(3)(b) of 
Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006); and how the derivative claim regime (built on 
the presumption on the appropriate application of judicial deference on directors’ 
business judgment) under the Companies Act 2006 as a whole has been formulated 
bearing the characteristics very much in line with these psychology concepts of 
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motivation and creativity (within the context of company directors’ business 
decisions).  
Finally, as briefly mentioned above, this chapter leads to the next chapter on the 
research being undertaken to explore the types of business decisions. In doing so, 
judicial or legislated deference and negligence liability are being applied (in the UK 
law) to different types of business decisions without the danger of de-motivating 
directors’ business creativity. A type of business decision known as Non-Programmed 
(Creative) Business Decision will be formally identified and explored. Thereafter, 
case studies on the types of business decisions within the context of directors’ 
business decision-making will be conducted towards the end of Chapter Five. This 
leads to the conclusion that the company law’s deference, from a psychology 
perspective, has been appropriately applied by the courts, based on types of business 
decisions, with the positive result in motivating company directors’ business 
creativity.  
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CHAPTER FIVE - TYPES OF BUSINESS DECISIONS 
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL AND 
LEGISLATED DEFERENCE 
 
‘We need to construct not a single theory of organization but two bodies of theory, 
one of them applicable to programmed decision-making and the other applicable to 
non-programmed decision-making.’727 – Herbert A. Simon.    
CHAPTER INTRODUCTION  
In Chapter Two, I discussed the UK common law judicial deference; the 
codification of the common law into the Companies Act 2006; and the mechanism of 
legislated deference operated based on a specific type of business decisions, i.e., 
business judgment as opposed to directors’ functional responsibilities.   
In Chapter Three, I pointed out that the justification of such a deferential approach 
was actually based on company directors’ business creativity as opposed to the 
traditional understanding of questioning the degree of business expertise of judges. 
In Chapter Four, I proposed a definition of creativity (a version of definition 
borrowed from the psychology definition of Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity); 
the significance of creativity to companies from an economics perspective; the 
                                                
727	 Cited	by	Earl	 Latham,	 ‘Research	Frontier	 in	Politics	and	Government:	Booking	Lectures,	1955	by	
Stephen	 K.	 Bailey,	 Herbert	 A.	 Simon,	 Robert	 A.	 Dahl,	 Richard	 C.	 Snyder,	 Alfred	 De	 Grazia,	Malcom	
Moos,	Paul	T.	David,	David	B.	Truman’	(1956)	Am	Political	Sci	Rev	Vol	50,	No	2,	545	
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inherent link between motivation and creativity; and finally, how the deferential 
approach under the Companies Act motivates company directors’ business creativity.     
So far, the principles that have been established are:  
- the legislated deference has only been available to protect directors from bad results 
as a consequence of their business creativity rather than functional 
responsibility/corporate governance functions or, as this chapter will classify, from a 
psychology perspective - programmed business decisions728; and 
- that the conditions of ’novelty’ and ‘usefulness’ as elements of the psychology 
definition of creativity. Whether or not a business decision is a creativity decision 
from a psychology perspective will depend on the full satisfaction of these two 
elements.729  
This chapter will explore creativity with greater details by using the concept of the 
types of business decisions. This chapter will, in particular, use H. A. Simon’s theory 
of programmed and non-programmed business decisions; together with hybrid 
and ’evolution’ of types of business decisions to demonstrate, from a psychology 
perspective, how the law operates; and how the law should operate within the context 
                                                
728	 Functional	 Responsibility	 is	 a	 generic	 term	 given	 by	 Reed	 in	 ‘Company	Directors	 –	 Collective	 of	
Functional	Responsibility’	(2006)	Com	Law,	172	to	describe	business	decisions	that	do	not	satisfy	the	
elements	of	creativity,	for	instance,	the	responsibility	required	by	law	to	acquire	the	skills	expected	to	
be	 relevant	 to	 the	 company’s	 business	 (Dorchester	 Finance	 Company	 v.	 Stebbing	 [1989]	 BCLC	 498	
(Ch)).	 This	 is	 closer	 in	 line	with	 the	 programmed	decision,	 a	 type	 of	 decision	which	must	 be	made	
within	the	pre-defined	rule.	 	
729	 To	 put	 it	 simply,	 the	 conditions	 of	 novelty	 and	 usefulness	 require	 freedoms	 in	 the	 director’s	
decision-making	process.	 	 	 	
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of company directors’ business decisions. In other words, looking at the law from a 
psychology perspective, this chapter classifies directors’ business judgments as 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions; and this chapter classifies directors’ 
functional responsibilities or corporate governance functions as programmed business 
decisions.  
In addition, the overall aim of this Chapter is not only limited to the identification of, 
from a psychology perspective, the types of business decisions. Steps have also been 
taken to examine how the types of business decisions apply to the already discussed 
the theory of creativity in psychology. This will formulate the final proposed theory 
of Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions, i.e., a modified psychology term 
to describe business judgments.    
This chapter will use a number of selected UK and US cases as case studies to look 
into the types of business decisions from a perspective of the psychology theories. In 
doing so, this chapter will demonstrate that the company law’s deference produces 
psychology effect of promoting directors’ business creativity.   
TYPES OF BUSINESS DECISIONS  
As already been pointed out in Chapter Three, unlike the traditional argument in 
favour of company law’s deference pointing to the ground of ’the judges are not 
business experts’. The actual justification of company law’s deference is based on 
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directors’ business creativity. This is distinguished by the types of business decisions. 
This argument demonstrates that even business expert judges can be ‘ill-equipped’ to 
place themselves in the positions of company directors in dealing with certain types of 
business decisions. The complexity of directors’ business judgment for judges to be 
able to fully comprehend, regardless the level of their business expertise. This new 
perspective also opens up to a different spectrum in showing the judges’ 
understanding on how the law is to be operated in the best interest of the company. 
This can only be achieved through encouraging directors to take business decisions 
involving creative and venturesome business activities without the fear of incurring 
personal liability.730 In other words, as Chapter Four demonstrates, the company 
law’s deference based on the types of business decisions731 prevents the judicial 
system from operating as a controlling extrinsic motivator.  
In order to properly explore the types of business decisions, one must first answer the 
question as to what is a ‘decision’. Therefore, it is necessary to first define a ‘decision’ 
from an academic point of view.   
                                                
730	 Carlos	Andres	and	Laguado	Giraldo,	‘Factors	Governing	the	Application	of	Business	judgment	Rule:	
An	 Empirical	 Studies	 of	 US,	 UK,	 Australia	 and	 The	 EU’	 (2006)	 122	 <	
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.542.5943&rep=rep1&type=pdf>	 accessed	
24	February	2018;	See	also	 l.	Denis	Ping,	 ’The	Business	 Judgment	Rule:	Should	 it	Protect	Non-Profit	
Directors?’	(2003)	103	Colum	L	Rev	946;	and	see	also,	Demetra	Arsalidou,	‘Objectivity	vs.	Flexibility	in	
Civil	 Law	 Jurisdictions	 and	 the	 Possible	 Introduction	 of	 the	 Business	 Judgment	 Rule	 in	 English	 Law’	
(2003)	Co	Law	24(8)	228-233	
731	 For	 how	 extrinsic	 motivator	 decreases	 intrinsic	 motivator	 on	 scientific	 terms,	 see	 for	 instance,	
Amabile	 T.M.	 and	 Cheek	 J.M.	 ‘Commentary	 Essays	 on	 Findlay	 and	 Lumsden’s	 The	 Creative	 Mind:	
Toward	an	Evolutionary	Theory	of	Discovery	and	innovation’	(1988)	J	Social	Biol	Strut	59	 	 	
 300 
Academic writers Teale et al. have cited a number of academic writers’ statements 
defining a ‘decision’ in their book;732 and they include – ’Acts of choice between 
alternative courses designed to produce a specified result, and one made on a review 
of relevant information guided by explicit criteria.’ – Rose, quoted by Weeks in 
Salaman and Thompson, 1980:187;  
A conscious and human process, involving both individual and social 
phenomena, based upon factual and value premises, which includes a choice of 
one behavioural activity from one or more alternatives with the intention of 
moving towards some desired state of affairs.’ – Shull et al. in Harrison, 1999:4.; 
and  
A moment, in an ongoing process of evaluating alternatives for meeting an 
objective at which expectations about a particular course of action impel the 
decision maker to select that course of action most likely to result in attaining 
the objective. – Harrison, 1999:5.733     
Richard Prentice has also given an in-depth definition of decision as: 
The delimitation of goals and their specification as objectives; the recognition 
of problem (the recognition that objectives are not be attained); the search for 
                                                
732	 Mark	 Teale	 et	 al.	 Management	 Decision-Making	 Towards	 an	 Integrative	 Approach	 (1st	 edn,	
Financial	Times/Prentice	Hall	2002)	Chapter	6	
733	 ibid	 	 	
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possible strategies to solve this problem; the prediction of consequences of 
these strategies in relation to the predicted strategies of an environment (the set 
of opponents); the evaluation of strategies discovered in the context of extent to 
which the anticipated consequences obtained the objectives; the selection of 
strategies on the basis of the evaluation; the implementation of that strategy and 
the monitoring of the consequences of the intervention.734  
Looking at the above definitions from a broad perspective, a general consensus of a 
‘decision’ encompasses the elements of evaluation and selection of choices with an 
aim to achieve a specific objective or objectives. This indicates both the process of 
decision-making as well as the final decision itself.  
As the main focus of my research is based on the decision taken by a company 
director in the process of operating the company’s business, a further step is taken to 
define a decision from within the context of corporate business.   
As academic writers have yet to produce a direct definition relating to decisions taken 
within the company business context, i.e., ‘business decisions’, I have attempted to 
seek to place my reliance on the relevant statutory definition. Unfortunately, I have 
not been able to trace any relevant definition within the UK and the US legislation. I 
therefore, would rely on my general perception of what a business decision is, drawn 
                                                
734	 P	Prentice,	‘The	Theory	of	Games	and	Conceptual	Framework	for	the	Study	of	Non-Programmed	
Decision	Making	by	individuals?’	(1975)	Area	Vol	7	No	3	161	 	
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from the UK and the US case law. Through which the simplicity of establishing the 
nature of business decisions can be seen, namely, the involvement of elements of 
evaluation and selection of choices with an aim to achieve a specific objective that are 
relevant to the operation of the company’s business or activities. See for instance, 
director evaluating and selecting options in the context of supervision of the job 
performance of his subordinates as part of the internal control of the operation of the 
company’s business (Equitable Life Assurance v. Bowley735); a hypothetical director 
evaluating and selecting options on whether or not to pursue a derivative claim, in an 
attempt to prevent any disruption to the Company’s business (Iesini v. Westrip 
Holdings Ltd736); or (in an US case law) evaluating and selecting options on whether 
or not to include a severance compensation clause in the directorship contract (Re. 
Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation (Disney V)737 ). The business decisions 
demonstrated in the above cases are of strategic nature, Keay and Loughrey have, in 
their recent article, pointed out the UK courts’ historical recognition of business 
decisions from perspective of the dictionary meaning of ‘commercial’.738 Their 
interpretation of the meaning of the word ‘commercial’ is backed up by reference to 
                                                
735	 [2003]	EWHC	2263	(QB)	[41]	
736	 [2009]	BCC	420	(Ch)	[85]	
737	 907	A	2d	693	[2005]	
738	 Cobden	 Investments	 Ltd	 v.	 RWM	 Langport	 Ltd	 [2008]	 EWHC	 2810	 (Ch);	 Moxon	 v.	 Litchfield	
[2013]3957	(Ch)	and	ARB	International	Ltd	v.Bailie	[2013]	EWHC	2060	(Comm)	all	cited	by	Keay	A	&	 	
Loughrey	 J,	 ‘ The	 Concept	 of	 Business	 Judgment ’ Legal	 Studies	 1,	 10	 <	
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/DFC0700879FEF7FF4B
D7E9A589A211C4/S0261387518000296a.pdf/concept_of_business_judgment.pdf>	 accessed	 5	
January	2019	
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the Oxford English Dictionary, i.e., ‘the activity of buying and selling’.739 However, 
the reliance of the dictionary meaning of the word, ‘commercial’ appears  to offer a 
limited scope within the context, as in some cases, the judges have decided that 
directors’ commercial decision goes beyond activities of mere buying and selling. For 
instance, in Kleanthous v. Paphitis,740 the judge held that a director’s decision to 
discontinue a derivative claim for avoiding disruption to the group dynamics of the 
company’s employees; and/or damage to the reputation of the company would 
constitute a commercial decision.      
To strengthen the understanding of what constitutes a business decision in the context 
of company directors’ decisions, reference is drawn to Australian law - a legal 
jurisdiction that operates a concept of judicial or legislated deference similar to UK 
and US company law. Australian law defines a business decision as ‘... any decision 
to take or not to take action in respect of a matter relevant to the business operations 
of the corporation’.741  
The UK and the US case laws, as well as, the Australian statutory definition do not 
initially define what a decision is.  Therefore, for the purpose of this research, the 
                                                
739 	 Oxford	 English	 Dictionary	 at	
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/37081?redirectedFrom=commercial#eid	 as	 cited	 by	 Keay	 A	 &	
Loughrey	 J,	 ‘ The	 Concept	 of	 Business	 Judgment ’ Legal	 Studies	 1,	 10	 <	
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/DFC0700879FEF7FF4B
D7E9A589A211C4/S0261387518000296a.pdf/concept_of_business_judgment.pdf>	 accessed	 5	
January	2019	
740	 [2011]	EWHC	(Ch)	[71],	[72]	&	[75]	 	
741	 Corporations	Act	2001,	Section	180(3)	
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word, ‘decision’ within the context of business decisions that is drawn from both the 
UK and the US case law and the Australian statutory definition will be based on the 
earlier quotes of the academic definitions of ‘decisions’.  To sum up, a business 
decision can simply be defined as evaluation and selection of choices with an aim to 
achieve a specific objective(s) for operation of a company’ or companies’ business.  
However, for the purpose of this research, it is insufficient to solely place the reliance 
on the above definitions. As pointed out by Teale et al.742 that there are problems or 
difficulties in defining a decision (a business decision in the present context) to suit a 
given situation. For the purpose of this research, an example of the difficulties could 
be a situation where a judge is being presented with a case whereby, he or she is to 
decide whether or not a particular business decision warrants the protection of judicial 
or legislated deference. In other words, the term, ‘decision’, and in the context of this 
research – ‘business decision’, is conceptual and when in operation, can take a variety 
of forms.  
This means that a business decision can be ‘varied and multi-faceted and, whilst we 
may identify elements of a decision that may be common to other decisions, it does 
                                                
742	 Mark	 Teale	 et	 al.	 Management	 Decision-Making	 Towards	 an	 Integrative	 Approach	 (1st	 edn,	
Financial	Times/Prentice	Hall	2002)	Chapter	6	 	
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not necessarily follow that all decisions are similar in nature’.743 This gives rise to a 
need to identify business decisions by way of their types.    
NON-PROGRAMMED BUSINESS DECISIONS 
As briefly mentioned throughout the previous chapters, there are a number of 
types of business decisions. The first type of decisions is known as Non-Programmed 
or Unstructured Decisions which was first properly and fully classified by H.A Simon 
in 1965.744  A non-programmed or unstructured decision is as described by its name, 
i.e., that the decision is unclear, ambiguous and insufficiently or completely not 
predefined.   
Academic writer, Harrison has called a non-programmed or unstructured decision a 
category II decision which, along with other conditions, is ’non-routine, non-recurring 
and uncertain’.745   
Similarly, Venkatachalam and Sellappan described a non-programmed decision as 
‘…novel and unstructured. No rule, routines, or standard operating procedures can be 
developed to handle them. Solutions must be worked out as problems arise.’746 
                                                
743	 Mark	 Teale	 et	 al.	 Management	 Decision-Making	 Towards	 an	 Integrative	 Approach	 (1st	 edn,	
Financial	Times/Prentice	Hall	2002)	Chapter	6	 	
744	 See	generally	H.A.	Simon,	The	New	Science	of	Management	Decisions	(Prentice	Hall	1965)	
745	 As	cited	by	Mark	Teale	et	al.	Management	Decision-Making	Towards	an	Integrative	Approach	(1st	
edn,	Financial	Times/Prentice	Hall	2002)	Chapter	6	
746	 Venkatachalam	and	Sellapan,	Business	Process	(Prentice-Hall	of	India	Pvt.	Ltd	2011)	115	
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Soelberg has given a more detailed account of the uncertainty that relates to 
non-programmed decision by stating that: 
…that decision maker applied a few special-purpose decision rules when 
arriving at his choice; that a number of decision criteria that he (decision maker) 
applied were initially un-operational; that many of the choice alternative he 
considered were unknown to start with; that information about the alternatives’ 
consequences and their relative worth was not immediately available from the 
task environment; and that decision maker might not even be able to specify the 
nature of an ideal situation to his problem.747   
As there have been a number of terms describing the above type of decision, for the 
purpose of simplification in the following discussions, only the term - 
non-programmed decisions will be used from now and throughout the chapter, with 
the exception of quotes from third parties.  
According to H.A. Simon and other academic writers such as Griffin and Moorhead, 
non-programmed business decisions are risky and yielding big impact on the 
company’s business. 748  And Soelberg pointed out the creative nature of 
non-programmed decisions by commenting that: 
                                                
747	 Peer	Soelberg,	Unprogrammed	Decision	Making	(MIT,	1967)	239-67,	240	
748	 Ricky	W.	 Griffin	&	Gregory	Moorhead,	 Ricky	W.	 Griffin	&	Gregory	Moorhead	 on	Organizational	
Behaviour:	Managing	People	and	Organizations	(South-Western	College	Pub	2010)	192	 	
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But if you ask him directly, decision maker would insist that the 
un-programmed problem confronting him had to be solved in its own unique 
context … yet it is precisely this type of non-programmed decision making that 
forms the basis for allocating billions of dollars’ worth of resources in the 
economy every year.749   
This comment supports the research conclusion presented in Chapter Four which 
stresses the significance of business creativity (non-programmed nature) to companies 
from an economics point of view.     
From a business point of view, to be effective in making a non-programmed business 
decision, directors are required to conduct market research including evaluating 
intricate issues, analysis alternatives and making strategic decision that bears 
significant consequences for the company. Therefore, an effective non-programmed 
decision is very difficult (and requires more thoughts) to make, especially when the 
decision has to be made within a short period of time. See for instance, Emmanuel et 
al who describe non-programmed decision making as ‘one contingent variable’ to the 
proper performance of single accounting information system within companies, and 
‘… the multi-divisional company was chosen to exemplify the difficulties or applying 
                                                
749	 Peer	Soelberg,	Unprogrammed	Decision	Making	(MIT,	1967)	239-67,	240	
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conventional accounting systems because of high incidence of non-programmed 
decision making.’750  
The complexity and uncertainty of success of non-programmed business decisions has 
also been stressed by writers Venkatachalam and Sellappan, both stated that: 
The creation of an organization’s strategy involves non-programmed decision 
making by managers who experiment to find the best way, to use an 
organization’s skills and resources to create value and who never know in 
advance whether they are making the right decision.751  
It follows that, the undertakings of non-programmed business decisions in a company 
often require the employment of resources of which the company can offer. By 
linking this to the discussion in Chapter Three, places company directors in positions 
that make them less boundedly rational in their decision-making process as opposed 
to judges. As judges are bound by the strict judicial budgets and constrains, all aim to 
streamline the courts’ system as opposed to companies’ business. This in turn, renders 
the judicial system relatively less resourceful than corporate environment.  
The difficulty in non-programmed decision-making is backed further (and in greater 
details) by Cyert et al through their intricate analysis of the rational process of general 
                                                
750	 Clive	Emmanuel	and	David	Otley,	Accounting	for	Management	Control	 (2nd	edn,	Change	Learning	
EMEA	1990)	357	 	 	
751	 T	A	Sellappan	and	V	M	Venkatachamlam,	Business	Process	(PHI	2010)	115	 	
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decisions; and followed by breaking of general decisions into elements of which the 
related information can be ill-defined. Thereby gives rise to the distinction between; 
and the reasons for the existence of both programmed and non-programmed types of 
decisions:  
In economics and statistics, the rational choice process is described somewhat       
as follows: 
1. An individual is confronted with a number of differences, specified 
alternative courses of action. 2. To each of these alternatives is attached a set of 
consequences that will ensue if that alternative is chosen. 3. The individual has 
a system of preferences or ‘utilities’ that permits him to rank all sets of 
consequences according to preference and to choose that alternative that has the 
preferred consequences. In the case of business decisions, the criterion for 
ranking is generally assumed to be profit.752  
If we try to use this framework to describe how real human beings go about 
making choices in a real world, we soon recognize that we need to incorporate 
in our descriptions of the choice process several elements that are missing from 
the economic model: 
                                                
752	 Richard	Cyert	et	al,	’Observation	of	A	Business	Decision’	(1956)	J	Bus	237	
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1. The alternatives are not usually ’given’ but must be sought, and hence it is 
necessary to include the search for alternatives as an important part of the 
process. 2. The information as to what consequences are attached to which 
alternatives is seldom ‘given’, but instead, the search for consequences is 
another important segment of the decision-making task. 3. The comparisons 
among alternatives are not usually made in terms of simple, single criterion like 
profit. One reason is that there are often important consequences that are so 
intangible as to make an evaluation in terms of profit difficult or impossible. In 
place of searching for the ‘best’ alternative, the decision maker is usually 
concerned with finding a satisfactory alternative – one that will be attained 
specified goal and at the same time satisfy a number of auxiliary conditions. 4. 
Often, in the real world, the problem itself is not a ‘given’, but, instead, 
searching for significant problems to which organizational attention should be 
turned becomes an important organizational task.753  
It is interesting to point out that the position above is similar, but not completely in 
line with the ‘usefulness’ condition of the Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity in 
the context of directors’ business decisions. In particular, as we can see, the objective 
of searching for the ’best alternative’, as described in point 3 above, can be said to be 
similar to - ‘an aim to benefit’ within the provision of the ‘usefulness’ condition of the 
creativity theory. However, in the former, the decision-making process usually 
                                                
753	 ibid	 	
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involves the objective of searching for a ‘satisfactory alternative754’ without it being a 
specific requirement that the decision has to be useful. In other words, it is not an 
essential condition to establish a non-programmed decision to always benefit any 
party or towards problem-solving; whereas the latter, places an essential emphasis on 
the process of decision-making, with the intention, based on the subjective element of 
good faith, i.e., the decision must be made in good faith with an aim to benefit the 
company. This difference, couple with the classifications of types of business 
decisions, render the combined research of the law; the psychology theory of 
creativity; and the theory of types of decisions essential in achieving completeness 
and clarity for the purpose of this thesis.   
And as discussed in the previous chapter, in order for a decision to be creative, it has 
to be ‘useful’, i.e., the business decision made bona fide with an intention to benefit 
the company. Therefore, this renders the issue relates to the end quality of the 
decision immaterial. This principle applies strictly on a business decision that 
constitutes a Non-Programmed Business Decision within the context of creativity. 
This coincides with the subjective element in the legal process of determining 
whether or not deferential approach should be taken by the court in directors’ favour 
under section 263(2)(a). In which the court is to decide on whether or not the decision 
was made bona fide by the director acting as an appropriate independent organ of the 
company; and in the interest of the company (the conditions as seen in the cases such 
                                                
754	 ibid	
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as Smith v. Fawcett755; Extrasure Travel Insurance Ltd v. Scattergood & Others756; 
and Stimpson v Southern Landlords Association757). The law concludes that the 
element of ‘the end quality of a decision’ is not a condition to establish 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision.758 
Overall, as generally pointed out in Chapter Three, the theory of creativity represents 
a broader and more in-depth study that relates to creativity. For instance, the theory 
dictates the requirement of company directors acting in good faith, in the interest of 
the company as a pre-condition of ‘usefulness’.759 The creativity theory enables my 
research to cover its inter-related subject, i.e., motivation. That allows me to 
demonstrate the differences between non-business expert judges and non-business 
expert directors with a view on how the law has been formulated to motivate 
company directors’ creativity in decision making. However, creativity itself does not 
clearly define and categorize the types of business decision which all represent 
essential components of this research. These components are aiming to give, from a 
psychology perspective, an overall view of the company law’s deference in the 
context of motivating directors to be business creative.  Hence, my research 
                                                
755	 [1942]	1	CH	304	(CA)	306	
756	 [2002]	BCLC	1	(Ch)	[90],	[97]	
757 BCC 387 (Ch) (as cited in the case comment, ‘Stimpson v Southern Landlords Association: 
Permission to Continue Derivative Claim Refused’ (2010) Co Law 277, 283-284; see also Tang, 
‘Shareholders’ Remedies: Demise of the Derivative Claim?’ (2012) UCL 182 
758	 See	generally	H.A.	Simon,	The	New	Science	of	Management	Decisions	(Prentice	Hall	1977);	Richard	
Cyert	et	al,	 ‘Observation	of	A	Business	Decision’	 J	Bus	237,	238;	and	See	Ricky	W.	Griffin	&	Gregory	
Moorhead,	Organizational	Behaviour:	Managing	People	and	Organizations	(10th	edn,	South-Western	
College	Pub	2010)	192	
759	 Andrall	E.	Pearson,	‘Tough-Minded	Ways	to	get	Innovative’	(May/June	1988)	HBR	99	
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combines the mutually complimentary theories of Product-Oriented Measure of 
Creativity and Types of business Decisions. This combination will deliver a new 
model ensuring clarity in explaining the suitability for applications of judicial or 
legislated deference concerning company directors’ business decisions.  
Consequently, I will name my proposed model of business decisions as 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions.  
From a traditional law academic point of view, law academic writers do not use the 
term non-programmed business decision in their writings. They nevertheless 
appreciate the justification of judicial deference offered by the judges in Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co;760 or Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb761 through the recognition of 
the creative nature and unpredictability of such type of business decisions. For 
instance, Fischel has described non-programmed business decisions with the 
characteristic that: 
The range of future contingencies may be unforeseeable. Alternatively, even if 
it is foreseeable, the desired responses to future contingencies may be unknown 
initially. Attempt to define desired responses to future contingencies will have 
to change overtime in light of new information.762 
                                                
760	 [Mich	1919]	170	NW	668	
761	 LR	5	(HL)	580	cited	by	Moore	on	Corporate	Govenance	in	Shadow	of	State	(Hart	Publishing,	2013)	
in	support	of	the	UK	historical	existence	of	UK	judicial	deference	justified	by	the	unpredictable	nature	
of	directors’	business	decisions.	 	
762	 Daniel	R.	Fischel,	‘The	Business	Judgment	Rule	and	Trans	Union	Case’	(1985)	BL	Vol	40,	1440	
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In the following, I will further elaborate non-programmed business decisions by first 
using some hypothetical examples. This would give a broader view on the scope of 
the proposed concept. This would then lead to an experiment on the applicability of 
the concept of the types of business decisions in legal scenarios through case studies 
based on the actual law cases, all will be undertaken at the end of this chapter.  
HYPOTHETICAL ANALYSIS 
A director of a company had to make a non-programmed business decision 
regarding the development and selling of smart-phones763 or transgenic beans764 
which would include exploring the new idea; researching the new technology; 
selecting the right segment of the markets; and employing the right advertisements to 
promote this new product to the consumers. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, as well as the earlier part of this chapter, this 
decision-making process satisfies the conditions of Product-Oriented Measure of 
Creativity by way of its ’novelty’ and ‘usefulness’, as the business idea is 
non-programmed or ill-defined, with an aim to benefit the company.765  
The difficulties to the directors in the decision-making process are that the creative 
concept and marketability of smart-phones or transgenic beans to the general public 
                                                
763	 Samsung	Electronics	(UK)	Limited	v	Apple	Inc.	[2012]	EWHC	(Ch)	as	mentioned	in	Chapter	Four	–	
Case	studies	number	one	
764	 Bowman	v	Monsanto	Co.	596,	U.S.	 [2013]	as	mentioned	 in	Chapter	Four	–	Case	studies	number	
four	
765	 Kanter,	The	Change	Masters	(New	York:	Simon	and	Schuster	1983)	as	cited	by	Teresa	M	Amabile,	
‘A	Model	of	Creativity	and	Innovation	in	Organization’	(1988)	Res	Organ	Behav,	Vol	10,	167;	see	also.	
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or the farming industry (respectively) are unique. Hence, the relevant information is 
either very limited or ill-defined at first. Consequently, a non-programmed decision 
entails the elements of high risk-taking and uncertainty,766 but at the same time, they 
are aimed to deliver a long-term impact on the success of the company’s business.767 
It follows that, this type of business decision involves a high level of executive 
judgment and deliberations taken at the board level. 
Linking the above analysis to Chapters Two, Three and Four. One can see from a 
psychology perspective, the inter-connection between creativity and non-programmed 
business decisions; and that the reason of judicial or legislated deference being 
justified to protect the directors and to promote business innovation (with the 
exception of cases where the directors were grossly negligent in the process of 
making the non-programmed business decision768; or where there is a conflict of 
interest between the directors and their company). This means that the directors 
must ’ … neither appear on both sides of the transaction nor expect to derive any 
personal benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to benefit which 
                                                
766	 Theodore	Kowalski	&	Thomas	L.	Lasley,	Handbook	of	Data-based	Decision	Making	in	Education	(1st	
edn,	Routledge	2008)	8	
	
767	 See	e.g.,	Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	The	New	Corporate	Governance	In	Theory	&	Practice	(OUP	USA	
2008)	124;	and	Melvin	A.	Einsenbeg,	‘The	Duty	of	Care	of	Corporate	Directors’	(1989-1990)	51	U.	Pitt.	
L.	Rev.	958-959	 	
768	 Smith	 v.	Van	Gorkom	488	A.2d	858	 [Del.	 1985]	 as	 cited	by	Douglas	M.	Branson,	 ‘The	Rule	That	
Isn’t	Rule	–	The	Business	Judgment	Rule’	(2002)	ART	3	631,	640	 	
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devolves upon the corporation or all the stockholders generally.’769 This again 
demonstrates that, from a legal perspective, a non-programmed business decision by 
itself is not sufficient to invoke judicial or legislated deference without the essential 
condition of ’usefulness’ in creativity being satisfied. Hence, the combination of 
creativity and non-programmed business decisions as this research proposes that 
results in a new model of business decision known as Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decisions. 
Going back to the factors, namely, conflict of interest or breach of duty of loyalty; 
that render a non-programmed business decision a non-creative decision (as described 
above). Quick and typical examples of conflict of interest likely to occur in the 
context of business decisions would include the situations as follows: 
- As commented by the judges in Norlin Corp v. Rooney, Pace Inc.,770 where 
directors are involving and implementing the strategy to resist a tender offer in a 
company takeover case, as directors would normally ’ … act solely and primarily to 
retain control’771 of the company.772 A UK case similar to Norlin can be found in 
                                                
769	 Aronson	 v	 Lewis	 473	 A2.d	 at	 812	 [Del.1984]	 as	 cited	 by	 Charles	 Hanson	 in	 ‘The	 ALI	 Corporate	
Governance	 Project:	 Of	 the	 Duty	 of	 Due	 Care	 and	 the	 Business	 Judgment	 Rule,	 a	 Commentary’	
(1985-1986)	41	BUS	LAW	1237,	1248	 	
770	 [2d	Cir.	1984]	744	F2d	255	as	cited	by	E.	Norman	Veasy	&	Julie	M.S.	Seitz,	‘The	Business	Judgment	
Rule	in	the	Revised	Model	Act,	the	Trans	Union	Case,	and	the	ALI	Project	–	A	Strange	Porridge’	(1985)	
63	 Tex	 L	 Rev	 1489,	 1483;	 See	 also	 Richard	D.	 Truesdell,	 JR,	 ‘Does	Norlin	 Corp.	 v.	 Rooney	 Pace,	 Inc	
Preserve	for	Shareholders	Control	of	a	Corporation’s	“Ultimate	Destiny”’	 (1986)	20	Colum	J	L	&	Soc	
Probs	325	 	
771	 E.	Norman	Veasy	&	 Julie	M.S.	Seitz,	 ‘The	Business	 Judgment	Rule	 in	 the	Revised	Model	Act,	 the	
Trans	Union	Case,	and	the	ALI	Project	–	A	Strange	Porridge’	(1985)	63	Tex	L	Rev	1489,	1483	
772	 Thomas	A.	D’Ambrasio,	‘The	Duty	of	Care	and	the	Duty	of	Loyalty	in	the	Revised	Model	Business	
Corporation	Act’	(1987)	40	Vand	L	Rev	663,	678	
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Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd773 where in an attempt to protect his future 
employment opportunity, the director unlawfully increased the company’s shares with 
an intention to prevent a hostile takeover;  
- Where a company director self-servingly withheld from the company the business 
opportunity of which it is commercially relevant for the company to know;774 or  
- Where a director purposely turning a blind eye through his or her failure to 
undertake an investigation into the activities likely to involve a fraudulent act of 
another fellow director who had happened to be his or her closely connected person, 
for instance, a close relative.775 Again, apart from the case involving a clear conflict 
of interest on the part of the director, the director’s business decision to refrain from 
intervening in a possible fraud case cannot be deemed to have been made ‘usefully’ or 
in the interest of the company. Therefore, such a decision will not constitute a 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision - an essential component of this 
chapter that has already been briefly covered above.  
I shall discuss the related issue of gross negligence and conflict of interest in greater 
details in my case studies at the latter part of this chapter. 
                                                
773	 [1974]	AC,	821	(PC)	 	
774	 See	Bhullar	v.	Bhullar	[2003]	EWCA	Civ	424	(CA)	[41]	
775	 	 See	Lexi	Holdings	v.	Luqman	&	Others	[2009]	EWCA	Civ	(Ch)	117	
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Another hypothetical example that demonstrate a Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decision can be shown on a situation where the director of a big car 
manufacturing company made a business decision to turn the company from being a 
plc to ltd.776 The decision for such a change of the company’s status was made with 
an aim to allow the company to avoid the pressure from the public who urge the 
company to constantly achieve the short-term goal. A change of the status, as the 
director believes, would allow the company to focus on more long-term research and 
development projects. Unless the director was acting in bad faith when making the 
business decision, the decision would constitute a Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decision. This is because, from a psychology perspective, the business 
decision to change the status for overcoming the public pressure was not bound by 
any predefined rule (Novelty); and was aimed to benefit the company (Usefulness).  
SUMMARY 
In psychology, non-programmed decision is the types of decision that is, in the 
decision-making process, not bound by any predefined rule. Therefore, one can see a 
great element of uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the decision during the 
decision-making process. By putting the same concept into the context of directors’ 
business decision-making, it can be described as non-programmed business decisions. 
                                                
776	 See	for	instance,	Tom	Huddleston	Jr,	‘Elon	Musk	Says	He	Eants	to	Take	Tesla	at	Over	$70	Billion	–	
Here	 is	 What	 that	 Means’	 (CNBC,	 9	 August	 2018)	
<https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/08/elon-musk-wants-to-take-tesla-private--heres-what-it-means.ht
ml>	accessed	19	January	2019	
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This is because the decisions are of non-programmed in nature and involve evaluation 
and selection of choices with an aim to achieve a specific objective(s) for operation of 
a company’ or companies’ business.  
From a relevant law perspective, although no such specific term of the types of 
business decision is used, one can see from the case law such as Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Co;777 or Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb778 where the creative and unpredictability 
nature of such a business decision has been recognized by the courts in justifying 
judicial deference. This type of business decision is typically known, in law, as 
business judgment; or commercial decision that the court is not equipped to judge.779  
Non-programmed business decision satisfies the ‘novelty’ condition of creativity in 
psychology. However, the concept of non-programmed business decision does not 
require the satisfaction of the second condition of creativity, i.e., ‘usefulness’; and 
from UK company law perspective, the requirement that the business decision made 
by the director, in the interest of the company, within the provision of section 172 
companies Act 2006.  
                                                
777	 [Mich	1919]	170	NW	668	
778	 LR5HL	580	cited	by	Moore	on	Corporate	Govenance	in	Shadow	of	State	(Hart	Publishing,	2013)	in	
support	of	the	UK	historical	existence	of	UK	judicial	deference	justified	by	the	unpredictable	nature	of	
directors’	business	decisions.	 	
779	 See	for	instance,	Iesini	v.	Weststrip	Holdings	Ltd	[2009]	EWHC	(Ch)	[80]	 	
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It follows that, the fusion of the concept of non-programmed business decision with 
the concept of product-oriented measure of creativity is essential to achieve a 
complete view of, from psychology perspective, business judgment.  
PROGRAMMED BUSINESS DECISIONS 
NOT every type of business decision is of unique and innovative nature. 
Therefore, a distinction between different types of business decisions together with 
how a business decision was originally made must be clearly drawn.  
Another type of business decision that was also introduced by H.A Simon.780 This is 
known as Programmed or structured Decisions, i.e., unlike the non-programmed 
business decision mentioned above, this type of decisions  refers to the type that has 
been pre-programmed or to be made on routine, and repeated basis.781 This type of 
business decision falls quite literally within the rational process of general decisions 
by Cyert782 who was quoted earlier on. In other words,  ‘… a decision rule or policy 
which tells a decision maker which alternative to choose once they have 
pre-determined information about the decision situation.’ 783  Examples of 
programmed decisions include, handling employees’ discipline against an employee 
who turns up to work late regularly; re-ordering office stationeries that involves 
                                                
780	 See	generally	H.A.	Simon,	The	New	Science	of	Management	Decisions	(Prentice	Hall,	1965)	
781	 As	cited	by	Mark	Teale	et	al.	Management	Decision-Making	Towards	an	Integrative	Approach	(1st	
edn,	Financial	Times/Prentice	Hall	2002)	Chapter	6	
782	 Richard	Cyert	et	al	‘Observation	of	A	Business	Decision’	(1956)	J	BUS	Vol	29	No	4,	237	
783	 See	 Ricky	 W.	 Griffin	 &	 Gregory	 Moorhead,	 Organizational	 Behaviour:	 Managing	 People	 and	
Organizations	(Houghton	Mifflin	Company	2010)	Chapter	8,	192	
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decision that is subject to the pre-set limitation of re-ordering; job allocations; 
production schedules; or company directors taking out an insurance policy on behalf 
of the company as shown in the case of Re D’Jan of London Ltd784 (this case will be 
used in my case studies, towards the end of this chapter, indicating the interrelation 
with programmed business decision and the law).   
For the purpose of simplification in the following discussion, only the term - 
programmed decisions will be used from now and throughout this chapter.  
Unlike non-programmed decisions, a programmed decision can be easily adopted and 
readily applied by even a computer: 
… most famous scientific description of a case of highly programmed decision 
making is perhaps G.P.E. Clarkson’s, in which it was demonstrated that the 
portfolio selection decisions made by a bank trust investment officer were so 
well programmed that his decisions could be predicted by a computer …785  
 
PROGRAMMED BUSINESS DECISIONS TAKEN AT COMPANIES BOARD 
LEVELS   
According to H.A. Simon and other academic writers such as Griffin and 
Moorhead, programmed business decisions are taken at the lower tiers of the 
                                                
784	 [1994]	1	BCLC	561	(Ch)	
785	 See	Peer	Soelberg,	Unprogrammed	Decision	Making	(MIT,	1967)	3-16	 	
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organization and yield small impact on the company’s business.786 I would however, 
demonstrate with examples in the following parts of this chapter, that this particular 
assumption is faulty; and that programmed decisions can easily be taken at the top 
level of the organization which consequently bear serious impact on the company’s 
business. Therefore, the presumption must be excluded as the key components of 
programmed business decisions for the purpose of this research.  
The first example of a programmed decision taken at the upper tier of a company 
relates to a recent case, whereby the business decisions taken by company directors 
resulted in a great negative impact on a number of parties including the company, 
consumers and company’s creditors is shown in the 2014 Taiwan food scandal case. 
The case involved the adulteration of cooking oil with recycled gutter (or waste) and 
animal feed oil that was not fit for human consumption. This case is being selected to 
demonstrate the situation demonstrating the involvement of company directors in the 
programmed decision-making process. Precisely, this case is selected due to its 
up-to-date and close relevance to the present subject-matter, i.e., programmed 
business decisions (resulted in a substantial impact to the company) made by 
company directors. The example is also used to fill the gap that has been left by 
certain academic writers when explaining the nature of a programmed business 
                                                
786	 See	 Ricky	 W.	 Griffin	 &	 Gregory	 Moorhead,	 Organizational	 Behaviour:	 Managing	 People	 and	
Organizations	(Houghton	Mifflin	Company	2010)	Chapter	8,	192;	see	also	‘Programmed	Decisions	and	
Non-programmed	 Decisions	 Explained’	 <	
https://iedunote.com/programmed-decision-non-programmed-decision>	accessed	2018	
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decision. For instance, the company’s quality control example has been used to 
describe a programmed business decision by Cyert et al, in the absence of such 
description being supported by a real incident.787 I shall therefore, use this case as a 
starting example to give an insight of programmed business decisions.  A number of 
other examples will also be discussed following the first example to achieve a full 
picture of programmed business decisions made by directors.   
In the 2014 Taiwan food scandal incidents, the directors of a number of companies 
who had purchased the non-human consumption oil (to be sold as cooking oil) from 
the manufacturer were accused to have secretly ignored the company’s own internal 
sanitary control and safety procedures. It is believed that the directors had either been 
negligently trusted the raw oil supplier or because the directors had intended to 
achieve cutting down of the company’s food production cost by a satisfactory 
margin.788   
The directors have argued that they had not known nor had they been told by the raw 
materials supplier that those raw materials were of non-human consumption in nature. 
However, from the perspective of this thesis, it can be argued that due to the company 
(as its competitive marketing strategy) had promoted its own specific sanitary 
procedure prior to the food scandal incident; and the possibility of the directors’ 
                                                
787	 Richard	Cyert	et	al	‘Observation	of	A	Business	Decision’	J	Bus	Vol	29,	237,	238	
788	 HSU,	Stacy,	 ‘Hong	Kong	Edible	Oil	 Imports	Halted’	Taipei	Times	(14	September	2014);	 ‘Firm	Sells	
Waste	Oil	as	Cooking	Oil’	The	China	Post	 (6th	September	2014);	See	also	generally,	Chen-Ling	Huang	
‘Who	 Benefits	 from	 Food	 safety	 Incidents?’	 (2014)	 New	 Society	 for	 Taiwan	 <www.taiwansig.tw>	
accessed	2015	 	
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unconstitutional by-passing of the company’s existing internal sanitary control. The 
internal sanitary control and safety system can be said to serve as a standard 
‘benchmark’ where the directors ‘can defend the quality of their business decisions by 
pointing to established protocol’789 and the judges can ’use such protocol or practices 
as objective benchmarks to test the quality of the decisions’.790 In addition, the 
question of creativity has been ruled out within the business decision, as it had been 
strictly based on a predefined internal sanitary system that does not satisfy the 
condition of ‘novelty’ within the Productivity Oriented Measure of Creativity 
Theory.791 Therefore, as discussed in Chapter Two, the legal mechanism operates 
within the concept of judicial or legislated deference based on types of business 
decisions, led to the exclusion of judicial or legislated deference to the directors in 
question. This is so, because the directors were deemed to have made a programmed 
                                                
789	 Melvin	A.	Eisenberg,	‘The	Duty	of	Care	of	Corporate	Directors	and	Officers’	(1990)	51	U	Pitt	L	Rev	
945,	964	
790	 Melvin	A.	Eisenberg,	‘The	Duty	of	Care	of	Corporate	Directors	and	Officers’	(1990)	51	U	Pitt	L	Rev	
945,	964;	See	also	Annete	Greenhow,	‘The	Statutory	Business	Judgment	Rule:	Putting	the	Wind	into	
Directors’	Sails’	(1999)	BondLawRw	Vol	11,	42	for	the	importance	of	relying	on	standard	’benchmark’	
by	 the	 judiciary.	 	 N.B.	 The	 situation	 might	 have	 been	 different	 if	 the	 company	 prior	 to	 the	 food	
scandal	 incident	 announced	 to	 the	 public	 that	 a	 decision	 has	 been	made	 that	 no	 internal	 sanitary	
check	will	be	in	place	and	thus,	a	complete	trust	to	be	placed	on	the	raw	material	suppliers.	In	such	as	
case,	 the	 business	 decision	 will	 not	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 programmed	 business	 decision	 as	 no	
pre-defined	rule	on	which	the	decision	to	remove	the	internal	sanitary	system	was	based.	In	so	far	as	
Non-Programmed	(Creative)	Business	Decision	is	concerned,	(in	the	absence	of	any	pre-existing	legal	
requirement)	such	a	decision	might	be	regarded	as	a	Non-Programmed	(Creative)	Business	Decision	
unless	it	had	not	been	made	by	the	directors	in	good	faith.	 	 	 However,	if	the	quality	control	system	
was	 linked	to	the	 legal	 requirement,	 for	 instance,	 the	Food	and	Safety	 law,	the	directors	would	still	
have	been	bound	by	a	pre-defined	rule	set	by	the	law.	This	links	to	what	I	am	going	to	discuss	at	the	
part	immediately	following	the	present	discussion.	 	 	 	
791	 Teresa	M.	Amabile,	‘A	Model	of	Creativity	and	Innovation	in	Organization’	(1988)	Res	Organ	Behav	
Vol	10,	125,	167;	Robert	T.	Clemen	and	Terence	Reilly,	Making	Hard	Decisions	with	DecisionTools	(3rd	
edn,	 South-Western	 College	 Pub	 2013)	 218;	 See	 also	 Sethi	 et	 al,	 ’Cross-Functional	 Product	
Development	 Teams:	 Creativity,	 and	 the	 Innovativeness	 of	New	Consumer	 Products’	 (2001)	 J	Mark	
Res	Vol	38,	73,	74	 	
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business decision, but they have failed to properly implement their programmed 
business decisions. In other words, it can be argued that if the directors failed to 
implement the company’s predefined food quality controls procedure, such a failure 
would exclude the directors from the protection of judicial or legislated deference. 
This is because the predefined rule represents an essential component of a 
programmed business decision and must be strictly followed.  
In addition, contrary to the standard academic view that programmed decisions bear 
the component of yielding small impact on the company’s business,792 the above 
example indicates that that such a programmed business decision was; and can be 
easily made directly by the companies’ directors. Such type of business decision 
carries a long-term negative impact on the companies’ business, e.g., short-termism to 
achieve cost-saving at the expense of the companies’ long-term business reputation 
that led to the long-term negative impact on the companies’ future business.793 
Other than the straightforward case where the pre-existing policy is internally set by 
the company itself, H.A Simon’s theory of a programmed decision generally refers to 
the decisions that have been pre-programmed or ‘to be made on routine or repeated 
basis’.794 This can also, by implication, refer to the situation where the predefined 
                                                
792	 See	 Ricky	 W.	 Griffin	 &	 Gregory	 Moorhead,	 Organizational	 Behaviour:	 Managing	 People	 and	
Organizations	(South-Western	College	Pub	2010)	192	 	 	
793	 ‘FDA	Releases	 List	 of	 Affected	Companies’	Taipei	 Times	 (6th	 September	 2014):	 	 see	 also	 ‘Sauce	
Maker	Yillin	Group	Recalls	Tainted	Oil	Products’	The	China	Post	(6th	September	2014)	
794	 As	cited	by	Mark	Teale	et	al.	Management	Decision-Making	Towards	an	Integrative	Approach	(1st	
edn,	Financial	Times/Prentice	Hall	2002)	Chapter	6	
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policy that governs the directors’ decision making, has been set out by an external 
source. This can bear a conceptual significance to the present discussion despite the 
question of legality.  Indeed, the following examples used here outline the overlaps 
between the standard of duty of care set by the law and the companies’ internal policy 
set up by the companies in compliance with the law.  
One of the conceptual examples of this would be the predefined and pre-set health 
and safety regulations at workplace.  
The Health and Safety Executive paper published in June 2013 has laid out the 
guideline for company directors to adopt, ensuring health and safety of the company’s 
employees at work. The paper also gives examples explaining the consequence of 
company directors who had failed to effectively follow the pre-determined health and 
safety guideline. For instance, ‘The managing director of a manufacturing company 
with around 100 workers was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for 
manslaughter following the death of an employee who became caught in unguarded 
machinery.’795  
The investigation revealed that, had the company adequately maintained guarding 
around a conveyor, the death would have been avoided. The judge  said that 
                                                
795 	 The	 Health	 and	 Safety	 Executive	 ‘Case	 Studies	 When	 Leadership	 Falls	 Short’	 (2013)	 <	
http://www.hse.gov.uk/leadership/casestudies-failures.htm>	accessed	2015	
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‘whether the managing director was aware of the situation was not the issue; he 
should have known as this was a long-standing problem …’.796   
Another example relating to the health and safety regulations for directors to be found 
negligent for their failure to properly implement a required programmed business 
decision would be matters relating to the removal of or management of asbestos from 
the work place. Thus, placing the company’s employees to the serious health risk 
asbestos related disease such as lung cancer, mesothelioma and asbestosis. Asbestos is 
defined by the Control of Asbestos Regulations 2002 to include the minerals such as 
chrysotile, asbestos tremolite or any mixture of these minerals.     
The following provisions published by the Health and Safety executives re-stress that 
ignorance is not a defense in asbestos issues:  
Recent case law has confirmed that directors cannot avoid a charge of 
neglect … by arranging their organization’s business so as to leave them 
ignorant of circumstances which would trigger their obligation to address health 
and safety breaches.797  
This position corresponds to the health and safety issue discussed above. Both are 
confirming that programmed business decision can often be made directly and 
                                                
796 	 The	 Health	 and	 Safety	 Executive	 ‘Case	 Studies	 When	 Leadership	 Falls	 Short’	 (2013)	 <	
http://www.hse.gov.uk/leadership/casestudies-failures.htm>	accessed	2015	
797	 INDG417(rev	1.)	published	by	the	Health	and	Safety	Executive,	16,	8,	06/13.	See	also,	Control	of	
Asbestos	Regulations	2012.	 	 	 	 	
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indirectly by the directors, rather than being exclusive to lower ranking company 
officers.  
As opposed to Griffin and Moorhead’s argument suggesting that programmed 
business decision yields a small impact on the company,798 the programmed business 
decision relating to asbestos management and removal can yield a significant impact 
on the company. Particularly when the building concerned represents one of the 
properties within the company’s commercial property portfolio in a large scale. 
Therefore, the removal or management of asbestos can be extremely costly to the 
company.799 And any failure of compliance with the relevant Health and Safety 
Regulations can result the company in facing a significant fine from the relevant 
public authority.800   
An immediate example similar to the above health and safety at work regulations and 
the 2014 Taiwanese food scandal case examples, from a programmed business 
decision perspective, would be re Baring plc (No. 5).801 With reference to Daniels v. 
Anderson802 by Jonathan Parker J (a case already discussed in Chapter Two) who held 
                                                
798	 See	 Ricky	 W.	 Griffin	 &	 Gregory	 Moorhead,	 Organizational	 Behaviour:	 Managing	 People	 and	
Organizations	(South-Western	College	Pub	2010)	192	 	
799	 JS	Moskowitz,	Environmental	Liability	and	Real	Property	Transaction:	Law	and	Practice	(John	Wiley	
&	 Sons	 1989)	 27;	 see	 also	 USA	 Today,	 ‘When	 Removing	 Asbestos	 Made	 No	 Sense’	 <	
https://www.nofluoride.com/asbestos.cfm>	accessed	March	2018	
800 	 Health	 and	 Safety	 Executive,	 ‘Penalties’	
<http://www.hse.gov.uk/enforce/enforcementguide/court/sentencing-penalties.htm>	 accessed	
March	2018	
801	 [2000]	BCLC	532	(Ch)	
802 [1995] 16 A.S.C.R. 607, 666 as cited by Reed, ‘Company Directors – Collective or Functional 
Responsibility’ (2006) Com Law 173 
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the company directors negligent due to their failure to implement a programmed 
business decision relating to the matter of the company’s internal control procedure, 
i.e., a breach of director’s functional responsibility relating to supervision over the 
affairs of the company as required by the law. Similarly, the in the Australian ASIC v. 
Rich the judge held that company directors’ duty to monitor the company’s business 
did not constitute business judgment/Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions, 
rather, such a decision was a programmed business decision due to the certainty 
element without the question of a ‘decision to take or not to take’.803  
The final examples of a typical programmed business decision made by directors with 
significant impact on company’s interest can be seen in Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v. 
Stebbing, where the directors of a lending company granted a loan without complying 
with the predefined safety requirements under the Moneylenders Acts and resulted in 
the loan being turned into a bad debt.804    
To sum up, contrary to the academic views of the writers such as Griffin and 
Moorhead, proposing that programmed business decisions are mostly made by lower 
ranking officers, the business decisions in the Taiwanese food scandal cases in 2014; 
the health and safety regulations; re Baring plc (No. 5); and Dorchester Finance Co 
                                                
803	 [2009]	NSWSC	1229	[7278]	as	cited	by	Keay	A	&	Loughrey	J,	‘The	Concept	of	Business	Judgment’	
Legal	 Studies	 1	 <	
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/DFC0700879FEF7FF4B
D7E9A589A211C4/S0261387518000296a.pdf/concept_of_business_judgment.pdf>	 accessed	 5	
January	2019	
804	 [1989]	 BCLC	 498	 (Ch)	 as	 cited	 by	 Charles	 Wild	 and	 Stuard	 Weistein	 in	 Smith	 and	 Keenan’s	
Company	Law,	(15th	edn,	Longman	2011)	409	
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Ltd v. Stebbing mentioned above are all examples of programmed decisions made by 
company directors with substantial impact to the company’s business. These 
examples clearly and conceptually demonstrate that higher level of management in 
the organizations such as board of directors are deemed by the courts to owe a duty of 
care to effectively lead, monitor and make sure that a pre-existing policy of the 
company, government policy or legal requirement are properly implemented.  
Failure to properly implement such programmed business decisions would yield a 
significantly negative impact on company’s business, third parties’ welfare and even 
on directors’ personal assets. 
SUMMARY  
H. A. Simon’s theory of programmed and non-programmed business decision can be 
summarized as follows:  
A Programmed business decision is a business decision that has been 
pre-programmed whereby the decision maker, in the process of making the decision, 
was bound by a predefined rule or policy of which the business decision has to be 
made from within.  This type of business decision, from a legal perspective, 
coincides with company directors’ decisions relating to day to day running of the 
business; and is ruled by an existing policy, e.g., health and safety requirement or the 
constitution of the company - binding the director regarding the way in which the 
business decisions are to be made.  As seen from Chapter Two, programmed 
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business decisions are decisions that do not qualify directors from the protection of 
judicial or legislated deference, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Bowley.805  
A non-programmed business decision is a business decision whereby a decision 
maker in his decision making-process is not bound to follow any predefined rule in 
order to reach the decision. In this way, a non-programmed decision reflects the 
condition of  ‘novelty’ within the definition of creativity.  
The objective of this research is to examine the company law’s deference in the 
context of company directors’ business decisions. Whereby company directors are 
required to make the business decision in the interest of the company. The theory of 
non-programmed business decision itself cannot, however, sufficiently achieve this 
objective as the concept does not strictly require the component of ‘good faith’. To 
overcome this shortage, I have proposed to combine the psychology theory of 
creativity from Chapter Four. The end result is a decision model known as 
Non-programmed (Creative) Business decision, i.e., a type of business decision 
whereby 1. the decision maker is not bound by a predefined rule in his 
decision-making process to reach the decision; and 2. the decision has to be made in 
such a fashion that satisfies the ‘usefulness’ condition within the definition of the 
Product Oriented Approach of Creativity. In other words, a Non-Programmed 
                                                
805	 [2003]	1	Ch	407	(QB)	
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(Creative) Business Decision within the context of company directors’ business 
decision is a decision that has to be made in the interest of the company.   
FURTHER EXPLORATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF TYPES OF 
BUSINESS DECISIONS 
In the above, I have discussed the differences between Non-programmed and 
programmed business decisions with the former being processed based on unique and 
ill-defined information as opposed to well-structured rules relating to the latter.  
In the following part of this chapter, I will point out that H.A. Simon’s strict 
compliance of the distinctions between programmed and non-programmed business 
decisions can be over-simplistic and are based on a number of faulty assumptions. I 
will demonstrate my related thoughts analytically in the following sub-sections: 
EVOLUTIONS OF TYPES OF BUSINESS DECISIONS & SEPARATION OF 
BUSINESS DECISIONS FROM A BUSINESS DECISION 
In this section, I would, at the first stage of my discussion, borrow an existing 
theory of semi-programmed decision coupled with my proposed terminology, i.e., 
‘Evolution of Types of Business Decisions’ to demonstrate the faulty assumptions of 
strict compliance of the models of programmed and non-programmed business 
decisions. Once this is done, the second stage will set in, whereby I will apply my 
own analysis to show that certain types of programmed decisions or 
semi-programmed decisions in business context can be viewed as non-programmed 
business decisions due to certain ‘external’ factors.  
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In reality, many often there can be an overlap between types of business decisions 
with the consequence of having a specific type of decision that ‘evolves’ into another 
type. For instance, take the smartphone scenario quoted in the earlier part of this 
chapter; assuming that a smartphone manufacturer A made a non-programmed 
decision last year to introduce and release the world’s first smartphones. As a result, 
the manufacturer enjoyed a great commercial success over the sale of the products for 
one financial year. 
This year, the directors of the manufacturing company A decide to continue the 
production line and release further smartphones into the same market. At this point, it 
can be argued that the business decision which was originally non-programmed is 
now turning or ‘evolving’ into a programmed business decision due to the loss of its 
uniqueness and innovativeness through its reccurrence. Besides, many of the pre-set 
rules in regards to the implementation of the recurring business decision would, by 
this time, have been established by way of the manual instructions or the computer 
system. This existence of a predefined rule is a typical component of a programmed 
business decision.   
For clarity, please note that it has occurred to me that the above process has 
been ’indirectly recognized’ by H.A. Simon himself as well as other academic writers 
such as Cyert and Throw in the process of stating that a person might not be able to 
use a predefined programme to meet the solution of another problem which is 
non-programmed: 
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If the rule determined when action would switch from one programme steps to 
another were specified, and if the programme steps were described in enough 
detail, it would be possible to replicate the decision process. The programmed 
steps taken together defined in retrospect, then, a programme for an originally 
un-programmed decision. The program would be inefficient one because it 
would contain all the false starts and blind alleys of the original process … 806 
To further elaborate my smartphone business decision scenario presented earlier on, 
by linking to the above statement which concluded that uniqueness (creativity or 
innovation) contain an element of ‘blind alleys of the original process’.807 And 
therefore, the smartphone business decision in question has to be ‘original’ or ‘novel’ 
by way of uniqueness and innovation in order to be taken as a non-programmed 
business decision. This is in line with the definition of Product-Oriented Measure of 
Creativity Theory explored in Chapter Four. Namely, ‘novelty’ plus ‘usefulness’. 
Only when there is a recurrence of the business decision in the same circumstances, 
will it be a programmed business decision.  
To better understand the subject, one has to realized that the recurring smartphone 
business decision (now a programmed business decision) still carries certain 
components of which the business decision ‘inherits’ from its original form, i.e., a 
non-programmed business decision; hence an overlap between the two types of 
                                                
806	 Cyert	et	al,	‘Observation	of	a	Business	Decision’	(1956)	J	BUS	245	
807	 ibid	
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business decisions occurs. As already illustrated in the earlier part of this chapter, the 
non-programmed business decision in this case include:  
- Long-term impact on the company A’s success (to attract more buyers with the aim 
to prevent losing its existing customers); and 
- Such a decision still requires the involvement of a high-level executive judgment 
taken at the board level. 
Despite the overlap, a person at this stage can still be able to identify a ‘pure’ 
non-programmed business decision within a programmed business decision, if say, 
the smartphones being released this year contains a unique and innovative feature. For 
instance, in competing with the competitors’ products, company A’s smartphone is 
now exclusively waterproof and presented with a new smartphone shape style. 
Consequently, the revolutionized in-built waterproof function in the smartphones, as 
well as, new shape style will be a non-programmed decision808  due to the ill-defined 
information on which the company is to undertake the project.  To sum up, the 
decision to continue the production line of the smartphones is a programmed decision, 
as at this stage is it based on an existing production method and business strategy; and 
the additional water-proof and the new shape features to be added to the smartphone 
constitutes a non-programmed business decision.   
                                                
808	 See	 Samsung	 Electronics	 (UK)	 Limited	 v	 Apple	 Inc.	 [2012]	 EWHC	 (Ch)	 on	 the	 shape	 style	 of	
Samsung	smartphone	as	mentioned	in	Chapter	Four	case	studies	number	one.	 	
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As	demonstrated	above,	the	evolution	of	types	of	decisions	or	as	traditionally	known,	
a	 semi-programmed	decision809	 as	described	by	Gupta,	 ‘In	 this	 type	of	decision	at	
least	one	or	more	than	two	of	the	stages	can	be	handled	by	a	well-defined	pre-set	
procedure.’	Similarly,	from	the	legal	perspective,	when	assessing	a	business	decision,	
judges	 would	 take	 the	 approach	 to	 view	 ’the	 decisions	 within	 a	 decision’	
independently	 and	 separately	 to	 enable	 them	 to	 clearly	 identify	 whether	 or	 not	
judicial	 or	 legislated	 deference	 can	 be	 applied.	 For	 instance,	 in	 Iesini	 v.	 Westrip	
Holdings	Ltd810	 where	the	judge	in	deciding	whether	or	not	to	allow	the	continuing	
of	 the	 action,	 identified	 (within	 the	 decision	 to	 continue	 the	 derivative	 claim)	 a	
distinction	 between	 programmed	 decision	 (evaluating	 and	 selecting	 option	 on	
whether	or	not	to	pursue	a	derivative	claim	based	on	success	rate	of	the	case,	the	
legal	cost	plus	 the	amount	of	compensation	to	be	obtained)	and	non-programmed	
decision	 (evaluating	and	selecting	option	on	whether	or	not	 to	pursue	a	derivative	
claim,	in	an	attempt	to	prevent	any	disruption	to	the	Company’s	business)811	 leading	
to	the	conclusion	that	the	court	is	ill-equipped	to	handle	the	latter.	 	
COMPANY DIRECTOR POSSESSING PROFESSIONAL SKILLS  
Following the above discussion, now take a look at the separation of 
programmed business decision from a non-programmed business decision from 
another perspective. A director who makes a business decision through the reliance of 
his professional skill, for instance, a director acting as a property surveyor who 
manage the company through the relevant skills. In this situation, the director will be 
                                                
809	 As	described	by	Hitesh	Gupta,	‘In	this	type	of	decision	at	least	one	or	more	than	two	of	the	stages	
can	be	handled	by	a	well-defined	pre-set	procedure.’	Hitesh	Gupta,	Information	Management	System,	
(International	Book	House	PVT.	Ltd,	2007)	88	
810	 [2009]	EWHC	2526	(Ch)	[80]	
811	 See	paragraph	2.7	above	for	definition	of	a	business	decision.	 	
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deemed to have made a programmed business decision even though such a decision 
forms part of a larger decision that is non-programmed.  
This is so because the business decision is based on the professional expertise of the 
director. And such a professional expertise is governed by a pre-existing code of 
conduct of which the business decision is based upon.  
For instance, in Norman v. Theodore Goddard 812  the court differentiated the 
director’s skills in property management (programmed decision) and duty to seek 
advice from Corporate Trust Lawyers (again, programmed decision) from the overall 
offshore tax advance project involving elements of uncertainty and ill-define 
information to the director (non-programmed decision).  
THE SOCIETY DETERMINES THE TYPES OF BUSINESS DECISIONS 
(COMPANY SHARE RE-PURCHASE SCHEME EXAMPLE) 
Apart from the situations where a non-programmed decision evolves into a 
programmed business decision or an overlap between the two types of business 
decisions, we can also observe another pattern where the types of business decisions 
are actually shaped by ’a form of human freedom (as described in Chapter Four 
regarding Creativity)813 which operates in the same fashion as the condition of 
                                                
812	 [1991]	BCLC	1028	(Ch)	
813	 J.	Maitland,	 	 ‘Creativity’	 (1976)	 J	 Aesthet	 Art	 Crit	 Vol	 34	 No	 4	 397,	 408;	 Kristina	 Jaskyte	 and	
Audrone	 Kisieline,	 ‘Determinants	 of	 Employee	 Creativity:	 A	 Survey	 of	 Lithuanian	 Non-Profit	
Organisations’	(2006)	VOLUNTAS	vol	17	No	2	133,	139;	see	also	T.	Amabile	and	J.	Giltomer,	‘Children’s	
Artistic	 Creativity:	 Effects	 of	 Choice	 in	 Task	 Materials’	 (1984)	 	 Unpublished	 Manuscript,	 Bradies	
University	 (as	 cited	 by	 Beth	 A.	 Hennessey,	 ‘Social,	 Environmental,	 and	 Developmental	 Issues	 and	
Creativity’	(1995)	Edu	Psychol	Rev	Vol	7	No.	2	163,	168)	
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Novelty within the theory of creativity, i.e., novelty is not about literal newness but a 
decision that is free from the governing of any predefined regulations. 
To elaborate this, I now would like to borrow M.A. Boden’s theory that describes the 
society being the factor in determining whether or not a product is unique814 
(or ’non-programmed’ for the purpose of the present discussion).  Let’s say that 
directors of Company have made a business decision to undertake a share re-purchase 
scheme through the open market approach. 
The share re-purchase project will be a non-programmed decision due to its 
uniqueness and innovativeness. Such a view can be taken from the theoretical 
perspective where such a business decision was made to allow the company to adapt 
to any significant change of any ’external’ circumstances, market taste or ’the society’ 
(a term used by M.A. Boden as quoted above). ‘The change of the society’ could refer 
to a change in the economic, commercial, social or scientific condition surrounding 
the share re-purchase project.  
A typical stock operating situation, a predicted temporally decrease of the general 
level of consumer’s spending or a temporally change of consumers’ fashion taste in 
relation to company’s products causing the company’s temporally inability to reinvest 
its retained profit. Thus, led to an undervalue of its own shares. The share buyback 
                                                
814	 See	generally	M.	Boden,	The	Creative	Minds:	Myths	and	Mechanisms	 (2nd	edn,	London	Rutledge	
2003)	 	
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would then be desirable to reduce the outstanding shares in order to ensure an 
increase of the earning per share.  And then, when the directors’ business forecasts 
indicate that the market will shortly correct itself, the re-issuance of those shares will 
eventually lead to an increase of the company’s equity capital.815 These changes of 
the business environment or ’the society’ has shifted the focus on the ‘problem’ on 
which the decision was made to resolve. This effectively renders the share 
re-purchase project ill-defined.  
Using Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity Theory to assess the above, we can see 
that the change of the ’society’ (of which the business project or idea is corresponded 
to) represents the novelty; and provided that the business decision also satisfies the 
condition of ‘usefulness’, the business decision will be classified as a 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision, i.e., a specific type of 
non-programmed business decision that has exclusively been made in the interest of 
the company.  
Indeed, as Amabile has said about the interrelationship between a decision and the 
external factor within the context of Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity that: 
If we take individual ideas or product that can be reliably identified as creative 
by experts, then we can look at … the environmental factors … corresponding 
                                                
815	 For	reasons	associated	with	share	buyback,	see	Shares	Magazine,	 ‘Why	Do	Companies	Buy	Back	
Shares’	 (23rd	 November	 2017)	
<https://www.sharesmagazine.co.uk/article/why-do-companies-buy-back-shares	 >	 accessed	 3rd	May	
2018.	 	 	
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to the production to those ideas or products. Thus, the definition used here is 
based on products (ideas): creativity is the production of novelty and useful 
ideas by an individual or small group of individuals working together.816 
It follows that, it would be correct to say that the condition in determining the element 
of uniqueness and innovation of a business decision can be speculative. It can also be 
correct to say that the condition in determining the element of uniqueness and 
innovation of a business decision can be determined by the external factors. And with 
reference to the above paragraph, a significant change of commercial or social 
environment to which the business decision is corresponded to.  The uniqueness of 
the decision caused by the external factors relating to the business environment 
renders the decision non-programmed. Indeed, the nature of non-programmed 
decisions as described by Venkatachalam and Sellappan is to allow ‘the organization 
to change and adapt to its environment’.817 
This interpretation of non-programmed business decisions is very much in line with 
the legal understanding of business judgment within the operation of judicial 
deference or section 263(3)(b) of the Companies Act 2006. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, business judgment is a non-programmed nature which is not subject to any 
predefined rule (for instance, where the judge in Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb took 
                                                
816	 Teresa	M.	Amabile,	‘A	Model	of	Creativity	and	Innovation	in	Organisation’	(1988)	Res	Organ	Behav	
vol	10,	125-	126	(1988)	
817	 Venkatachalam	and	Sellappan,	Business	Process	(Prentice-Hall	of	India	Pvt.	Ltd	2011)	115	
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into account of the change of the ‘the society’ or the ‘mercantile world’818 when 
describing a non-programmed business decision as a ‘…conduct ... a great deal of 
more speculation … and a great deal more readiness to confide in the probabilities of 
things…’;819 or  Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd820;  and Kleanthous v. Paphitis821 
where the judge in considering section 263(3)(b), expressed a general deferential 
principle on the list of non-exhaustive commercial factors (exclusively emphasizing 
directors’ business decisions that are not subject to any predefined policy) as opposed 
to company director’s functional responsibilities which is of programmed nature, for 
instance, director’s duty of internal control management and corporate oversight as 
shown in the case of re Baring plc and others (No. 5), Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry v. Baker.822  
SUMMARY  
Company directors making business decisions day in and day out, many of the 
decisions by nature cannot be simply categorized into one single type as they are of 
mixed types in nature. As a result, judges have shown the tendency to identify the 
types of business decisions within the embodiment of one decision. For instance, a 
hypothetical director’s decision to continue a legal action against the company under 
sections 263(2)(a) and 263(3)(b) Companies Act 2006 has been broken down by the 
                                                
818	 LR	5	(HL)	480,	495	
819	 ibid	480,	495	
820	 [2009]	BCC	420	(Ch)	[85]	
821	 [2011)	EWHC	2287	(Ch)	[71],	[72]	
822	 [1999]	1	BCLC	433	(Ch)	
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judge into different types of decisions for the purpose of deciding whether or not such 
a decision to continue the action is permissible. In other words, a programmed 
decision which can be assessed by the judge against a predefined rule or calculation, 
such as the amount of financial compensation. And a non-programmed decision of 
which the judge is ill-equipped to assess due to absence of any predefined rule, for 
instance, any disruption to the company’ board of directors’ dynamics as a 
consequence to the continuation of the legal action (Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd;823 
and Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd824).  
Judges in cases such as Dodge v. Ford Motor Vehicle825; and Overene Guerney & Co 
v. Gibb826 have also shown the tendency to appreciate that the element of uncertainty 
or speculation in a ‘mercantile world’827  (that results in the absence of any 
predefined rule) is very broad. Such element of uncertainty or speculation can be 
identified not just the business decision itself, but also by way of external factors such 
as the change of business environment and the consumer’s fashion taste which 
renders a predefined rule obsolete. Thus, turning what was originally a programmed 
business decision into a non-programmed business decision.   
  
                                                
823	 [2009]	BCC	420	(Ch)	
824	 [2010]	CSIH	2	(CSIH)	
825	 [1909]	N.W.	668,	684	
826	 LR	5	(HL)	480,	495	
827	 ibid	
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EXPERIMENTING THE CONCEPT OF PROGRAMMED AND 
NON-PROGRAMMED (CREATIVE) BUSINESS DECISION THROUGH 
ACTUAL LAW CASE STUDIES 
In the above, I have discussed the types of business decisions leading to the 
conclusion of a fusion of non-programmed business decision with Product-Oriented 
Measure of Creativity definition. This is known as Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decisions. In the following, I shall look into the types of business decisions 
and judicial/legislated deference, from a relevant psychology perspective, by way of 
case studies.   
Case studies method is defined by Thomas as follows:  
Case studies are analysis of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, 
policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or 
more methods. The case that is the subject of inquiry will be an instance of a 
class of phenomena that provides an analytical frame – an object- within which 
the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates.’828  
To further elaborate the concept of types of business decisions within the definition of 
the Product Oriented Approach in Creativity,829 and how both of programmed & 
                                                
828	 Thomas	G	(2011)	‘Sonia	is	typing...A	typology	for	the	case	study	in	social	science	following	a	review	
of	 definition,	 discourse	 and	 structure’	Qualitative	 Inquiry	17	(6):	 511–521	 as	 cited	 in	
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_study.	 	
829	 The	proposed	concept	of	Non-programmed	(Creative)	Business	Decisions	consist	the	elements	of	
Product	Oriented	Measure	of	Creativity	and	Non-programmed	Types	of	Decisions,	thus	it	is	necessary	
to	cover	both	in	these	case	studies.	 	 	
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non-programmed types can render judicial or legislated deference inoperable by the 
element of bad faith, I shall use a number of actual law cases.  
Each of these cases is randomly chosen within a population of cases where their 
contextual conditions are of direct relevance to the application of the concept of types 
of business decisions. As the chosen cases are law cases with the relevant outcomes 
being determined by the judges, the writer of this thesis had no control over the 
outcome of these cases. The chosen cases are used to test the concept of types of 
business decisions presented in this thesis. In terms of the direct relevance, first, the 
cases have been selected on the basis that they are of the U.S and the UK cases. 
Together they serve as an analytical framework suitable for the jurisdictional 
background of this thesis. Second, they are chosen with an aim to demonstrate the 
concept from contrasting perspectives. For instance, Franbar Holdings Ltd V. 
Patel; 830  Kleanthous v. Paphitis 831 ; and Bhullar v. Bhullar 832  are respectively 
selected to examine programmed business decisions; Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decisions; and decisions that have not been made in good faith with the 
framework of derivative claims under the Companies Act 2006. Whereas cases such 
as Smith v. Van Gorkom833 and Re. Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation 
(Disney V) 834 are selected to look into the concepts from the perspective of judicial 
                                                
830 [2009] Bus LR D14 (Ch) 
831	 [2011]	EWHC	2287	Ch)	
832	 [2016]	BCC	134	(Ch)	
833 [Del. 1985] 488 A.2d 858 
834 907 A 2d 693 [2005] 
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deference or business judgment rule which, unlike legislated deference, do not operate 
within the statutory framework.   
It should be noted that the case studies exercises are in no way aimed to decide the 
liability of the directors. They are only used to give indications as to how the court 
determined or should determine, from a psychology (and management) perspective, 
the type of business decisions. It should also be noted that the concept of types of 
business decisions based on creativity is a concept with high flexibility. Thus, the 
assessment of the types of business decisions is highly dependent on the facts of each 
case. An appropriate degree of assumptions will be given to demonstrate the 
flexibility of the concept.  
To achieve a better understanding of this research, I shall first summarily recap the 
basics of the proposed concept of a Non-programmed (Creative) Business Decision. 
A Non-programmed (Creative) business decision is based on the three main premises 
(together hereby known as the Rule Number One) as already discussed in the early 
part of this chapter as well as Chapter Four, namely:  
- that the business decision must carry an element of ‘novelty’ or ‘originality’. Such 
element can be derived from a pure originality by its own or a change of the people’s 
perception, i.e., the ’environment’ or ‘society’ that relates to the business decision. In 
other words, there must either be a none- existence of a predefined rules governing 
the way in which the business decision should be made or conducted; or that the 
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relevant predefined rule becomes ill-defined or obsolete as a result of a change of the 
‘business environment’835;  
- that the business decision must be ’useful’ to the company, in other words, the 
business decision must have been made bona fide with an aim to benefit the company. 
Therefore, ’the right and wrong in the quality of the business judgment’836 is not 
relevant.837 This, in effect, renders the principle of immediate shareholders’ profit 
maximization (or to a certain extent, short-termism) laid down by the judge in the 
case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co838 irrelevant839 in deciding whether or not the 
decision constitutes a non-programmed (Creative) Business Decision; and 
- that the directors’ misconduct with reference to gross negligence, bad faith and 
conflict of interests precludes creativity. This condition is in line with the principles 
of both American business judgment rule, as well as, the UK legislated judicial 
deference as discussed in Chapter Two.    
PROGRAMMED BUSINESS DECISIONS CASE STUDIES 
 CASE STUDY 1: FRANBAR HOLDINGS LTD V. PATEL [2009] BUS. L.R. 
D14 (CH) 
                                                
835	 See	 also	 Teresa	M.	 Amabile,	 ‘A	Model	 of	 Creativity	 and	 Innovation	 in	 Organisation’	 (1998)	 Res	
Organ	Behav	Vol.	10,	125-126	
836 As per Lord Wilberforce in the case of Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] UKPC 3 
(PC) 832, the court has ‘no jurisdiction to determine the right and wrong of the quality of a business 
judgment’.  In other words, the court is only to decide if the business decision had been made in good 
faith in the interest of the company; and if the decision is a business judgment or as this thesis puts it – 
a Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision.    
837 Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] UKPC 3 (PC) 832; See Teresa M. Amabile, ‘A 
Model of Creativity and Innovation in Organisation’ (1988) Res organ Behav, Vol 10, 125 – 126  
838	 [Mich	1919]	170	NW	668,	684	 	
839 Shlensky v Wrigley 237 M.E. 2d 776 [lll. App. 1968] 
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Facts: Franbar (the Claimant) had sold over 75% of shares of Medicentres 
(Company M) to Casualty Plus (Respondent 1). In addition, the Claimant had entered 
into a shareholders’ agreement with Respondent 1 allowing each of the parties to sell 
or call the shares of Company M at a price 9 times higher than Company M’s 
earnings. Casualty Plus appointed two directors (the Respondent 2). A derivative 
action brought by the Claimant, the minority shareholder, on behalf of Company M 
against both Respondents 1 and 2.    
An application to continue the action under section 263(2)(a) was refused by the court 
on the ground that Company M was in the course of pursuing its own remedy, i.e., 
under the existing shareholders’ agreement for breach of the covenants by the 
Respondents. Company M would, therefore, incur an additional legal cost should the 
hypothetical director decides to pursue the continuation of the derivative action 
against the respondents (in view of the duty to ‘promote the success of the company’ 
owed by a hypothetical director within the provisions of section 172).    
Comment: the hypothetical director decision to discontinue the derivative action 
against the Respondents constitutes a programmed decision as it was made based on 
the assessment of both of the predefined legal cost and compensation obtainable in the 
derivative action (pursuing in combination with the shareholders’ agreement action) 
against the legal cost and compensation obtainable through the shareholders’ 
agreement action alone. 
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CASE STUDY 2: SMITH V. VAN GORKOM (ALSO KNOWN AS TRANS 
UNION CASE) 488 A.2D 858 [DEL. 1985] 
Facts: there was a leveraged buyout merger of TransUnion proposed by another 
company known as Marmon Group. A leveraged buyout is a mechanism employed to 
take over a company with the funds that are mostly or entirely acquired from debt.840 
During the price negotiation stage with the bidder - Marmon Group, Mr. Van Gorkom 
– the TransUnion chairman and CEO, casually set the company’s proposed price per 
share at a sum of fifty-five dollars without any consultation from an external share 
price expert. 
The proposed share price of Fifty-Five Dollars was subsequently put forward to 
TransUnions’ Board of directors for their approval. However, no relevant information 
regarding the methodology and calculation on how Mr. Van Gorkam arrived at the 
proposed Fifty-Five Dollars figure was asked to be disclosed in the board meeting. In 
addition, the fact that the proposed figure was not agreed by the company’s 
management was completely ignored in the meeting. Without following the usual 
standard based on the required information, the board swiftly approved Mr. Van 
Gorkom’s proposed share price.  
When the case was brought before the court, the judge was highly critical of Mr. Van 
Gorkam’s share price decision. Stating that ’the record is devoid of a competent 
                                                
840	 See	generally,	Burrough	&	Heylar,	Barbarians	at	the	Gate,	New	York:	Harper	and	Row	(Arrow	1990)	
113-116	 	 	
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evidence that fifty-five dollars represented the per share intrinsic value of the 
Company’841 and ruled that both Mr. Van Gorkom and the board of directors liable 
for negligence.   
Comment: When applying the Rule Number One, it is clear that the business 
decision made by Mr. Van Gorkam was a programmed business decision as there was 
no element of novelty or originality that related to the proposed share price figure. In 
other words, there was a predefined rule in the context of the methodology relating to 
the calculation commonly applied to the share price of the company subject to a 
proposed leverage buyout.  
It was also clear that the approval of the board of directors in favour of Mr. Van 
Gorkom’s proposed figure was too, a programmed business decision, as the steps of 
approving the proposed share price had been predefined under the company’s 
constitution. In other words, it was part of the directors’ functional responsibility to 
supervise Mr. Van Gorkam to ensure that the proposed figure had been properly 
reached. 842  These included the requirement of seeking the disclosure of the 
                                                
841	 As	cited	by	David	Kershaw,	Company	Law	 in	Context	–	Text	and	Materials	 (2nd	Edn,	OUP	Oxford	
2012)	 414;	 Also	 as	 cited	 by	 Lynn	 A.	 Stout,	 ’In	 Praise	 of	 Procedure:	 An	 Economic	 and	 Behavioural	
Defense	of	Smith	v.	Van	Gorkam	and	the	Business	Judgment	Rule’	(2002)	96	NW	U	L	REV	675;	and	See	
also	 further	 information	 on	 Smith	 v	 Van	 Gorkom	 488	 A.2d	 858	 [Del.	 1985]	 as	 cited	 by	 Herbert	 S.	
Wander	&	Alain	G.	LeCoque,	‘Boardroom	Jitters:	Corporate	Control	Transactions	and	Today’s	Business	
judgment	Rule’	(1986)	Bus	Law	Vol	42,	64	
842 	 This	 approach	 of	 differentiating	 between	 directors’	 business	 judgment	 and	 functional	
responsibility	with	the	 latter	being	excluded	from	the	protection	of	 judicial	deference	 is	 in	 line	with	
the	British	judicial	approach	in	cases	such	as	Re	Barings	plc	[1999]	BCLC	433	(Ch);	and	Equitable	Life	
Assurance	Society	v	Bowley	[2003]	1	Ch	407	(QB)	as	already	discussed	in	Chapter	Two.	 	
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methodology in arriving the fifty-five dollars per share price, as well as, offering the 
reasons of objecting the proposed price by the company management.   
During the process of the litigation, the court noted that the defendant directors were 
experts of leveraged buyout. This serves as strong evidence that the board was 
accustomed to follow the predefined rule in establishing whether or not the share 
price was reached in accordance with the proper methodology but had failed to do so.   
CASE STUDY 3: RE D’JAN OF LONDON LTD [1994] 1 BCLC 561 (CH)  
Facts: Mr. D’Jan, the director of the company, signed an insurance form 
containing an amendment to the insurance terms on behalf of the company without at 
all reading it. It later transpired that the revised insurance policy had been filed 
mistakenly by the company’s insurance broker because the proposed insurance term 
contained a mistake, i.e., a negative answer was given to the question asking if Mr. 
D’Jan had been a director of any company that had been liquidated. 
The consequence of this error resulted in the insurance company vitiating the 
insurance. Thereby forfeiting the insurance proceeds covering the substantial value of 
the stocks that were later destroyed by the fire at the company’s premises. 
Consequently, an action of negligence was brought against Mr. D’Jan.   
Comment: Irrespective whether or not the insurance form was signed with an 
intention to benefit the company (thus satisfies the second condition of the 
Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity) the director’s act of signing an insurance 
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form was still a programmed business decision as the insurance form would contain a 
warning notice requesting the authorized signatory to read and answer the questions 
carefully to avoid the insurance being vitiated. This warning notice serves as a 
predefined rule to be followed by the director to ensure the validity of the insurance 
policy.  
NON-PROGRAMMED (CREATIVE) BUSINESS DECISION CASE STUDIES  
CASE STUDY 1: KLEANTHOUS V. PAPHITIS [2011] EWHC 2287 (CH) 
Facts: The claimant, a shareholder of the company sought the permission from 
the court under Section 261 of the Companies Act 2006 for the continuation of the 
derivative action against the director. To decide on whether or not to allow the 
derivative action to continue, the court was to decide on whether or not a hypothetical 
director would make a commercial (or non-commercial) decision that the 
discontinuation of the action was in the interest of the company within the provision 
of section 172 Companies Act 2006.843 
The permission to continue the derivative action was refused on the basis that the 
court was diffident to second guess the commercial factors844 proposed by the 
defendant directors. Namely, the company would be adversely affected by the 
                                                
843	 Kleanthous	v.	Paphitis	[2011]	EWHC	2287	(Ch)	[70]	
844	 In	giving	the	judgment,	the	court	concluded	that	the	directors	are	in	better	position	than	the	court	
in	‘assessing	where	the	companies’	commercial	interest	lie’	Kleanthous	v	Paphitis	[2011]	EWHC	2287	
(Ch)	[75].	This	is	very	much	in	line	with	Lewison	J’s	statement	in	Iesini	v	Westrip	Holdings	Ltd	[2009]	
EWHC	2526	(Ch)	[80]	who	refused	to	second	guess	the	commercial	judgment	of	company	directors	on	
the	basis	that	‘the	court	is	ill-equipped	to	take’.	 	
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litigation on the director’s business decisions by way of disruption to the company 
employees’ morale as a whole. This included the morale of the senior management. It 
was also claimed that the decision to continue the derivative claim would result in 1. 
losing company directors which in turn, would damage the company’s future trade 
performance; and 2. damage to the company’s reputation ‘as a result of publicity and 
disclosure arising from the litigation’.845 All these speculations had ‘much force’846 
in judges’ mind with the consequential result in the discontinuing of the derivative 
action. Based on the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court was satisfied that 
these commercial factors had been proposed, in good faith, by the director within 
section 172 Companies Act 2006.  
It should be noted that other than the general commercial factors, the court’s refusal to 
continue the derivative action was also made on the basis of a hypothetical director’s 
programmed decision relating to weighing the size and strength of the claim against 
the benefits to the company in granting the permission; the availability of alternative 
redress; and the directors’ financial ‘contributions’ to be used to compensate the loss.  
These are the matters of programmed decision which was dealt with in Case Study 
One of Programmed Business Decisions of this chapter; and shall be disregarded for 
                                                
845	 Kleanthous	 v	 Paphitis	 [2011]	 EWHC	 2287	 (Ch)	 [71],	 [72]	 &	 [73];	 also	 mentioned	 in	 Kershaw,	
Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	Oxford,	28	Jun.	2012)	613	 	
846	 ibid;	also	as	cited	by	Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	Oxford,	
28	Jun.	2012)	622	
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the purpose of the discussion of Non-programmed (Creative) Business Decision in 
this section. 
Comment: In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary from the claimant847 
(this would mean that the hypothetical director’s business decision to discontinue the 
action was not made with gross negligence. Thus, the principle of a Non-Programmed 
(Creative) Business Decision can now apply), the hypothetical director’s business 
decision (taking into account of the business factors, including the disruption of the 
company’s senior management, the damage to the company’s reputation; and the 
damage to the trade relationship between the company and its customers) in not 
pursuing the continuation of the derivative claim is a Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decision. As 1).  the court admitted that there was no predefined rule that 
enables the court to accurately assess those business factors; and 2). that the 
hypothetical director’s business decision satisfies the condition of ’usefulness’ within 
the definition of the Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity, i.e., the business 
decision was made in good faith with an aim to benefit the company. In other words, 
the business decision ‘would be most likely to promote the success of the company …’ 
within the provisions of s172. This is so because the business factors such as retaining 
the talented directors; keeping the positive image of the company’s reputation; and 
maintaining the proper trade relationship with its customers and creditors are business 
                                                
847	 Kleanthous	v	Paphitis	[2011]	EWHC	2287	(Ch)	[73]	
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factors that cannot be excluded or minimized in the interest of the company and its 
shareholders.  
CASE STUDY 2: RE. WALT DISNEY COMPANY DERIVATIVE LITIGATION 
(DISNEY V) 907 A 2D 693 [2005] 
Facts: Michael Ovitz, a founder of Creative Artists Agency (CAA) and one of 
the most powerful figures in Hollywood, was hired under a five-year contract to serve 
as the president of the Walt Disney Corporation in 1995. Unfortunately, his 
presidency was not a successful one. Thus, the presidency contract between Mr. Ovitz 
and the company was terminated just over one year of Mr. Ovitz’ office.  
Mr. Ovitz soon filed a claim against the company for a severance payment of one 
hundred and thirty million US dollars under the presidency contract package even 
though Mr. Ovitz had only performed his part of the contract for merely one year. It 
should be noted that the severance payment provision was made in favour of Mr. 
Ovitz with the exceptions of gross negligence, fraud or dishonesty. The presidency 
contract was terminated for the reasons not falling within any of these exceptions.   
The company shareholders were not happy about the original deal and brought a 
derivative action against the company’s directors who were responsible for 
incorporating the severance payment provisions into the presidency contract.    
In an attempt to preclude the directors from the protection of business judgment rule, 
the plaintiffs in the case included in their claims relating to both question of lack of 
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good faith, as well as, directors acting grossly negligent in relation to their decisions 
to hire Mr. Ovitz’ through the entitlement of the severance payment.’848  
The court held that the directors were sufficiently informed of the facts when hiring 
Mr. Ovitz. The directors, therefore, were not grossly negligent; and were acting, in 
good faith, in the interest of the company to have the severance payment clause added 
to the director’s contract as an inducement to successfully recruit Mr. Ovtiz as a new 
director. The court held that the decision to enter into the presidency contract with Mr. 
Ovitz constituted a business judgment. Consequently, the directors were protected by 
the business judgment rule of which the court was ill-equipped to second guess.849  
Comment: it would not have been difficult to decide whether or not such a business 
decision was a Non-programmed (Creative) Business Decision (even though the 
contract resulted in the company in losing over one hundred and thirty million US 
dollars) if, for instance,  Mr. Ovitz had brought with him a new commercial 
technology and had assigned the same over to the company as a consideration in 
exchange of the presidency contract. The new technology would have benefited the 
company despite the severance payment.  
                                                
848	 Derivative	Litig.	Disney	V	 [2005]	907	A.2d	at	749	as	cited	by	Andrew	S.	Gold,	A	Decision	Theory	
Approach	to	the	Business	Judgment	Rule:	A	Reflection	on	Disney,	Good	Faith,	and	Judicial	Uncertainty’	
(2007)	Md	L	Rev,	vol	22,	398	,	406;	See	also	generally	William	A.	Klein,	Business	Associations	(8th	edn,	
Foundation	Press	2012)	368	 	
849	 [2005]	907	A	2d	693,	747	and	760	
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In reality, the usefulness for hiring Mr. Ovitz (at the expense of the  high salary 
package and the risk of incurring the substantial severance payment) was derived 
mainly from a desirable demand for his powerful connection within Hollywood which 
offered the company a greater opportunity in the business of the film making 
industries. As Irwin Russell, one of the company’s director subsequently commented 
that ‘Ovitz was an exceptional corporate executive… who merited “downside 
protection” and “upside opportunity”’.850 In other words, in an attempt to gain Mr. 
Ovitz’s business brilliance, the severance payment provision as a ‘’downside 
protection’’ was a business judgment exercised by the directors, in good faith, as an 
appropriate independent organ of the company.  
Other than the business brilliance of Mr. Ovitz, the condition of ‘usefulness’ of this 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision could be established, from another 
perspective, i.e., by the fact that the severance payment was used as a ‘downside 
protection’ with an aim to persuade Mr. Ovitz to give up his Fifty-Five percent shares 
in his old company – CAA, thereby, ensuring his business loyalty to Walt Disney.851    
The novelty of the business decision can be traced from the inclusion of the severance 
payment provision into the directorship contract as an incentive or enticement to 
achieve the recruitment of Mr. Ovitz. As there was no any predefined rule governing 
                                                
850	 Derivative	 Litig.	 (Disney	V)	 [2005]	 907	A.2d	27	 at	 36-37	 as	 cited	by	Andrew	S.	Gold	 ‘A	Decision	
Theory	 Approach	 to	 the	 Business	 Judgment	 Rule:	 A	 Reflection	 on	 Disney,	 Good	 Faith,	 and	 Judicial	
Uncertainty’	(2007)	Md	L	Rev	Vol	22,	398,	473	 	
851	 [2005]	907	A	2d	693,	702	and	703	
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the way in which the provisions of the presidency contract had to be negotiated and 
drafted. Much was depending on the bargaining powers of the parties and how they 
achieved a common goal by ‘solution design’. In other words, the severance payment 
provisions were ‘designed’ as an extraordinary clause to entice Mr. Ovitz who had 
originally refused to relinquish his fifty-five percent shares in his old company.852 
With the two conditions of ‘usefulness’ and ‘novelty’ being satisfied, the act of hiring 
Mr. Ovitz through the presidency contract containing the severance payment clause 
was a business judgment in the eyes of the court;853  and from a psychology 
perspective – a Non-programmed (Creative) Business Decision.  
CASE STUDY 3: SHLENSKY V. WRIGLEY 237 M.E. 2D 776 [III. APP. 1968] 
Facts: Between 1961-1965, the director of a baseball club known as Chicago 
Cubs consistently refused to install field lights which prevented the night baseball 
games to be played at Wrigley Field. The plaintiff shareholder of Chicago Cubs was 
not happy with the director’s business decision, brought a derivative action against the 
director for negligent mismanagement of the company’s business.  
The plaintiff shareholder alleged that night baseball was not a new activity as it had 
been played by twenty major league teams since 1935. And that it had been a 
continuous practice for the purpose of maximizing the company’s revenue and 
income.  
                                                
852	 ibid	
853	 ibid	
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The plaintiff also claimed that the company had suffered a financial loss due to the 
continuing absence of the night baseball games in Wrigley Field.  
During the process of the litigation, the plaintiff, in addition to the above allegations, 
accused the director of acting in bad faith against the company. This was an attempt 
to ensure that the director was to be precluded from the protection of the business 
judgment rule (thus the relevant principles of good faith laid down in cases such as 
Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co.854; and Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe 
Line Co.855 were consulted by the judge). The director was subsequently cleared from 
this accusation 856 ; and the director’s business decision constituted a business 
judgment of which the court considered itself to be ill-equipped to interfere with.857 
Comment: This is a Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision subject to the 
change of environment or ‘society’858 for the following reasons: 
- the business decision on refusing to play night baseball games by way of the refusal 
on the field light installation was tantamount to an element of ’novelty’ as there was 
no predefined rule as to how night baseball games were to be excluded (the assertion 
was not about whether or not the director had been in compliance with the standard 
                                                
854	 142	A	654,	659	[Del.	Ch.	1928]	as	cited	by	Mr.	Justice	Sullivan	in	Shlensky	v.	Wrigley	95	APP	2d	173,	
178	[III.	App.	1968]	
855	 41	F	Supp	334,	339	[1941]	as	cited	by	Mr.	Justice	Sullivan	 in	Shlensky	v.	Wrigley	95	APP	2d	173,	
179	[III.	App.	1968]	
856	 [1968]	95	APP	2d	173,	180	
857	 [1968]	95	APP	2d	173,	183	 	
858	 As	discussed	in	Paragraph	5.12	above	-	A	term	used	by	M.	Boden,	The	Creative	Minds:	Myths	and	
Mechanisms	(2nd	edn,	London	Rutledge	2003)	 	
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procedure of installing the night light. Rather, it was about the director using the 
absence of the night light to exclude night games). Also, the exclusion of night 
baseball games was, in that particular era or ’environment’, a new business approach 
as night baseball games were a common practice amongst the U.S baseball clubs 
since 1935;  
- the business decision was a business decision that satisfied the second condition, 
i.e., ’usefulness’ as the director made the decision in good faith with an intention to 
genuinely benefit the company for the following reasons:  
a. preservation of the company’s reputation: due to the peculiar location of the 
baseball field, i.e., the baseball filed was at a highly populated residential area where 
the neighbourhood was extremely vulnerable to loud noises and disturbances. It wasin 
the best interest of the company’s reputation to avoid having the night baseball 
games;859  
b. avoidance of unnecessary cost: the neighborhood’s objection to the local 
government’s planning permission for the proposed night baseball games would, in 
any way, have prevented the night games project from going ahead. The chance of 
success on the local residents’ objection could be further enhanced on the ground that 
their properties value would have been depreciated by the introduction of the night 
baseball games. Consequently, the company would have suffered from a considerable 
                                                
859	 [1968]	95	APP	2d	173,	181	
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financial loss from an attempt to acquire the relevant planning permission; money 
spent on the equipment and advertising for the night games860; and 
c. the value of the company’s real estate, including the baseball field at Wrigley Field, 
could also have been substantially and adversely affected as a result of the proposed 
night baseball games.861  
It is interesting to note that the plaintiffs’ allegation of bad faith on the part of the 
director was further weakened by the fact that during the litigation, the judge found no 
evidence whatsoever to support the plaintiff’s claim, i.e., that night baseball games 
played by other baseball teams had any connection with the increase of their 
profits.862 On the other end of the spectrum, the strength of the above ‘benefits 
argument’ to the company was enhanced by this lack of evidence in support of the 
argument that nigh baseball games led to great company revenue.  
CASE STUDY 4: HILDRON FINANCE LIMITED V. SUNLEY HOLDINGS 
LIMITED [2010] EWHC 1681 (CH) 
Facts: In 1986, the directors of the seller company sold a large block of flats 
and in the contract of sale, there was a provision for the overage payment which 
provided that a share fifty percent proceeds of sale to be paid to the seller company 
upon the subsequent sale of the porter’s flat. The trigger event of the overage payment 
was based on the two conditions being satisfied: 1. when the porter’s flat was no 
                                                
860	 ibid	
861	 ibid	 	
862	 ibid	173,	182	
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longer required to accommodate a resident porter; and 2. that the flats was sold in an 
open market.   
The Leasehold Reform Housing and Urban development Act 1993 came into force 
after the sale. The Act allowed the tenants of the flats to acquire the flats by way of 
collective enfranchisement rights. When the porter’s flat ceased to be occupied by the 
resident porter, the tenants exercised their right under the new law which prevented 
the seller company from selling the flats in the open market. Thereby rendered the 
overage provisions void.  The freehold of the porter’s flat was transferred to the 
tenants at a price of twenty thousand pounds, one third lower than that of the price 
that could have been obtainable in the open market; but fifty percent higher than the 
original price when the flat was sold in 1986.  
The judge ruled the parties in the original property disposal was not in a position to be 
able to predict the enactment of the 1993 Act.863 Therefore, there was no element of 
bad faith on the part of the director of the selling company.    
Comment: This is similar to the Disney case in Case Study No. Two as both cases are 
concerned with contracts secured by the company directors. The seller company’s 
directors could have been liable for negligence for restricting their company’s overage 
in the open market sale, thereby frustrated the overage under the 1993 Act. However, 
the directors should be insulated from negligence liability. This is because director’s 
                                                
863	 	 [2010]	EWHC	1681	(Ch)	37	
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business decision on the overage provisions in the original sale contract was a 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision on the grounds that 1. that the novelty 
of the business decision has been satisfied as there was no predefined rule governing 
how the overage mechanism was to be formulated. Despite the fact that the director of 
the seller company decided to maximize the sale proceeds by way of an overage, at a 
potential risk of non-payment over the seeking for a higher sale price at the outset, it 
was a matter of business and investment negotiation between the parties. The law that 
came into force after the sale,  was an event that the parties had no chance to predict 
when the overage agreement was entered into; and 2. that the business decision has 
satisfied the requirement of ’usefulness’ as the overage agreement was constructed to 
allow the seller company to acquire a share of an increase value of the property that 
was aimed to be realized after the sale of the property.864   
This is a perfect case where it can be demonstrated that the director’s bona fide 
business decision made with an aim to benefit the company from the growth of the 
property’s value overtime establishes a Non-Programmed (Creative) Business 
Decision. This is so, even though the end result led to the frustration of the overage 
covenant and that no profit was made whatsoever by the company.  
                                                
864	 See	 Practical	 Law	 Company	 (online	 database)	 for	 overage	 payment	 in	 general	 including	 its	
definition	<http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-200-2514>	last	access	2018	
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CASE STUDIES ON BUSINESS DECISIONS INVOLVING CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST AND BAD FAITH 
CASE STUDY 1: ZAVAHIR V. SHANKLEMAN [2017] BCC 500 (CH) 
Facts: The Company  was set up by the occupants of the four flats for the 
purpose of acquiring and managing the freehold of the block of flats within with the 
four flats comprising.   
All the directors and shareholders knew, for a fact, that the company did not have any 
profit available for distribution. However, one of the directors went ahead and granted 
a long-term lease extension to the shareholder for an undervalue price. Thus, resulted 
in the reduction of the company’s value. The claimant (a director and shareholder of 
the company) sought permission to bring a derivative claim against another director 
and shareholders on the ground that the long lease extension constituted an 
undervalue transaction which in effect constituted a breach of s830(1) of Companies 
Act 2006, ‘A company may only make a distribution out of profits available …’ 
The court considered that the claimant had presented more than a prima facie case. 
However, the claimant was not able to satisfy the second stage of the claim, i.e., the 
claim was not a claim of which a hypothetical director would seek to continue in the 
interest of the company under section 172.  
This decision was made based on reason that the claim failed to satisfy the assessment 
of the overall cost due to the company not having the conduct of the business. In other 
words, even if the company won the case, it would not be able to recover the legal 
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cost involved in the case. In addition, the defendants have argued that the claimant 
director was not acting in good faith as the claimant, was seen by the court, to have 
treated the company as nothing but ’a nominee owner of the freehold’.   
Comment: whilst the court in this case did not find it necessary to determine the good 
faith element. It did recognize that the hypothetical director seeking to discontinue the 
derivative action would be required to act in good faith as it was a requirement under 
section263(2)(a) taking into account of a hypothetical director acting in accordance 
with section 172. To this, the judge  said, ‘I have not found it necessary to reach any 
conclusion on the good faith or otherwise on any of the parties to this action …’865 
implying that even if the hypothetical director’s decision to continue constituted an 
apparent Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision, the court would still reject 
the request to continue the claim if it became  necessary for the court to reject on the 
basis of bad faith.    
CASE STUDY 2: BHULLAR V. BHULLAR [2016] BCC 134 (CH)  
Facts and Comment: The above view was in line with the decision in Bullar v. 
Bhullar where the transfer of the funds (made by the defendant director) into the 
company T, a company owned by the defendant director, was deemed to be an act of 
dishonesty. As the transfer was done without the prior authority of the other directors 
of the claimant company. A director must act in good faith, would be likely to 
                                                
865	 Zavahir	v	Shankleman	[2017]	BCC	500	(Ch)	[41]	
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promote the success of the company, to discontinue the derivative claim.866 As the 
defendant director accepted that the transfer of the funds to company T was an act of 
bad faith,867 the permission to continue the action was granted. Looking from the 
defendant director’s perspective, the decision to transfer the funds was not a 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision as the condition of usefulness could 
not be satisfied in any event due to lack of good faith.  
Interestingly, the court took the view, from the perspective of the claimant, in regard 
to a separate claim on an indemnity for costs (of which the claimant would not be 
entitled) and ruled that the claim was not made in good faith. This led to application 
for the n  permission to continue the claim refused.  To look at the issue from the 
other end of the spectrum, it could be said that the hypothetical director was acting in 
good faith and in the interest of the company, to discontinue the claim on the basis 
that the claimant was not entitle to the benefit of the pre-emptive indemnity.  
CASE STUDY 3: DODGE V. FORD MOTOR CO 170 NW 668 [MICH 1919]868  
Facts: Henry Ford - the company director of Ford car manufacturing company 
decided to re-invest the company profits into developing a number of plants and 
machinery in anticipation of an increase car sale in the future. This business decision 
was made at the expense of withholding dividends from the shareholders.   
                                                
866 Section 172 Companies Act 2006; see also Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel [2009] 1 BCLC 1, 11 
867	 The	defendant	director	 in	this	case	tried	to	rely	on	the	statutory	 limitation	as	a	defense	 instead	
Bhullar	v.	Bhullar	[2016]	BCC	134	(Ch)	[27]	 	
868	 See	also	Bus	Law	(1985)	Vol	40,	1437,	1440	
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The company shareholders were not happy with the director’s business decision, 
brought an action against the director. During the ruling, the judge commented that it 
was not within the capability of the judge to conclude whether or not the director’s 
forecast of a massive increase of the company sale in the near future was accurate.869 
However, it later turned out that the director’s forecast was correct and that the 
additional plant and machinery were indeed the correct business move to meet a rise 
in the number of cars within the company’s production-line as a result of an increase 
in the consumers’ demand. 
Unfortunately, the court ruled the Henry Ford’s business decision unlawful on the 
ground that it was made with an intention to benefit the general public rather the 
company itself.  
Comment: the above business decision of the director would first appear to be a 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Decision as it has apparently satisfied the two basic 
conditions for creativity, namely, novelty and usefulness.  
The decision was of novelty, as there was no predefined rule internally or externally 
of the company governing the re-investment decision and the directors’ business 
                                                
869	 (Mich.	1919)	170	N	W	668,	684	as	cited	by	Robert	Hamilton,	Corporations	 including	Partnership	
and	Limited	Partnership,	Cases	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	West	Academic	Press	1981)	816	
 367 
forecast. The judge admitted during the process of the litigation that ‘… the ultimate 
result of the larger business cannot be certainly estimated.’870 
In theory, the decision would be deemed to be ’useful’ to the company, not just it 
subsequently turned out to be profitable to the company as a result of the accurate 
forecast of the director, i.e., an increase of the consumers’ demand for the cars; but 
even if the director’s forecast turned out to be inaccurate, the company could still 
benefit from the director’s re-investment decision through the acquisition of the plant 
and machinery. For instance, those assets could be use for 1. the development of new 
technology for expected competition whilst the old factories could be used to 
maintain the continuous car productions; 2. they could be turned into the company’s 
potentially profitable, new business venture, such as Ford’s mechanics factories; 3. 
the properties could be leased to a third party whereby the company obtains the 
profits by way of the rents and when the property market went up, they could be sold 
at a better value; 4. if the company owned the properties by way of leases, the 
company could, as a good practice of commercial property, assign the leases to a third 
party for profits; 5. a mixture of a business plan involving all of the above; or 6. the 
business expansion signified the economic outlook of the market sentiment with the 
potential effect to significantly boost up the company’s share prices. This in turn 
benefited the shareholders in a greater deal than a mere  single distribution of 
                                                
870	 Per	 Ostrander	 C	 J	 as	 cited	 by	 Robert	 Hamilton,	 Corporations	 including	 Partnership	 and	 Limited	
Partnership,	Cases	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	West	Academic	Press	1981)	816	
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dividends. ‘A company’s share price tends to reflect not so much what it has achieved 
in the past but whether or not it is expected to grow earnings and profits in the 
future.’871    
The ‘usefulness’ of Mr. Ford’s proposed investment was implied by the judge whose 
view was, to a certain extent, in line with the above, ’It is recognized that the plan 
must often be made for a long future, for expected competition …’872 
This case example when being taken within the context of creativity demonstrates that 
the issue of immediate profitability of a decision for the company is immaterial as far 
as the term ‘usefulness’ is concerned. This is because the decision can be useful to the 
company in an immediate non-profitable fashion, for instance, it is useful to achieve 
the company’s growth as a long-term plan.   
However, the court’s final ruling was that Mr. Ford’s business decision was unlawful 
as’ … the powers of the directors are to be employed … for the profit of the 
stockholders …’873 rather than, ’to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders 
                                                
871 	 See	 online	 article	 –	 What	 Impacts	 Share	 Prices?	
<https://www.mywealth.commbank.com.au/learn/choosing-investments/what-impacts-share-prices-
>	accessed	2018	
872	 Dodge	v.	Ford	Motor	Co	170	NW	668,	684	[Mich.	1919]	as	cited	by	Robert	Hamilton,	Corporations	
including	 Partnership	 and	 Limited	 Partnership,	 Cases	 and	Materials	 (2nd	 Edn,	West	 Academic	 Press	
1981)	816	 	
873	 ibid	as	cited	by	Lynn	A.	Stout,	’Why	We	Should	Stop	Teaching	Dodge	v.	Ford’	Va	L	&	Bus	Rev	Vol	3,	
164,	171	 	 	
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in order to devote them to other purposes…’874 (N.B. with reference to ‘benefiting 
the public’). 
This is a classic scenario where the conditions of novelty and usefulness are 
apparently present within the decision-making process of the director. But the absence 
of good faith renders the condition of ’usefulness’ unsatisfied.  
CASE STUDY 4: NORLIN CORP. V. ROONEY, PACE INC. [1984] 744 F.2D 
255  
Facts: Norlin Corporation – the largest manufacturer of music instruments in 
the United State during the 1980s, became a target for hostile company takeover bid 
launched by the Rooney, Pace Group in partnership with Piezo Electronics.875  
After failing to obtain a temporary restraining order from the court preventing Rooney, 
Pace and Piezo Electronics to continue the purchase of Norlin shares, the directors of 
Norlin sought to dilute the hostile bidder’s percentage of their Norlin shares as a 
measure to frustrate the proposed takeover.876  
On February 13, 1984, the Wall Street Journal announced that Rooney, Pace 
and Piezo Electronics had raised their stake of Norlin common shares to 47.6 
                                                
874	 ibid	as	cited	by	Lynn	A.	Stout,	‘Why	we	should	stop	teaching	Dodge	v.	Ford’	Va	L	&	Bus	Rev	Vol	3,	
164,	171	 	 	
875	 ‘Incompetence,	Inc’	Forbes	(1	Dec,	1986)	40-51	as	cited	by	John	F.	Uggen,	‘The	Day	the	Music	Died:	
Rooney,	 Pace	 and	 the	 Hostile	 Takeover	 of	 the	 Norlin	 Corporation’	 TheBHC	 (2010)	 <	
https://thebhc.org/sites/default/files/uggen.pdf>	accessed	2018	 	
876	 Richard	D.	Truedell	JR,	‘Does	Norlin	Corp.	v.	Rooney,	Pace	Inc.	Preserve	for	Shareholders	Control	
of	a	Corporation’s	“Ultimate	Destiny?”’	(1986)	20	Colum	J	L	&	Soc	Probs	325,	327;	and	John	F.	Uggen,	
‘The	Day	the	Music	Died:	Rooney,	Pace	and	the	Hostile	Takeover	of	the	Norlin	Corporation’	TheBHC	
(2010)	<	https://thebhc.org/sites/default/files/uggen.pdf>	accessed	2018	 	
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percent. Norlin management argued, however, that the hostile stake represented 
only 42.3 percent after the issuance of the nearly one million new shares.877 On 
March 16th the New York Stock Exchange delisted Norlin, charging that a 
change in control had taken place ‘without prior notification to shareholders, 
and that the issuance of the new preference shares violated the exchange’s 
listing criteria for public ownership of stock.’878   
The case subsequently went to the court against the director of Norlin for the violation 
of the exchange listing criteria by unlawful issuance of the company shares without 
prior notification to the shareholders.  The increase share capital was subsequently 
held by the court to be unlawful.  
Comment: the directors’ business decision to increase the number of shares as a 
method of preventing the hostile takeover could not be a Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decision even if the first two criteria of the types of the decision could be 
satisfied; This is due to the fact that ’the directors offered no rationale to shareholders 
other than its determination, to oppose, at all costs, the threat to the company that 
Piezo’s acquisitions ostensibly represented.’879 The business decision was clearly a 
                                                
877	 ‘Norlin	Hostile	Holders	Stake	Rises	 to	47.6%’	 (1985)	WSJ	B1	as	cited	by	 John	F.	Uggen,	 ‘The	Day	
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matter of conflict of interest with the directors not having the intention to act in the 
best interest of the company880 – the element (conflict of interest) that defeats 
business creativity; the element also renders the  law relating to liability for 
negligence inoperable.  
The business judgment rule ’did not allow activities that were nothing more than a 
tool of management self-perpetuation.’881 
This ruling bears a striking resemblance to the UK law whereby directors can be held 
criminally liable for their improper use of the power to allot shares. For instance, in 
Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd, where the company was under the threat 
of the takeover bid. The company directors increased share capital with an attempt to 
defeat the proposed takeover through a dilution of the bidders’ existing share capital. 
Thus, reducing the bidders into minority shareholders. This share allotment was not 
deemed to be exercised in good faith for the benefit of the company882 as the 
allotment that had been undertaken by the directors was not in connection within their 
management power. Rather, it was a misuse of the directors’ power to allot shares to 
simply defeat the proposed takeover. Consequently, the allotment of shares was held 
invalid.   
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CASE STUDY 5: LEXI HOLDINGS PLC V LUQMAN AND OTHERS [2007] 
EWCA 2652 (CH) 
Facts: The company has gone into insolvency proceedings, and it transpired 
that the managing director had misappropriated over fifty-nine million pounds from 
the company’s bank loan. The administrator obtained the court judgment to recover 
approximately forty million pounds from the other two directors who were not 
directly involved in the bank loan misappropriation, on the grounds that the two 
directors who happened to be the sisters of the managing director, had the knowledge 
that their brother had served two terms of imprisonment for deception. And added on 
top with the facts that the two directors should have known the misappropriation from 
the company bank account but turned a blind eye to the misappropriation through 
their deliberate failure to inform the company auditor and other directors of the 
facts.883  
Comments: Unlike the previous two cases, this is the case where the decisions of the 
directors fail to constitute a Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision both on 
the relevant conditions, as well as, the interference of bad faith.  
The two directors’ business decisions could constitute conflict of interest due to the 
managing director being their brother. Their business decisions constitute dishonesty 
                                                
883	 See	Mayson,	 French	 and	 Ryan	 on	 Company	 Law,	 (34th	 edn,	OUP	Oxford	 2017	 -	 2018)	 497;	 and	
Online	 Article	 by	 Ed	Weeks,	 ‘Rubber	 Stamping	 by	 Directors	 Can	 Lead	 to	 Liability	 –	 Lexi	 Holdings	 v	
Luqman’	
https://www.cripps.co.uk/rubber-stamping-by-directors-can-lead-to-liability-lexi-holdings-v-luqman-2
/	accessed	2018	
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and bad faith against the company due to deliberate breach of duty to attend to the 
company’s affair at the detriment of the company.884 In view of the element of bad 
faith, it is immaterial to determine the type of business decisions made by the sisters 
in this case. The inaction of the sisters constitutes breach of the directors’ duty to 
supervise as part of their functional responsibility. Thus, breach of the process of 
making proper programmed business decisions. In any event, the concept of 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision is inoperable.    
THE AGENCY COSTS AND THE STRATEGIES  
The above section, I have discussed the types of business decisions from a 
psychology perspective. I then adopted the case studies to demonstrate how each of 
these types of decisions fit into the case law scenarios, leading to the examination of 
the judicial or legislated deference from a psychology perspective.  
In Chapter Three, I discussed the agency costs885 and the difference of its effects as 
an enforcement of bounded rationality on both company directors and judges. Led to 
the conclusion that judges are more boundedly rational than directors due to the 
judicial constraints that led to a greater degree of incentive for agency costs. In the 
                                                
884 Lexi Holdings PLC v Luqman and Others [2007] EWCA 2652 (Ch) [38]  
885	 Kraakman	 et	 al	 described	 the	 agency	 costs	 as,	 ‘…because	 the	 agent	 commonly	 has	 better	
information	 than	 does	 the	 principal	 about	 the	 relevant	 facts,	 the	 principal	 cannot	 easily	 assure	
himself	 that	 the	agent’s	performance	 is	precisely	what	was	promised.	As	a	consequence,	 the	agent	
has	an	incentive	to	act	opportunistically,	skimping	on	the	quality	of	his	performance,	or	even	diverting	
himself	some	of	what	was	promised	to	the	principal.’	Kraakman	et	al,	The	Anatomy	of	Corporate	Law	
–	A	Comparative	and	Functional	Approach,	(3rd	edn,	OUP	Oxford,	2017)	27	
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following section, I will revisit the issue of the agency costs, I will discuss the 
strategies companies have used to reduce directors’ agency costs. The section will 
demonstrate, whilst directors can be subject to agency problems, their behaviour can, 
unlike judges, be controlled by a number of strategies. Whilst judicial or legislated 
deference promotes the intrinsic motivation in directors’ business creativity, there are, 
at the same time, strategies (non-litigation in nature) that can be adopted to minimize 
agency costs. In turn, these strategies ensure that company directors’ business 
decisions (irrespective the types) are made in good faith and in the interest of the 
company. As mentioned in Chapter Four and the following of this chapter, these 
strategies, from a psychology perspective, do not serve as a controlling extrinsic 
motivation that hinders directors’ business creativity due to the ‘no choice’ condition. 
This is different to derivative suits (in the absence of judicial or legislated deference). 
The strategies that have been commonly used by shareholders/companies against 
directors’ agency costs are as follows:  
RIGHT TO SELL OUT (TRANSFER) & RE-ELECTION OF THE BOARD  
It has been argued that company shareholders under normal circumstances entered 
into contractual relationship with directors on voluntary basis with an option to 
choose the deal. As correctly pointed out by Irvine that, ‘No one forces an investor to 
buy stock and thereby participate in corporate democracy’.886 This can be evidenced 
                                                
886	 William	Irvine,	‘Corporate	Democracy	and	Rights	of	Shareholders’	(Jan,	1988)	J	Bu	Ethics	Vol	7,	99	
107	 	
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by Section 112(1) and (2) of the Companies Act 2006 which provides that an 
individual can only become a member of a company if his or her name is registered as 
a shareholder and that he or she had consented the name to be registered. 
Shareholders are also the persons who elected the board.887  
Shareholders who disapprove the directors, could therefore, either do a shares 
sell-out888 – ’In the absence of restrictions in the articles the shareholder has by virtue 
of the statute to transfer his shares without the consent of anybody to any transferee.’ 
- Re Discovery Finance Corporation Ltd, Lindlar’s Case.889 Kraakaman et al have 
argued that an unrestricted right of transfer of shares890 can be an efficient tool to 
discipline directors as the right of transfer ‘allow hostile takeovers in which the 
disaggregated shareholders of a mismanagement company can sell their shares to a 
single active shareholder with a strong financial interest in efficient management.’891 
                                                
887	 Ralph	A.	Peeples,	 ‘The	Use	and	Misuse	of	 the	Business	 Judgment	Rule	 in	 the	Close	Corporation’	
(1984-85)	60	Notre	Dame	L	Rev	487;	and	H.	Henn	&	J.	Alexander,	‘Law	of	Corporations’	661-663	(3rd	
edn,	1983)	both	cited	by	Frankiln	A.	Gevurtz,	Corporation	Law,	 (2nd	edn,	West	Academic	2010)	293;	
See	also	Mayson,	French	&	Ryan,	Mayson	French	and	Ryan	on	Company	Law	(34th	edn,	OUP	Oxford,	
2017-2018)	434-425	 	 	
888	 Also	 known	 as	 shareholders’	 ‘right	 of	 transfer’	 as	 descried	 by	 Kraakman	 et	 al,	 The	 Anatomy	 of	
Corporate	Law	–	A	Comparative	and	Functional	Approach,	(3rd	edn,	OUP	Oxford,	2017)	33-34;	under	
Directive	 2001/34/EC,	 art	 46(1);	 and	 LR	 2.2.4R(1)	 shares	 of	 listed	 companies	 are	 normally	 freely	
transferable;	 the	 right	 of	 transfer	 of	 shares	 (governed	 by	 the	 company’s	 articles)	 is	 also	 stated	 in	
section	544(1)	Companies	Act	2006.	 	
889	 [1910]	1	CH	312	 (Ch)	316.	Also	as	 cited	by	Mayson,	 French	&	Ryan,	Mayson,	 French	&	Ryan	on	
Company	Law	(34th	edn,	OUP	Oxford	2017-2018);	See	also	Susan	Mcluaghlin,	Unlocking	Company	Law	
(5th	edn,	Routledge	2015)	434	 	
890	 It	should	be	noted	that	the	right	of	transfer	in	a	private	company,	as	per	the	company’s	article	of	
association,	most	likely	need	a	prior	approval	of	the	directors	who	have	the	right	to	refuse	to	register	
the	transfer	of	shares.	 	
891	 Kraakman	et	 al,	The	Anatomy	of	 Corporate	 Law	–	A	Comparative	and	 Functional	Approach,	 (3rd	
edn,	OUP	Oxford,	2017)	34	
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This, in turn, pose a threat of having the existing directors being replaced with another 
group of directors. 
Apart from being an effective tool for disciplining management, Dow and Gorton 
have pointed out that shareholders’ right of transfer of their shares can also be used as 
an indication or standard to assess management performances through share prices.892 
‘… by increasing transparency for existing investors and potential bidders about 
whether the company is underperforming under its current management team.’893  
Now, this ties in with the so called ‘Comply & Explain approach’ as set out in in UK 
Corporate Governance Code894 whereby the premium listed companies are required 
to comply with the standard of governance relating to matters such as the effective 
management and relations to the shareholders. This would ensure the transparency 
relating to the making of any Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision. The 
business decision backed by an appropriate risk management that is accurately 
reflected in the information given by the directors to the shareholders will be expected. 
Directors will also be expected to maintain a proper dialogue with the shareholders to 
achieve mutual understanding of corporate objectives which include any proposed 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision.  If the directors do not wish to 
                                                
892	 James	 Dow	 and	 Gary	 Gorton,	 ‘Stock	 Market	 Efficiency	 and	 Economic	 Efficiency:	 Is	 There	 a	
Connection?’	(1997)	J.	Finance	1087	as	cited	by	Kraakman	et	al,	The	Anatomy	of	Corporate	Law	–	A	
Comparative	and	Functional	Approach,	(3rd	edn,	OUP	Oxford,	2017)	35	
893	 Kraakman	et	 al,	The	Anatomy	of	 Corporate	 Law	–	A	Comparative	and	 Functional	Approach,	 (3rd	
edn,	OUP	Oxford,	2017)	35	
894	 The	UK	Corporate	Governance	Code,	paras	9.8.6R(5)	and	9.8.6R(6);	and	Listing	Rules,	para	9.8.7R		
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comply with these standards, then they would be required to disclose the 
non-compliance and explain to the investors the reason behind the non-compliance. 
This gives the shareholders an opportunity to sell their shares if the explanation fails 
to satisfy the shareholders.   
Apart from the right of transfer, shareholders of, in particular – non-public companies 
can sell back their shares, for instance, through unfair prejudice claim where the 
minority members’ interests have been unfairly prejudiced by way of which the 
company’s affair is being conducted (Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006).  
Shareholders may also re-elect the board as pointed out by Scott that ‘The cost of bad 
decision, on the other hand, can be reduced by replacing managers who exhibit 
inferior judgment, including at times the managers at the top.’895 Kraakman et al have 
also pointed out the shareholders’ right of selection and removal as measures to 
reduce agency costs, ‘Given a central role of delegated management in the corporate 
form, it is no surprise that appointment rights – the power to select or remove director 
(or other managers) are key strategies for controlling the enterprise.’896 Keay has 
made a reference to a result of an empirical study that ’replacing management was 
                                                
895	 Kenneth	E.	Scott,	‘Corporation	Law	and	the	American	Law	Institute	Corporate	Governance	Project’,	
35	Stan	L	Rev	927,	936	
896	 Kraakman	et	 al,	The	Anatomy	of	 Corporate	 Law	–	A	Comparative	and	 Functional	Approach,	 (3rd	
edn,	OUP	Oxford,	2017)	37	
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also seen as a quick and cheap way of’ discipline company directors who behave 
poorly.897   
The right to remove company directors is re-affirmed by Section 168 of the 
Companies Act 2006 (whose predecessor is Section 303 of the Companies Act 
1985898) which confers a non-exclusive right (Re Peveril Gold Mines Ltd899) to the 
shareholders to include provisions ’for dismissal of a director without special notice 
and without permitting the director to make representations (Brown v. Panga Pty Ltd 
[1995]).’900  Consequently, to remove the directors, all the members of the company 
need is a passing of an ordinary resolution901, i.e., Section 168(1) states that ‘A 
company may by ordinary resolution at a meeting remove a director before the 
expiration of his period of office, notwithstanding anything in agreement between it 
and him’. 
The position of the shareholders’ right to remove directors is enhanced by the 
non-exclusion of security of tenure of directorship. As pointed out by Kershaw and 
Cheung that it is clear from the latter part of Section 168(1), i.e., ‘… notwithstanding 
                                                
897	 J.	Holland,	’Influence	and	Intervention	by	Financial	Institutions	in	Their	Investee	Companies’	(1998)	
6	 Corporate	 Governance	 249,	 255	 as	 cited	 by	 Andrew	 Keay,	 ‘Company	 Directors	 Behaving	 Poorly:	
Disciplinary	Options	for	Shareholders’	(2007)	J.B.L.	656-682,	662	 	 	
898	 See	for	example,	Colin	Mercer,	‘Section	113	and	114	–	Written	Resolutions:	What	About	Table	A?’	 	
(1991)	Comp	Law	220-221	 	
899	 [1898]	1	CH	122	(CA)	as	cited	by	Mayson,	French	and	Ryan	on	Company	Law	Mayson,	French	&	
Ryan,	Mayson,	French	&	Ryan	on	Company	Law	(34th	edn,	OUP	Oxford	2017-2018)	81,	441.	See	also	
Practical	Company	Law	(Online	Data	Base)	<http://uk.practicallaw.com/1-528-9825>	access	2018	
900	 Mayson,	 French	 and	 Ryan,	Mayson,	 French	 &	 Ryan	 on	 Company	 Law	 (34th	 edn,	 OUP	 Oxford	
2017-2018)	441	-	442	
901	 A	 simple	 majority	 of	 more	 than	 50%	 of	 the	 shareholders’	 vote	 (Companies	 Act	 2006,	 sections	
282(2),	(3),	&	(4))	
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anything in agreement between it and him’ that a director ‘does not, therefore, have 
any formal security of tenure.’902 In other words, one cannot contract out the 
mandatory right of shareholders to remove directors by way of ordinary resolution as 
prescribed by the Companies Act 2006.  
The non-excludable right of shareholders to remove directors is significant to 
shareholders’ powers as the mechanism encourages market self-regulation. In other 
words, if the shareholders are not happy with the director’s business performance, 
then they could exercise their right under Section 168.  
In the absence of security of tenure relating to directorship, in practice, however, can 
lead to a desire to include a severance provision in the directors’ contract903 with the 
company. This has been seen in the case of Re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation904 
but the director negotiating the contract of employment on behalf of the company will 
be encouraged to exercise his Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Judgment to 
negotiate an appropriate severance payment provisions between of the parties. For 
instance, although it is not possible to contract-out judicial or legislated deference in 
favour of directors, an exception could be made to exclude or reduce the sum of 
                                                
902	 Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	(2nd	edn,	OUP	Oxford	2012)	222;	and	Rita	
Cheung,	 ’Shareholders	Agreement	–	Shareholders	Contractual	Freedom	in	Company	Law’	(2012)	JBL	
516	
903	 Mayson,	 French	and	Ryan,	Mayson,	 French	and	Ryan	on	Company	 Law	Mayson,	 (34th	 edn,	OUP	
Oxford	2017-2018)	443	
904	 [2006]	 (Disney	V).	07	A.	2d	693;	see	also	Kershaw,	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	
(2nd	 edn,	 OUP	 Oxford	 2012)	 222;	 and	 Rita	 Cheung,	 ‘Shareholders	 Agreement	 –	 Shareholders	
Contractual	Freedom	in	Company	Law’	(2012)	JBL	516	
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severance payment if the director is dismissed on the ground of negligence and 
unreasonable behaviour. The scope and extent of the limitation to severance payment 
in the directorship contract will much depend on the bargaining positions and the 
level of creativity of the respective parties.   
This strategy, from a psychology perspective, does not constitute a controlling 
extrinsic motivator as the element of controlling extrinsic motivator is extinguished 
by the ‘no choice’ condition.905  
UTILITY OF CORPORATE COMPENSATION 
It has been pointed out by some academic writers906 that the problems associated 
with agency costs can be mitigated by using certain methods in conjunction with the 
system that insulates directors from derivative suits, e.g., corporate market regulation 
which could optionally include the utility of executive compensations (stock 
ownership of directors or director’s performance related pay907).   
                                                
905 	 See	 Chapter	 Four;	 and	 the	 Utility	 of	 Corporate	 Compensation	 below	 for	 more	 relevant	
information.	 	
906	 See	 for	 instance,	 Stephen	 G.	 Marks,	 Encyclopaedia	 of	 Law	 and	 Economics	 -	 The	 Separation	 of	
Ownership	and	Control’	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing	Ltd,	1999) 692,	692	&	706;	and	Kraakman	et	al,	The	
Anatomy	of	Corporate	Law	–	A	Comparative	and	Functional	Approach,	(3rd	edn,	OUP	Oxford,	2017)	35,	
36	
907	 An	 interesting	 note	 that	 in	 recent	 years,	 the	 use	 of	 executive	 compensation	 has	 caused	 public	
outcry	due	 to	 the	massively	high	 levels	of	executive	pay.	 ‘Inappropriate	 levels	of	executive	 rewards	
have	destroyed	public	trust	and	led	to	a	situation	where	all	directors	are	perceived	to	be	overpaid.’	 	
Julia	Werdigier,	‘In	Britain,	Rising	Outcry	over	Executive	Pay	that	Makes	“People’s	Blood	Boil”’	(2012)	
<https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/business/in-britain-a-rising-outcry-over-lavish-executive-pay
.html	>	accessed	11th	November	2018	
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The method of utility of corporate compensation as the judge in Slosh v. Telex Corp908 
said that the market operates as a corporate control would replace the judicial 
intervention in ensuring that company directors are encouraged to strive more for 
making good (and I add - creative) business decision for the success of the 
company.909  Here, we can see that the policy behind the judicial deference backed 
by the corporate deterrence is clearly referring to the justification of encouraging 
directors to take business risk, i.e., to be business creative.  
The corporate deterrence could include the directors (or agents’) own human desire of 
wanting to achieve their psychological ‘incentive of conscience, pride and 
reputation’.910 Karaakman et al has said that this type of incentive ‘correspond 
with… intrinsic motivation’911 in psychology. The corporate deterrence or market 
regulation can also incur by way of corporate takeover, whereby the agency problem 
created by the directors resulted in the company being taken over by another company. 
And given the poor business performance of the existing directors, the new owner of 
the company might desire to replace the directors with another group of directors.912 
Kraakman et al described this type of corporate control in line with extrinsic 
                                                
908	 [1988]	(Del.	Ch.)	13	DEL.J.	CORP.	J.	L.	1250,	1262	as	cited	by	Kenneth	B.	David,	JR,	’Once	More,	The	
Business	Judgment	Rule’	(2000)	WIS.L	Rev.	573,	580	 	 	 	 	
909	 ibid.	 	
910	 Kraakman	et	 al,	The	Anatomy	of	 Corporate	 Law	–	A	Comparative	and	 Functional	Approach,	 (3rd	
edn,	OUP	Oxford,	2017)	35	
911	 ibid	
912	 This	 ties	 in	with	 the	 threat	of	 removal	as	previously	mentioned	as	one	of	 the	 strategies	against	
agency	 problem,	 i.e.,	 instead	 of	 being	 removed	 by	 the	 existing	 shareholders	 of	 the	 company,	 the	
threat	of	removal	comes	from	the	new	owners	of	the	company.	 	 	 	
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motivation in psychology913 (but not controlling extrinsic motivation as I shall 
explain immediately below).        
It is essential to know that, from a psychology perspective, the utility of corporate 
compensation does not constitute a controlling extrinsic motivation (as opposed to the 
derivative suit in the absence of judicial or legislated deference). As already 
mentioned in Chapter Four – Controlling Extrinsic Motivator affected by ‘no choice’ 
condition, and I here reiterate, that this is because psychology studies have 
demonstrated the difference between the legal action and the market regulation. In 
that, as opposed to legal action by way of derivative claim regime (in the absence of 
judicial or legislated deference), directors’ intrinsic motivation is less likely to be 
affected adversely by market regulation. This is because with market regulation, the 
element of punishment comes with less or no choice. In other words, directors can be 
derivatively sued for their negligence within the process of business creativity but 
they would not be sued for adopting a more conservative business approach without 
taking business risk arisen from creativity. However, directors can damage their 
corporate reputation for either causing financial loss to the company as a result of 
their business negligence; or they can damage their corporate reputation for not 
exercising business creativity and thus, rendering the company less commercially 
competitive.  
                                                
913	 Kraakman	et	 al,	The	Anatomy	of	 Corporate	 Law	–	A	Comparative	and	 Functional	Approach,	 (3rd	
edn,	OUP	Oxford,	2017)	35	
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RESTRICTION ON THE COMPANY’S ARTICLE OF ASSOCIATION  
An objects clause lays down the capacity and power of a company. 
Historically, a designated object of a company was a concession by the state for 
individuals to operate business through corporation. In other words, the state gave the 
power to companies, subject to the condition that companies must not act outside the 
designated power as it would cause uncertainty for investors on their overall 
investment strategy, thus, the absence of an objects clause restricting the power of 
companies that time was deemed to be against the public interest.914  
It follows that prior to the reform of Companies Act 1989, companies were required 
to have an objects clause in its memorandum of association and any act of the 
company that goes beyond the limitation of the objects clause would be deemed to be 
ultra vires, i.e., beyond the power of the company and void. For instance, in the case 
of Re Introductions Ltd915 where it was held that as pig-breeding business was not 
within the scope of the company’s objects, therefore, the loan that had been granted 
for the purpose by the money lender (with the full prior knowledge of the ultra vires) 
was unenforceable against the company.  
The requirement for an objects clause has now been abolished by the Companies Act 
1989 as subsequently amended by Section 31(1) of the Companies Act 2006. The 
Companies Act 2006 states that - Unless the company’s articles specifically restrict 
                                                
914	 See	Alan	Dignam	and	John	Lowry	on	Company	Law,	(6th	edn,	OUP	2010)	chapter	12	 	
915	 [1970]	CH	199	(CA)	 	
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the objects of the company, its objects are unrestricted. Under the Companies Act 
2006, company memorandums have now become historical artifacts and the objects 
clause of any existing company have now been transferred to the articles, ‘from which 
it may be deleted by special resolution (section 21) unless it is subject to the 
provisions for entrenchment.’916    
This reform allows the shareholders to have an option to either restrict company 
directors’ power engaging in certain type of business917 or to give directors an 
unrestricted power to deal with any kind of legal business. The option of restrictions 
on objects clause, of course, cannot prevent directors from exercising 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions. As such type of decisions can be 
made even with the existence of the objects clause, i.e., creativity can still be invoked 
within one type of business. It simply ensures that shareholders or potential share 
investors would, to a reasonable extent, have the prior knowledge as to the kind of 
business of which the directors’ Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions can 
be made.  Furthermore, although no longer applicable to the third party entering into 
the contract with the company, the ultra vires doctrine would still be operable 
internally against the directors under section 171 Companies Act 2006 which requires 
all directors (a) ‘to act only in accordance with the company’s constitution’; and (b) 
                                                
916	 Mayson,	 French	 &	 Ryan,	 Mayson,	 French	 &	 Ryan	 on	 Company	 Law	 (34th	 edn,	 	 OUP	 Oxford	
2017-2018)	104	
917	 Kraakman	et	 al,	The	Anatomy	of	 Corporate	 Law	–	A	Comparative	and	 Functional	Approach,	 (3rd	
edn,	OUP	Oxford,	2017)	31	
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‘only exercise power for the purpose of which they are conferred’. This gives the 
shareholders the right to seek an injunction to prevent director from acing ultra vires.  
In addition to the limitation of directors’ power through an objects clause in the article 
of association, the Model Article (both private and public companies) also reserves 
shareholders the power to ‘… by special resolution, direct the directors to take, or 
refrain from taking, specific action’.918 As provided by the above articles, one can see 
that the UK law attempts to achieve a balance of distribution of powers between 
directors and shareholders through giving directors general powers in business 
decision-makings but subject to any alteration by way of shareholder’ special 
resolution.  In other words, whilst directors enjoy a wide scope of decision-making 
powers within the Model Articles, shareholders can override the directors’ powers 
either to direct them to take a particular business decision or to prevent them from 
taking a particular business decision, as long as the shareholders achieve a passing of 
a special resolution.  However, despite the shareholders’ right of intervention, the 
Model Articles confers business decision-making power onto shareholders, it does not 
allow shareholders to ’invalidate anything which the directors have already done.’919  
  
                                                
918	 Article	4(1)	
919	 Article	4(2)	 	
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GATEKEEPER CONTROL 
Kraackman et al used the term ’gatekeeper control’ to describe the employment of 
non-corporate actors to supervise the behavours of company directors.920 Gatekeepers 
could include a number of parties whose professions are relevant for the purpose of 
supervising corporate conducts, for instance, these gatekeepers can be accountants or 
auditors. 921  Gatekeeper control can take the form of the employment of 
non-executive directors. 922  The key responsibilities of non-executive directors 
include ‘… scrutinize the performance of management in meeting agreed-goals and 
objectives and monitoring …’923; and ‘satisfy themselves that financial information is 
accurate and that financial controls and system risk-management are robust and 
defensible’.924  In other words, non-executive directors supervise the corporate 
conduct of executive directors, making sure the accuracy of all the relevant 
information in executive directors’ business decision-making process; and the 
implementation of the business decision(s).   
Inevitably, the use of gatekeepers/non-executive directors can generate the issue of 
agency costs against the principal/company. However, the risk of agency costs 
between the gatekeepers/non-executive directors and the principal/company can be 
                                                
920	 Kraakman	et	 al,	The	Anatomy	of	 Corporate	 Law	–	A	Comparative	and	 Functional	Approach,	 (3rd	
edn,	OUP	Oxford,	2017)	42	
921	 ibid	
922	 The	UK	Corporate	Governance	Code	(2016),	para.	B.1.1	states	that	Non-executive	directors	in	the	
UK	are	required	to	be	‘independent	in	character	and	judgment’.	 	 	
923 	 Derek	 Higgs,	 ‘Review	 of	 the	 Role	 and	 Effectiveness	 of	 Non-Executive	 Directors’	 (2007)	 <	
https://web.archive.org/web/20070610171658/http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file23012.pdf>	 accessed	
10th	November	2018;	See	also	the	UK	Corporate	Governance	Code.	 	
924	 ibid	
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reduced by ‘the application of the basic legal strategies to the gatekeepers themselves, 
with chief reliance on the standard and trusteeship strategies.’925 As pointed out by 
Yermack, non-executive directors have turned their outside directorship status into 
professions whereby increases in their management reputation would open them to 
better opportunities of securing other non-executive directorship contracts with other 
companies. The relevant financial incentives cannot be trivial.926  
As opposed to executive directors, the gatekeepers’ roles are of are, by nature, 
supervisory, i.e., programmed business decisions, as opposed to creative, i.e., 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions. Legal strategies therefore, does not 
have the issue of de-motivating business creativity. The legal enforcement of the 
duties of non-executive directors can be limited as In Re Westmid Packing Services 
Ltd927 it was held that directors (likely to include non-executive directors) must keep 
themselves properly informed of the company’s affairs irrespective the dominance of 
another party. However, in Re Polly Peck International Plc (No 2)928 the court 
refused to hold the non-executive directors liable for not being, as it was not realistic 
to require them to control a powerful dominant director who was planning to remove 
the non-executive directors.   
                                                
925	 Kraakman	et	 al,	The	Anatomy	of	 Corporate	 Law	–	A	Comparative	and	 Functional	Approach,	 (3rd	
edn,	OUP	Oxford,	2017)	43	
926	 David	Yermack,	‘Remuneration,	Retention	and	Reputation	Incentives	for	Outside	Directors’	(2004)	
J.Finance	2281,	2307	
927	 [1998]	BCC	836	(CA)	
928	 [1994]	1	BCLC	574	(Ch)	604	
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Premium listed companies in the UK are unlikely to be exposed to the issue of 
independent judgment in a fashion as shown in Re Polly Peck International plc (No 2) 
as the UK Corporate Governance Code929 requires the board to ‘… include an 
appropriate combination of executive and non-executive directors (and, in particular, 
independent non-executive directors) such that no individual or small group of 
individuals can dominate the board’s decision-making. Again (as discussed earlier on 
this chapter), any non-compliance to this requirement will place the directors under an 
obligation to disclose to the shareholders with an explanation as to the 
non-compliance. This gives an opportunity to any dissatisfied shareholders to sell 
their shares.930  
SUMMARY 
Whilst company directors are expected to exercise business creativity in their 
business decision-making, balance has to be maintained between judicial or legislated 
deference and mitigation of the agency costs. To demonstrate the minimization of the 
potential agency problems in the process of directors’ business decision-making, a 
number of strategies have been discussed in this chapter.  
Company shareholders are equipped with a number of protections to prevent or 
minimize unsatisfactory or agency costs associated business decisions made by the 
                                                
929 Financial	 Reporting	 Council,	 ‘The	 UK	 Corporate	 Governance	 Code’	 (2018)	
<https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corpora
te-Governance-Code-FINAL.PDF>	accessed	10th	November	2018	
930	 See	ft	878	 	
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directors. Shareholders are allowed to transfer their shares either to a third party; or 
the company (via the unfair prejudice931 claim upon satisfying the legal conditions); 
they are allowed, by majority votes, to replace the board; and they are allowed, by 
majority votes, to restrict the business objects of the company.  
In the UK, listed companies are expected to comply with the standard of corporate 
conduct imposed by the UK Corporate Governance Code. Directors are required by 
the Code to disclose to the shareholders of any non-compliance of the standard. 
Shareholders (who are dissatisfied with the directors’ explanation for non-compliance) 
can take pre-emptive actions, e.g., to sell their shares.  
Shareholders can also mitigate the risk of agency costs through the use of the 
gatekeepers/non-executive directors, making sure that the directors’ proposed 
business decisions are substantiated by accurate financial information, with the 
gatekeeper’s supervision carried out under a robust risk management system. 
Froma corporate perspective, agency costs can also be minimized by way of the 
utility of corporate compensation such as the market regulation. Market regulation is 
arguably (as opposed to derivative suits in the absence of judicial or legislated 
deference) an effective way of controlling the management without de-motivating the 
directors’ business creativity.  
                                                
931	 Such	action	normally	being	brought	by	shareholders	of	small	and	non-public	companies.	 	
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These strategies, unlike derivative suits (in the absence of judicial or legislated 
deference), do not constitute controlling extrinsic motivator due to the ‘no choice’ 
condition. These strategies can therefore, be used alongside judicial or legislated 
deference without adversely affecting directors’ business creativity, whilst ensuring 
mitigation of agency costs. 
NON-PROGRAMMED (CREATIVE) BUSINESS DECISION AND THE 
COMPANY SHAREHOLDERS 
The above sets out the strategies to counter the agency problems. In the 
following, I will move on to discuss the relationship of the concept of 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions and company shareholders. I will 
also demonstrate a number of reasons as to why the concept is beneficial to 
shareholders. This discussion will be based on both the existing academic literatures 
and will make relevant references to the Companies Act 2006. 
The discussion will also be conducted through presenting the following arguments to 
demonstrate the impact of judicial deference or legislated deference by way of 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision to company shareholders. These 
arguments will demonstrate that the shareholders are deemed to be of ’lesser victims’ 
when Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions go wrong; and at the same 
time, demonstrate that they are in fact, the beneficiaries of directors’ 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions:     
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RISK DIVERSIFICATION  
Shareholders have the choice of protecting themselves with a diversified share 
portfolio in different companies, which in turns minimizes the risk of the directors’ 
mismanagement, or having a disagreement with the directors’ business decisions.932  
Gurvetz has pointed that it has been argued by certain judges that ‘in the case of 
diversified shareholders, the seemingly more risky alternatives may well be the best 
choice since great losses in some stocks will overtime be offset by even greater gains 
in others ... ‘; 933  and ’Shareholders can diversify the risk of their corporate 
investments’.934 Irvine has also pointed out that, ‘If an investor does decide to buy 
stock, he has a choice, in America, of perhaps eight thousand companies to invest 
in.’935 Thus, ‘it is in their economic interest for the corporation to accept in rank 
order all positive net present value investment projects available to the corporation, 
starting with the highest risk adjusted rate of return first‘.936  
Therefore, negligence liability that discourages the continuation of directorship or 
business risk taking should be replaced by the business judgment rule937 and in this 
                                                
932	 E.J.Elton	and	M.	J.	Gruber,	’Risk	Reduction	and	Portfolio	Size:	An	Analytic	Solution’	[1977]	J	Bus	Vol	
50,	415-437	 	
933	 Per	Ralph	Winter	 in	 Joy	v.	North	692	F.	2d	880,	885,	886	 [1982]	as	cited	by	Frankiln	A.	Gevurtz,	
Corporation	Law	(2nd	edn,	West	Academic	2010)	293	
934	 ibid	
935	 William	Irvine,	 ‘Corporate	Democracy	and	Rights	of	Shareholders’	(Jan,	1988)	J	Bus	Ethics,	Vol	7,	
99,	107	
936	 Per	Chancellor	Allen	in	Gagliardi	v.	Trifoods	Int’l,	Inc.	683	A.2d	1049,	1052	[Del.	Ch.	1996]	as	cited	
by	Franklin	A.	Gevurtz,	(2nd	edn,	West	Academic	2010)	293	 	
937	 Annete	Greenhow,	‘The	Statutory	Business	Judgment	Rule:	Putting	the	Wind	into	Directors’	Sails’	 	
(1999)	BondLawRw	Vol	1142;	and	Alfred.	F.	Conard,	 ‘A	Behavioral	Analysis	of	directors’	 Liability	 for	
Negligence’	(1972)	Duke	LJ	904;	and	Einsenbeg,	‘The	Duty	of	Care	of	Corporate	Directors’	(1989-1990)	 	
51	U	Pitt	L	Rev	958-959	 	
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thesis – company law’s deference in the context of the Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decisions. The importance of the avoidance of discouraging directors from 
taking business risk is in line with the UK judges stance. For instance, in Overend 
Gurney & Co v. Gibb938  - where the judges agreed that directors should be 
encouraged to take business risk as the directors operate in business environment need 
to have ’ … a great deal more readiness to confide in the probabilities of things, with 
regard to success in mercantile transactions…’; or as per Newey J in Newey J in 
Kleanthous v. Paphitis 939 who followed the no-threshold on the merits principles 
laid down by Roth J in Stainer v Lee940 & Lord Reed in Wishart v Castlecroft 
Securities Ltd941 concluded the general commercial factors, such as the adverse effect 
of litigation on the director’s business decisions to cause disruption to the morale of 
the company’s senior management; or making directors risk adverse, thus reducing 
the maximum trade performance of the company would discontinue the derivative 
claim against the directors.   
The advantage of risk diversification in company shares have also been echoed by 
Fischel as he has mentioned in his article that,  
                                                
938	 [1872]	LR	5	(HL)	480	as	cited	by	Kershaw,	Kershaw	Company	Law	in	Context:	Text	and	Materials	
(2nd	edn,	OUP	Oxford	2012)	423	 	
939	 [2011]	EWHC	2287	(Ch)	
940	 [2010]	EWHC	1539	(Ch)	as	cited	by	Newey	J	in	Kleanthous	v.	Paphitis	(2011)	EWHC	2287	(Ch)	[40]	
941	 [2005]	CSIH	63	(CSIH)	[37]	as	cited	by	Newey	J	 in	Kleanthous	v.	Paphitis	 [2011]	EWHC	2287	(Ch)	
[71],	[72]	&	[73]	
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shareholders, because of their ability to invest in many firms, are better able to 
bear business risk than corporate managers. The bankruptcy of an airline 
company, for example, might be a disaster for its employees and managers who 
lost their jobs but a matter of indifference to its investors who own shares in 
other airline companies that obtain the bankrupt company’s routes.942 
CORPORATE DEMOCRACY   
The term ’democracy’ refers to, ’the possibility of aligning the power of the 
individual with the needs of community through a sense of common purpose.’943 
Thus, Corporate Democracy refers to the concept of guaranteeing the company 
directors business decision-making power conferred upon by the majority 
shareholders of the company for the best interest of the company. In other words, it 
refers to ‘Maintaining a proper balance in the allocation of power between the 
stockholders’ right to elect directors and the board of directors’ right to manage the 
corporation ...’944 
Consequently, it is the duty of the directors, rather than shareholders (whether or not 
by way of judicial intervention) to make business decisions on behalf of the company. 
As the Judge in Kamin v. American Express Co mentioned, ’The Directors’ room 
                                                
942	 Daniel	R.	Fischel,	‘The	Business	Judgment	Rule	and	the	Trans	Union	Case’	(1985)	The	Bus	Law	Vol	
40,	1437,	1442	
943	 Gjalt	 De	 Jong	 and	 Arjen	 Van	 Witteloostuijn,	 ‘Successful	 Corporate	 Democracy:	 Sustainable	
Co-operation	of	Capital	and	Labor	in	the	Dutch	Breman	Group’	Aca	Manag	Exec	(2004)	Vol	18	54-66,	
55	 	
944	 MM	 Companies	 Inc.	 v.	 Liquid	 Audio,	 No.	 606,	 Del	 Sup	 Ct	 Jan	 17,	 30	 [Del.	 2003]	 as	 cited	 in	
<https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/wisinvboard122203.htm.>	accessed	2018	
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rather than the courtroom is the appropriate forum for thrashing out purely business 
questions which will have an impact on profits, market prices, competitive stations, or 
tax advantages.’945 
The concept of corporate democracy has been clearly echoed by judges in the UK 
cases such as Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd946; Smith v Croft (No. 2);947 
and Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd948 where the judges showed their 
diffidence to interfere with the management decisions of the boards who, in their 
decision-making process, were acting as an appropriate independent organ of the 
company.  
SHAREHOLDERS’ PREFERENCE TO NON-PROGRAMMED 
(CREATIVE) BUSINESS DECISIONS BACKED BY JUDICIAL OR 
LEGISLATED DEFERENCE 
‘Shareholders, as a class, want managers to take more risk than they might 
otherwise be willing to.’949 As directors’ creativity in entrepreneurial ventures is of 
the essence for the company’s success and profitability. This risk-taking element 
exercised in a corporation serves as a trading vehicle is a feature that non-corporation 
                                                
945383	N.Y.S.2d	at	810-11	[1976]	(as	cited	in	Stephen	M.	Bainbridge,	‘The	Business	Judgment	Rule	as	
Abstention	 Doctrine’	 (2004)	 57	 Vand	 L	 Rev	 98,	 120;	 &	 Stephen	M.	 Bainbridge	 The	 New	 Corporate	
Governance	in	Theory	and	Practice	(OUP	USA	2008)	111)	
946	 [1974]	821	(PC)	832	 	 	
947	 [1988]	 Ch	 114	 (Ch)	 as	 cited	 by	Mayson	 and	 French	 and	Ryan,	Mayson	 and	 French	 and	Ryan	 on	
Company	Law	(23rd	edn,	OUP	Oxford,	2006-2007)	664	
948	 [1990]	1	CH	656	(CA)	
949	 Danile	R.	Fischel,	‘The	Business	Judgment	Rule	and	the	Trans	Union	Case’	(1985)	Bus	Law	Vol	40,	
1437,	1442	 	
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investments do not have. It evidently follows that, ‘If shareholders wanted to avoid 
risk, they would have purchased government bonds rather than shares of stock’.950  
It follows that shareholders’ preference to Non-Programmed (Creative) Business 
Decisions would lead to the desire of wanting to ensure that company directors’ 
willingness to take a business risk is not being fettered by judicial intervention. As 
pointed in Chapter Four that Judicial intervention on business judgment through 
negligence liability constitutes Controlling Extrinsic Motivator that discourages 
directors from taking appropriate risks by way of Non-programmed (Creative) 
Business Decisions. Chapter Four also mentioned the interruption of the board’s 
group dynamics through the possibility of an increase the type of diligence towards 
the agency costs that shareholders would not want. As pointed out by Conard, that 
under the threat of negligence liability, directors instead of exercising diligence to 
maximize the company’s profits and growth, more efforts are likely to be made to 
protect the directors themselves from negligent claims. In other words, directors are 
likely to exercise diligence in seeking expert opinions in the situations where they are 
clearly not necessary to do so. Consequently, these agency costs would inevitably be 
damaging to the company both financially and timely.951  
                                                
950	 ibid;	See	also	in	general	Stefania	P.S.	Rossi,	Stefania	P.	S.	Rossi	and	Roberto	Malavasi	on	Financial	
Crisis,	Bank	Behaviour	and	Credit	Crunch	(1st	edn,	Springer	2016)	 	
951	 Alfred	F.	Conard,	‘A	Behavioral	Analysis	of	Directors’	Liability	for	Negligence’	(1972)	Duke	L	J	904	 	
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Bainbridge has also pointed out that judicial intervention brings in a negative impact 
on the board’s internal dynamics 952  which would lead to ’team production 
problems’953 that ultimately affect the business performance of the company. Thus, 
judicial intervention would not be preferred by shareholders in general. And as 
mentioned earlier on in this chapter, the disruption of board’s internal dynamics 
caused in the absence of judicial or legislated deference has been indirectly echoed by 
the UK judges such as Lord Reed in Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd;954 and 
Newey J in Kleanthous v. Paphiti [2011] who, for instance, quoted Lord Reed’s 
statement in Wishart case:955  
A hypothetical director acting in accordance with section 172, and considering 
whether to commence legal proceedings, could ordinarily be expected to have regard 
to a range of factors, including … the disruption caused to the company's business, 
and potential risks to reputation and business relationships.956 
And went on to conclude that the argument that the continuing of the derivative suit 
will cause ‘disruption to business, reputation and relationships’957 bears ‘much 
force’958 in favour of the discontinuation of the derivative claim.959  
                                                
952	 Bainbridge,	‘The	Business	Judgment	Rule	as	Abstention	Doctrine’	(2004)	57	Van	L	Rev,	124	
953	 ibid	
954	 [2009]	CSIH	63	[37]	 (CSIH)	as	cited	by	Newey	J	 in	Kleanthous	v.	Paphitis	 [2011]	EWHC	2287	(Ch)	
[71],	[72]	&	[73]	
955	 ibid	
956	 Wishart	v	Castlecroft	Securities	Ltd	[2009]	CSIH	63	(CSIH)	[37]	as	cited	by	Newey	J	in	Kleanthous	v.	
Paphitis	[2011]	EWHC	2287	(Ch)	[71]	
957	 ibid	[72]	
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SUMMARY  
The protection by way of judicial or legislated deference in favour of company 
directors within the context of the Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions 
cannot be considered as a threat to shareholders’ interests.  
As mentioned in Chapter Three, company directors’ business creativity is significant 
to the success of the company, and from a psychology perspective, such creativity has 
to be motivated by way of judicial or legislated deference. This is in line with the 
reality that share investors in general do recognize and prefer the risk elements that 
associate with shares. The investment choices are widely available in the financial 
market and the investors, through the acquisition of shares, are entering into the 
contractual relationships with companies on voluntary basis. The financial investment 
market offers financial instruments that are considered to be less risky than shares, 
such as government bonds which are more suitable than shares to the risk adverse 
inventors. 
In addition, the risk elements that associate with shares can be managed based on a 
diversified share portfolio.   
                                                                                                                                      
958	 ibid	[73]	
959	 Other	factors	such	as	obtaining	redress	by	an	alternative	mean	including	the	availability	of	unfair	
prejudice	claim	and	the	deemed	sufficient	money	recoverable	 from	the	defendant	directors	via	 the	
shareholders’	distribution	also	play	a	part	in	the	discontinuation	of	the	action.	Kleanthous	v.	Paphitis	
[2011]	EWHC	2287	(Ch)	H12.5	
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Finally, the existence of judicial/legislated deference ensures that the shareholders can 
enjoy the freedom under the corporate democracy with the company’s business being 
run by a board elected by the shareholders without any interference of an unelected 
third party.   
CONCLUSION 
This thesis examines, from a psychology perspective, the law relating to judicial 
and legislated deference in the context of company directors’ business decisions. The 
main objective of the studies is to demonstrate that the UK judicial and legislated 
deference is being operated with a positive effect of motivating company directors’ 
business creativity. This research is done with the relevant US law, providing support 
with a reasonable degree of comparison to achieve an in-depth understanding of how 
the judicial and legislated deference operate; and how both deferential approaches, 
from a psychology perspective, fit in line with creativity and types of business 
decisions.  
As both the UK and the US law offer deferential protection to directors only in 
relation to decisions that constitute business judgments, psychology provides a solid 
ground on which judicial and legislated deference can be psychologically looked into 
by way of the theory of types of decisions, namely, programmed and 
non-programmed decisions. Specifically, the non-programmed decisions being 
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closely in line with the legal concept of business judgments, i.e., a type of business 
decision that qualifies for judicial and legislated deference.  
However, the sole reliance of the concept of non-programmed business decisions 
cannot sufficiently answer the main objective of this research. Whilst the concept of 
non-programmed decisions reflects Novelty, it (unlike the legal requirement) does not 
deem the condition of decisions taken in ‘good faith’ as an essential component to 
establish the type of the decisions. To address this shortcoming, doctrine of the 
Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity is borrowed. The gap of the ‘good faith’ 
requirement is filled by the condition of ‘usefulness’ within the provision of the 
definition of Creativity. This ensures that one can look into company directors’ 
business decisions in the context of the UK judicial and legislated deference from the 
perspectives of business novelty; good faith in the interest of the company; and the 
types of business decisions. This research approach enables this thesis to be written to 
formulate a new type of business decision specifically designed to denote directors’ 
business judgment. This type of business decision is given the name as 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions.   
In addition, the psychology observation of UK judicial and legislated deference 
cannot be complete without looking into: 
- the functional responsibilities or corporate governance functions of company 
directors, i.e., business decisions that are not considered by the courts as business 
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judgments, and therefore, judicial or legislated deference is not applicable. This thesis 
demonstrates that this type of business decisions can be examined psychologically by 
way of programmed business decisions; and  
- business decisions that have been made with an element of conflict of interest or bad 
faith.   
As the above types of business decisions would operate to disqualify directors from 
the protection of judicial or legislated deference due to the absence of business 
creativity.960 
Finally, the demonstration of the psychology concept relating to types of business 
decisions within the context of the law has been undertaken by way of case studies at 
the end of Chapter Five.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
960	 As	 mentioned	 throughout	 Chapters	 Four	 and	 Five,	 the	 condition	 of	 ’usefulness’	 within	 the	
definition	of	creativity	would	not	be	satisfied	if	the	relevant	decision	is	made	in	bad	faith.	 	
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CHAPTER SIX - FINAL CONCLUSION 
The thesis looks into the motivating effect of judicial and legislated deference, from a 
psychology perspective, on directors’ business creativity. This thesis argues that 
company directors’ business creativity, in the interest of the companies, represents the 
actual justification of judicial or legislated deference. In order to achieve this 
objective, works have been logically undertaken to demonstrate, from a broad 
perspective, the following: 
1. Chapter Two reviews the UK law with an aim to trace the existence of judicial 
and legislated deference;  
2. Chapter Three looks into the correct interpretation of the judges’ terms, namely, 
‘judges are not business experts’ and ‘… judges are ill-equipped …’ leading to 
the conclusion that these terms cannot be taken literally. The actual meaning of 
these terms justifying judicial or legislated deference lies on the business 
creativity of company directors;   
3. Chapter Four looks into the psychology theories of creativity and motivation.  
4. Chapter Five looks into the types of business decisions, from a managerial 
psychology perspective, with the end result of formulating the theory of the type 
of business decisions, known as – Non-Programmed (Creative) Business 
Decisions.  
Taking a substantive view, each of the chapters has achieved the following:  
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Chapter Two mapped the landscapes of judicial and legislated deference within UK 
company law throughout the pre- and post- Companies Act 2006 eras. The courts 
have adopted a different attitude towards different types of business decisions, namely, 
business judgements (Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions); and 
decisions relating to corporate governance functions such as supervision and internal 
control. With the former type of decisions retaining the protection of judicial or 
legislated deference.  
Derivative action initiated by company shareholders was, in common law, subject to 
the Wrongdoer’s Control Rule. This rule insulated company directors against actions 
for their business judgments. Judicial deference given by the court via the 
Wrongdoer’s Control Rule was severely limiting derivative actions almost to the point 
of being practically not actionable.      
The Wrongdoers’ Control Rule was abolished by Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006. 
Derivative claims can now be brought under the Act with the directors in question 
being protected by the deference legislated by the Act. Shareholders who initiated the 
derivative claim have now to satisfy the hypothetical directors’ test within the 
provisions of sections 263(2)(a) and 263(3)(b). Under the relevant law the 
shareholders would have to convince the court that a hypothetical director, acting in 
good faith, would decide whether or not the continuing of the derivative claim would 
be in the interest of the company. In applying the law, the courts have adopted the 
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common law deferential approach961 by calling itself of being ‘ill-equipped’ to 
interfere with the business judgments of company director.962 This is a term which is 
similar to the term ‘judges are not business experts’ quoted in American Cases 
dealing with business judgment rule.963 
The term ‘ill-equipped’ or ‘judges are not business experts’ must not be taken from 
the view relating to the availability of business experts within the judicial system. As 
Chapter Three has demonstrated that there is, in fact, no shortage of business 
expertise in the judicial system. These expert witnesses are available in trials to assist 
the judges to achieve understanding of business transactions in general. However, this 
does not mean that business experts can be employed as benchmarks in assessing 
company directors’ Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions. This is due to 
the uniqueness of this types of business decisions based on the merit of each 
individual case. The chapter further argues that judges, as opposed to company 
directors, are subject to a greater degree of bounded rationality which severely limits 
their capacity in judicially processing the complexity of company directors’ 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decisions.  It follows that the true meaning of 
the terms ‘judges are ill-equipped’ or ‘judges are not business experts’ justifying 
judicial or legislated deference should have, and still has, been based on company 
directors’ business creativity.  
                                                
961	 For	instance,	the	approach	taken	by	the	judges	in	Overend	&	Gurney	v.	Gibb	[1972]	LR	(HL)	580	
962	 See	for	instance,	Iesini	v.	Westrip	Holdings	Ltd	[2009]	EWHC	(Ch)	[80]	
963	 See	for	instance,	Dodge	v.	Ford	Motor	Co	170	NW	668	[Mich.	1919]	
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Business creativity is not an established concept in UK company Law. Therefore, in 
the absence of the definition of business creativity, it would not be possible to identify 
what creativity is. This lack of a suitable definition would hamper the progression in 
achieving the core objective of this thesis, i.e., to effectively examine the relevant law 
from a psychology perspective. To fill this gap, Chapter Four borrowed the 
psychology theory of creativity to formulate a suitable definition of business 
creativity.  
Company directors’ business creativity is significant to the interest of the companies 
in many different economic aspects. Chapter Four demonstrated these aspects from an 
economics point of view (and illustrated the economic benefits by using a number of 
law cases), ranging from the long-term survival of the company to the product market 
monopoly.  
Chapter Four explored the inter-relations between creativity and motivation. This 
established the argument that in the absence of judicial or legislated deference, the 
law would be a controlling extrinsic motivator that demotivates director’s business 
creativity at the expense of the company that they serve. Other relevant theories of 
motivation such as Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs have been used to further evidence 
the inter-connection between creativity and motivation. This strengthens the support 
of the necessity of judicial or legislated deference within the context of company 
directors’ business decision-making.  
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As Chapter Two has pointed out the difference of company directors’ business 
judgment and the functional responsibility relating to supervision and internal control 
with the former being protected by judicial or legislated deference. Chapter Five looks 
into the aspects of different types of business decisions, from a psychology 
perspective. Specifically, the concept of non-programmed business decisions is 
viewed closer in line with the concept of directors’ business judgment. However, the 
sole reliance of the concept of non-programmed business decisions cannot satisfy the 
main objective of this thesis. This is because, whilst the concept of non-programmed 
business decisions reflects Novelty (one of the components within the definition of 
the psychology concept of creativity), it does not necessarily deem the condition 
requiring the decisions to be taken in ‘good faith’ as an essential component to 
establish the type of decisions, i.e., business judgments.  
Therefore, to successfully examine the law relating to judicial or legislated deference 
within the context of directors’ business decisions, Chapter Five combines the theory 
of the Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity with the theory of types of decisions. 
This combination fills the ‘gap’ of ‘good faith’ requirement by the condition of 
‘usefulness’ within the definition of the Product-Oriented Measure of Creativity. This 
leads to the formulation of a specific type of business decision, i.e., business judgment. 
This thesis coins business judgments, from a psychology perspective, as – 
Non-Programmed (Creative) Business Decision.   
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By examining judicial and legislated deference, from a psychology perspective, based 
on the theories of creativity and types of decisions, this thesis has demonstrated that 
an appropriate psychological balance relating to directors’ motivation and business 
creativity has been coherently maintained in the legal regime. Whereby, directors are 
insulated from the relevant liability within the context of Non-Programmed (Creative) 
Business Decisions; and not within the context of programmed business decisions. 
This combined research of the relevant law with other disciplines (psychology in 
particular) leads to creation of a useful mechanism capable of identifying and 
predicting the types of business decisions for the application of judicial or legislated 
deference.  
 408 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
Primary Sources 
Australian Legislation 
Corporations Act 2001 
UK Legislations 
Companies Act 1862 
Companies Act 1985 
Companies Act 2006 
Constitutional Reforms Act 2005 
Insolvency Act 1986 
Leasehold Reform Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 
UK Case Law 
Airey v. Cordell [2007] BCC (Ch) 
Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1990] 1 CH 656 (CA) 
ARB International Ltd v. Baillie [2013] 2 CLC 255 (QB) 
Barrett v. Duckett [1995] 1 BCLC 243 (CA) 
Bhullar v Bhullar [2016] BCC 134 (CH) 
Bristol & West Building Society v. Mothew [1998] CH 1 18 (CA) 
Brown v. British Abrasive Wheel Co. Ltd [1919] 1 CH 290 
 409 
Burland v. Earle [1902] AC 83 (PC) 
Carlen v. Drury [1812] 1 V & B 154 (Ch) 
Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v. Lloyds Bank Ltd [1970] CH 62 (Ch) 
Cobden Investments Ltd v. RWM Langport Ltd [2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch) 
Daniels v. Daniels [1978] CH 406 (Ch) 
Dalby v. Bodily [2004] EWHC 3078 (CH) 
Dorchester Finance Co v. Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498 (Ch) 
Dovey v. Cory [1901] AC 477 (HL) 488 
Extarsure Insurance Limited v. Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC (Ch) 
Foss v. Harbottle [1843] 2 Hare 461 
Franbar Holdings Ltd v. Patel [2009] 1 BCLC 1 (Ch) 
Hildron Finance Limited v. Sunley Holdings Limited [2010] EWHC 1681 (CH) 
Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] CH 254 (Ch) 
Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 832 (PC) 
Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co [1883] 23 CH 654 (CA)  
Iesini v. Westrip Holdings Ltd  
Item Software (UK) Ltd v. Fassihi [2005] ICR 450 (CA) 
John Shaw and Sons (Salford) Ltd v. Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113 (CA) 
Kiani v. Cooper [2010] BCC (Ch) 
Kleanthous v. Paphitis [2011] EWHC (Ch) 
 410 
Lagunas Nitrate Co v. Lagunas Syndicate [1899] 2 CH 392 (CA)  
Lexi Holdings Plc v Luqman and others [2007] EWCA 2652 (Ch) 
Mission Capital plc v. Sinclair [2008] BCC 866 (Ch) 
Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] AC 1430 (SC) 
Moxon v. Litchfield [2013] 3957 (Ch) 
Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc. [1984] 744 F.2D 255  
Norman v. Theodore Goddard BCLC 1027 (Ch) 
Overend Gurney & Co v. Gibb [1872] LR 5 (HL) 
Pavlides v. Jensen [1956] (CH) 565 (Ch) 
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd (No.2) [1982] CH 204 (Ch) 
Re Barings plc (No. 5) [2000] BCLC 532 (Ch) 
Re Brazilian Rubber Plantation and Estates Ltd [1911] 
Re Cardiff Savings Bank (the Re Marquis of Bute’s Case) [1892] CH 100 (Ch) 
Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co [1925] CH 707 (CA) 
Re D’Jan of London [1993] BCC 646 (Ch) 
Re Discovery Finance Corporation Ltd, Lindlar’s Case [1910] 1 CH 312 (Ch) 
Re Introductions Ltd [1970] CH 199 (CA) 
Re Polly Peck International plc (No 2) [1994] 1 BCLC 574 (Ch) 
Re Smith & Fawcett ltd [1942] Ch 304 (CA) 
Re Westmid Packing Services Ltd [1998] 2 ER 124 (CA) 
 411 
Redwood Mater Fund Ltd v. TD Bank Europe Ltd [2002] EWHC 2703 (CH) 
Regencrest Plc v. Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 81, (Ch) 
Sidebottom v. Kershaw, Leese and Company Limited [1990] 2 KB 9 (Ch) 
Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL)  
Shuttleworth v Cox Bros & Co (Maindenhead) [1927] 2 KB 9 (CA) 
Smith v Croft (No. 2) [1988] CH 114 (Ch) 
Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch) 
Stimpson v. Southern Landlord Association [2010] BCC 387 (Ch) 
Samsung Electrics (UK) Ltd V. Apple Inc. [2012] EWHC (Ch)  
Taylor v National Union of Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area) [1985] BCLC 237 (HC) 
Travel Insurance Limited v. Scattergood and Others [2002] BCLC 1 (Ch) 
Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2) [1975] QB 373 (CA) 
Webster (A Child) v. Burton Hospital NHS Foundation [2017] EWCA civ 62 (CA) 
Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd [2009] CSIH 63 (CSIH) 
Zavahir v. Shankleman [2016] EWHC 1534 (Ch) 
Irish Case Law 
Bloxham (in liquidation) v. Irish Stock Exchange ltd [2014] IEHC 93 
US Case Law 
Aronson v. Lewis 473 A 2d 805 [Del. 1984]  
Black v. Fox Hill North Community Assoc. A.2d 1228, 1231 [1992] 
 412 
Bowman v. Monsanto Co. 596, U.S. [2013] 
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541, 548 [1949] 
Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co. 142 A 654 [Del. Ch.1928] 
Deal v. Johnson So. 2d 214 [Ala.1978] 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co 170 NW 668 [Mic. 1909] 
Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc. 683 A.2d 1049 [Del. Ch. 1996] 
Grobow v. Perot 539 A.2d 180 [Del. 1988] 
Joy v. North 692 F. 2d 880 [1982] 
Kamin v. American Express Co 383 NYS 2d 807 [1976] 
Kessler v. Ensley Co. 123 Fed. 558 [1903] 
MM Companies Inc. v. Liquid Audio, No. 606, Del Sup Ct Jan 17, 30 [Del. 2003] 
Meyer v. Fleming 27 U.S. 161 [1946] 
Re. Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation (Disney V) 907 A 2d 693 [2005] 
Shaw v. Davis 28A. 621 [1894] 
Shlensky v. Wrigley 237 M.E. 2d 776 (iii App 1968) 
Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A 2d 858 [Del 1985] 
Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. 41 F Supp 334 [1941] 
US Legislations  
Model Business Corporation Act 1984 
UK Secondary Regulations 
 413 
Civil Procedure Rules 
Control of Asbestos Regulations 2002 
Listing Rules  
The UK Corporate Governance Code 2016 
US Secondary Regulations 
Federal Rule of Evidence 2001 
Secondary Source 
Books  
A. Lewis, The Cambridge Handbook of Psychology and Economic Behaviour 
(Cambridge University Press 2008) 
Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (3rd edn, Longman, 1987) 
A.H Maslow, The Further Reaches of Human Nature (1st edn, Penguin / Arkana, 
1993) 
Andrew Hicks and S H Goo, Cases and Material on Company Law (6th edn, OUP 
2008) 
Adrian Furnham, The Psychology of Behaviour at Work: The Individual in the 
Organisation ( 2nd edn, Psychology Press, 2005 
Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal 
(Harvard University Press 2006) 
Alan Dignam and John Lowry on Company Law, (6th edn, OUP 2010) 
A. Reza Arastec and J.D. Arastec, Creativity in the Life Circle (E. J. Brill 1968) 
Barro & Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth (Cam. M.A. The MIT Press 2004); 
 414 
Bird et al, Boyle & Bird’s Company Law (9th edn, Jordan Publishing Limited 2014) 
Bruner, J.S. On knowing, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Pres, 1962) 
B. Steil, G.D. Victor & R.P. Nelson, Technological Innovation and Economics 
Performance. A Council on Foreign Relations Book (1st edn, A CFR Book. Princeton 
University Press, 2002) 
Burrough, Bryan, Barbarians at the Gate, New York: Harper and Row (Arrow 1990) 
Calvin, ed Taylor, Widening Horizons in Creativity: The Proceedings of the Fifth 
Utah Creativity Research Conference, (1st edn, John Wiley, New York 1964) 
Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist\'s View of Psychotherapy (1st edn, 
Mariner Books, 1961) 
Charles Wild and Stuard Weistein in Smith and Keenan’s Company Law, (15th edn, 
Longman 2011)  
Clive Emmanuel and David Otley, Accounting for Management Control (2nd edn, 
Change Learning EMEA 1990) 357 
Davies, Gower and Davie, Davies, Gower and Davie’s Principles of Modern 
Company Law (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2008) 
Dignam & Lowry, Company Law (8th edn, OUP 2014) 
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard 
University Press 1991) 
Ed. Douglas Madsen, Arthur H. Miller, and James A. Stimson. Dubuque, Iowa: 
Kendall/Hunt, In American Politics in the Heartland (Kendall Hunt Pub Co 1991) 
E.L. Deci, Intrinsic Motivation (1st edn Plenum Publishing Company Limited, 1975) 
E.L. Deci & R. M. Ryan, Intrinsic Motivation and Self-determination in Human 
Behaviour (1st edn, Springer Science & Business Media, New York 1985) 
 415 
Eric Kessler, Encyclopedia of Management Theory (1st edn, SAGE Publications 
2013) 
Ewoud Hondius & Andre Janssen, Disgorgement of Profits: Gain Based Remedies 
Throughout the World (1st edn, Springer International Publishing, 2015) 
Farrar, Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles and Practice (3rd edn, South 
Melbourne: OUP 2008) 
Findlay and Lumsden, The Creative Mind: Journal of Social and Biological Structures 
(Academic Press 1988) 
Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law (2nd edn, West Academic Publishing 2010) F 
Knight, Uncertainty, and Profit (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1921) 
Gigerenzer, Gerd, Selte and, Reinhard, Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox 
(MIT Press, 2002) 
G. Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (Yale University Press, 1977) 
Grantham and Rickett, Company and Securities Law (Commentary and Materials) 
(Thomson Reuters 2001) 
H. Henn & J. Alexander, ‘Law of Corporations’ 661-663 (3rd edn, 1983) 
Hannigan, Company Law (4th edn, OUP 2015) 
H.A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, Volume 1, Economic Analysis and 
Public Policy (MIT Press 1982) 
H.A. Simon, The New Science of Management Decisions (1st edn, Prentice-Hall, 
1965) 
Henry Mintzberg, Mintzberg, Henry Mintzberg, Mintzberg on Management: Inside 
Our Strange World of Organizations (1st edn, The Free Press, New York 1989) 
 416 
Hitesh Gupta, ‘In this type of decision at least one or more than two of the stages can 
be handled by a well-defined pre-set procedure.’ Hitesh Gupta, Information 
Management System, (International Book House PVT. Ltd, 2007) 
Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (3rd edn, Cambridge 
University Press October 1983) 
J.A. Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development: An Enquiry into Profits, Capital, 
Interest and the Business Circle (1st edn, HUP, Cambridge M.A 1934) 
Jeffrey Pfeffer, The Human Equation: Building Profits by Building People First, 
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1998) 
Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (OUP 2009) 
Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law – A Comparative and Functional 
Approach, (3rd edn, OUP Oxford, 2017 
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance (Harvard University Press 
2004) 
L. S. Daniel et al, Psychology: European (1st edn, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 
2011) 
M. Boden, The Creative Minds: Myths and Mechanisms (2 edn, London Rutledge 
2003) 
Mark Teale et al. Management Decision-Making Towards an Integrative Approach 
(1st edn, Financial Times/Prentice Hall 2002) 
Marshall Dimock, Creativity (1st edn, Wiley on behalf of The American Society for 
Public Administration, 1986 
Mayson and French and Ryan, Company Law (34th edn, OUP 2017-2018) 
 417 
M. Conant, ’The Anti-trust Per Se Rule: Judicial Decision-Making Under ‘Bounded 
Rationality’ (1980) L & E Con Rev 49 
Michal D. Mumford, Handbook of Organisational Creativity (1st edn, Academic 
Press 2011) 
Moore on Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State (Hart Publishing 2013) 
Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institution of Capitalism (The Free Press 1985) 
O’Sullivant et al, Economics: Principles in Action (Prentice Hall; Student edn, 2006) 
57 
Palmer’s Company Law (25th edn, Sweet & Maxwell) 
P Kotsler , Principles of Marketing (1st, Pearson, 1991) 
Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management (Pearson 
1992) 
Pettet, Pettet’s Company Law, edited by J. Lowry and A. Resberg, (3rd edn, Harlow: 
Pearsson, 2009) 
Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management (1st edn, 
Pearson 1992) 
Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk (re-print Ed, Earthscan Publications 2000) 
Peer Soelberg, Unprogrammed Decision Making (MIT, 1967) 239-67 
Porter and Lawler, Managerial Attitudes and Performance (Richard D. Irwin, Inc 
(1968)) 
Ricky W. Griffin & Gregory Moorhead, Ricky W. Griffin & Gregory Moorhead on 
Organizational Behaviour: Managing People and Organizations (South-Western 
College Pub 2010) 
 418 
Robert Hamilton, Corporations including Partnership and Limited Partnership, Cases 
and Materials (2nd edn, West Academic Press (1981)) 
R.M Kanter, The Change Masters (1st edn, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1984) 
Robert Hamilton, Corporations including Partnership and Limited Partnership, Cases 
and Materials (2nd, West, 1981) 
Robert T. Clemen and Terence Reilly, Making Hard Decisions with Decision-Tools 
(1st edn, Brooks/Cole 2004) 
Sheikh, Company Hand Book (Bloomsbury Professional 2016) 
Stephen G. Marks, Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics - The Separation of 
Ownership and Control’ (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1999) 
Stefania P.S. Rossi, Stefania P. S. Rossi and Roberto Malavasi on Financial Crisis, 
Bank Behaviour and Credit Crunch (1st edn, Springer 2016) 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (1st 
edn, Oxford University Press, 1987) 
Susan Mcluaghlin, Unlocking Company Law (5th edn, Routledge 2015) 
Teresa M. Amabile, The Social Psychology of Creativity (1st edn, Springer-Velag, 
New York 1983) 
Theodore Kowalski & Thomas L. Lasley, Handbook of Data-based Decision Making 
in Education (1st edn, Routledge 2008) 
Venkatachalam and Sellapan, Business Process (Prentice-Hall of India Pvt. Ltd 2011) 
William A. Klein, Business Associations (8th edn, Foundation Press 2012) 
Case Commentaries 
‘Application for Permission to Continue Derivative Claim Refused’ (2016) Co. L.N. 7  
 419 
‘Stimpson v Southern Landlords Association: Permission to Continue Derivative 
Claim Refused’ (2010) Co. L.N. 277 
N. Tavare, ‘Webster (A child) v. Burton Hospitals NHS Foundation (Case Comment)’ 
(2017) JPI Law, C93-C96 
Edited Articles 
Barry Rider, ‘Editorial – A Statutory Derivative Action’ (2007) Co Law 2-7, 2 
Journal Articles 
Abraham H. Maslow, ‘A Theory of Human Motivation’ (1943) Psychol Rev 50(4) 
370 
Adeyeye, ‘The Limitations of Corporate Governance in the CSR Agenda’ (2010) Co 
Law 31(4) 114 
Adrian Furnham, ‘Creativity, Intelligence and Personality: A critical review of a 
Scattering Literature.’ (2008) Genet Soc Gen Psychol Monogr, 355 
A. J Elliot and M. Covington ‘Approach and Avoidance Motivation’ (2001) Edu 
Psychol Rev 13 
Alfred. F. Conard, ‘A Behavioural Analysis of directors’ Liability for Negligence’ 
(1972) Duke LJ 904 
Almadani, ‘Derivative Actions: Does the Company Act 2006 Offer a Way Forward?’ 
(2009) Co Law 
Allan G Hallsworth, ‘Short-Termism and Economic Restructuring in Britain’ Econ 
Geogr (1996) 35 
Andrall E. Pearson, ‘Tough-Minded Ways to get Innovative’ (May/June 1988) HBR 
66 No 3, 99 
Andre Tunc ’The Judge and the Businessman’ (1986) Law Q Rev vol 102 549 
 420 
Andrew S. Gold, ‘A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: 
Reflections on Disney, Good Faith and Judicial Uncertainty’ (2007) Mary L Rev vol 
66 398 
Anne Scarlett, ’Confusion and Unpredictability In Shareholder Derivative Litigation: 
The Delaware Court’s Response to Recent Corporate Scandals’ (2008) Fla L Rev 
589131 
Andrew Hick, ‘Directors’ Liabilities for Management Errors’ (1994) 110 LQR 39, 
391 
Andrew Keay, ‘Company Directors Behaving Poorly: Disciplinary Options for 
Shareholders’ (2007) J.B.L. 656-682 
Andrew Keay, ‘Application to Continue Derivative Proceedings on behalf of 
Companies and the Hypothetical Director Test’ (2015) CJQ 346 
Armour et al, ‘Private enforcement of corporate law: an empirical comparison of the 
United Kingdom and the United States’ (2009) JELS 694 
Arsht, ’The Business Judgment Rule Revisited’ (1979-1980) 8 Hofstra L Rev 112 
Arthur Lewis, ‘Competing technologies, Increase Returns, and Lock-In by Historical 
Events’ (1989) EJ. Vol 99, No 394 
A. Reza Arastec and J.D. Arastec, Creativity in the Life Circle (E. J. Brill 1968) 
Arthur Schawlow, ‘Going for Gap’ Interview in The Stanford Magazine (Fall 1982, 
42) 
Arks & Schipani, ‘Medical Malpractice v. The Business Judgment Rule: Differences 
in Hindsight Bias’ (1994) 73 Or L Rev 587 
A. Toynbee, ‘Has America Neglected Her Creative Minority?’ EPE (1962) 7 
A. Toynbee ‘Is America Neglecting Her Creative Minority?’ (1964) EPE 
 421 
Audrone Kisieline, ‘Determinants of Employee Creativity - A Survey of Luthuanian 
Non-Profit Organisations’ (2006) Voluntas, vol 17, No 2, 133 
A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, ‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ 
(1974) vol 185 Science 1124 
Avishamlom Tor, ‘The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline and 
Legal Policy’ (2002) 101 Mich L Rev 498 
Baumol & Strom ‘Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth’ (2007) SEJ 
Bernard S. Sharfman, ‘Shareholder Wealth Maximization and its implementation 
under Corporate Law’ (2007) FLA. LAW. REV. 386 
Beth A. Hennessey, ‘Social, Environmental, and Developmental Issues and Creativity’ 
( 1995) Edu Psychol Rev Vol 7 No. 2 163 
Boyle, ‘The Judicial Review of the Special Litigation Committee: The Implications 
for the English Derivative Action after Smith v. Croft’ (1990) Comp Law 
Bucafusco et al, ‘Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Law’s Creativity 
Threshold’ (2014) Tex L Rev 1921 
Cabrelli, ‘Derivative Actions: Part of Minority Shareholders’ “Forensic Arsenal” in 
Scotland’ (2003) SLT 73 
C.E. Shalley, G.R. Oldham & J.F. Porac, ‘Effect of Goal Difficulty, Goal Setting 
Method, and Expected External Evaluation on Intrinsic Motivation.’ (1987) Acad 
Manag Rev, Vol 30, No 3, 553, 
Charles Hansen, ‘The ALI Corporate Governance Project: of the Duty of Care and the 
Business Judgment Rule, a Commentary’ (1986) 41 BUS Law 1237 
C. Jolls and C. R. Sunstein, ‘Debiasing Through Law’ The Journal Of Legal Studies’ 
(2006) vol 35 (1) 199 
 422 
Colin Mercer, ‘Section 113 and 114 – Written Resolutions: What About Table A?’ 
(1991) Comp Law 220-221 
C. R. Rogers, ‘Towards the Theory of Creativity’ (1954) Rev Gene Sem 11, 249 
Cummings and O’Connell, ‘Organizational Innovation’ (1978) J Bus Res 6, 33 
C. R. Sunstein, ‘What's Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics’ 
(2003) 97 Nw U L Rev 1295 
Dacey and Madaus, ‘The Person, the Product and the Response: Conceptual Problems 
in the Assessment of Creativity’ (1965)J Pers Vol 33, 309 
Daniel R. Fischel, ‘The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case’ (1985) 
Bus Law vol 40 1437 
Daniel Lederman, ‘An International Multilevel Analysis of Product Innovation’ (2010) 
JIBS 606 
Danupol Hoonsopoon and Guntalee Ruenrom ‘The Impact of Organizational 
Capabilities on the Development of Radical and Incremental Product Innovation and 
Product Innovation Performance’ (2012) JMI 250 
David Ahlstrom, ‘Innovation and Growth: How Business Contributes to Society’ 
(2010) AOM 11 
David Kershaw, ‘The Rule in Foss v. Harbottle is dead: Long Live the Rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle’ (2015) JBL 274-302 
David Yermack, ‘Remuneration, Retention and Reputation Incentives for Outside 
Directors’ (2004) J.Finance 2281 
Demetra Arsalidou, ‘Litigation Culture and the New Statutory Derivative Claim’ 
(2009) Co Law 30(7) 206 
 423 
Demetra Arsalidou, ‘Objectivity vs. Flexibility in Civil Law Jurisdictions and the 
Possible Introduction of the Business Judgment Rule in English Law’ (2003) Co Law 
24(8) 228-233 
De Sousa et al, ‘Creativity, Innovation and Collaboration Organizations’(2012)IJOI 1, 
2 
Donald Woods, ‘Creativity’ (1989) JCST, Vol 18, No. 4, 259 
Douglas M. Branson, ‘The Rule That Isn’t Rule – The Business Judgment Rule’ 
(2002) ART 3 631 
Douglas Slater, ‘Creativity in Organization – the Goose which Can Lay Golden Eggs’ 
(2001) RSA Journal 32 
Earl Latham, ‘Research Frontier in Politics and Government: Booking Lectures, 1955 
by Stephen K. Bailey, Herbert A. Simon, Robert A. Dahl, Richard C. Snyder, Alfred 
De Grazia, Malcom Moos, Paul T. David, David B. Truman’ (1956) Am Political Sci 
Rev Vol 50, No 2, 545 
Edmond & Lowry, ‘The Continuing Value of Belief for Directors’ Breach of Duty’ 
(2003) MLO 210 
Einsenbeg, ‘The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors’ (1989-1990) 51 U Pitt L Rev 
958 
Eric A. Posner, ‘A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial 
Error’ (2000) 94 NW UL REV 749 
E.J.Elton and M. J. Gruber, ’Risk Reduction and Portfolio Size: An Analytic Solution’ 
[1977] J Bus vol 50, 415 
E.L. Deci and R.M. Ryan, Intrinsic Motivation and Self-determination in Human 
Behavior (1st edn, Plenum, New York 1985) 
 424 
E. L.Deci and R.M. Ryan, ‘The Support of Autonomy and the Control of Behaviour’ 
(1987) J Pers Soc Psychol 53, 1024 
E. Norman Veasy & Julie M.S. Seitz, ‘The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised 
Model Act, the Trans Union Case, and the ALI Project – A Strange Porridge’ (1985) 
63 Tex L Rev 1489 
Frank Barron and David M. Harrington, ‘Creativity, Intelligence and Personality’ 
(1981) Annu Rev Psychol 32, 431 
F Cainelli, R. Evangelista and M. Savona, ‘Innovation and Economic Performance in 
Services: a Firm-Level Analysis’ (2006) Cam J Econ, 435 
Finch, ’Company Directors: Who Cares About Skill and Care?’ (1992) The Mod L 
Rev 179 
Folger, Rosenfield and Hays, ‘Equity and Intrinsic Motivation: the Role of Choice’ 
(1978) J Person Soc Psychol 36, 557 
F. Schauer, ’Incentives, Reputation and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial 
Behaviour’ (1999) 68 U CIN L Rev 615 
Fuller & Dornbush, ‘Organisational Construction of Intrinsic Motivation’ (1988) 
Sociol Forum, Vol 3 No 1 
Gulati & Bainbridge, ‘How do Judges Maximise? (the Same Way Everybody Does – 
Boundedly) Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions’ (2002) EMORY LJ 83 
Gerner-Beurle and Edmunf-Phillipp Schuster, ‘The Evolving Structure of Directors’ 
Duties in Europe’ (2014) 15, EBO LR 191 
Gary Hamel, ‘Bring Sillicon Valley Inside’ (1999) HBR, 70 
Gevurtz, ‘The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?’ 
(1994) CAL L REV 305 
 425 
Gibbs, ‘Has the Statutory Derivative Claim Fulfilled its Objectives? A Prima Facie 
Case and the Mandatory Bar: Part 1’ (2011) Co Law 41 
Giles Hirst et al, ‘A Cross-Level Perspective on Employee Creativity: Goal Oriented, 
Team Learning Behaviour, and Individual Creativity’ (2009) AOM 290 
Gjalt De Jong and Arjen Van Witteloostuijn, ‘Successful Corporate Democracy: 
Sustainable Co-operation of Capital and Labor in the Dutch Breman Group’ Aca 
Manag Exec (2004) vol 18 54- 
G.R. James, ‘Employers’ Organization in the 21st Century’ (1997) ILO Publications, 4 
G N Mandel, ‘To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the 
Psychology of Creativity’ (2011) Notre Dame L Rev vol 86 
Greenhow, Annete, ‘The Statutory Business Judgment Rule: Putting the Wind into 
Directors’ Sails’ (1999) Bond L Rev vol 11, 42 
Guay, F., Chanal, J., Ratelle, C. F., Marsh, H. W., Larose, S., & Boivin, M. ‘Intrinsic, 
Identified, and Controlled Types of Motivation for School Subjects in Young 
Elementary School Children’ (2010) Br J Educ Psychol vol 80(4), 711 
Hal. R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, ‘Medical Malpractice v. The Business Judgment 
Rule Differences in Hindsight Bias’ (1994) 73 Or L Rev 597 
Hayward and Everett, ‘Adaptors and Innovators: Data from Kirton Adaptor Inventory 
in a Local Authority Setting’ J Occup Organ Psychol 56 339 
Hennessy, ‘Self-Determination Theory and the Social Psychology of Creativity’ 
(2000) PI, Vol 11, No 4, 293 
Herbert S. Wander & Alain G. LeCoque, ‘Boardroom Jitters: Corporate Control 
Transactions and Today’s Business judgment Rule’ (1986) Bus Law Vol 42, 64  
Huang. Y, ‘Debating china’s Economic Growth: The Beijing Consensus or the 
WashingtonConsensus?’ (2010) Acad Manag Perspect, 31 
 426 
HusamAldin Nizar Al-Walkawi and Rekha Pillai, ‘Internal Mechanisms of Corporate 
Governance’ (2012) Journal of modern Accounting and Auditing Vol 18, 549 
l. Denis Ping, ’The Business Judgment Rule: Should it Protect Non-Profit Directors?’ 
(2003) 103 Colum L Rev 946 
J. Maitland, ‘Creativity’ (1976) J Aesthet Art Crit Vol 34 No 4. 397 
J.R. Macey, ‘A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford’ (2008) 
Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 177 
J.S. Eccles and A. Wigfield, ‘Motivational belief, Values and Goals’ (2002) Annu 
Rev Psychol Vol 53, 109 
Jackson and Messick, ‘The Person, the Product and the Response: Conceptual 
Problems in the Assessment of Creativity’ (1965) J Pers, Vol 33, 309 
James Dow and Gary Gorton, ‘Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency: Is 
There a Connection?’ (1997) J. Finance 1087 
Jeffrey O’Connell & Andrew S. Boutros, ‘Treating Medical Mal-practice Claims 
Under the Variant of the Business Judgment Rule’ (2002) 77 Notre Dame L Rev Vol 
77:2 373 
John E. Ettlie and Ernesto M. Reza, ‘Organizational Integration and Process 
Innovation’ (1992) AMJ 795 
J. Paul Sykes, ’The Continuing Paradox: A Critique of Minority Shareholder and 
Derivative Claims under the Companies Act 2006’ (2010) CJQ 2 
Jerry Dermer, ‘The Interrelationship on Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation’ (1975) 
Acad Manag J Vol 18, No 1, 125 
J. Holland, ’Influence and Intervention by Financial Institutions in Their Investee 
Companies’ (1998) 6 Corporate Governance 249 
 427 
Jeffrey Rachlinski, ‘The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism’ (2003) NWU 
L Rev 1168 
Joseph R. LaChapelle, ‘Review on the Social Psychology of Creativity’ (1985) 
NAEA 47 
John S. Decey and George F. Facilitation, ‘Creativity: Definition, Explanation and 
Facilitation’ (1969) IJE Vol 3, No 1, 55 
Joseph R. LaChapelle, ‘Review on the Social Psychology of Creativity’ (1985) 
National Art Education Association, 47 
Julian Velasco, ‘Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review’ (2004) Wash U 
L Rev Vol 82 821 
Kerry Freeman, ‘Rethinking Creativity’: A Definition to Support Contemporary 
Practice’ (2010) Art Education Vol 63 No 2, 13 
Keay and Loughrey, ’Something Old, Something New and Something Borrowed’ 
(2008) 124 LQR 469 
Keay and Loughrey ’Derivative Proceedings in Brave New World for Company 
Management and Shareholders’ (2010) JBL 3 
Kenneth B Davis, Jr, ‘Once More, The Business Judgment Rule’ (2000) Wis Law 
Rev 573 
Keneth E. Scott, ‘Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate 
Governance Project’ (1982-1983) 35 Stan Law Rev, 927 
Kirton and Pender, ‘The Adaption-Innovation Continuum. Occupational Type, and 
Course Selection’ (1982) Psychol Rep Vol 51, 883 
Kristin E. Daley, ‘Taking Care of Your Creativity’ (2005) The Journal of Museum 
Education, Vol 30, No.1 Encouraging Creativity, 23 
 428 
Kristina Jaskyte and Audrone Kisieline, ‘Determinants of Employee Creativity: A 
Survey of Lithuanian Non-Profit Organisations’ (2006) VOLUNTAS Vol 17 No 2 
133 
L.D. McLean, ‘Organizational Culture’s Influence on Creativity and Innovation: A 
Review of the Literature and Implications for Human Resource Development’ (2005) 
Adv Develop Hum Resour 226 
L. Greene and G. Burke, ‘Beyond Self-Actualisation’ (2007) JHHSA, vol 30, No 2, 
116 
Legg and Jordan ‘The Australian Business Judgment Rule after Asic v. Rich: 
Balancing Director Authority and Accountability’ (2014) 34 Adel L Rev 404 
Levitt, ‘Growth and Profits through Planned marketing Innovation’ (1960) JM 1 
Lightman, ‘The Role of the Company at the Permission Stage in the Statutory 
Derivative Claim’ (2011) CJQ 1-9  
Linda Shanock et al, ‘Rewards, Intrinsic Motivation, and Creativity: A Case Study of 
conceptual and Methodological Isolation’ (2003) Creat Res J Vol 15, Nov 2 & 3, 121 
Lloyd Greene and George Burke, ‘Beyond Self-Actualisation’ (2007) JHHSA, Vol 30, 
No 2, 116 
Lynn A. Stout, ’Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford’ Va L & Bus Rev Vol 
3, 164 
Mark Batey and Adrian Furnham, ‘Creativity, Intelligence and Personality: A Critical 
Review of a Scattering Literature’ (2008) Genetic, Social and General Psychology 
Monographs 123(4), 355 
M.K. Kirton, ‘Adaptors and Innovators in Culture Clash’ (1978) Curr Anthropol Vol 
19 No. 3, 611 
 429 
Mary O’Sullivan, ‘The Innovative Enterprise and Corporate Governance’ (2000) 
Camb J Econ, 393 
Maria Welker et al, ‘Shareholder Activism and Alienation’ (2011) Curr Anthropol, 
Vol 52, No, S3, 62 
M. Dimock, ‘Creativity’ (1986) Public Administration Review, 46 (1), 3 
M. Gagne & E. L. Deci, ‘Self-determination Theory and Work Motivation’ (2005) J 
Organ Behav 26, 331 
M.S. Basadur, ‘Organisational Development Interventions for Enhancing Creativity in 
the Workplace’ (1995, 1997) J Creat Behav, 31(1), 59 
M. Seeman, ‘Alienation Studies’ (1975) Annu Rev Sociol, 191 
M.V Covington and K.J Muller, ‘Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation: An 
Approach/Avoidance Reformulation’ [2001] Educ Psychol Rev Vol 13, No.2, 157 
Mwaura, ’Company Directors’ Duty of Skills and Care: A Need for Reform.’ (2003) 
Com Law 285 
Ndzi, ‘Directors Excessive Pay and Shareholders’ Derivative Action’ (2015) 36(5) Co 
Law 144 
'New CPRs Published for Statutory Derivative Claim' (2007) Co LN 13 
Newell, Shaw and Simon, ‘The Process of Creative Thinking’ (1958) presented at a 
Symposium on Creative Thinking, University of Colorado, 1, 
Nicholas Bourne, ‘Directors -- Duty of Care and Skill’ (2004) 25 Bus L Rev 218 
O’Connor and Yballe, ‘A. H. Maslow Revisited: Construction a Road Map of Human 
Nature’ (2007) J MANAG EDU, 31(6), 738 
Oldham and Cummings, ‘Employee Creativity: Personal and Contextual Factors at 
Work.’ (1996) Acad Manag J, 39(3), 507 
 430 
P. Anderson and M. Tushman, ‘Managing Cycles Through Technological Change’ 
(1991) RTM 26-34 
P. Singh et al, ‘Organisational Culture and Its Impact on managerial Remuneration’ 
(1977) IJIR, Vol 13, No 1, 1 
Parkhurst H.P. ‘Confusion, Lack of Consensus, and the Definition of Creativity as a 
Construct’ (1999) J Creat Behav 33 1, 21 
P Prentice, ‘The Theory of Games and Conceptual Framework for the Study of 
Non-Programmed Decision Making by individuals?’ (1975) Area Vol 7 No 3 161 
Paul S. Sergerstrom, ‘Innovation, imitation, and Economic Growth’ (1991) J Political 
Econ, 807 
Peilei F, ‘Innovation Capacity and Economic Development: China and India’ (2011) 
Econ Change Rest 44 (2/1) 43 
Pendell, ‘Derivative Claims: A Practical Guide’ (2007) Co LN 1 
Pia Weiss ‘Adoption of Product and Porcess Innovation in Different Markets: The 
Impact of Competition’ (2003) Rev Ind Organ, 301 
Prentky R. A., ‘Mental Illness and Roots of Genius’ (2001) Creat Res J 95 
R. Cianci, and P.A. Gambrel, ‘Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs: Does it Apply in a 
Collective Culture’ (2003) JAME 8(2): 143 
Rakich, Longest, Darr, ‘Managing Health Services Organizations’ (2000) Baltimore: 
Health Professions Press (as cited by L. Greene and G. Burke, ‘Beyond 
Self-Actualisation’ (2007) JHHSA, Vol 30, No 2, 116 
Ralph A. Peeples, ‘The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the Close 
Corporation’ (1984-85) 60 Notre Dame L Rev 487 
 431 
Reed, ’Company Directors – Collective or Functional Responsibility’ (2006) Com 
Law 171 
Reisberg, ‘Judicial Control of Derivative Action’ (2005) ICCLR 338 
Reisberg, ‘Shareholders’ Remedies: The Choice of Objectives and the Social 
Meaning of Derivative Actions’ (2005) EBOR 242 
Richard Cyert et al, ’Observation of A Business Decision’ (1956) J Bus 237 
Richard D. Truesdell, JR, ‘Does Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, Inc Preserve for 
Shareholders Control of a Corporation’s “Ultimate Destiny”’ (1986) 20 Colum J L & 
Soc Probs 325 
Rita Cheung, ‘Shareholders Agreement – Shareholders Contractual Freedom in 
Company Law’ (2012) JBL 516 
Rogers, C., ‘Towards a Theory of Creativity’ (1954) ETC: A Rev Gen Sem 11 
R. Koestner et al, ‘Setting Limits on Children’s Behaviour: The Differential Effect on 
Controlling vs. Informational Styles on Intrinsic Motivation and Creativity’ (1984) J 
Pers 233 
R. M. Ryan and E. L. Deci, ‘Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions 
and New Directions’ (2000) Contemp Educ Psychol 25 
S.A Kirkpatrick and Edwin. A Locke ‘Leadership: Do Traits Matter?’ (1991) Acad 
Manag Pespect, 48 
Sethi et al, ’Cross-Functional Product Development Teams: Creativity, and the 
Innovativeness of New Consumer Products’ (2001) J Mark Res Vol 38, 73 
Stallworthy, ‘Minority rights and the Continuing Thrall of Foss v. Harbottle’ (1988) 
Conv May-Jun 210 
Stephen J. Zaccaro, ‘Trait-Based Perspective of Leadership’ (2007) Am Psychol 6 
 432 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine’ (2004) 
57 Vand L Rev 98, 117 
Tang, ‘Shareholders’ Remedies: Demise of the Derivative Claim?’ (2012) UCL 178 
Taylor H. Cox and Stacy Blake, ‘Managing Cultural Diversity: Implication for 
Organisation Competitiveness’ (1991) EJ, 46 
Thomas A. D’Ambrasio, ‘The Duty of Care and the Duty of Loyalty in the Revised 
Model Business Corporation Act’ (1987) 40 Vand L Rev 663 
Thomas G (2011) ‘Sonia is typing...A typology for the case study in social science 
following a review of definition, discourse and structure’ Qualitative Inquiry 17 (6): 
511–521 
Tierney, Farmer and Graen ‘An Examination of Leadership and Employee Creativity: 
The Revelation of Traits and Relationships’ (1999) Pers Psychol 52(3). 591 
Tom C.W. Lin ‘Reasonable Investor(s)’ (2015) B U L Rev, 472, 472 
Tsang, ‘Computational Intelligence Determines Effective Rationality’ (2008) IJAAC 
66 
Teele and Ramsay, ‘Directors’ Duties to Act in the Interests of the Company – 
Subjective or Objective’ (2015) JBL 179 
Teresa M. Amabile, ‘A Model of Creativity and Innovation in Organisations’ (1988) 
Res Organ Behav Vol 10 167 
Teresa M. Amabile T.M. and Cheek J.M. ‘Commentary Essays on Findlay and 
Lumsden’s The Creative Mind: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Discovery and 
innovation’ (1988) J Social Biol Strut 59 
Teresa. M. Amabile, ‘Entrepreneur Creativity Through Motivational Synergy’ (1997) 
J Creat Behav 31(1), 18(26) 
 433 
Teresa M. Amabile, ‘Innovation - How to Kill Creativity’ (1988) HBR 77 
Teresa. M. Amabile, ‘Motivation and Creativity: Effect on Motivational Orientation 
on Creative Writers’ (1985) J Pers Soc Psychol 293 
Teresa M. Amabile ‘Motivating Creativity in Organisations: On Doing What You 
Love and Loving What You Do’ (1997) Calif Manag Rev 39 
Teresa M. Amabile, ‘Motivational Synergy: Toward New Conceptualizations of 
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation in the Workplace’ [1994] HRMR, 3, 183- 
Teresa M. Amabile ‘The Social Psychology of Creativity’ (1983) J Pers Soc Psychol 
357 
T. Amabile and J. Giltomer, ‘Children’s Artistic Creativity: Effects of Choice in Task 
Materials’ (1984) Unpublished Manuscript, Bradies University 
Tomasic, ‘Corporate Rescue, Governance and Risk Taking in Northern Rock: Part 2’ 
(2008) Comp Law 29(11), 333 
T Schubert, ’Marketing and Organizational Innovations in Entrepreneurial Innovation 
Process and their Relation to Market Structure and Firm Characteristics’ (2010) Rev 
Ind Organ 189 
Tamo Zwinge, ‘An Analysis of Duty of Care in the United Kingdom in Comparison 
with the German Duty of Care’ (2011) ICCLR 22(2) 31  
V. Griskevicius et al, ‘Renovating the Pyramid of Needs: Contemporary Extensions 
Built Upon Ancient Foundations’ (2010) Perspect Psychol Sci 5, 292 
W, ‘Minority Shareholders and Directors’ Duties’ (1978) Mod L Rev Vol 41, 569 
Wedderburn, ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ (1957) CLJ 
194 
 434 
Whittington and Evans, ’The Enduring Impact of Great Ideas’ (2005) Prob Pers 
Manag, 2, 114 
William Irvine, ‘Corporate Democracy and Rights of Shareholders’ (Jan, 1988) J Bu 
Ethics Vol 7, 99 
WJ Bigoness ‘A Conceptual Paradigm and Approach for the Study of Innovators’ 
(1981) Acad Manag J 68 
Woodman et al, ‘Toward A Theory of Organizational Creativity’ (1993) Acad of 
Manag Rev Vol 18 No.2 293 
Z. Shapira, ‘Expectancy Determinants of Intrinsically Motivated Behaviour’ (1976) J 
Pers Soc Psychol, 1244 
Online Articles & Reports 
Aronsen et al, ‘United States: Shareholders Derivative actions: From Cradle to Cradle’ 
(2010) 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/87654/Directors+Officers/Shareholder+Deriv
ative+Actions+From+Cradle+To+Grave> 
Brad Plumer, 'American Companies are Investing Way Less in Science Than They 
Used To' (Vox Technology 2015) < 
http://www.vox.com/2015/2/4/7965967/corporate-research-basic-science> 
Carlos Andres and Laguado Giraldo, ‘Factors Governing the Application of Business 
judgment Rule: An Empirical Studies of US, UK, Australia and The EU’ (2006) 122 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.542.5943&rep=rep1&typ
e=pdf> 
Chancery Guide, 
www.chba.org.uk/for-members/library/.../chancery-guide-updated-october-2013, 
October 2013 
 435 
Chen-Ling Huang ‘Who Benefits from Food safety Incidents?’ (2014) New Society 
for Taiwan <www.taiwansig.tw> 
Derek Higgs, ‘Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors’ 
(2007) < 
https://web.archive.org/web/20070610171658/http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file23012.p
df> 
D. Kenrick, ‘Rebuilding Maslow’s Pyramid on an Evolusionary Foundation’ 
(Psychology Today 2010) 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/sex-murder-and-the-meaning-life/201005/reb
uilding-maslow-s-pyramid-evolutionary-foundation> accessed 
E. Langlais, ‘An Analysis of Bounded Rationality in Judicial Litigations: The Case 
with Loss/Disappointment Averse Plaintiffs’ (2010) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id,’ … Cognitive biases are also 
exhibited by well experienced lawyers and judges.’ 
Ed Weeks, ‘Rubber Stamping by Directors Can Lead to Liability – Lexi Holdings v 
Luqman’ 
<https://www.cripps.co.uk/rubber-stamping-by-directors-can-lead-to-liability-lexi-hol
dings-v-luqman-2/> 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-06-30/samsung-sues-apple-in-londo
n-following-u-s-iphone-ipad-patent-lawsuit.> 
G. Gigenrenzer et al, ‘Fast & Frugal Heuristics: The Tool of Bounded Rationality’ 
(2004) 65 http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/rh/RH_Fast_2009.pdf 
Gunday et al, ‘Effect of Innovation Types of Firm Performance’, (2009) 4 < 
http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/13660/1/Gunday_et_al_Effects_of_Innovation_on_Fir
m_Performance.pdf>  
Hagle, Timothy M. ‘So Many Cases, So Little Time: Judges as Decision Makers’ 
(1990) < 
 436 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/44208624_So_Many_Cases_So_Little_Tim
e_Judges_as_Decision-Makers> 
Health and Safety Executive, ‘Penalties’ 
<http://www.hse.gov.uk/enforce/enforcementguide/court/sentencing-penalties.htm> 
H. Ford & S Crowther, ‘My Life and Work’ (1922) 
<https://archive.org/details/mylifeandwork01crowgoog> 
John Gardner, 'Many Faces of the Reasonable Person' (Oxford University Research 
Archive 2015) < 
http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9e724c9c-89c0-4ec0-bafd-4e3125081558> 
JMHA Redmond, 'Need Theories' (Confluence 2015) < 
https://wikispaces.psu.edu/display/PSYCH484/2.+Need+Theories> 
John F. Uggen, ‘The Day the Music Died: Rooney, Pace and the Hostile Takeover of 
the Norlin Corporation’ TheBHC (2010) < 
https://thebhc.org/sites/default/files/uggen.pdf> 
JS Moskowitz, Environmental Liability and Real Property Transaction: Law and 
Practice (John Wiley & Sons 1989) 27; see also USA Today, ‘When Removing 
Asbestos Made No Sense’ < https://www.nofluoride.com/asbestos.cfm> 
Julia Werdigier, ‘In Britain, Rising Outcry over Executive Pay that Makes “People’s 
Blood Boil”’ (2012) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/business/in-britain-a-rising-outcry-over-lavish
-executive-pay.html > 
Kane et al, ‘Apple: Samsung Copied Design’ (2011) (The Wall Street Journal, Dow 
Jones and Company) 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703916004576271210109389154> 
 437 
Kaplan Financial Knowledge Bank (2012) < 
http://kfknowledgebank.kaplan.co.uk/KFKB/Wiki%20Pages/Directors%27%20remun
eration.aspx> 
Keay A & Loughrey J, ‘The Concept of Business Judgment’Legal Studies 1 < 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/DFC0700
879FEF7FF4BD7E9A589A211C4/S0261387518000296a.pdf/concept_of_business_j
udgment.pdf> 
Lessin J.E. ‘Apple Finds It Difficult to Divorce Samsung’ (The Wall Street Journal, 
July, 2013) < 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324682204578513882349940500 > 
N. Tanden & B. Efron, ‘How to Foster Long-Term Investment’ (2015) 
<http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/12/07/2015/how-foster-long-term-innovati
on-investment>  
Oxford English Dictionary at 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/37081?redirectedFrom=commercial#eid> 
Practical Law Company (online database) for overage payment in general including 
its definition <http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-200-2514> 
Professor John Kay, ‘The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term 
Decision Making’ (2012) Final Report 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachme
nt_data/file/253454/bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf  
‘Programmed Decisions and Non-programmed Decisions Explained’ < 
https://iedunote.com/programmed-decision-non-programmed-decision> 
Queensland Government, ‘Queensland Government Business Guide for Investors’, 
(Business and Industrial Portal 2015) 
https://www.business.qld.gov.au/business/business-improvement/becoming-innovativ
e-business/why-business-innovation-important> 
 438 
Roger L Martin, ‘Yes, Short-Termism Really is a Problem’ (2015) HBR 
https://hbr.org/2015/10/yes-short-termism-really-is-a-problem 
Shares Magazine, ‘Why Do Companies Buy Back Shares’ (23rd November 2017) 
<https://www.sharesmagazine.co.uk/article/why-do-companies-buy-back-shares > 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘Judges Are not Business Experts, But So What?’ (2011) 
www.ProfessorBainbridge.com> 
The Health and Safety Executive ‘Case Studies When Leadership Falls Short’ (2013) 
< http://www.hse.gov.uk/leadership/casestudies-failures.htm> 
The Supreme Court, ‘Guide to Judicial Conduct and Complaints’ (2 January 2019) < 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/judicial-conduct-and-complaints.html> 
Thomas G, ‘Sonia is typing... A typology for the case study in social science 
following a review of definition, discourse and structure’ (2011) QUINFS 17 (6) 511 
as cited in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_study > 
Tom Huddleston Jr, ‘Elon Musk Says He Eants to Take Tesla at Over $70 Billion – 
Here is What that Means’ (CNBC, 9 August 2018) 
<https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/08/elon-musk-wants-to-take-tesla-private--heres-wh
at-it-means.html> 
What Impacts Share Prices? 
<https://www.mywealth.commbank.com.au/learn/choosing-investments/what-impacts
-share-prices-> 
Zac Hall, ‘Samsung Remains as a Key Supplier for Apple’s Iphone Despite Patent 
Dispute, Competition’ (9TO5MAC 2015) < 
http://9to5mac.com/2015/02/24/samsung-apple-iphone-supplier/> 
Reports & News Reports 
Alex Bath, ‘You Need Passion and Energy to Create a Truly successful Business’ The 
Guardian (London 25th June 2012) 
 439 
Andrew Pollack, ‘As patent Ends, a Seed’s Use Will Survive’ The New York Times 
(2009) 
‘FDA Releases List of Affected Companies’ Taipei Times (6th September 2014) 
‘Firm Sells Waste Oil as Cooking Oil’ The China Post (6th September 2014) 
HSU, Stacy, ‘Hong Kong Edible Oil Imports Halted’ Taipei Times (14 September 
2014) 
‘Incompetence, Inc’ Forbes (1 Dec, 1986) 
INDG417 (rev 1.) published by the Health and Safety Executive, 16, 8, 06/13 
‘The Modern Company: Internal Governance and External regulation’ Company Law 
Review Steering Group: Final Report 
La Commission, Shareholder Remedies: Report on a Reference under Section 3(1)(e) 
of the Law Commission Act recommendations in England and Wales (Law Com. No. 
246, Cm. 3769, 1997) 
‘Norlin Hostile Holders Stake Rises to 47.6%’ (1984) WSJ, B1 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Oslo Manual, (1st edn, 
Eurostat, European Commission 2005) 9 
‘Sauce Maker Yillin Group Recalls Tainted Oil Products’ The China Post (6th 
September 2014) 
Sir George Cox, ‘Overcoming Short-termism within British Business – The Key to 
Sustain Economic Growth’, (An Independent Review Commissioned by Labour Party 
2013) 
